
NOTES

Economic Aspects of the British Decision to Send a Naval Force to the Baltic Early in 1801

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In the course of 1799 and 1800 relations between Britain, on the one hand, Russia and the Neutral Powers (Denmark, Prussia and Sweden), on the other, increasingly deteriorated. Late in 1800 (for the estimated date, see below), the British Cabinet decided to dispatch a naval force to the Baltic, as soon as ice conditions permitted, to safeguard what it considered Britain's rightful interests. The 'task force' sailed from England in March 1801, commanded by Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, with Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson Second — in — Command.

In this paper our interest centres on the problem at what date was the Cabinet's decision taken and, considering the various areas of conflict between Britain and the Northern Powers, which was (were) the determinative factor(s) for the decision? In 1987 we requested the Search Department of the Public Record Office at Kew, London, to look for minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet at which the decision was adopted and what was (were) the primary motive(s) for the decision? The answer of the Search Department stated that "the Cabinet did not, in any meaningful sense, exist in Britain in 1801 and certainly did not leave behind minutes of meetings"².

The published literature takes the view that the motive for the decision of concern was the Armed Neutrality Pact (ANP) of the Northern Powers. We will draw attention to the fact that at the time when the decision was first adopted, apparently on 28 November 1800, not only was the Pact as yet unsigned, but even indications of the possible formation of the Pact played no

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² The reply of the Search Department is dated 2 February 1987 and is signed by Mr. Howard Davies.

role in the decision. However, when some 11 days later more definite news was received in London of an impending conclusion of the Pact, the Cabinet's reaction was most vigorous. We will also show that, when the decision was *first* made, it was directed against Russia and Russia alone. It seems certain that it was the later news of formation of the Pact that caused the Cabinet to widen the application of the original decision to the Northern Neutrals as well. An examination of the sources (we have pointed out above that no unpublished document seems to be available of the meeting at which the decision was taken) intimates that the primary reason for the decision was of an economic and, in fact, of an increasingly economic-social nature. To show this, we shall review the three areas of conflict between the Powers concerned around 1800.

Conflict Area (1): *Searches and convoying of neutral vessels.* As a belligerent, Britain claimed the right to search neutral merchantmen for contraband of war, that is, what the British Government considered to be contraband of war. In the late 1790s there were several incidents (some involving the use of fire arms) between the Royal Navy and neutral vessels that resisted the search. This led Denmark, the country with the largest number of vessels among the Neutrals, to provide for naval escort her merchantmen. Britain was prompt and sharp in objecting to this practice.³

Following one of the more serious incidents between a Danish warship on convoy duty and a British warship early in summer 1800, Britain sent a diplomat, Lord Whitworth, to Copenhagen in August, in an attempt to come to amicable terms with the Danish Government. Whitworth was accompanied by a naval squadron to lend greater weight to his mission. On 29 August a compromise was reached, and, although the accord was not quite to the liking of the British, Britain accepted the arrangement. Thus, at least in autumn 1800, Conflict Area (1) did not play a role of importance in the relations between the countries. That is, the matter of searches was not a factor for taking the decision in question.

Conflict Area (2): *Russian embargo on British vessels in Russian ports and sequestration of British capital in the Russian Empire.* Malta was captured by the French in June 1798. Thereafter there were some contacts between the British Government and Tsar Paul concerning possession of the island after its prospective reconquest from France. Since November 1797 the Russian-Orthodox Tsar was the Grand Master of the ultramontane Catholic Order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, with headquarters in Malta. Paul interpreted the exchanges between him and Britain that the island would be turned over to him, the Grand master of the Order, after Malta's fall into British

³ See the relevant documents in F. PIGGOTT and G.W.T. OMOND, *Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities 1780 and 1800*, London, University of London Press, 1919. This book will be referred to below by the symbol P & O.

hands.⁴ In September 1800 the island capitulated to the British but the British Government showed no intention to hand over the island to the Tsar. In retaliation, the furious and vindictive Russian Emperor placed an embargo on British vessels in Russian ports (about 200), imprisoned their crews (4000 to 5000?) and sequestered British property and capital in his empire, estimated by Lord Grenville, Britain's Foreign Secretary at the time, at £ 1,500,000.⁵

The embargo was imposed on 18 November 1800 (N.S.). News of it reached Grenville on the 27th of the month through a British merchant in Hamburg who traded with Russia.⁶ The embargo meant that Britain became deprived of the possibility of continuing to obtain vital supplies of grain and naval stores which were shipped to Baltic ports from the 'Hinterland' south of the southern coast of the sea: East Prussia, Poland and Western Russia. A reference to the tables of importation in Galpin's book *Grain Supply of England During the Napoleonic Period*⁷ shows that in the dearth year of 1800 45% of the grain imports and as much as 60% of the wheat imports into Britain came from the afore-mentioned areas. The wheat imports were particularly important, for by the end of the XVIIIth century wheaten flour was the primary ingredient for bread for most Britons, even to many in the lower classes.

In 1799 and 1800 the British Isles were in the grip of two successive years of crop failure. The ensuing scarcity was most severe in 1800 and in the grea-

⁴ See the Russian Foreign Minister Count Rostopsin's letter to the Diplomatic Corps and Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Secretary, both dated 23 October 1800 (O.S.), and Lord Grenville's undated letter to the Count. All three notes are reprinted in P & O, cited in fn (= footnote) 3, pp. 420-422.

In his letter of 9 December 1800 (N.S.) to the Earl of Carysfort, the British Minister to the Prussian Court, Lord Grenville is emphatic that no signed agreement was made between the two Powers. Grenville's letter is reprinted on pp. 404-405 of *Report on the Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, Preserved at Dropmore*, Dublin, HMSO, 1908, Vol. VI. Historical Manuscripts Commission. This work will be referred to below in brief as DP 6. For Grenville's letter see pp. 404-405 of the volume.

The way Grenville's denial is worded leaves open the possibility that some sort of verbal promise was made, with the intention of keeping the Tsar in the war against Napoleon.

⁵ DP 6, pp. 422-423. In Vol. III of the book *The Later Correspondence of George III*, edited by A. Aspinall, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, in fn 2 to p. 442, the editor states that there were about 70 ships in Riga and 120 at St. Petersburg. The estimate of the amount of British capital and property sequestered by the Tsar is given by Grenville in his letter to Carysfort, dated 9 December 1800, quoted in fn 4.

⁶ P. 442 in the work edited by A. Aspinall, cited in fn 5.

⁷ W. F. GALPIN *The Grain Supply of England during the Napoleonic Period*, New York, Macmillan, 1925. The figures quoted by us can be derived from Galpin's tables on pp. 246-247 and 256.

ter part of 1801. Although the imports of wheat were very large in these two years (about three times the average for the war years 1793-99),⁸ not all the deficiency could be made up with supplies from foreign sources, for in 1799 the countries that were the 'traditional' sources of wheat for Britain, viz. the lands to the south of the Baltic, themselves suffered a shortfall, for much the same meteorological reasons as the British Isles: a cold growing season. Additionally, in Britain there were excessive rainfalls, causing the flooding of the fields and of the harvest.⁹ It is estimated that in the British Isles in 1799 the harvest of wheat was but 50% of the previous years and that of 1800 25% less than the average. The present writer carried out a simple calculation using figures cited in the Houses of Parliament, indicating that in the harvest year October 1799 - September 1800, harvest and imports of wheat provided only 60% of the 7,000,000 quarters said to have been the annual consumption of wheat in Britain.¹⁰

As is known, the scarcity caused numerous more-or-less violent bread riots in the country. Such slogans appeared on posters as "Peace and Large

⁸ The table on p. 89 of the work by J. MARSHALL, *A Statistical Display of the Finances, Navigation and Commerce of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland etc.*, London, Haddon 1833, shows that in 1793-99, i.e. the first seven years of the war, imports of wheat averaged just over 400,000 quarters annually. In 1800 the wheat imports amounted to 1,264,000 and in 1801 1,424,000 quarters. These were by far the largest imports of the war 1793-1814, with the sole exception of 1810.

In Britain, the growing season of 1799 was 2-3°C colder than in 1798. Much the same difference is shown by the temperature data of Berlin (Inner City), Vilnius and Warsaw — the only meteorological stations of the period whose temperature can be taken to approximate the temperatures of the grain-growing areas of Prussia, Poland and Western Russia which supplied Britain with substantial amounts of wheat and grain in general. The shortfall of harvest in the afore-mentioned areas is mentioned also by Rufus King, the American Minister to London, in his letter of 21 October 1799 to the U.S. Secretary of State. King writes as follows: "This Country will suffer exceedingly from the badness of its corn Harvest, wh. [= which] has been very much injured by the rains that have continued without intermission [?] J.N.] for the last two months. It is apprehended that no considerable succour can be obtained from the north of Europe, where, from the same cause, there is likely to be a failure of crops. Bread is already at two prices [= double] & it is believed that it must be still dearer." See p. 136 in Vol III of R. KING, *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, edited by his grandson C.R. King, New York, G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1896. Reprinted in New York by Da Capo Press, 1971.

⁹ There are no rainfall data for the grain-growing areas of Prussia, Poland and Western Russia for the period of concern here. In Britain, in the Midlands and Scotland the rainfall was very heavy in August and September 1799.

¹⁰ *Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803*, London, Hansard. See Vol. XXXV, 1819, col. 825. The total annual requirements of wheat in the British Isles is quoted in the Sixth Rep. of the Commons' Committee on the High Price of Provisions. Volumes of the *Parliamentary History* will be denoted below PHE and the volume number by Arabic numerals, e.g. PHE 35.

Bread or a King without a Head", and "Bread or Blood ... Have Frenchman [sic] Shewn You a Pattern to Fight for Liberty".¹¹ The riots resembled the bread riots that broke out in France after the severe crop failure of 1788.¹²

By the beginning of October (1800) it was clear that the British Isles had suffered another crop failure. The shock excited by the failure is reflected in various documents and activities. On 8 October, William Pitt, the Prime Minister wrote a letter to Addington, Speaker of the House of Commons (and his successor as from February-March 1801). The letter contains the statement "After all, the question of peace and war is not in itself half so formidable as that of the scarcity with which its is necessarily combined, and for the evils and growing dangers of which I see no adequate remedy".¹³ The fact that the Prime Minister of a country that by late 1800 was engaged in a war for over 7½ years, found the scarcity a graver problem than the conduct of war against a tenacious enemy, is an indication how serious the internal situation of Britain was. Still in October, the Cabinet decided to convene the Houses of Parliament on 11 November to debate the scarcity, for recommendations on remedial measures and for showing the population that the Government was not indifferent to the suffering of the poor.¹⁴

The special session was opened by the King in the presence of the two Houses. George III's speech began with the following sentence: "My lords and gentlemen: My tender concern for the welfare of my subjects, and the sense of the difficulties with which the poorer classes particularly have to struggle, from the high price of provisions, have induced me to call you together at an earlier period than I had otherwise intended." Next, he made mention of the "evil necessarily arising from unfavourable seasons", condemned the acts of violation of laws and of the public peace.¹⁵

Both in November and December the two Houses debated in a number of sessions the "Address of Thanks" to the King, and Committees were set up to investigate the situation and to put forward remedial measures. In the Commons the Government was attacked by several members in sharp terms; some members claimed that if peace were re-established, the scarcity would pass; some pointed out that the large subsidies provided by the Government

¹¹ These posters are cited on the basis of p. 16 in Galpin's book, fn 7.

¹² See J. NEUMANN and J. DETTWILLER, *Great Historical Events That Were Significantly Affected by the Weather: Part 9, The Year Leading to the Revolution of 1789 in France*, *Bull. Amer. Meteorological Soc.* 71, 1990, 33-41.

¹³ See p. 244 in Vol. II of *Life and Correspondence of the Right Honourable William Pitt*, edited by Earl Stanhope, London, J. Murray, 1862.

¹⁴ The decision to convene the Houses of Parliament for 11 November (1800) was taken by the Cabinet on 10 October. See *The Diaries and Correspondence of the Right Hon. George Rose*, London, R. Bentley, Vol. I, pp. 281-282. George Rose was a Minister in the Treasury, a close and loyal friend of Pitt.

¹⁵ *PHE* 35, cols. 495-497.

to Russia, Austria, Bavaria, Hanover, Wurtemberg, Sardinia and Naples to keep them fighting, the money squandered on indemnifying Corsican emigrants, American loyalists, French clergy and pensions to the French nobility in exile, could have been better used to subsidize the bread price to the poor at home.¹⁶

The embargo meant that, if it continued, the scarcity would be even graver in 1801 than in 1800. It is probably correct to conjecture that the expectation of ever more severe scarcity, even higher bread prices and even more violent bread riots in 1801, gave rise to the fear in the minds of government Ministers and local authorities of the possible development of events similar to those in France in 1789. The phrase 'growing dangers' in Pitt's letter cited above may well have been a hint at such a potential trend.

We shall now turn to examine documents written around the end of November 1800 indicating that when the decision was first taken to dispatch a naval force to the Baltic early in 1801, the venture was motivated by the Russian embargo and its expectable consequences in Britain. It will be also shown that this first decision was directed against Russia alone.

In a volume publishing the later correspondence of George III, A. Aspinall, the editor, reprints a letter of Lord Grenville, written at 11 p.m. on 27 November to the King.¹⁷ Grenville attaches to his communication a letter received that day from Hamburg, as mentioned earlier, from a merchant trading with Russia who proposes an action to be taken that "appears both to Mr. Pitt & to Lord Grenville to be indispensably necessary, and to be pressing in point of time". Finally, the King is requested to hold a Council the next day. The late hour of writing is explained by the fact that Grenville had to wait for Pitt's reply in the matter.

In his reply, written at 11.35 the same evening, the King expresses his desire that Grenville will give notice to members of the Privy Council of a meeting to be held as early as convenient. The King then continues as follows: "I highly approve of the measure proposed and I am certain with such a *strange*¹⁸ character as that of the Russian Emperor nothing can be gained but shewing he is not feared". In a brief written at 11.45 p.m., the Foreign Secretary informs the King that he made arrangements for the Council to convene at "twelve tomorrow".

The nature of the measure proposed by the merchant is mentioned in a letter of the King to Pitt on the 28th: a prohibition from the Privy Council to

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 517.

¹⁷ This work is cited in fn 5, see p. 442 of the volume.

¹⁸ The word 'strange' is printed in italics in the text edited by A. Aspinall. Contrast this with the message respecting a subsidy to Russia, read in the Commons by Henry Dundas, Secretary for War on behalf of the King on 6 June 1799, in which George III refers to the Tsar as "his good brother and ally." See col. 1042 in *PHE* 34, 1819.

the merchants trading with Russia from answering any bills of exchange from that empire.¹⁹ The King's reply must have been written before the midday meeting of the Council, for after the meeting no announcement was made of the prohibition proposed.

We have requested an examination (see *Acknowledgments*) of the minutes of meeting of the Privy Council held on 28 November (1800). The minutes are held at the Chancery Lane Branch, London, of the Public Record Office. The minutes, as they are preserved, show no mention, no discussion of the embargo and the retaliatory steps to be taken by Britain. In view of the Foreign Secretary's call at the Royal Palace late in the evening (11 p.m.) the day before and the King's letter to Prime Minister Pitt on the 28th (almost certainly in the morning, before the meeting) in which he expressed his support to the measure proposed by the merchant in Hamburg and, further, in view of the gravity of the expectable consequences to Britain of the embargo, it is most unlikely that the embargo was not discussed at the meeting. The meeting was convened, after all, for discussing the Russian blow. A plausible explanation of the absence of any mention of the Russian embargo in minutes of the meeting is that the Council wished to keep the decision taken secret - 'top secret', in more modern military jargon.

The nature of the decision that *was* adopted by the Council on the 28th is suggested by a letter of Earl Spencer, written the same day. Earl Spencer held two important posts in Pitt's Cabinet of 1794-1801: he was both Lord Privy Seal and First Lord of the Admiralty. As such, he was certain to have attended the meeting.²⁰

Spencer's letter of 28 November was addressed to Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of St. Vincent, in which, among other things, the following is said: "The hostile measure taken by the Emperor of Russia (which will, I fear, deprive us of a considerable quantity of hemp), will make it necessary to economise our stores ... Your Lordship will also receive an instruction founded on our late intelligence from Brest, which I hope will enable us to get our ships in as perfect an order as possible in point of repairs against the opening of the weather after the winter, when it is not improbable that we may have a *more extended naval war on our hands than we have ever yet had* [*italics mine, J.N.*]); on this subject I propose by and by to write more fully²¹."

There are four significant points in Spencer's letter supporting our inter-

¹⁹ The letter is reprinted in the Appendix, p. XXII, to *Life and ... of William Pitt* cited in fn 13.

²⁰ The list of Cabinet members in Pitt's administration of 1794-1801 is printed on p. 580 of the volume by J.S. WATSON, *The Reign of George III, 1760-1815*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960.

²¹ See pp. 273-274 in Vol. IV of *Private Papers of George, Second Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1794-1801*, edited by Rear-Admiral H.W. Richmond, London, Navy Records Society, 1924.

pretation that, when the decision was first taken to dispatch a naval force to the Baltic its moving power was the Russian embargo and that the planned dispatch was directed against Russia alone. The first point is the mention of a 'naval war'; the second is that only Russia is named and not the other Northern Powers; the third is connected with the second one, viz. the statement of the need to 'economise' on naval stores, being an oblique reference to the embargo; the final point of significance is the phrase "on this subject I propose by and by to write more fully", suggesting that more has been determined than just a decision in principle.

Some of the additional details decided on are revealed in a letter of St. Vincent to Spencer, dated 7 December, which probably is a reply to Spencer's letter. In the second paragraph of his letter St. Vincent writes as follows: "Should the Northern Powers continue their menacing posture, Sir Hyde Parker is the only man you have to face them. He is in possession of all the information obtained during the Russian armament, more particularly that which relates to the navigation of the Great Belt ... Rear-Admiral Whitshed told me a few days ago he and his brother-in-law Bentinck sounded the Great Belt and found it practicable²²".

One of the outstanding points of St. Vincent's letter is that by 7 December not only had decision been taken to embark on a 'naval war', but even its commander viz. Parker, was designated. The term 'Northern Powers' goes against our interpretation that the decision was directed solely against Russia, but, on the other hand, the Russian armament and the Great Belt are cited; neither the Danish nor the Swedish 'armament' are referred to. Moreover, the fact that the Great Belt and its sounding are mentioned, but neither the Sound nor the Copenhagen Roadstead, makes it certain that the attack was intended against Russia and Russia alone — at that time. Had it been the intention to go against the Danish Navy as well, it would have been indispensable to take account of Copenhagen Roadstead, because the Copenhagen waters would have presented not only a navigational problem, but also the risk of fire from the Danish warships, guns of the sea forts (e.g. the Trekoner fort) and, possibly, from the coastal guns of the Danish capital. And, before entering the Copenhagen waters, the coastal guns of Kronborg and, perhaps, those of the Swedish coast (if any), had to be reckoned with. The shallowness of the Great Belt presents navigational hazards, but at least the British had some soundings for that waterway but not for the Copenhagen Roadstead. Before the British fleet attacked the Danish Navy in the waters of the capital on 2 April 1801, Parker, Nelson and other officers had to take soundings of the Roadstead. That was a risky undertaking. Some of the work was done at night, using small boats and muffled oars to reduce the possibility of being spotted and fired at.²³ Thus, had the decision of 28 November included the

²² P. 274 of the work cited in fn 21.

²³ See the narrative of the Battle of Copenhagen by Lt.-Col. William Stewart, pp.

plan of an attack on the Danish Navy, the increased hazards would have had to receive attention. Denmark, if it had the determination, could have taken advantage of the narrowness of the Sound (4 km at its narrowest) and, using a combination of static (sea forts, coastal guns) and mobile (warships) defences, inflict heavy losses on the British fleet.

Another document supporting our interpretation is Lord Whitworth's letter of 18 December to Spencer. Whitworth was the British Minister to St. Petersburg until late spring of 1800. In his letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whitworth responds to a query concerning the strength of the Russian Navy and its bases at Reval and Kronstadt. No doubt, as the British diplomat who had left the Russian capital but some 7 months earlier, he was considered to have the most up-to-date information on the Russian Navy. In his letter,²⁴ the diplomat gives an estimate of the Russian Navy in the Baltic. No word is said about the Danish Navy which, in all likelihood, would have presented a more formidable opponent than its Russian counterpart.

Conflict Area (3): *The Armed Neutrality Pact* (ANP). The ANP was related, of course, to Conflict Area (1), but it differed from the latter both in a quantitative and qualitative sense because the Pact committed its parties to come to the aid of any other party to the Pact if brought under pressure by any belligerent.

Rumours of a revival of the ANP of 1780 (the First ANP) reached London in October 1800. According to Pope,²⁵ at the beginning of October, Drummond, Britain's Minister to the Danish capital, reported to Lord Grenville the disturbing rumour that the Tsar had made pressing propositions to the Danish Court to renew the ANP. On 19 November (N.S.), the Earl of Carysfort, the British Minister to the Prussian Court, notified Grenville of a 'plot' not only for the revival of the ANP, but also for the formation of a 'league' of the Northern Powers for mediation of a general peace.²⁶

Carysfort's letter could not have reached London before 9 December. In Grenville's letter of the same day no mention is made of any information obtained by Carysfort. On the contrary, it is the Foreign Secretary who informs his Envoy in Berlin of a Swedish initiative for the re-establishment of an ANP. The pertinent part of Grenville's letter reads as follows: "News has been received to the effect that 'the Court of Stockholm early in the last

299-304 in Vol. IV of the work *The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson*, with Notes by Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, London, H. Colburn, 1845. The work of sounding the waters of Copenhagen Roadstead is described on p. 302.

Lt.-Col. Stewart was Commander of the ground troops, 760 rank and file, who went with the British fleet.

²⁴ See p. 275 in the volume quoted in fn 22.

²⁵ See p. 64 in D. POPE, *The Great Gamble*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972.

²⁶ DP 6, p. 464.

month sent full powers to its Minister at Petersburg [sic] to conclude a Convention for the purposes of re-establishing the principles of Maritime Law established in 1780, and that the Swedish Government entertained the expectation that the Ministers of Prussia and Denmark would at the same period receive similar authority from their respective Courts'.²⁷

But on the 9th Grenville wrote another letter to Carysfort.²⁸ Apparently, at the time of writing that other letter, the news of the Court of Stockholm's initiative had not yet reached the Foreign Secretary. Since no mention is made in that other letter of the Swedish King's initiative, we are justified in assuming that the letter with the news of the Court of Stockholm's action must have come to Grenville's hand after the other letter. That is, news of the threat of the call for the formation of the ANP reached London 11 days after the decision of concern in this paper was taken, or *the matter of the Pact did not play a role in adopting the decision.*

After 9 December the spectre of revival of the ANP began to play an increasing role in the concern of the British Cabinet. The Pact was concluded at St. Petersburg on the 16th of the month on behalf of Denmark and Sweden, and on the 18th on behalf of Prussia, but intelligence on the act of signing did not reach London until 13 January 1801²⁹: in winter news from Russia was slow to travel. But even before the definite news of the Pact was received in London, the Cabinet was fast to act, probably on the basis of the news of the King of Sweden's initiative at the Russian capital. On 16 December Grenville drafted a sharp note to the Signatory Powers which was handed to their Envoys resident in Berlin by Carysfort on the 28th³⁰. The note indicates that the original decision was widened to include, in addition to Russia, Denmark and Sweden as well. This act of widening must have been taken place between 9 and 16 December.

On 14 January 1801, a day after the information was obtained on the signing of the Pact, Britain imposed an embargo on Russian vessels in British ports. On 12 March the British Baltic fleet sailed from Yarmouth, Copenhagen being its first target and on 2 April the Battle of Copenhagen took place³¹. And, although Nelson did take a division of the squadron to Reval in

²⁷ Pp. 438-439 in P & O quoted in fn 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 404-405.

²⁹ See pp. 50-52 in Vol. I of *Letters of Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of St. Vincent whilst First Lord of the Admiralty, 1801-1804*, edited by D.B. Smith, London, Navy Records Society, 1922.

The date of signing of the ANP by Prussia is given as 18 December 1800 (N.S.) in CH. DE MARTENS and F. DE CUSSY, *Recueil Manuel et Pratique de Traités, Conventions et Autres Actes Diplomatiques*, Leipzig, A.A. Brockhaus, 1846. See p. 219 of Vol. II.

³⁰ See the first work cited in fn. 29, p. 50.

³¹ That Copenhagen was the first to be attacked was due to meteorological-strategic considerations. In any winter when the Baltic freezes over, the Danish waters

May, this was a kind of a friendly visit, for by that time Tsar Paul was dead: early on 24 March (N.S.) his courtiers strangled him. His successor, his eldest son, Alexander (Alexander I) reversed his father's policies and sought to re-establish good relations with Britain.

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are the first to have their ice cover thawed. If a naval attack is made in the Copenhagen waters before the ice at Reval melts away, then the Russian squadron at Reval cannot hasten to Denmark's aid. The ice at Kronstadt usually thaws 7-10 days after that of Reval, so that in the case of a well-timed attack on Reval, the squadron at Kronstadt cannot sail to Reval's help, nor can the Russian warships at Reval flee to Kronstadt. As Pope has put it aptly on p. 125 of his work quoted in fn 25: "at this stage the climate governed British naval strategy and planning for the Baltic."

