European Inter-Continental Emigration The Road Home: Return Migration from the U.S.A.

J. D. Gould
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

From the fiscal year 1907-08 onwards U.S. immigration statistics identified aliens entering (or leaving) the country in two categories, immigrant (or emigrant) aliens, and non-immigrant (or non-emigrant) aliens. The basis for this distinction was stated in the following terms: "Arriving aliens whose permanent domicile has been outside the United States are classed as immigrant aliens; departing aliens whose permanent residence has been in the United States who intend to reside permanently abroad are classed as emigrant aliens; all alien residents of the United States making a temporary trip abroad and all aliens residing abroad making a temporary trip to the United States are classed as non-emigrant aliens on the outward journey and non-immigrant on the inward".[1] In this formulation, the adjectives 'permanent' and 'temporary' refer to periods of one year upwards and of less than one year, respectively. Twelve months was adopted as the conventional basis for distinguishing between 'sojourners' and 'migrants' in several countries before World War One; the

[1] *Report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration*, U.S. Bureau of Immigration, 1910, p. 8, fn. (a).

distinction was internationalised, on the initiative of the International Labour Organisation, in the 1920s, and is still used today in international migration statistics.

It can be seen that this distinction between 'emigrant' and 'non-emigrant' rests essentially on a subjective, *ex ante*, foundation, since it depends on the statement of the individual as to his *intended* length of stay in or absence from a country. Migration statistics based on these categories give an inaccurate picture of a country's net population gain or loss through international migration, simply because *ex ante* intentions, even when honestly stated (and they are not always honestly stated), are not always realised. This was equally true of U.S. migration data from 1907-08 onwards. Thus, in round figures and according to the official data, the net gain of the U.S.A. from international migration during the years 1907-08 to 1913-14 was 4,647,000 when reckoned as the difference between immigrant and emigrant aliens, but only 4,070,000 when reckoned as the difference between alien arrivals and departures. Evidently there was a systematic tendency for aliens to make statements, when entering or leaving the U.S.A., which either deliberately or inadvertently represented their intention to remain in or return to the U.S.A. in an optimistic light. It is of some interest and importance to examine the reasons for these discrepancies though it will emerge that we cannot be certain exactly *who* thus mis-stated their intentions, or when, and whether deliberately or through inadequate foreknowledge.

Suppose that we classify all alien arrivals (A) into the United States of America in three groups. First, there is the distinction observed by the Bureau of Immigration between 'immigrant' aliens and 'non-immigrant' aliens. Secondly, subdivide the latter into arriving aliens intending a stay of not more than one year (and who are temporary visitors rather than immigrants by virtue of that intended limited stay) and aliens already resident in the U.S.A. (and not, therefore, 'immigrants' by virtue of that residence) returning to it after an absence of less than one year. Call these

groups c, a, and b respectively. Similarly, alien departures (D) may be subdivided into emigrant aliens (z), non-resident aliens departing after a stay of less than one year (x), and resident aliens stating an intention, on departure, to be absent for less than one year (y).

Recalling that, over the interval 1907-08 to 1913-14, the inward balance measured as immigrants less emigrants exceeded that measured by arrivals less departures, we may write this inequality

$$(A - D) < (c - z)$$

This may be expanded into

$$(a + b + c - x - y - z) < (c - z)$$

which implies

$$(a - x) + (b - y) < 0$$

and therefore either $a < x$

or $b < y$, or both.

Now of course if all arriving and departing aliens honestly stated their intentions regarding duration of stay or of absence and adhered to those intentions, one should expect that over a period (not necessarily any given period of twelve months) a would approximately equal x and b would approximately equal y. At least in respect of one of these pairs, however, this expectation was not fulfilled, and by a large margin. Can we say which, or for just what reasons?

The presentation of U.S. migration statistics in and after 1907-08 does not permit us to say whether $a \neq x$ or $b \neq y$, or both, for while the tables give figures for x and y separately, they do not break down the category "non-immigrant aliens" (that is, they give only the sum $(a + b)$, and not values for a and b separately.) It is instructive, nevertheless, to consider the matter further. If in fact $b < y$ (that is, if the number of aliens who had previously

established a residence in the U.S.A. and who returned to it after an absence of less than one year was smaller than the number of such people stating such an intention to return when departing), this might be either (l) because some aliens who said they intended to stay away for less than one year, and who were honest in making that statement, changed their minds on returning 'home' and stayed away longer, or permanently, or died before they could give effect to their intention, or (m) because they were dishonest in stating their intention to return within the year. On the other hand, one might expect some offset to these discrepancies from (n) some emigrant aliens (i.e., departing aliens intending to stay away for more than one year) changing their minds in the other direction, and returning within one year of departure. Now, even if U.S. statistics reported values for b as well as for y, which as we have seen they did not, this would still not enable us to attach values to the components of the expression

$$l + m - n \; [= (y - b)].$$

Equally, one could expect that a might be less than x because (p) some immigrant aliens changed their minds about staying permanently in the U.S.A. and departed within the year. On the other hand, offsets would arise if (q) some entering aliens, though truthfully stating an intention to remain less than one year, decided in the event to stay, or if (r) entering aliens actually intending to stay permanently stated the opposite intention. Again, not only do we not know the values of both a and x, but even if we did, we could not attach values to the individual components of $p - q - r = [(x - a)]$.

It is thus impossible, at least from the aggregate statistics of arrivals, departures, immigrants, and emigrants, to know exactly why the difference between the first two of these terms should be smaller than the difference between the third and fourth. However, on the basis partly of more qualitative or fragmentary evidence of a historical kind, and partly of what we know about migrant beha-

viour in general (including that of present-day migrants), an educated guess is possible. Such considerations suggest that in all probability the principal reasons for the discrepancy were (*p*), that is, that some alien immigrants intending permanent settlement in the U.S.A. quickly became homesick or disappointed by what they found, and departed within the year, and (*m*), that some departing aliens stating an intention to return within the year were dishonest in doing so.

The first of these, (*p*), hardly needs much commentary, as it is such a familiar feature of all international migration; but it deserves to be pointed out that whereas in the earlier nineteenth century recent immigrants who developed the wish to return home were often dissuaded by the cost of doing so, or by their memory of the long and highly unpleasant voyage they had recently experienced, in the period we are now considering lower relative fares, quicker and much less unpleasant transport, and far more compatriots from whom one could borrow or beg the passage money made this a less frequent impediment to answering the call of nostalgia. We find here one reason for the very marked increase through time in the number of "immigrants" returning to their homelands.

The second category, (*m*), calls for a little more discussion, as it is not at first so apparent why departing aliens should in any appreciable number of cases misrepresent their future plans by dishonestly stating an intention to return to the U.S.A. within a year. There were perhaps, to judge by contemporary comment, two chief reasons.[2] First, many of the less sophisticated immigrants of the 'New' immigration were undoubtedly only imperfectly acquainted with U.S. immigration laws and practices, and given this background it is easy to suspect that some departing aliens who in fact supposed that they would not be returning to the U.S.A. nevertheless stated their intention to do so, in the (presumably) erroneous belief that this would in some sense guarantee or at least

[2] On what follows see Saloutos, 1964 (a); and more generally, Shepperson, 1965.

enhance their chances of re-entry and safeguard them against possible exclusion *just in case* they wanted to seek re-admission. Secondly, and probably more important, the genuine 'emigrant alien', in Bureau terminology, was the object of much emotive criticism in the U.S.A., both because his action in departing seemed to the American patriot to be in some sense a criticism of America, a tacit repudiation of the American dream, and more concretely, because the savings he took away with him were looked on as 'draining away' the national wealth. Immigrants, who are always and everywhere far more sensitive than their hosts suppose to even the finest nuances of attitudes towards them, were without doubt aware of these sentiments and might well wish to avoid the odium of being looked upon as traitors to America by representing their departure as a temporary trip abroad when, in fact, a permanent departure was contemplated.

The difference between gross and net immigration is significant in several ways, and it is from this significance that the foregoing discussion derives its importance. First, if one's interest focuses on the contribution of immigration to population growth or the growth of the labour force, net figures are evidently more appropriate than gross. Textbooks in economic history have a tendency to quote the impressive figures of "alien immigrants" to the U.S.A. in the early twentieth century as though these in themselves established that there was a massive increase in the net inflow in the pre-war years. The fact that a parallel series of "alien emigrants" does not become available until 1907/08 has doubtless made it easier to ignore the quantitative impact of the reverse flow of aliens returning to Europe, though the existence of such a flow and indeed its growing quantitative importance are well-known to migration specialists. Even given awareness of this point, however, it does not suffice to allow for the outflow by subtracting alien emigrants as recorded from 1907-08 from alien immigrants, since the immigrant-emigrant balance, as we have seen, overstates the true net gain of the U.S.A. measured on an arrivals-departure basis.

It might be mentioned in passing that even the arrivals–departures balance should by no means be trusted to give a faithful picture of the U.S. gain through international migration. This is because several categories of arrivals and departures were either totally ignored or at best only crudely estimated in the official figures. This was particularly true of movements over the land borders of the U.S.A., especially that with Canada. In their study of the size of the foreign-born population of the U.S.A., Kuznets and Rubin added on to the official statistics an estimated net inflow of 118,000 people crossing the Canadian border during the decade 1880-90 and surviving to 1890, and one of no fewer than 625,000 crossing in the following decade and surviving to 1900.[3] The fact that no comparable deficiency is to be suspected in the official figures for the early twentieth century helps to reduce the difference in the size of the total inflow between the late nineteenth century and the 1900s, and is one of the factors which tends to cut down to size the apparently unique inrush to the U.S.A. in the years immediately preceding World War One.

At the risk of induly prolonging an aside, it is convenient to stress at this point that there is no certainty that *any* of these measures given us a thoroughly reliable picture of America's net gain through international migration. The estimates of net immigration gain in Kuznets and Rubin's valuable study rest on some adjustments to the raw 'arrivals' and 'departures' figures which are avowedly crude, and on others which in the writer's view — the matter will not be argued here — are conceptually questionable. This may partly explain why, when the results of Kuznets and Rubin's work are set alongside the figures derived from Census counts of the foreign-born in the U.S.A., substantial differences appear. These are summarised in Table 1, calculated from Table 10 (p. 74) in the Kuznets-Rubin study. It should be emphasised first that *none* of these figures is an estimate of net immigration into the U.S.A. in

[3] Kuznets and Rubin, 1954, Table 10, p. 74.

the periods indicated; what the figures offer are estimates of the growth of the foreign-born population between successive Census dates allowing both for the *net* gain through migration and for *deaths of the foreign-born in the U.S.A.* within the intervals stated. Such deaths are explicitly allowed for by Kuznets and Rubin and are, of course, implicitly "allowed for" in Census counts. While, therefore, the figures given in Table 1 are not exactly net migration flows, the juxtaposition of the two Kuznets-Rubin series on the one hand and the Census series on the other does provide an indication of the difference between net immigration as estimated from migration data and from Census data, since the remaining item, alien deaths in the U.S.A., is either explicitly or implicitly allowed for in all three series.

TABLE 1

DECENNIAL INCREASE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN IN THE U.S.A. FROM KUZNETS-RUBIN ESTIMATES AND FROM CENSUS ENUMERATION OF FOREIGN-BORN WHITES

(000's)

Period	Kuznets/Rubin (raw)			Kuznets/Rubin (revised)			Census		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1880–1890	1,666	1,185	2,851	1,740	1,229	2,969	1,430	1,132	2,562
1890–1900	— 162	378	216	124	559	683	563	529	1,092
1900–1910	2,360	1,265	3,625	2,071	1,057	3,128	2,009	1,123	3,132
1910–1920	315	553	868	296	462	758	4	362	366

Source: Derived from Kuznets and Rubin, 1954, Table 10, p. 74.

It can be seen that large differences in migration estimates are suggested by the two approaches. The 'raw' Kuznets-Rubin figures (recorded arrivals *minus* crudely estimated departures *minus* estimated alien deaths in the U.S.A.) differ dramatically from the Census data, especially in the 1890s and 1910s; but even the 'revised' figures of the two authors (i.e. revised to allow for such deficiencies

of the migration data as defective recording of land arrivals and departures, the under-recording of departures by sea through incomplete coverage of the shipping statistics on which they are based, and so on) reveal estimates of the growth of the foreign-born population of the U.S.A. which coincide closely with the Census figures only for the decade 1900-1910. For the 1880s the revised Kuznets-Rubin figures are some 16 percent higher than those obtained from the Census; for the 1890s, more than 37 percent lower; while for the period 1910-20, the former are more than twice as high as the latter! Even for the 1900s the close agreement in respect of total foreign-born population growth hides a not insignificant disagreement when we consider the two sexes separately. In short, the presumption that any of these approaches yields a really accurate and reliable estimate of net U.S. immigration should be firmly resisted. Quantitative, including econometric, studies which are based on U.S. immigration data are thus placed in some hazard, particularly since it is some approximation to the raw rather than the revised Kuznets-Rubin figures which has generally been employed. (It is worth noting that Kuznets and Rubin are not dismayed by the discrepancies between their "revised" estimates and those of the Census; rather, they take this as confirmation that the Census counts of the foreign-born are astray.)

The distinction between gross and net migration is significant in another way, and one of more direct concern in this study: and that is, that the ratio of net to gross migration was constant neither over time nor between nationalities. As to the change over time, Kuznets and Rubin assume a ratio of alien departures to arrivals of 10 percent for the years before the Civil War, and we have seen in Essay 1 that Simon calculated alien *ocean* departures from the United States as 25.0 percent of the inter-continental admissions for the 1870s, 17.0 percent for the 1880s, and 44.8 percent for the 1890s.[4]

[4] Simon, 1960, p. 690.

The mere fact of a substantial rate of repatriation poses challenges to the analyst of the ' causes ' of migration. The typical model purports to explain given levels and changes in the rate of westward migration by postulating economic self-interest, appropriately defined, as the behavioural assumption and showing how, in the given objective circumstances, that led to such a flow. Such a model is hard indeed to reconcile with a substantial, though smaller, eastward flow. If the immigrants came, as so many models assert, because of higher real wages and better job opportunities in the U.S.A. than in Europe, why did so many go back? As obvious a question as this has been totally ignored by the majority of econometric studies on pre-World War One migration.

This question might be answered in one of two ways. Either it might be asserted that on arriving in the U.S.A. some migrants perceived conditions there to be less attractive than they had supposed; or it might be said that a substantial and increasing proportion of America-bound migrants never intended more than a temporary sojourn in the U.S.A. Even supposing one or both of these assertions true, however, this hardly shields the immigration model familiar in the literature from the damage done to it by the fact of a substantial return flow of migrants. For the first retort would seem to call for a model built around subjective expectations rather than around objective economic realities, while the second would call into question any explanatory model founded, implicitly or explicitly, on *lifetime* — earnings concepts. Leaving this on one side, however, what truth *is* there in these assertions?

As to the first, that a migrant departing for a country he has never seen responds to a subjective, imagined portrait of the land of his choice cannot very well be disputed; and that for some immigrants the reality they subsequently perceive proves less attractive than the portrait they had imagined is the most commonplace observation in the history of emigration. It may be agreed, too, that improvements in ocean transport enabled a growing fraction of such disenchanted immigrants to return ' home '. But it still

seems hard to account fully in this way for as substantial an increase as seems to have occurred in the number of repatriants, and this is especially so when one considers that the ever-increasing number of Europeans who had lived in the U.S.A. and then returned home either permanently or for a temporary visit was everywhere generating by the late-nineteenth century a more and more accurate and widespread knowledge of conditions in the U.S.A., so that the gap between portrait and reality, one should have thought, must have been narrowing rather than widening. Further, even conceding that because of their longer history of migration the Irish may have had a better knowledge than did the Greeks of conditions in America, and Norwegians than Bulgarians, it still seems improbable that the resulting differences in the extent to which the reality of America disenchanted in comparison with the dream can have been large enough to explain repatriant ratios as divergent as 6.3 percent and 63.4 percent respectively, in the first case, or as 6.7 percent and 68.5 percent respectively, in the second.[5]

Fortunately it is not necessary to rely on such argument by elimination to reach the conclusion that there is a lot of truth in the alternative possibility, that is, that an increasing fraction of those who migrated to the U.S.A. *never intended to remain permanently*. To those brought up on the literature of traditional economic history it would seem surprising to overlook or query such a possibility, for there is such widespread evidence of *intentionally* temporary migration that that has long been an integral part of the conventional wisdom of non-econometric historians of immigration. Coletti, for example, in his remarkable study of Italian emigration published as early as 1911, observed that the transatlantic emigration of his day was becoming more and more like traditional Italian emigration to Europe, the emigration of single persons and of married men without their families becoming ever more prominent as compared with family emigration,

[5] The figures are taken from Table 2 below.

and temporary sojourns overseas replacing long-term or lifetime commitment. Coletti explained this change in the character of transatlantic migration by three factors: the increase in the area of newly-cultivated land in America; the greater ease and declining relative cost of trans-oceanic transport; and growing familiarity with the countries of immigration.[6] The first of these relates more particularly to Argentina, whither the annual migration of *golondrinas*, the Italian 'swallows' who came for the harvest and then returned, was then at its height. Coletti's second and third reasons represent a fine insight by an acute observer, a perception of the fundamental change by which, for an increasing number of emigrants, migration was less and less an act of faith, a commitment — born of despair and nourished by hope — to an unknown or imperfectly-known future, and more and more the result of a cool calculation of profit and loss based on increasingly widely-known and accurate data. Such a perception has become commonplace amongst many of those who have written on inter-continental migration since Coletti's day, though unfortunately few econometric historians have employed this insight in their work, which has normally been based on the assumption of stable elasticities of response over time.

There is ample evidence that the growth of return migration reflects fundamentally an increase in *intentionally* temporary movements made more feasible and profitable by the greater speed, comfort and declining real cost of long-distance passenger shipping. This is most obviously true, for example, of such a phenomenon as the annual migration of Italian harvesters to Argentina, a movement in search of seasonal work which merely projected the activities of Italy's traditional bands of mobile harvest labour on to an international stage, and which was entirely similar to the traditional migrations of skilled and unskilled Italian labour from North Italy to various European countries, or the annual flow of Spaniards to Algeria. But more generally, the characteristics of the migrant

[6] Coletti, 1911, p. 184.

cohorts reflect and bear witness to the change in motivation. Temporary sojourners, being attracted by the possibility of working remuneratively and saving hard for a limited span of years, are more predominantly male than permanent migrants, and tend to a greater extent to be drawn from the younger working ages.[7] Coletti himself, as we have seen, noted the change in the sex composition of Italian transatlantic migration, and statistical compilations made at later dates confirm that this is a general feature of emigration from countries oriented particularly towards temporary migration.

Broadly, this characteristic is reflected in the overall sex composition of U.S. immigration, the masculinity of which rose from about 58 percent in the mid-nineteenth century to nearly 70 percent in the five years 1906-10.[8] This, of course, is a statistic the impact of which is diluted by its highly aggregative nature and the inclusion of immigration from countries which did not exhibit any marked tendency to temporary migration along with those that did. More striking is the contrast between the masculinity ratios of immigrants and emigrants; for Italy, for example, it has been noted that while over the period 1909-28 male Italian immigrants to the U.S.A. exceeded female by rather more than two to one, amongst the repatriants the ratio was more than seven to one.[9]

The most satisfactory statistical proof of the contention that the age and sex composition of transatlantic migration in the early twentieth century reflect the prominence of temporary migration is to be found, however, in cross-country rather than in time series analysis, for it is a striking and important feature of temporary migration that it was *not* distributed evenly over all countries of emigration. Rather, it was a practice which,

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[7] A major exception, relevant to this essay, was the annual migration of Poles to work in the German sugar-beet harvest, which was dominated by women and young children: Ruziewicz, 1930, p. 69; Rabinovitch, 1932, pp. 219-20.

[8] Ferenczi and Willcox, 1929, Vol. I, Text Table 15, p. 211.

[9] Livi Bacci, 1961, p. 41.

for reasons to be discussed, was peculiarly characteristic of the countries from which the "New" immigration originated.*

To demonstrate this we can make use of the alien emigrant figures which become available in the U.S. statistics from 1907-08 onwards. One's first thought is simply to calculate the relationship between the ratio of alien emigrants to alien immigrants and the ratio of males to females, as revealed by U.S. statistics, for each ethnic group and for some year or series of years. But this simple procedure should be modified in two directions.

First, as demonstrated above, the division of departing aliens into emigrants and non-emigrants was defective, being based only on an *ex ante* statement of intentions which may not have been honestly stated and may not in any event have been persevered with. One cannot, on the other hand, simply set the data on total alien *departures* against those on alien *immigrants*, since this would be to include the genuinely short-term visitors (the businessmen, the tourists and the like) on the outgoing side but not on the incoming side. A better statistic to use is the total, for each country,

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* It might be convenient at this point to state that the increase over time in the overall 'repatriant ratio' from the U.S.A. almost certainly results from a combination of two factors: first, an increase over time in the proportion of immigration coming from countries which *at all times* had above-average repatriant ratios; and secondly, an increase over time in the repatriant ratios for individual countries of emigration. (And possibly from the interaction between these two.)

Regrettably, it is not possible as yet to sort out the respective quantitative importance of these two factors. There is little question about the fact (as opposed to the magnitude) of the first effect; but even the fact, let alone the magnitude, of the second has not yet been established for more than a few countries. U.S. migration statistics probably do not permit this effect to be rigorously proved for periods prior to 1907-08. Some statistical evidence on the increase through time of Italian repatriation rates will be presented in Essay Four. For Norway calculations made on the basis of that country's own census and migration statistics reveal higher repatriant ratios in the early twentieth century than in the nineteenth. (Moe, 1970, pp. 150-1.) Swedish data on emigration to and immigration from countries outside Europe suggest repatriant ratios (immigrants divided by the emigrants of four years earlier) rising from an average of about 10 percent in the later 1870s and early 1880s to about 30 percent in the years before World War One. (Calculated from Ferenczi and Willcox, 1929, pp. 756, 760.) There are qualitative, but strong, suggestions of such increases for a number of other countries.

of alien emigrants *plus* alien non-emigrants *minus* alien non-immigrants. The rationale for this is that the two hypothesised major components of the discrepancy between the arrivals-departures balance and the immigrants-emigrants balance both affect the *departures* side: that is, immigrants intending permanent residence but departing within the year, and emigrants intending permanent repatriation but falsely stating an intention to return within the year. Both groups would be recorded amongst *alien non-emigrants* but, conceptually speaking, should properly be with *alien emigrants*. The *alien non-immigrants* category, by contrast, probably included relatively few who initially misrepresented or subsequently changed their intention to return. Hence the formula suggested should approximately set out the genuine temporary visitors and include both on the incoming and the outgoing side, as is appropriate, all who had described themselves on entering as immigrants and who subsequently left for good.

Secondly, the numbers of these returning migrants are not appropriately compared with the corresponding numbers of migrants entering *in the same year*. There is a persuasive body of evidence which suggests that the average stay of temporary migrants in the U.S.A. was of the order of three to four years. Thus, the recorded U.S. data on the length of stay of returning migrants from 1907-08 onwards, which unfortunately classify the sojourn only crudely (one and less than five years; five and less than ten years, and so on) show that for the 1908 to 1914 June years, 77 percent had been in the U.S.A. continuously for less than five years, and a further 18 percent for less than 10 years.[10] A Swedish study has shown that of those Swedes returning to the country after an absence of one year or more, about 30 percent of the men and 23 percent of the women had been away less than two years, and a further 30 percent of the men and 28 percent of the women for between two and four years.[11] The Italian

[10] Kuznets and Rubin, 1954, p. 30, fn. 9.

[11] Tedebrand, in Kälvemark, 1973, p. 267. Also Tedebrand, 1972.

Commissariat of Emigration in the first decade of the twentieth century estimated an average repatriant sojourn overseas of four years.[12] It would be appropriate, then, to calculate the relationship between returning aliens and those who had entered say three years earlier, rather than with the entrants of the same year.

Calculations along these lines were first performed to establish rates of repatriation for each country of origin. However, in going on to examine the relationship between rate of repatriation and the age and sex composition of each migrant cohort, it was necessary to use the " race or people " breakdown of U.S. immigrants, as the U.S. returns only provide a cross-classification between age and sex on the one hand and " race or people " on the other; there is no breakdown by country-of-origin and age or sex. The technique has been first to sum returning aliens, defined as emigrant aliens *plus* non-emigrant aliens *minus* non-immigrant aliens, for each country and for the years 1907-08 to 1913-14, and to express this total as a percentage of the sum of immigrant aliens from the same country for the years 1904-05 to 1910-11. The countries of origin have then been ranked in order of the resulting " repatriant ratios ", as shown in Table 2. That table also includes two other ratios thrown up during the process of calculation and having, as will be shown, a modest heuristic value of their own, namely the ratio of non-emigrant aliens to non-immigrant aliens, and that of emigrant aliens to non-emigrant aliens.

The first striking feature of the " repatriant ratios " is their range. What is called Bulgaria/Serbia/Montenegro has the highest repatriant ratio, almost seven out of every ten immigrants from that " country ", it seems, being temporary sojourners in the U.S.A. rather than long-term immigrants. For Wales, on other hand, the repatriant ratio is actually negative (that is, there

[12] Coletti, 1911, p. 76.

TABLE 2

RANKING OF COUNTRIES OF LAST/FUTURE RESIDENCE BY:

Repatriant ratio		Non-emigrant aliens ÷ Non-immigrant aliens		Emigrant aliens ÷ Non-emigrant aliens	
	%				
Bulgaria/Servia/Montenegro	68.5	Hungary	6.4	Greece	7.3
Greece	63.4	Portugal	4.6	Turkey	7.2
Italy	57.9	Greece	4.3	Portugal	6.5
France	48.3	Turkey	1.9	Austria	6.0
Austria	47.7	Russia	1.7	Hungary	5.9
Hungary	33.8	Germany	1.6	Italy	5.9
Spain	29.7	Italy	1.6	Bulgaria, etc.	5.1
Turkey	29.4	Switzerland	1.5	Norway	3.5
Portugal	22.8	Denmark	1.5	Sweden	3.4
Germany	21.7	Austria	1.5	Russia	3.2
Switzerland	20.3	Bulgaria, etc.	1.5	Rumania	3.1
Rumania	17.7	Netherlands	1.4	Spain	1.7
Belgium	16.5	France	1.4	Denmark	1.6
Russia	16.1	Rumania	1.4	Switzerland	1.6
Scotland	13.1	Scotland	1.3	Ireland	1.5
England	11.6	Sweden	1.2	Germany	1.2
Netherlands	11.4	Ireland	1.2	Belgium	1.2
Denmark	10.4	England	1.0	France	1.1
Sweden	9.6	Belgium	1.0	Wales	0.8
Norway	6.7	Spain	0.7	Netherlands	0.7
Ireland	6.3	Wales	0.5	Scotland	0.7
Wales	— 1.4	Norway	0.5	England	0.4

Source: Calculated as described in the text from data in the annual *Reports* of the U.S. Commissioner-General of Immigration.

was a net balance of intending short-term visitors to the U.S.A. who decided to stay, or of long-term departures who decided to come back.) Secondly, with a few exceptions the countries of the "New" immigration had markedly higher repatriant ratios than those of the "Old" immigration, confirming the statement made a few paragraphs back. When we switch, moreover, to a "race or people" basis of analysis we shall see that several of the countries of the "New" immigration included in the Table record deceptively low repatriant ratios only because

a high proportion of immigrants from those countries were in fact Jews, who as a people and for obvious reasons had a very low tendency to return. For France, the high repatriant ratio underlines the fact that despite the moderately high number of people entering the U.S.A. from France (some of them not, of course, French nationals), that country was not a large-scale supplier of permanent migrants to the United States.

If all persons included in the statistics as non-immigrant and non-emigrant aliens were in fact genuine short-term visitors entering or leaving the country — tourists, businessmen, people visiting friends or relatives — then the ratio of these two categories over a period of years should approximate to unity. For several countries of the "Old" immigration — England, Ireland, Scotland, Belgium, Sweden — this is in fact the case, while for two other such countries, Norway and Wales, the ratio of the second to the first is well *below* unity, indicating a systematic tendency to *under*state the intention to remain in or return to the U.S.A. But overall, as we have seen, there were many more "non-emigrant" than "non-immigrant" aliens, and for most of the other countries, especially those of the "New" immigration, the ratio is well above unity. Hungary, Portugal and Greece stand out with particularly high figures. It should be noted that while a relatively large number of genuine short-term visitors would "pull" this ratio towards one, the paucity of such visitors from any given country does not of itself account for a ratio substantially different from one. Where that is found, it is evidence of the systematic tendency to overstate the intention to remain in or return to the U.S.A. we have already noticed.

A high ratio of emigrant aliens to non-emigrant aliens suggests a high proportion of "migrant traffic", as opposed to casual, short-term visiting, between the United States and country concerned. The word "traffic" is important, since of course if all immigrants to the U.S.A., however numerous, stayed there permanently there would be no emigrant aliens and the ratio would be

zero. In fact, we again find relatively low ratios for most of the countries of the " Old " immigration, with much higher values for ratios pertaining to the countries of the " New " immigration — Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria / Servia /Montenegro all have ratios of more than five to one — indicating that the relatively more advanced countries of the " Old " immigration had a larger component of business or pleasure visitors to the U.S.A., as we should expect. When we recall that for most of the countries of the " New " immigration the number of " non-emigrant aliens " (i.e. the denominator of the fraction) is inflated by the inclusion of many who *de facto* should have rather been entered as emigrant aliens (i.e.n the numerator), the force of this contrast is enhanced.

To make comparison between the rate of repatriation and the age and sex composition of the immigrant stream the data force us, as already stated, to abandon the " country of origin " and adopt a " race or people " basis. Repatriant ratios have therefore been re-calculated, in a similar fashion, on that basis and are set out in Table 3. Alongside are figures showing the distribition of immigrants in these various ethnic groups summed over the years 1905 /06 to 1910 /11 by sex and by age. Other columns also show the rank order of the groups concerned for each of these measures.

The basis for classification is not the only difference between Tables 2 and 3; the latter also covers a shorter period, the required breakdown of departing aliens by race and by emigrant or non-emigrant status not being available for 1907 /08. This is unfortunate since the year in question, being one of economic recession in the U.S.A., was characterised by generally high repatriant ratios. For all European countries the ratio *1907 /08 repatriants ÷ 1904 /05 immigrants* was well over 50 percent, while for some individual countries it was much higher (e.g. for Italy it was over 94 percent.) In general, then, the " country-based " figures of Table 2 and the race-based figures of Table 3 would be closer

TABLE 3

REPATRIANT RATIO, MASCULINITY AND AGE GROUP BY RACE

Race	Repatriant ratio		Masculinity		Aged 14 < 45	
	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank
Turkish	107.02	1	96.02	1	96.46	1
Russian	86.99	2	87.24	6	92.46	7
Greek	57.12	3	94.17	3	96.17	2
Bulgarian, Servian, Montenegrin	52.86	4	95.37	2	95.58	3
Magyar	49.59	5	69.91	12	85.60	15
English	47.68	6	60.82	21	74.59	22
Italian (North)	47.08	7	76.57	10	87.76	12
Italian (South).	42.24	8	77.24	9	83.37	17
Slovak	41.52	9	68.56	13	87.35	13
Croat/Slovene	40.26	10	81.77	7	92.33	8
Rumanian	38.01	11	89.49	5	92.48	6
Spanish	35.55	12	80.83	8	83.68	16
Portuguese	32.89	13	61.31	20	71.84	25
Polish	32.66	14	68.17	14	88.85	11
French	27.59	15	56.66	24	72.69	24
Dutch	25.47	16	64.94	17	72.73	23
Scottish	25.35	17	62.50	19	76.42	20
Scandinavian	24.74	18	62.94	18	86.76	14
Dalmatian, Bosnian, Herzegovinian	21.37	19	91.66	4	94.76	4
Lithuanian	21.19	20	66.86	16	90.27	9
German	20.87	21	58.45	22	76.75	19
Ruthenian	17.73	22	72.73	11	93.18	5
Irish	16.29	23	52.23	26	89.46	10
Welsh	12.41	24	66.92	15	76.86	18
Bohemian/Moravian	10.77	25	57.40	23	75.14	21
Hebrew	7.11	26	53.66	25	68.25	26

Source: As for Table 2.

together were the former table recalculated for the period 1908/09 to 1913/14, the same as Table 3. For Italy, for instance, the Table 2 repatriant ratio would become 49.7 percent instead of 57.9 percent — much closer, evidently, to the ratios for North and South Italians in Table 3. Generally, Table 3 tends to *under*-state pre-war repatriant ratios in so far as it is based on data in

which years of relative economic depression (and therefore of higher than average repatriation rates) are under-represented. Even so, the overall repatriant ratio for these 26 " races " was 33.15 percent.

Allowance made for this difference in chronological coverage, the repatriant ratios shown in the two tables do not differ too markedly for countries which were ethnically homogeneous, such as Italy. Few Italians arriving in or departing from the United States came from or went to any country other than Italy, and probably some of those who sailed via a non-Italian port did so on both the outward and the return jurney; and few of those entering the United States from or leaving it for Italy were other than Italians. The same comments cannot be made, unfortunately, for some of the other countries and races appearing in these Tables. For the peoples of the British Isles and for the French, the proximity of Canada was the disturbing feature. For those of the British " races " there was a large excess, in the decade before the war, of " non-emigrants " over " non-immigrants "; whereas, as can be seen in Table 2, no such excess appears in regard to the *countries* of the British Isles. Undoubtedly this arose in large part from a net movement of the British-born in the United States enticed northwards across the U.S./Canadian border by the great Canadian boom of the early twentieth century. These Canada-bound British emigrants moving on from the U.S.A. enter into the numerator of the fractions on which Table 3 is calculated, but not — since they were not returning to the British Isles — into those underlying Table 2. For the French, contrariwise, there was a large net inflow of " French " immigrants to the U.S.A. across the Canadian border in the years immediately preceding the War, and these immigrants appear in the denominators of the fractions underlying Table 3, but not in those of Table 2.

It is in this way that we are to explain the facts that whereas the repatriant ratios for the *peoples* of the British Isles in Table 3

are much larger than those of the *countries* of the British Isles in Table 2, for the French the comparison is the other way round. In the geographical sense it is the ratios in Table 2, rather than those in Table 3, which align conceptually with the notion of "repatriant" relevant in this argument, since many of the "repatriants" and of the "immigrants" underlying Table 3 were not going back to, or entering the U.S.A. from, their European country of origin. It is unfortunate that the limitations of the published statistics compel us to embrace this conceptually less appropriate classification in this part of the argument.

Table 3 equally encounters greater difficulties at the European end than Table 2, for "country of last (or future) residence" is a classification less open to ambiguity than "race or people", especially as regards those born somewhere in the ethnic melting-pot of East Europe and the Balkans. That errors and inconsistencies occurred in the recording of the foreign-born entering or leaving the U.S.A. from or to this part of Europe cannot be doubted, but such errors and inconsistencies were almost certainly more numerous in the recording of the "race" of the migrants than when officials were recording the country which migrants had just left or to which they were then heading.

For all of these reasons the interpretations suggested by Table 3 are somewhat less secure than those prompted by Table 2. As against that, however, the former Table has the great merit of "decomposing" somewhat the various streams of migrants from and to the ethnically-complicated countries of East and Southeast Europe. In particular, it is fortunate that the U.S. immigration officials, not knowing or not caring that the Jews are not a "race", recorded Hebrews separately, and by doing so not merely revealed the unique (though hardly surprising) reluctance of the Jewish people to return to Europe, but by purging them from the statistics for the European countries in which they had lived left the repatriant ratios for the Turks, the Russians, and the Rumanians far more correctly represented. (The extraction

of the Poles and Ruthenians likewise improves the validity of the repatriant ratio shown for *Russians* in Table 3, as compared with *Russia* in Table 2.)

The conceptual limitations which have been discussed inevitably disturb the correlations — our main reason for compiling Table 3 — between the repatriant ratios for 1908/09 to 1913/14 and the sex and age characteristics of the immigrants of each "race" for 1905/06 to 1910/11. Because of the Canadian complication the English have a much higher repatriant ratio than one would have expected on the basis of their ranking by masculinity and by proportions in the 14-44 age range. The French ratio, however, is for the same reason depressed and thus brought closer to what the sex and age rankings would have led one to expect. Equally, all the qualitative evidence leads one to regard with great suspicion the remarkably low repatriant ratio for *Dalmatians, Bosnians and Herzegovinians*, and to wonder whether the formal annexation in 1908 of that part of the former Turkish possessions in Europe by Austria-Hungary may not have something to do with this.

In the light of all these difficulties the degree of correspondence between the three series is impressive. In particular, the Spearman coefficient of rank correlation between the ordering of the races by repatriant ratio and by masculinity indicates a high degree of correspondence: the value of *rho* (+0.735) is significant at the 99.9 percent level. The correspondence between the repatriant ratio and the proportion of immigrants in the 14-44 age group is much lower, not surprisingly in view of the crudity of the age classification and of the fact that the age composition of immigrants must surely be heavily influenced by the age distribution of the society from which they are drawn. This, naturally, varied considerably more than the *sex* composition of the society of origin. (For example, the abnormally low marriage and birth rates in later nineteenth-century Ireland had led to a top-heavy age structure and an unusually large proportion

of unmarried persons. These features were reflected in the composition of Irish immigrant cohorts; as appears from Table 3, those cohorts exhibited an abnormally low level of masculinity combined with a relatively high proportion in the age group 14–44. The former characteristic arose, in large part, because of the exceptionally large proportion of single women amongst Irish immigrants to the U.S.A. The difference between the masculinity ranking (26) and the age-group ranking (10) is, in fact, much wider for the Irish than for any other of the 26 " races " included in Table 3.) Notwithstanding, the Spearman coefficient between the repatriation and age-group rankings still indicates a fair measure of agreement (*rho* = +0.413, which is easily significant at the 95 percent level.)

The interpretation of these results is obvious. Since the masculinity of the immigrants on entry is an *ex ante* characteristic which cannot possibly have been ' caused ' by a *subsequent* decision to return, confirmation is found for the hypothesis that the various ethnic groups exhibit differing repatriant ratios because of differing *intentions* regarding their length of stay in the United States — intentions resulting in, and revealed by, the differing degrees of masculinity of their emigrant cohorts. A similar interpretation is to be placed on the observed " bunching " of those migrant peoples particularly prone to repatriation in the working years.

The other noteworthy features of Table 3 are fairly obvious. The repatriant ratios of the various races vary over an even wider range than in the table based on countries, the ratio for the Turks (107.02) indicating, of course, a net outflow of Turkish-born from the United States at this time. The repatriant ratios for several races, notably the Turks, Russians, and Rumanians, are markedly higher than for the corresponding countries in Table 2, a contrast brought about, as already explained, by the separating-out in Table 3 of the Jews with their characteristically very low repatriant ratio.

Masculinity also varies widely, the highest values being those for South-East Europe and the Balkans, from which area male immigrants to the United States exceeded female by margins varying between 8 and 25 to 1. The Irish and the Jews were at the opposite extreme, the number of men barely exceeding that of women. (Around the turn of the century the number of female immigrants from Ireland did in fact for a time appreciably exceed the number of males.) The percentages in the age range $14 < 45$ vary much less widely, not surprisingly as all migration tends to be dominated by adults in the younger working ages. The resulting "compression" of the ranks probably helps to explain why the differences of age are less closely correlated than is sex composition with the variations in repatriant ratio.

What explains the rise of temporary migration; and, what explains its greater prominence in the migration history of the countries of south and east Europe as compared with those of the north and west? We have seen that beyond the extension of farming in Argentina, a special case, Coletti offered two explanations: first the greater speed, ease and lower real cost of passenger shipping, and secondly the increasing familiarity of transatlantic migration, with the more accurate knowledge which that brought of opportunities in America. There can be no questioning the importance of both of these factors in explaining the *general* rise of temporary migration. They may, too, help to explain more particularly what happened in countries of the "New" immigration, in so far for instance as the historical geography of railway construction and the introduction of direct and frequent steamer stailings from (particularly) Italian ports to U.S. ports probably induced a specially-marked erosion of the disincentives which relatively expensive and complicated transport routes previously offered to potential transatlantic emigrants from these parts of the continent. But one would think that this could do no more than bring these areas more closely

into line, in these respects, with the countries of the "Old" migration, some of which still remained privileged with regard to transatlantic transport and which had an intimate and long-continued knowledge of American conditions through the large numbers of their nationals who had already spent some time in the United States. Even though Norway was a country with an exceptionally low repatriant ratio, knowledge of conditions in the United States must have been accurate enough in the light of the fact, revealed by the census of 1920, that in the south of the country one in four of all males aged 15 and over had been in America.[13] This of course is not to deny that a special knowledge of some particular opportunities developed locally in parts of southern and eastern Europe; the attraction of the annual *golondrina* movement of Italians to the Argentine rested, for example, on an extremely intimate knowledge of opportunities in that country. But generally we need to explain the particular popularity of temporary migration in countries of the "New" migration by reference to factors more specific to such countries than transport improvements or improving knowledge of conditions overseas.

It is sometimes said that changing conditions in the U.S.A. itself account for the rise of temporary migration. The argument is that by the late-nineteenth century the closing of the frontier, the growth of American industry and the rise of the great conurbations of the East offered a different spectrum of opportunities to the immigrant, one which was much more attractive to those looking for quick returns with a view to repatriation than the agriculturally-oriented employment pattern of the early and mid-nineteenth century had been. Without a doubt there is some truth in this. *Ceteris paribus* the rate of repatriation was lower where migrants settled the land than where they took up urban occupations; the differing character and time-shape of the factor

[13] Semmingsen, 1961, p. 44.

rewards provide an easy explanation for this. Thus in the United States Norwegian immigrants had a characteristically high tendency to settle on the land and characteristically low repatriant rates. In Brazil there was a far higher tendency to repatriation from São Paulo, where the interests of the dominant class made it very difficult for immigrants to acquire land, than from the three southern States in which Germans, Italians and others settled on the land much as in other temperate-zone regions of recent settlement.[14] Further, this line of argument explains why, with a few exceptions like the *golondrinas*, the U.S.A. became the chief overseas country of attraction to 'sojourners' in the late nineteenth century. For it was not the case that there were no longer Europeans who wanted to work in land-related occupations or, specifically, to become farmers; but those who did were now more likely to choose destinations *other than* the United States — the British in the British Dominions; the Italians in South America; and Central Europeans in Canada. (There was a very substantial influx of Central Europeans to Canada in the early twentieth century, and the proportion of central European people in the Canadian population in the 1920s is very much higher in the prairie provinces than in earlier settled parts of Canada. In 1921 the non-British, non-French elements actually comprised a majority of the population of rural Saskatchewan.) [15]

But this factor on its own does not fully explain why countries of the "New" immigration were *particularly* prone to temporary migration and we have to consider some other explanations. First, the attractiveness of temporary migration depends critically upon differences in wage levels, for the costs of moving, including both the financial costs — fares, wages forgone, relocation costs — and the psychic costs associated with a spartan

[14] Monbeig, 1952, pp. 130-2; Lopes, 1936, pp. 172-3.
[15] England, 1929; esp. pp. 4-5.

life style and the temporary break-up of family, must be sufficiently offset by earnings cumulated over only a short period of time. This naturally calls for a large wage differential. For the permanent or long-term migrant the wage difference is not so critical, not merely because the costs can be recouped over a longer period, but because the chance of securing entrance to better-paid occupations by promotion or change of job is obviously greater for the long-term than for the temporary migrant. There is evidence going back to the early nineteenth century that better opportunities for "getting on" did in fact constitute a major attraction to British migrants to the United States for whom the difference in *real* wages was not, in itself, an overwhelming incentive.[16]

In the light of these considerations it is easy to see that the countries of the "New" immigration were marked out as the most likely sources of temporary immigration to the United States. It is true that their typically lower levels of education, lack of industrial experience, and lack of command of English gave emigrants from them a much lower chance of securing better-paid jobs and jobs with 'career' prospects than those of the "Old" immigration.[17] On the other hand, despite their being confined in the main to the less-well paid occupations in the United States, the difference between American and European real wage levels was sufficiently great to make temporary migration particularly worthwhile for migrants from countries of the "New" immigration. Industrial growth had caused wage rates to rise, on the whole, more rapidly in Northwest

[16] e.g. Thistlethwaite, 1958.

[17] While the reasons for this are still a matter of some dispute amongst American historians, it is perfectly plain that the scales were heavily tipped against the "New" immigrants in the structure of American industrial occupations and that they were heavily overrepresented in occupations characterised by high rates of labour turnover. The 1910 *Report* of the Immigration Commission showed weekly earning ranging from $ 15.36 for Swedes to $ 7.65 for Turks. For the figures and a discussion of the issues, see Higgs, 1971.

Europe than in the United States in the later nineteenth century, and had also of course greatly increased the number and variety of jobs available. It was clearly for this reason that migration from north and west Europe to the United States had tended generally to decline after the 1880s, and that some parts of north-west Europe, including the western provinces of the German Empire and Switzerland, had actually become regions of net immigration before the end of the nineteenth century. For the predominantly peasant migrant of central, eastern and southern Europe, on the other hand, even unskilled wage rates in America were attractive, for not only were wages low but there were few opportunities for paid employment anyway in their home countries. In fact, in many areas from which the "New" immigration sprang the opportunity cost of labour was extremely low; the peasant farm could easily be managed, save perhaps at the peak agricultural season, by the labour of the women, the children and the elderly, leaving the adult males in the prime working ages free to take wage labour wherever it offered. This, of course, was how much industry in Russia and Central Europe recruited its work-force in the proto-industrial era.

The opportunities for occasional or seasonal industrial work, however, often inadequately matched the growth of the rural population; and moreover they were threatened by the destruction of markets for the products of domestic industry following the building of railways, and by changes in the structure of industry in which capital-intensive establishments needing a full-time industrial proletariat out-competed older establishments using labour-intensive technologies. Thus in Russia, a study of the Moscow textile industry of the 1880s painted a clear contrast between the steam-powered mills whose higher capitalisation could only be recouped by year-round working and which thus required the recruitment of a true industrial proletariat, and the handloom sheds which partially or wholly closed down in the summer months while their peasant workforce went off to help with the

harvest.[18] In Galicia, the completion of the railway from Silesia spelt doom to the well-developed domestic industry of the region.[19] In Southern Italy, the competition from Northern factories following political (and therewith fiscal) unification and the building of the peninsula's railway network led to a " de-industrialisation " similar to that of parts of Asia following the growth of steamship routes to the East.[20] In Slovenia the construction of the rail link from Fiume to Karlstadt removed the opportunity to earn money in the carting trade previously enjoyed by the peasants in that mountainous region of inhospitable soil.[21] It was from the peasant masses of such regions as these that much of the " New " immigration was recruited, and once the traumatic shock of the first realisation of America had worn off and the first cohorts of temporary migrants had gone and returned, there was not all that large a logistical difference and no difference at all in motivation in the temporary migrant seeking industrial or service work in New York or Pittsburgh rather than in Moscow or Lodz or Lyons or Essen.

It is necessary to keep a sense of proportion. We are speaking here only of the *temporary* component of transatlantic migration. In many regions of the " New " immigration this constituted half, and in some more than half, of the annual outflow; but elsewhere, permanent or semi-permanent movement predominated. Further, the first news of America caused to simple people in Italy or the Balkans in the late nineteenth century the same sort of shock as in Norway and Sweden fifty years earlier. And an absence of three or four years is not the same thing as an absence of seven or eight months, and in a variety of social procedures and relationships substantial changes were necessary to

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[18] J. MAVOR, *An Economic History of Russia*, 2nd ed. (Dent. London, 1925), Vol II, p. 391.

[19] Balch, 1910, p. 135.

[20] Briani, 1959, pp. 29-30.

[21] Balch, 1910, pp. 175-6; Govorchin, 1961, p. 14.

accommodate this difference.* But it is necessary equally to recognise that the distinctive features of the " New " immigration stem at least as much from the traditional characteristics of the part of Europe from which it was drawn, and from transport developments, as from any change in the type of attraction exerted by the New World.

In this connection two further points remain to be stressed. First, temporary movement in search of wage jobs, often over long distances, was *traditional* in many of the regions from which the " New " immigration was drawn. Moreover, the traditional alternatives, or other alternatives closer to home, continued to exert their attraction in rivalry with that of America. Only in the early twentieth century did the yearly transatlantic outflow from Italy begin consistently to exceed that to Europe — even on Italian figures, and these very substantially underestimate the outflow to Europe, being based on the issue of passports which were not always used for travel to Europe and on which several journeys could be undertaken before renewal. It is probable that in reality Europe remained the major destination for Italian temporary emigrants right up to World War One. Indeed, a very clear geographical pattern emerged. Moving round the Alpine foothills from Liguria to Friuli, France, Switzerland and Germany respectively continued to dominate as the destinations of migrants; the relatively prosperous peasants and farmworkers of the Po plain made predominantly for South America, but increasingly for Milan also; while the United States was the chief magnet for the South Italian. (It is striking testimony, however, to the importance of tradition that even though the U.S.A. and industrial or service jobs were the target of a much

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* In parts of Southern Italy, it became usual for marriages to be solemnized shortly before the groom left for America. The marriage was deliberately left unconsummated, in order that the bride's virginity would provide evidence of her faithfulness on his return. No similar proof was forthcoming, or apparently expected, of the groom's conduct. See Coletti, 1911, p. 185.

higher proportion of South than of North Italians, transatlantic repatriation rates were higher for the latter.[22] This is one of the pieces of evidence against the view that changes in the character of European emigration were uniquely induced by changing conditions in the U.S.A.).

For the Pole, it was France, the industrial conurbations of western Germany, and the growing industrial areas of Russia which were the major attractions to the adult males, while Polish women and children constituted the bulk of the huge annual inflow to the sugar-beet harvest in eastern and central Germany.[23] At the height of the agricultural season there were probably more Poles in Europe outside the boundaries of 'ethnic Poland' than there were in North America, even excluding those in Russia and the increasing numbers from the central provinces who found adequate work opportunities in 'Poland' itself, in the growing industrial areas around Warsaw and Lodz.[24] For the peasantry of the Balkan southeast, however, there were fewer convenient alternatives to America, which probably explains why the peoples of Turkey-in-Europe, Greece and 'Bulgaria/Servia/Montenegro' head the repatriant ratio list in Table 3. As for the annual 'harvest' migrations to Latin America, the movements of the Italian *golondrinas* to the Argentine or of the Spanish to Central America or Cuba were but transatlantic extensions, made possible by the greater speed and cheaper fares of late nineteenth-century shipping, of the familiar harvest migrations from these countries to the North African coast, to Libya and

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[22] For Italian repatriants from the U.S.A., see Table 3 above. More generally, see Coletti, 1911, pp. 248-9.

[23] Cf. fn. 7, above It was the growth of sugar-beet production which generated a particularly urgent demand for seasonal labour in central Germany: see Willecke, 1912, p. 4.

[24] In the years immediately before World War One the annual movement of seasonal emigrants from "Poland" to Germany exceeded the annual inflow of Poles to the U.S.A. by a factor of at least three: Zubrzycki, 1952-3, pp. 258-9; Rabinovitch, 1932, p. 219; and data in Ferenczi and Willcox, 1929.

to Algeria and Morocco respectively — traditional movements which the American opportunities complemented and competed with, but did not replace.

Secondly, the peasants of southeast Europe, unlike those of Ireland, remained in many cases attached to the land, and saw wages in industrial or service occupations in the cities, whether of Europe or America, as a means of raising money to assist them in improving their lot as peasants: to supplement the inadequate income of a small holding; to buy additional land; to pay off a crippling mortgage; to improve the farmhouse or buy machinery. The reasons for these differences doubtless lie deep, and certainly not easily perceived, in the geography, history and society of the different regions of Europe;* but the effect was clear. A majority of the Irish settling in the New World gladly took up city jobs as a permanent way of life; for most of them, the last thing they wanted — though the still-open frontier would have permitted this had they wished — was to resume in the New World that life on the land which they associated with starvation and oppression in the Old. Few had any thought of returning. The Irish, a sentimental people, paid homage to their homeland by creating in the New World a sugar-sweet folk-legend and folk-music of the dear-old-isle-across-the-seas; but, a shrewd race too, they rarely made the mistake of returning there. For the peasants of eastern and southern Europe, on the other hand, at least as much oppressed by poverty and more oppressed by their rulers than the Irish, the call of home and land remained strong, and for many their exile in America was tolerated only as a means to improving life back home. It is possible that the Irish found the United States so much to their liking because it offered such an easy opportunity for indulging in the national sport of Anglophobia — a sport which command

* It has to be remembered that the Irish who went to the United States were overwhelmingly permanent migrants *in part* because Great Britain was the obvious destination for those looking only for seasonal work. See Ó Gráda, 1973.

of the English language enabled them not merely to indulge in but to benefit from by using it as a platform for political advancement. The Slovene, the Dalmatian, and the Bulgar had no such opportunity or incentive to wage war against his oppressor from the other side of the Atlantic.

Some Features of Italian Emigration and Emigration Statistics, 1876–1914.

Italy's role as a major country of emigration is, of course, well recognised. She took second place only to the British Isles in the gross tally of inter-continental emigration from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the Great War, and first place if the U. K. is decomposed into its several constituents. Though usually considered a country of the "New" immigration, Italy had reached during the 1880s a level of inter-continental outflow which no other country of south or east Europe was to attain before the present century; and by the time that emigration from Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria-Hungary and similar countries was reaching its peak, emigration from parts of Northern Italy was already tending to decline, partly, without doubt, because of the growing opportunities within the country generated by the industrialization boom beginning about 1896. We shall see, too, that *net* emigration per mille of the population peaked *before* 1900, not after.

Apart from its sheer numerical importance Italy is noteworthy in the context of emigration for a number of other features, such as the sharp regional variations in the chronology and direction of its emigrant outflows; the willingness of its citizens to favour a variety of destinations, including other European countries; and the relatively great importance of temporary emigration. The first of these characteristics can readily be explained as the result of the differing historical origins of the constituent parts of the newly-unified Kingdom: origins which not only bequeathed a differing momentum of emigration, but left their imprint

in differing economic structures and sharply diverging characteristics in regard to such social indicators as degree of literacy, level and type of industrial skill, and even health. Such features continued to exercise an enduring influence on migration patterns.

These same circumstances also partly explain the second characteristic, in that regional differences as to destination-preference, though declining, remained a persistent feature and accounted to a substantial extent for the variety characteristic of the overall national distribution of destinations. However, the readiness of Italian migrants to contemplate a variety of destinations goes beyond this, and stands out as a unique feature in the spectrum of European emigration. Unique, because in the case of the other major country to favour a variety of destinations, namely Great Britain, the links of Empire — present, in the case of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, and past in the case of the "special relationship" with the U.S.A. — offer themselves as a ready explanation of eclecticism. (The emphasis here placed on Empire is so to say negatively confirmed by the fact that despite the size of her commercial and financial stake in Latin America, Britain, unlike Italy, supplied very few emigrants to Argentina or other Latin American countries.) The ties of Empire — present or former — also explain the geographical pattern of emigration from Spain and Portugal, the only countries for which, in the long haul, the United States of America did not constitute the largest single magnet. Of course, it may also be that the economic opportunities and levels of real income offered by Latin American countries were inadequate to tempt immigrants from any but the poorer countries of Europe: but it has been argued in Essay 2 that comparisons based only on national average income levels are not well attuned to test this, and this contention is supported by the fact that for most of the nineteenth century the net flow of emigrants from Britain to America continued *despite* a higher level of per capita real income in the former country.

To return to Italy's pattern of emigration, it seems that for whatever reason, Italians were unusually willing to try emigration to any part of the world which seemed to offer the hope of a good economic reward. As Coletti reminds us, for the *bracciante* " tutto il mondo è un paese ", and in Northern Italy the " professionals " of emigration who " organise their life around the everyday fact of emigration " prided themselves on having the skill and knowledge to seek out work in any part of the continent and thus insulate themselves from the ups and downs of demand for labour in particular trades and particular localities.[1]

That different destinations were favoured by Italians in different parts of the peninsula was clearly due, in part, to the simple facts of history and geography. It is hardly surprising that the Alpine valleys and foothills of the North favoured neighbouring European states (of which they had once, in some cases, formed part), or that Sicilians should have preponderated in Tunisia. But the variety of occupational preferences also helps to explain the variety of destinations. In the Alpine provinces emigrants developed skills in industry and service occupations precisely in order to exploit the particular employment opportunities in neighbouring European states. Those emigrants from the North who preferred work on the land found the major opportunities in South America, the bulk of the movement coming at a time when the frontier was closing in the U.S.A., the climate and farming routine of which, moreover, were less congenial and familiar. The reversal of the seasons offered an obvious opportunity to Italy's mobile bands of harvest labour to extend their itineraries in an inter-continental fashion, once the steamer connections to the River Plate ports were sufficiently frequent, rapid, and cheap. The much lower development of industrial skills in Southern and Insular Italy and the lower income levels there marked out emigrants from that part of the country for

[1] Coletti, 1911, pp. 180, 192-9; Foerster, 1919, pp. 122-4.

destinations with a good demand for unskilled labour, which meant chiefly the U.S.A. but to an increasing extent, too, the rapidly growing cities of Latin America. The Venetian link with Brazil was forged by the chronological accident that Brazil's big drive to replace slave by immigrant labour coincided with the most critical period of agricultural depression in Venetia, while the Ligurian connection with Argentina was inaugurated neither by farmers nor by industrial workers but by Genoese sailors and shipbuilders who early established a monopoly of coastal and river navigation in that country.[2]

The unique variety of destinations which Italian emigrants adopted, then, was preponderantly and originally a matter of the diverging preferences of the various Italian regions. In turn, these differing regional preferences resulted from the facts and accidents of history and geography, from the opportunities which happened to exist at the particular period when emigration from each region developed, from the attempt to match the varying skills of each regional group of emigrants with the demand for labour and opportunities offered by the several major regions of immigration. As time went on, it is true, the differences between preferences as to destination became somewhat less marked — for reasons to be discussed — and the adoption of a "mix" of destinations a more genuinely nation-wide characteristic. But the mechanism of "feedback" guaranteed that the links between particular origins and particular destinations should not rapidly be dissolved, however ephemeral the circumstances in which they had been forged; Italian emigration, in fact, is one of the prime examples of this general truth. Italy provides, too — for this and other reasons — the most striking and convincing illustration that the nation is not the appropriate level of aggregation on which to study migration — or, at any rate, not a level of aggregation from which *alone* an adequate analysis

[2] Luzzatto, 1961; Vázquez-Presedo, 1971, p. 609.

of patterns and causes is possible. Of perhaps no other country is it so true to say that most of what is significant in the study of emigration is washed out, or concealed, at the national level of aggregation.

Indeed, for a satisfactory study one would need to go into far greater local detail than I can attempt. For the geographical variation of destination preferences is visible not only on such a crude level of disaggregation as the obvious distinction between North and South. Foerster, writing of his own day, stated that the Italian colonists of south Brazil are " as predominantly Venetian as the colonists of Argentina are Piedmontese, and in both countries the Lombards rank second " [3] — a situation evidently deriving, initially, from the links already mentioned between Venetia and São Paulo and between Genoa and the Plate estuary, and then spreading, by physical movement and by " feedback ", from Liguria into Piedmont and from Piedmont and Venetia into Lombardy, and from the coffee highlands of São Paulo into Brazil's three southern states. On yet a further level of disaggregation Livi Bacci reports that to his own personal knowledge there was a marked tendency for emigrants from the small town of Caserta (north of Naples) to settle in Providence, Rhode Island; [4] and elsewhere in these essays I draw on the research of Lochore to explain the highly localised origins of the small Italian communities of New Zealand.[5] The consolidating effects of " feedback ", incidentally, can be discerned in the migrant's choice of occupation as well as of locality, and that not just *grosso modo*, in regard to the broad regional preferences already sketched, but likewise on a very local level — as when Foerster reports that four out of five emigrants from Laurenzata (Basilicata) to U.S.A. became bootblacks.[6]

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[3] Foerster, 1919, p. 309.
[4] Livi Bacci, 1961, p. 6 (fn.).
[5] See Essay 5.
[6] Foerster, 1919, p. 417.

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In many respects, then, Italy is for the student the country of emigration *par excellence* — not merely for its sheer quantitative importance as a source of migrants, but as a country in and from (and back to) which migrants' motives and choices reached perhaps their highest and most developed level of sophistication, and from whose history many of the characteristics and motivations of migrant behaviour generally can be laid bare. It is therefore surprising that in so many respects the magisterial work of Coletti, now more than two-thirds of a century old, should still remain unsurpassed.

One area in which more recent work has been undertaken concerns the demographic significance of Italian emigration. Notably, there exist two important estimates of the net migration balance, one by M. Livi Bacci in his contribution to the symposium on Italian economic growth edited by Fuà, the other by Franco Giusti, in the centenary history of Italian population published by the *Istituto Centrale di Statistica* (= ISTAT).[7] Livi Bacci is concerned with the components of population growth only over intercensal periods, whereas Giusti attempts a year-by-year reconstruction. The latter's method of estimating the year-by-year intercensal movements is somewhat elliptically described in his paper, and is consequently somewhat difficult to evaluate. It appears however to be based, *inter alia*, on the assumption of 'a certain degree of proportionality between the number of departures and the migration balance'. This assumption, as it relates to year-to-year changes, is not easily accepted by the migration specialist, who knows that in the short term inward and outward movements were generally inversely correlated, and that even in the longer term, when direct proportionality of some sort was the norm, rates of return differed markedly from destination to destination and from decade to decade. However,

[7] M. Livi Bacci in Fuà, 1969, Vol. II; Giusti, 1965.

we are immediately concerned only with the longer term comparisons between inter-censal intervals, and as Giusti fairly comments these are probably subject only to a minimal degree of error.

Table 4 presents the conclusions of Livi Bacci and of Giusti in summary form, the figures for the former author being taken directly from the contribution mentioned, while I have myself summed the Giusti figures in decade intervals from the annual values to be found in Table 1.XV, on p. 116 of the ISTAT publication. It is disconcerting at first to note (from column 5) that except for the interval 1871–81 the two authors appear to reach conflicting conclusions as to the migration balance, and also (column 2) as to natural increase. The differences can, however, be explained with some success.

First, it should be noted that there is a minor arithmetical or typographical slip in the Livi Bacci figures: the net migration balance for 1901-11 should be 1,622 not 1,662 as printed. This, however, eliminates but a small part of the difference between the two sets of figures. The larger explanation is that the two authors do not use precisely the same time intervals. Livi Bacci deals in all cases with Census dates, whereas Giusti operates with (estimated) end-of-year population totals and with natural increase and net migration balances corresponding to this periodization. In 1871 and 1881 the censuses were in fact taken at the end of the year, which explains the similarity of the estimates for the first interval, but the censuses of 1901 and 1911 — no census was taken in 1891 — date from February 10th and June 10th respectively. Accordingly, whereas Giusti deals in intervals of strictly 10 years throughout, the Livi Bacci figures for 1881-1901 in fact relate to a period of some 229 months and 10 days, and those for 1901-11 to a period of 124 months. The Table therefore offers (in columns 7 and 8) *monthly* average natural increase and net migration rates, and it can be seen that the apparent conflict between the two authors is reduced to a very

TABLE 4

ESTIMATES OF ITALIAN NET EMIGRATION, 1872-1911 (000s)

Period	Population present at beginning (1)	Natural Increase (2)	Calculated population at end of period (3) = (1) + (2)	Recorded population at end of period (4)	Migration balance (5) = (4) — (3)	No. of months (6)	Monthly nat. incr. (7) = (2)/(6)	Monthly Migr. bal. (8) = (5)/(6)
				(a): *Livi Bacci figures*				
1871-81	26,801	2,021	28,822	28,460	— 362	120	16.84	— 3.02
1881-91 1891-1901	28,460	6,205	34,665	32,475	— 2,190	229.3	27.06	— 9.55
1901-1911	32,475	3,818	36,293	34,671	— 1,662*	124	30.79	— 13.08**
				(b): *Giusti figures*				
1871-81	26,801	2,021	28,822	28,460	— 362	120	16.84	— 3.02
1881-91	28,460	3,111	31,571	30,728	— 843	120	25.92	— 7.02
1891-1901	30,728	3,400	34,128	32,663	— 1,465	120	28.33	— 12.21
1881-1901	28,460	6,511	34,971	32,663	— 2,308	240	27.13	— 9.62
1901-1911	32,663	3,707	36,370	35,146	— 1,224	120	30.89	— 10.20

* *recte*, — 1,622

** assuming total migration balance = — 1,622.

Sources: (*a*) M. Livi Bacci in Fuà, 1969, Vol. II, p. 39.
(*b*) Giusti, 1965, Table 1. XV, p. 116.

small margin, readily acceptable as due to the slight difference of periodization, in respect of the rate of natural increase (both periods) and of net migration (1881-1901 only.)

A substantial difference still remains however between the two monthly migration balance estimates for the early twentieth century. Here the explanation, apart from the somewhat different period covered, would seem to rest upon the fact that there were marked seasonal fluctuations in the rate of outflow and inflow of Italian migrants. Particularly as regards seasonal migration to the Northern hemisphere (including, of course, Europe) there was a very marked bunching of departures in the northern spring, and an equally marked return peak late in the year. As it happens, the 'extra' four months covered by Livi Bacci because of the timing of the censuses of 1901 and 1911 fall in the period February 10th to June 10th, and thus his figures in effect include *eleven* seasonal outflow peaks but only *ten* return peaks. Giusti, of course, is immune to such seasonal fluctuations as he deals always with the December 31st — December 31st year. The two series can thus be regarded as confirming each other rather than, as at first appeared, contradicting each other, and it is the Giusti figures which appear more appropriate to our purposes, both because they are more "purged" of seasonal influences and because they can be directly compared with migration data which are also on a calendar year basis.

The Giusti estimates of the net migration balance imply annual average net emigration rates per mille of the mean population of about 1.31 for the period 1871-81; 2.85 for 1881-91; 4.62 for 1891-1901; and 3.61 for the period 1901-11. There are some challenges in these figures to the conventional wisdom about the 'New' immigration. A maximum net annual outflow of 4.62 per mille is certainly much smaller than the Irish maximum outflow (immediately following the Famine), and than that from Norway or from Sweden (in the 1880s) and almost certainly than that from Great Britain. Actually, the notion that net emi-

gration losses from southern and eastern Europe were uniquely large — a notion suggested by, for example, Brinley Thomas' famous sentence about the role of the Malthusian devil in that part of Europe — is quite false, for *net* emigration rates from these countries generally, even at their peak, were well below the maxima reached in earlier decades by several leading countries of the 'Old' immigration, as well as persisting, of course, for a much shorter period.[8] What has led to the contrary belief is the much larger role of temporary (including seasonal) emigration from the South and East. The significance of the countries of the 'New' immigration, beyond the large role of temporary emigration, was to add a very large number of people to the 'pool' from which European migration was drawn, so that despite relatively low net outflows per mille, a large number of emigrants was generated. Further, at the same time emigration from at least some of the traditional sources, especially Great Britain, was tending to revive — a revival induced by increasing demand for labour (following the setbacks of the 1890s) in some of the older countries of immigration, U.S.A., Argentina, and Australia, and the major new demand exercised by Canada.

It is also noteworthy, and again contrary to what is often supposed, that the annual net emigration rate per mille of the Italian population (and even in absolute terms) was markedly higher, if Giusti is to be believed, in the 1890s than in the 1900s, and not all that much lower in the 1880s than in the 1900s. Un-

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[8] For the period up to 1900 G. Sundbärg (*Aperçus Statistiques Internationaux*, repr. *Demographic Monographs*, Vol. 4, Gordon and Breach, New York, Table 53, p. 103) reports maximum annual net outflows per mille of the mean population as follows:

Ireland	20.97	(1841-50)
Norway	9.71	(1881-90)
Sweden	7.43	(1881-90)
U.K.	6.08	(1851-60)
Italy	4.55	(1891-1900)
Germany	2.80	(1881-90)
Austria-Hungary	1.11	(1891-1900)

fortunately this aspect of Giusti's work is a shade more open to doubt — as he himself is the first to point out — in that the annual distribution of the net emigration totals for the intercensal intervals is distinctly less reliable — in part, for the reason already mentioned — than those totals themselves. (The latter, as has been seen, are closely confirmed by Livi Bacci.) Since there was unfortunately no census in 1891, it is conceivable that the distibution as between the decades of the 1880s and 1890s is also wrongly apportioned by Giusti — though it is hard to think (especially since rates of natural increase are directly known) that apportionment can be so much in error as to alter the *ordering* of the three decades by rate of net emigration per mille. And in any event, if we aggregate the decades of the 1880s and 1890s to make a census-years interval in regard to which Giusti cannot be far out, an annual net outflow per mille for 1881-1901 of 3.78 is indicated, and such a rate still leaves intact the conclusion that on a per mille basis Italy was losing more people in the later nineteenth century than in the first decade of the twentieth.

The Giusti figures of net emigration can be set alongside statistics of the total outflow to give an estimate of the ratio of net to gross emigration, or (on the other side of the coin) the relative numbers of returning migrants or " repatriants ". (Giusti himself estimates only the net balances, not the individual — active and passive — components.) From the statistics of the *Direzione Generale della Statistica* we can take the recorded total of Italian emigration either to all destinations, or to countries outside Europe and the Mediterranean basin. Using the former figure for the years 1902-1911 as the denominator, the Giusti estimates of net emigration for the same period suggest a net to gross ratio of 20.3 percent — that is, a " repatriant ratio " of 79.7 percent. Using inter-continental emigrant totals as the denominator, the ratio works out at 35.0 percent (that is, a repatriant ratio of 65.0 percent.)

Most probably the first figure overstates the true overall net/gross ratio, since the Italian statistics of emigration to Europe understate the true volume of movement by an unknown but certainly substantial amount, and the denominator of the fraction should therefore be larger than it is. From our point of view more interest attaches to the second figures, that is to say those using inter-continental emigration only as the denominator. Here, of course, we err in (implicitly) attributing the whole *net* loss through emigration to inter-continental movements, as there seems to have been some — undoubtedly relatively small — net loss to Europe also. But if the numerator of this fraction is somewhat too large because of this, there is some offset in that Italian emigration statistics probably overstate the true volume of movement after 1901,[9] so that the denominator is too large also. It is not impossible, then, that the rate of inter-continental Italian repatriation was indeed of the order of 65.0 percent, as implied by the Giusti figures.

A few other figures may be set alongside for comparison. For most years from 1884 onwards, a statistic is available of inter-continental immigration into Italy, based on the disembarcation of third-class passangers at the four "authorised" Italian ports together with Le Havre (from 1905 only.)[10] Dividing the total of such immigration for the years 1902-11 by the familiar figures for inter-continental emigration suggests a "repatriant ratio" of 49.3 percent. This however is certainly too low, since in addition to the denominator probably being too large (as already explained) the shipping statistics understate the number of repatriants, by ignoring those returning migrants arriving at ports other than the five mentioned and also — probably more numerous — those who had done well enough overseas to allow themselves the modest luxury of returning by a class higher than

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[9] See Table 2 below.

[10] Ferenczi and Willcox, 1929, Vol. I, p. 839.

steerage. Allowing for these factors the corrected figure would certainly be much closer to the 65 percent already mentioned.

The figures quoted in the preceding paragraphs relate to repatriation from all countries outside Europe and the Mediterranean basin. The shipping figures just mentioned are broken down by country of last residence: using the figures of repatriants from the United States alone in conjunction with the corresponding subset of the emigration figures, a repatriant ratio of 49.7 percent is suggested for that particular destination. This estimate is subject to the same comment regarding its probable tendency to understatement as in the last paragraph. It may be compared with the following estimates of Italian repatriation from the U.S.A., which we owe again to Livi Bacci but which are quite independent of his work reported above, being estimated from successive U.S. Census returns of the foreign-born in conjunction with immigration data and with tables of mortality of the foreign-born:[11]

1880-1890	43.4 percent
1890-1900	47.6 percent
1900-1910	52.6 percent
1910-1920	63.2 percent

Finally, it will be recalled that my own estimate of "repatriant ratios" from U.S. migration statistic already reported in Essay 3 suggests a ratio of 57.9 percent for Italy for the departures of the years 1907/08 - 1913/14 set against the arrivals of the years 1904/05 - 1910/11.

Of course, the figures in the preceding paragraph relate only to movements between Italy and the U.S.A.; but that country alone took in some seven-tenths of all Italian inter-continental emigration in the prewar years, and the repatriant ratios for Argentina and Brazil seem to have been respectively a little below

[11] Livi Bacci, 1961, Chap. III and Appx A.

and considerably above the U.S. figure, so that the latter must be close to the overall average. Given that, and bearing in mind the slight differences of periodization, there is a considerable consistency about the various estimates offered. They seem to converge on a ratio of repatriants to emigrants, for inter-continental movements only, of the order of 60 percent for *c.* 1901-11. There is considerable reassurance here when we recall that the various estimates are grounded basically in four different and independent sources of evidence: Italian census and vital statistics data; Italian migration statistics; U.S. census and mortality data; and U.S. migration statistics. If we were to include Italian movements to Europe, which properly measured would probably still have been at least as large as inter-continental departures in the early twentieth century, and in regard to which the ratio of net to gross emigration was certainly very low, it seems probable that some four Italians re-entered the motherland for every five who left it during those years.

For the later nineteenth century, unfortunately, similar manipulations and comparisons of the Bacci or Giusti figures are less easy and less profitable. This is partly because of more constricting data problems, and partly because our inability to separate out net migration to Europe is a more serious deficiency, given the greater importance of movement to and from Europe as compared with inter-continental movement before 1900. However, the various approaches do agree in seeing the Italian repatriant ratio from inter-continental destinations as lower before 1900 than in the twentieth century, though probably higher in the '80s than in the '90s. This, of course, helps to explain why the Italian *net* population loss through emigration peaked in the 1890s.

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Prior to 1904, Italian emigration statistics were based on the *nulla osta*, the certification by the local *sindaco* that his office had no objection to the grant of a passport to an applicant. From 1904,

the basis was the actual issue of a passport. This method of collection resulted in an unusually rich array of information, particularly as to the normal place of residence and the intended destination of the emigrant.

However, the probabilities that the *nulla osta* would actually be followed by the issue of a passport and that the issue of a passport would actually be followed by the emigration of the person concerned were both less than unity, so that one would would expect the *nulla osta* tally to exceed the true number of emigrants. This tendency was, however, offset by contrary biases. Thus, many Italians travelled without a passport, which was of little value outside Europe and was rarely inspected in Europe. Further, the validity of the passport was apparently of somewhat ambiguous duration before 1901, when it was stabilised at three years, and the temporary migrant might thus accomplish two or more journeys before renewing the document. Moreover passports were not free before 1901, so that there was a financial incentive to avoid applying for one (or for a new one) if possible.[12]

For these reasons it is *a priori* uncertain whether in any given period Italian emigration based on the *nulla osta* would understate or overstate the " true " volume of emigration. One might hypothesise that the " multiple use " factor would be particularly likely to lead to understatement in the case of temporary migration, which was particularly characteristic of North Italian emigration to Europe; and one would reason that the ratio of emigration as revealed by Italian statistics to " true " emigration, whether above or below one, would tend to increase after 1901, when the machinery for obtaining a passport was simplified and the document was made free (and compulsory for transatlantic migrants), with perhaps some reversal of this trend from 1904, when

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[12] On the bases of Italian migration statistics see Marrocchi, 1965; Foerster, 1919, pp. 10-19; Coletti, 1911, pp. 3-19.

statistics came to be based on the issue of the passport, rather than on the *nulla osta*.

The facts, as far as known, appear to conform to *a priori* expectations. As for intra-continental migration, an Italian enquiry based on the sale of railway tickets suggested that the official figure of emigration to European countries from Friuli in the year 1900 was less than half of the true figure.[13] As for inter-continental emigration, the number of emigrants suggested by the Italian statistics was smaller than the corresponding number of immigrants from Italy recorded in the statistics of all major receiving countries — Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S.A. — prior to 1901, but the deficiency was reduced or reversed after that date.

The actual figures are given in Table 5. It will be noted that for the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the comparison yields fairly similar results for all three major recipient countries: Italian emigration data understate the number of migrants, as recorded in receiving country data, by about one fifth. For the early twentieth century, however, the three comparisons agree on only one point, namely that as expected on *a priori* grounds, the changes introduced in 1901 resulted in a reduction or reversal of the tendency for Italian data to understate " true " migration totals. In the case of the U.S.A. and Brazil, it is now the Italian figures which are larger, by some 14 percent and 28 percent respectively. In the case of Argentina, however, no more has happened than that the degree of " understatement " in the late nineteenth century Italian statistics has been approximately halved.

In view of the facts that the *receiving* country data are themselves in no way necessarily " true " migration estimates, and that in at least one case, that of the United States, their conceptual basis underwent substantial modification within the period concerned, it is doubtless foolish to make too much of these differences.

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[13] Reported in Coletti, 1911, p. 11. See also Faidutti-Rudolph, *n.d.*, p. 15.

TABLE 5

ITALIAN EMIGRATION TO ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, U.S.A.

Emigration to:	Argentina			Brazil			U.S.A.		
Period	Italian statistics	Argentinian statistics	$\frac{1}{2} \times 100$	Italian statistics	Brazilian statistics	$\frac{4}{5} \times 100$	Italian statistics	U.S. statistics	$\frac{7}{8} \times 100$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1879-1900	783,523	960,768	81.55	(a) 814,388	(a) 1,008,841	(a) 80.72	768,382	977,347	78.61
1901-1914	985,792	1,085,332	90.82	407,179	317,013	128.44	3,332,432	2,935,173	113.53
1901-1914 (b)							3,332,432	(b) 2,913,595	(b) 114.37

(a) = 1878-1900
(b) = see text, p. 95-96

Source: Ferenczi and Willcox, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 389-91; 543; 550; 830-1.

But the contrast between the Italian-Argentinian and the Italian-Brazilian comparisons can surely be at least partly explained.

In the case of Brazil, the first decade of the twentieth century saw the collapse of the coffee boom, a sharp deterioration in conditions on the coffee plantations, and the issuing by the Italian government of the Pirinetti decree outlawing the activities of the São Paulo recruiting agents in Italy.[14] These events led both to a sharp decline in Italian emigration to Brazil and to a rise in Italian repatriation from that country. It is thus entirely likely that some Italians who had taken out passports for emigration to Brazil did not in the event go there, but either stayed at home or substituted other destinations, including Argentina. Further, some of the Italians who left Brazil may have preferred to move on to other countries of immigration rather than return direct to Italy. Such choices would help to explain not only the inflation of Italian emigration data relative to Brazilian immigration data but also, since Argentinian statistics were based on alien arrivals by nationality irrespective of country of last residence, the continued inflation of Argentinian immigration relative to Italian emigration numbers.

In the case of the Italian-Argentinian comparison there is however another factor at work, and that is the emergence of an annual movement of Italians seeking seasonal work in the Argentinian harvests — the *golondrinas*. Since Argentinian data were based on all alien arrivals, whether or not it was their first entry to the country, the *golondrinas* would be more fully recorded than in Italian data based on the application for or issue of a passport which could be used for up to three annual trips.

The temptation is irresistible to present at this point two pieces of arithmetical *legerdemain* which the reader should be warned against taking too seriously: the most that can be said

[14] Monbeig, 1952, pp. 95-100; Normano, 1935, pp. 197-201; Bartolotti, 1953, pp. 79-80; and see Essay 1, fn. 14.

for them, which is not much, is that they are not obviously more foolish than many other and more sophisticated essays in quantitative economic history. Suppose, first, that but for the source of "inflation" mentioned in the second last paragraph, Italian *emigration* data would have exceeded Brazilian *immigration* data over the years 1901-14 by the same margin as in the case of the U.S.A., say by a factor of 1.14. This suggests a hypothetical value for the Italian figure of emigration to Brazil of 361,395 (= 317,013 × 1.14.) Then suppose that the difference between this and the figure actually shown in Table 1, that is 45,784 (= 407,179 — 361,395) corresponds with the number of Italians who had taken out passports for Brazil but went to Argentina. We then subtract this number from the Argentinian figure of Italian immigrants, 1901-14, to align that total more closely, conceptually, with the Italian figure for emigration to Argentina: 1,039,548 (= 1,085,332 — 45,784.) Next, suppose that but for the complication of the *golondrinas* making multiple trips to Argentina on the one passport, the Italian measure of emigration to Argentina would again have been the same multiple of the Argentinian measure of the inflow, namely 1.14, as in the case of Italian emigration to the United States. Hence but for the *golondrinas* we should have looked for an Italian emigration figure of 1,185,084 (= 1,039,548 × 1.14.) The difference between this and the recorded figure is 199,292 (= 1,185,084 — 985,792.) This, then, is the estimated number of *golondrinas* entering Argentina for the second or third time on a passport acquired in a preceding year, and therefore recorded in the Argentinian immigration but not in the Italian emigration data. Allow finally for the *golondrinas* entering on a *new* passport (i.e., every third year) and we have a total *golondrina* inflow over the year 1901-14 of 298,939 $\left(= 199{,}292 \times \frac{3}{2}.\right)$.

Is it plausible that *golondrina* movements over the years 1901-14 should have totalled some 300,000, or an average of between

21,000 and 22,000 annually? Scobie has suggested an annual movement of *golondrinas* in the 1900s of 100,000,[15] but on all counts this is undoubtedly a gross overestimate. Our second piece of " arithmetical legerdemain " permits a check, by using the *Commissariato dell'Emigrazione* figures of Italian emigrants sailing from the four Italian ports authorised for that traffic by the law of 1901, or from Le Havre. The advantage of these figures, apart from the fact that they were calculated from a different statistical source and by a different government agency, is that their presentation in monthly totals permits the charting of *seasonal* patterns of migration, something evidently impossible when the basis of the statistics is the issue of a passport which will be followed by the actual act of emigration, if at all, only after an unknown interval.

It is quite obvious from these statistics, as indeed one would expect, that emigration to the U.S.A. peaked in the northern spring, especially in March and April, when seasonal employment in North America was picking up after the winter, whereas in the case of Latin America the peak outflow came towards the end of the year, as the Italian harvest season ended and that of the southern hemisphere was about to begin. In the case of sailings to the River Plate the seasonal peak in the months September to January inclusive is extremely marked and regular.

Suppose we make two assumptions: that all *golondrinas* left Italy between September and January inclusive, and that there was no seasonal " bunching " of non-*golondrina* emigration to the River Plate. Then for each year we can subtract the monthly average outflow for the period February to August inclusive from the monthly average for September to January inclusive and multiply by five to calculate a *golondrina* outflow for each February to January year. This has been done for the years (February) 1902 / (January) 1903 to 1913/14 inclusive — the first-

[15] Scobie, 1964, pp. 60-1.

mentioned being the earliest year for which the data are available. Omitting 1911/12, the average annual *golondrina* outflow suggested is a little less than 37,500. (1911/12 is omitted because the data appear to be incomplete, exaggerating sharply the admittedly considerable decline in Italian emigration to the Argentine known to have occurred in 1911. The shortfall of the figures appears to relate particularly to the second half of the year, and the technique applied actually suggests a *negative* value for the outflow of *golondrinas* in September 1911/January 1912!)

The apparent conflict between the 37,500 *p.a.* outflow suggested by this technique and the 21,000 to 22,000 suggested by the earlier exercise can be substantially narrowed if we allow for three factors which have all tended to inflate the former figure relative to the latter. (1) The two years omitted, that is 1901/02 and 1911/12, were both undoubtedly years of much below-average *golondrina* outflow, the earlier year because the *golondrina* movement did not get into its stride until about the middle of the first decade of the century. (The outflow for 1902/03 estimated from the port figures was less than 11,000.) The inclusion of figures for these years would therefore bring the average down. (2) The first exercise relates to Italian emigration to Argentina alone, whereas the shipping figures are of travel to the River Plate, and thus include the small but not negligible Italian emigration to Uruguay and Paraguay also. (3) The second assumption underlying the second exercise, namely that non-*golondrina* movement was spread evenly over the year, is not fully justified, as undoubtedly there was a certain tendency for "permanent" Italian emigration to Argentina also to be seasonally "bunched", as with emigration to the U.S.A. The estimates by the second technique therefore overstate the September-January outflow of *golondrinas* alone. In combination, these three factors must explain a substantial though in the last resort unknown fraction of the difference between our two estimates, all of them pulling the larger of the two down. At

least, therefore, we can say that the two estimates agree in suggesting that Scobie's estimate of a *golondrina* outflow of 100,000 per annum is far too high. Indeed, this could hardly be otherwise, as the *total* annual repatriation of Italians from the River Plate ports, including of course those who had been there for a longer stay than just the summer months, very rarely reached 50,000, let alone 100,000.

Let us return to our discussion of the broader comparison between Italian and receiving country data. How similar are the pictures of Italian emigration to these three countries painted by these different sets of figures, leaving on one side the not inconsiderable differences revealed in Table 5 in the indications they furnish of the total cumulative outflow? The equations resulting from regressing Italian emigration data on the receiving country's annual immigration figures are given in Table 6, computing the periods 1879 (or 1878) to 1900 and 1901 to 1914 separately to allow for the changes affecting the basis of the Italian statistics introduced in 1901. The coefficients of determination show that with one exception there is a quite close measure of agreement. Odd man out is the Italian-U.S. comparison for the early twentieth century. In this case it seemed possible that the difference in periodization could be significant, the U.S. statistic for " 1908 ", for example, relating in fact to the twelve-month period 1 July 1907 to 30 June 1908. Bearing this in mind, and also that there was a marked seasonal peak in emigration from Italy to the U.S.A. in the northern spring, a series of U.S. immigration from Italy, M'_{us}, was calculated by the formula:

$$M'_{us(t)} = \frac{(3xM_{us(t)}) + M_{us(t+1)}}{4}$$

The result of the regression based on this artefact are reported in Table 6 under U.S.A. (b'), and it is seen that a better fit is in fact obtained, though the resulting R^2 is still substantially lower than for any of the other five equations. It is the slightly diffe-

TABLE 6

REGRESSION OF SENDING ON RECEIVING COUNTRY ANNUAL MIGRATION STATISTICS, ITALY TO ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND THE U.S.A., 1879 (BRAZIL = 1878) TO 1900 AND 1901 TO 1914

E_i = Italian emigration (i = A, B, US)
M_r = receiving country immigration (r = A, B, US)
R^2 = coefficient of determination

I: *Argentina*

(*a*) *1879-1900*

$E_A = + 4{,}092 + (0.722)\, M_A$
$R^2 = 0.891$

(*b*) *1901-1914*

$E_A = 1{,}076 + (0.894)\, M_A$
$R^2 = 0.901$

II: *Brazil*

(*a*) *1878-1900*

$E_B = - 2{,}819 + (0.872)\, M_B$
$R^2 = 0.951$

(*b*) *1901-1914*

$E_B = + 638 + (1.256)\, M_B$
$R^2 = 0.893$

III: *U.S.A.*

(*a*) *1879-1900*

$E_{US} = + 468 + (0.775)\, M_{US}$
$R^2 = 0.899$

(*b*) *1901-1914*

$E_{US} = + 46{,}395 + (0.914)\, M_{US}$
$R^2 = 0.348$

(*b'*) *1901-1914*

$E_{US} = - 101{,}652 + (1.632)\, M'_{US}$
$R^2 = 0.653$

Source: Calculated from same data as Table 2.

rent total of Italian immigration resulting from this calculated series which is given in the final row of Table 5. It is noteworthy that the estimated constant and coefficient on M'_{US} in this second U.S. equation for 1901-14 are substantially different, both in size and in the case of the former, in sign, from those generated by the first such equation.

Judging by the R^2s it thus seems as if the fluctuations of Italian emigration are fairly similarly represented by Italian and by receiving country data, with the exception of emigration to the U.S.A. in the period 1901-14. Visual inspection of the six pairs of graphs, however, suggested that this conclusion might

need to be qualified. It appeared that for the later nineteenth century the relatively high value of the coefficient of determination might have been generated partly by the success of both series, in each case, in capturing the strong *trend* movements — a fairly smooth, almost monotonic increase in the case of Italian emigration to the U.S.A.; and an even sharper rise, in the case of the two South American countries, to peaks in the late 1880s (Argentina) or the early 1890s (Brazil), with fluctuations about a declining trend thereafter. While both series, in each case, replicate these broad features, the year-to-year correspondence within each of the pairs seemed less marked, particularly in the cases of Argentina and the U.S.A.

To test for this possibility the coefficients of determination were re-calculated, for each country and each period, using the first differences between annual values rather than the raw data. The results are as follows:

		Raw data	First differences
Italy to			
Argentina	(1)	0.891	0.787
	(2)	0.901	0.875
Brazil	(1)	0.951	0.947
	(2)	0.893	0.831
U.S.A.	(1)	0.899	0.584
	(2)	0.653	0.734

(1) = late nineteenth century; (2) = early twentieth century.

As can be seen, the suspicions provoked by the graph are confirmed to the extent that the coefficients of the first-difference series are appreciably lower, for the later nineteenth century, in the case both of Argentina and (more markedly) of the U.S.A. In the case of Brazil there is no significant difference. In the twentieth century, there is again a slightly lower degree of correspondence on the first-difference basis for both Argen-

tina and Brazil, but for the U.S.A., the agreement between the two series is actually closer on the first-difference basis.

The conclusions to be drawn from the coefficients presented are twofold. First, any calculations based on year-to-year changes in the volume of emigration to American countries must be somewhat sensitive to whether Italian or receiving country data are used, at least for Argentina (later nineteenth century) and, more particularly, for the U.S.A. (both periods). Second, it comes perhaps as something of a shock to note that when the Italian statistics are used as a touchstone — and there is no obvious reason why they should be less accurate for migration to the U.S.A. than for migration to the Latin American countries — it is the U.S. statistics which, of the three receiving countries, are most under suspicion of waywardness. Certainly the changes which occurred over this period in the conceptual bases of the collection — a feature not, as far as is known, paralleled in the South American countries — may well be partly responsible; but the suspicion that the U.S. immigration data are not as superior in reliability as one might have assumed must remain.

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It is well known that the proportions in which Italian emigrants selected various destinations changed over time. For example, taking only the three major countries of extra-European destination, Argentina, Brazil and the U.S.A., Italian emigrants departed for these countries during the years 1881-86 in the proportions 52.2 percent, 16.4 percent and 31.4 percent respectively.[16] By 1908-13 both South American countries were receiving much smaller proportions of the (larger) total outflow, while the per-

[16] All of the statistics in this section of this Essay are calculated from *Annuario Statistico della Emigrazione Italiana, dal* 1876 *al* 1925, Commissariato Generale dell'Emigrazione, Rome, 1926.

centage bound for the United States had more than doubled: 22.7 percent, 6.7 percent and 70.5 percent respectively. At each of these dates, the *national* distribution of emigrants as between these three countries can, of course, be regarded as the average of the distribution for each of any geographical subdivisions into which the country might be partitioned, weighted by the share of each subdivision in total emigration to the three countries combined. Correspondingly, the *change* in the national distribution between any pair of dates may be regarded as a composite of the effect of changes in the choice of destinations by emigrants from each subdivision, and of changes in the relative total numbers of emigrants from such subdivisions.

We should not expect either of these possible sources of change to be unimportant. As to the first, the appeal of the United States of America increased and that of the two Latin American countries declined, over the 27-year interval under consideration, in most (but not all) places, though the broad pattern of regional preferences was preserved. As to the second, we note that the proportion of emigrants to these three countries choosing the U.S.A. in 1881-86 ranged from 95.7 percent in Insular Italy to 8.8 percent in the North (76.3 and 46.5 percent respectively in 1908-13), while those choosing Argentina from these two regions were respectively 3.7 and 77.6 percent in 1881-86 and 21.5 and 42.8 percent in 1908-13. Given such persistent (though narrowing) regional disparities as to destination, it must have been significant that over the 27-year interval in question the contribution of the North to total Italian emigration to the three countries fell from 45.6 to 17.5 percent, while that of Insular Italy rose from 2.9 to 24.0 percent.

It is therefore worth asking the question: *how far* is the change between the two periods in the national distribution of destinations to be explained by changes in the preferences of emigrants as to destination within each of a set of geographical subdivisions; and, *how far* by changes in the relative contributions of these

subdivisions to the total national outflow? An answer to this question can be found by contructing two *hypothetical* distributions for the later period, and comparing each with the actual distribution for the earlier period. The first hypothetical distribution is calculated by combining the total (actual) 1908-13 numbers of emigrants from the various regions (always to the three major American countries only) with the 1881-86 percentage distributions of destinations *within* regions, and the second by combining the 1881-86 total numbers of emigrants from the various regions with the actual 1908-13 intra-regional distribution of destinations. Comparing the first hypothetical 1908-13 distribution with the 1881-86 actual distribution reveals the change due to changing relative numbers of emigrants from the various regions, while comparing the second hypothetical distribution with the 1881-86 actual one reveals the change due to changing intra-regional preferences as to destination. The outcome of these calculations is summarised in Table 6, based upon data concerning emigration from the 16 *regioni* of which Italy was then composed.

The figures are shown, for convenience, in percentage terms. Lines 1 and 2 give the actual national distribution of emigration to the three countries for the two periods, and line 3 shows the difference between them. The first hypothetical 1908-13 calculation, as defined above, is shown on line 4, and the difference between that and the 1881-86 actual distribution (i.e., the change due to changing regional origins of *total* migration alone) in line 5. Similarly, line 6 shows the second hypothetical 1908-13 distribution and line 7, again by subtraction from the 1881-86 actual figures, the effect of changing intra-regional preferences as to destination alone. It will be noticed that the effects of these two 'hypothetical' changes do *not* sum to the observed change between the two periods for any of the three countries. This is because each of the two hypothetical 1908-13 distributions rests on the *ceteris paribus* assumption, that no other change had taken place. In actual fact, *both* sorts of change occurred

TABLE 6

THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITALIAN EMIGRATION TO THE U.S.A., BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA
(Percentages)

	U.S.A.	Brazil	Argentina
1. Actual, 1881-86	31.38	16.41	52.20
2. Actual, 1908-13	70.54	6.72	22.74
3. Change (= 2 — 1)	+ 39.16	— 9.69	— 29.46
4. Hypothetical 1908-13 (1)	51.45	13.64	34.90
5. Hypo. change (1) (= 4 — 1)	+ 20.07	— 2.77	— 17.30
6. Hypothetical 1908-13 (2)	60.08	9.40	30.52
7. Hypo. change (2) (= 6 — 1)	+ 28.70	— 7.01	— 21.68
8. Actual change 1881-86 to 1908-13 (= 3)	+ 39.16	— 9.69	— 29.46
9. Change due to changes in total emigration from each *regione*, destination preferences within *regioni* remaining constant (= 5) (% of row 8)	+ 20.07 (+ 51.25%)	— 2.77 (— 28.59%)	— 17.30 (— 58.72%)
10. Change due to changes in preferences as to destination within *regioni*, total emigration remaining constant (= 7) (% of row 8)	+ 28.70 (+ 73.29%)	— 7.01 (— 72.34%)	— 21.68 (— 73.59%)
11. Interaction (= 3 — 5 — 7) (% of row 8)	— 9.61 (— 24.54)	+ 0.09 (+ 0.93%)	+ 9.52 (+ 32.31%)

simultaneously, thus leading to a third source of variation resulting from the 'interaction' between the two. The magnitude of this 'interaction effect' can be assessed by adding the two 'hypothetical' effects, calculated as described, and subtracting them from the actual change. For convenience, the salient results are shown seriatim in lines 8 to 11.*

* An exposition of Table 4 in algebraic terms is provided in the *Appendix*.

It can be seen that in the case of all three countries both "primary" effects worked in the same direction. That is to say, the change in the destinations of Italian migrants as between the U.S.A., Brazil and Argentina over the interval 1881-86 to 1907-13 is to be explained *both* by changes in the preferences of emigrants from the various regions for these three competing destinations, *and* by changes in the *regional* sources of emigration within Italy — changes which favoured those areas which, in both periods, were particularly prone to generate emigrants to the U.S.A. and disfavoured those from which the Latin American states drew the bulk of their recruits. In combination these two factors, it will be noticed, *over*-explain the observed change, so that the interaction term has in the case of all three countries the opposite sign to that of both the explicandum and the explananda.

For Italian migration to the United States, for example, these results may be interpreted in the following manner: Italian emigration to the U.S.A. increased *both* because in most individual regions that country gained in attraction as compared with Argentina and Brazil, *and* because Italian migration increased particularly rapidly from those parts of the country — roughly, the South and Sicily — which were always prone to favour the United States as a transatlantic destination. However, while the proportion of migrants favouring the U.S.A. was higher in nearly all regions in 1908-13 than in 1881-86, the *increase* in the popularity of the U.S.A. was on the whole somewhat less marked in the South than in the North. Since it was also Southern and Insular Italy which, again on the whole, registered the greatest increase in total transatlantic migration over this interval, the aggregate effect on Italian emigration to the U.S.A. was somewhat less dramatic than it would have been had the proportion of migrants favouring that country risen equally in all parts of Italy; hence the *negative* interaction term. The exegesis

of the results for the two South American countries is, of course, precisely the opposite of this in both cases.

On the basis of the results shown in lines 8 to 11 we are certainly entitled to say that in the case of all three countries, and particularly of the U.S.A. and Argentina, *both* factors contributed substantially to the overall national change in the distribution of Italian emigration between the major American destinations. In the case of Brazil, a relative decline in that country's attractiveness as a destination appears to have been much the more important factor — as we should expect on general grounds. However, two circumstances make it impossible to say, on the basis of these calculations, just what the proportionate contribution of the two factors to the result in question was. One is the ambiguity lying within the interaction term, which as the figures show was a far from insignificant influence on changes in the flow to at least the two major countries of immigration; it is conceptually unclear where to 'credit' the interaction term, or how to partition it between the two prime factors.

The second circumstance deserves more extended treatment. It is, that the particular geographical subdivision of the Italian Kingdom here employed — that is, the sixteen *regioni* of which it was then composed — is analytically arbitrary; and there are good grounds for thinking that a finer subdivision into a larger number of constituent parts would give a 'truer' approximation to the contribution of our two 'factors' to the observed change in total emigration to the three countries under study. The ideal system of subdivision would be one in which each and every component part was homogeneous with respect to the distribution of emigration from it by country of destination — that is to say, that no possible further subdivision could produce smaller geographical areas with distributions of emigration different from that of the whole of which they were constituent parts. Only this form of geographical partitioning would reveal the full effect of changing regional origins of migration; analysis

based on any less disaggregated subdivision, some of whose units at least were not homogeneous with respect to the distribution of migrants' destinations, is liable to understate the effect of this factor and, by the same token, to overstate that of changing intra-regional preferences.

Why this is so will be more readily grasped if we take an extreme example. Suppose we divide Italy into only two parts, one a single region (say, *Marche*), and the other, the remainder of the country. For this form of geographical split the partitioning of "factors" affecting emigration, based on exactly the same methodology as underlies Table 6, works out as follows:

	U.S.A.	Brazil	Argentina
Actual change, 1881-86 to 1908-13	+ 39.16	— 9.69	— 29.46
Changes due to total migrant numbers, destination-preferences within regions constant	— 0.53	— 0.27	+ 0.79
Changes due to changing destination-preferences, total numbers constant	+ 39.64	— 9.65	— 29.98
"Interaction effect"	+ 0.05	+ 0.23	— 0.27

It can be seen that changing preferences as to destination within these two "regions" account for virtually the whole of the changes in the distribution of total Italian emigration between these three countries. Changes in the proportions of total migration emanating from Marche and from the rest of Italy have very little effect (it is fortuitous that what effect there is, is in the wrong direction anyway in two out of the three cases) simply because most of the "changing origins" effect remains buried within the overwhelmingly large "rest-of-Italy" region. The interaction term, too, has only a weak influence since, by the same token, little 'interaction' is taking place.

Table 6 was based on data for the 16 *regioni* because this is the most disaggregated level on which the Italian official data

to which I had access classify emigration by country of destination. But there is reason to think that a higher level of disaggregation would further increase the explanatory power of the " changing numbers " factor and diminish that of the " changing destination-preferences " factor. (It is mathematically impossible that such disaggregation could diminish the former and increase the latter.) First, published statistics at a provincial (sub-*regione*) level of aggregation are available, but distinguish only between European and Mediterranean destinations on the one hand and trans-oceanic destinations on the other; they reveal sharp differences in the proportions of emigrants choosing these destinations as between provinces in the same *regione*. It is hard to believe that while preferences differed sharply from province to province as between Europe and overseas, they were uniform (within *regioni*) as between the chief overseas destinations. Secondly, the distribution of emigrants by country of destination varied sharply, in some cases, between *contiguous regioni*: for instance, in 1881-86 nearly 47 percent of total emigration from Venetia to our three countries went to Brazil, while in neighbouring Lombardy the proportion was less than 9½ percent. It is extremely hard to believe that *within* these *regioni* there were no internal variations in destination preference, given that *between* them there was such a large difference in respect of the same characteristic.

Leaving these issues unresolved, as we must, it is in any event quite a different matter to know to what extent we can regard changes in our two factors as having *caused* the variations which occurred in the overall distribution of Italian emigration. The discussion up to this point must be interpreted as relating to the question: how were changes in the relative numbers of emigrants from the 16 *regioni*, and in the destination-preferences of emigrants within each *regione*, *arithmetically related* to these variations? But a mathematical solution to this problem cannot be confidently and readily translated into a statement about *causation*; and this

is so, not merely because of the two difficulties we have already noted — the problem of allocating the 'interaction' term, and the dependence of the figures thrown up by the calculations on the quite arbitrary, and probably inappropriate, level of aggregation of the data on which they are based.

More fundamental than these is the fact that neither of the primary factors into which the total mathematical effect has been decomposed is an unambiguous measure or indicator of any single "cause" of changing migration behaviour. Take for example the increase in demand for immigrant labour which was generated by the United States' growing population and by its developing urbanisation and industrialization. The effect of this is not unambiguously measured, as might at first be thought, by the increase in the relative popularity of the United States within *regioni*. For that increase in demand could be expected both to persuade some who would otherwise not have emigrated at all to go the U.S.A. and to persuade some who would otherwise have gone to Argentina or Brazil to go to the U.S.A. instead. Both effects, of course, contribute to a shift in the distribution of destinations in favour of the United States; but one extra migrant to the U.S.A. who would otherwise have stayed at home does not have the same effect on the distribution of emigration as one extra migrant to the U.S.A. who would otherwise have gone to Brazil. Hence the observed change in the distribution of destinations is not an unambiguous measure of the influence of U.S. demand for labour — even supposing the demand from the other receiving countries to have remained constant, which to all apprearances it did not.

Equally, changes in the intensity of regional "push" factors within Italy — for example in the regional distribution of income or of employment opportunities — would be expected to affect initially the relative number of emigrants from the various *regioni*. But the various countries of immigration might well have differing elasticities of demand for immigrant labour

from a particular country, and a domestically-induced change in the relative numbers of total emigrants from each *regione* might well result therefore in changes also in the distribution of destinations revealed by each *regione*. Thus, again, this last cannot be interpreted as a reliable measure *uniquely* reflecting the effect of the changing demand emanating from a particular country of immigration.

Quite apart from such conceptual problems of interpretation a realistic view points up the need to consider other types of information if a meaningful analysis of causation is to be attempted. Consider, for example, this apparent paradox. As between the the years 1881-86 and 1908-13 the *relative* attraction of the U.S.A. to Italian trans-oceanic emigrants surely increased overall; yet the proportion of emigrants choosing the U.S.A. did not increase equally, over this period, in *all* of Italy's 16 *regioni*, and the increase was in general markedly greater in the North and Centre, whence there had been few U.S. migrants in the 1880s, than in the South and the islands. Indeed in Sicily, proportionally the biggest source of U.S. migrants in 1881-86, the percentage leaving for that country actually fell over the 27-year period from 95.9 to 78.5 percent. Conversely, the fall in the percentage leaving for Argentina was greater in the North than elsewhere, and in three *regioni* — Umbria, Sicily, and Sardinia — the proportion actually rose. (In absolute numbers, there was a three-fold rise in those leaving for Argentina in the later as compared with the earlier period, and an only slightly smaller increase in departures for Brazil. These facts alone, of course, prove unequivocally that we cannot interpret the overall increase in Italian emigration simply in terms of an expansion of the demand for labour in the United States, that is, of increasing U.S. " pull ".)

An implication of these facts is that there was a tendency over this interval towards a more uniform national distribution of destinations. This implication is directly confirmed by the figures shown in Table 7, which presents the (unweighted) means,

standard deviations, and coefficients of variation of the percentages of emigrants bound for each of the three countries from the 16 *regioni* in each of the two periods. It can be seen that the coefficient of variation falls sharply over the 27 years in every case. (It can also be seen that by the twentieth century, emigration to the U.S.A. was much more evenly distributed throughout Italy than that to either of the Latin American countries.)

TABLE 7

MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF PERCENTAGES OF EMIGRANTS CHOOSING ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, U.S.A., BY *REGIONI*, 1881-86 AND 1908-13

		1881/86	1908/13
U.S.A.	Mean	35.65	63.60
	SD	30.32	19.44
	CV	0.85	0.31
Brazil	Mean	19.19	7.90
	SD	19.99	5.61
	CV	1.04	0.71
Argentina	Mean	63.91	28.50
	SD	78.66	19.15
	CV	1.23	0.67

To what are we to ascribe this tendency towards a reduction in regional variations in destination preference? One pervasive and very important factor was surely the gradual diffusion of knowledge of opportunities in countries other than that to which emigration had principally been directed, in earlier decades, from each part of the country. In the last part I shall put forward *diffusion of knowledge* as a general explanation of the increase in rates of emigration from south and east Europe in the decades before World War One. The mechanism which will be propo-

sed is that " feedback " transmitted from earlier emigrants to relatives, neighbours and friends brought about a spread of information about opportunities elsewhere and an increased confidence in contemplating the idea of emigration which were necessary if the " potential ", so to speak, created by wide disparities of economic opportunity were to generate a mass movement. One consequence of this mechanism was that emigration spread gradually from pioneer centres of high intensity into other regions from which it had in early years been light or non-existent, departures from the pioneer centre itself meanwhile increasing more slowly or not at all, or indeed declining. Hence a reduction in regional disparities in total out-migration rates, as will be demonstrated at the end with the aid of Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients. In just the same way it is reasonable to suppose that in a country such as Italy, characterised at first by sharp regional differences in the *direction* (as well as the volume) of out-migration, the gradual spread of knowledge in each region about possible alternative destinations would lead to reduced inter-regional differences in destinations also.

Beyond this there were however some more specific developments which, in both Northern and Southern Italy, caused the originally *dis*favoured destination in each area to become more highly regarded. Italians from the South and from Sicily, as is well known, overwhelmingly favoured employment in the industrial or service sectors of their country of destination. Like the Irish, they associated agriculture with poverty and hardship, and anyway lacked both the capital and the skills to take up farming in a new land. They thus moved abroad in search of the urban employments which their birthplace did not adequately offer. At first exclusively, and always predominantly, this suggested the U.S.A. as the destination. But as urban populations grew and some development occurred of the secondary and tertiary sectors of South American economies, the cities of Buenos Aires and São Paulo, and perhaps to a much lesser extent Rio

de Janeiro and even Montevideo, emerged as competing attractions to the southern Italian.

It may seem that such cities as these, and such countries as Argentina and Brazil, can have offered but feeble competition to the U.S.A. in view of the massive industrial development and urban growth achieved by the latter in the half century before World War One. But a number of offsetting factors have to be borne in mind. First, the *quantitative* contribution of immigration, proportionally, to population and labour force growth was substantially larger in Argentina than in the U.S.A. (though it was smaller in Brazil.[17]) In Metropolitan Buenos Aires, the foreign-born were consistently two-fifths or more of the total population, and so far as adult males (over the age of 20) were concerned, they outnumbered natives by about 4 to 1 throughout the period 1869-1914.[18] Further, it was only in landowning, in politics and in public administration (and in domestic service!) that immigrants were under-represented; they were *over*represented, by contrast, not just amongst tenant-farmers, agricultural labourers, and wage-earners in the secondary and tertiary sectors, but also in the emerging middle-class of entrepreneurs, managers and professional workers in commerce, finance, industry, teaching and the arts.[19] Amongst this immigrant-dominated bourgeoisie the Italian held pride of place, and though I am not aware of any studies of occupational mobility of different nationalities such as would permit a careful comparison, it appears on a cursory view extremely probable that the Italian immigrant had a better chance of upward movement in Buenos Aires than in New York. Further, we know that amongst Italian immigrants to both Argentina and Brazil those from northern Italy continued to be disproportionately represented in the pro-

[17] Mortara, 1947, pp. 19-21.

[18] Germani, 1970, pp. 296, 308.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 301, 309; Alsina, 1910, p. 43. For Brazil, see E. Willems in UNESCO, 1955, pp. 128-9.

vinces and on the land, whereas the southern Italians, as in North America, congregated in the metropolitan centres.[20]

Simultaneously other developments were causing a higher proportion of North Italians to favour emigration to the U.S.A. Transatlantic emigrants from northern Italy had always been much more inclined than their southern compatriots to look overseas for employment on the land, and not just because of the chronological accident which had led to the forging of a particularly strong link between the Brazilian coffee highlands and Venetia. The North Italian farmer or agricultural worker, if hard hit by the trend of agricultural prices and technology, was yet not as impoverished or as disenchanted with farming as his southern counterpart, and more often responded to adversity in the manner of the Scandinavians, by searching out better opportunities on the land in those countries from which the competition was emanating. Further, the North Italian who *did* want to migrate in search of industrial or service employment traditionally did so, profiting from propinquity, by seasonal emigration to a neighbouring European country. Hence amongst the balance who went overseas, industrial and service workers were underrepresented. However, the massive increase in the U.S. urban and industrial sector inevitably induced a growing number of North Italians to try North America in preference to Europe, especially as the increase in the speed and comfort of the trans-Atlantic crossing and the decline of the fare relative to wage-rates made it attractive to undertake temporary emigration to the States, thus involving less of a break with the traditional pattern of non-permanent North Italian industrial emigration.

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[20] Foerster, 1919, pp. 258-67.

Appendix

THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITALIAN EMIGRATION (see Table 6)

The "decomposition" described in the text on p. 100 and given numerical values in Table 6 may be represented algebraically as follows. (Note: "total" emigration here means the sum of recorded emigration from Italy, or from its 16 constituent *regioni*, to Argentina, Brazil and the U.S.A.).

Define

x_i = percentage share of ith *regione* ($i = 1, 2 \ldots 16$) in total Italian emigration

a_{iy} = percentage share of total emigration from ith *regione* to yth country (y = Argentina, Brazil, U.S.A.)

^{0} = 1881-86
^{1} = 1908-13
} time superscripts

Then the percentage of total Italian emigration to the yth country in 1881-86 (Table 6, line 1)

$$= \sum_i x_i^0 a_{iy}^0$$

and in 1908-13 (line 2)

$$= \sum_i x_i^1 a_{iy}^1$$

and the change over time (line 3)

$$= \sum_i x_i^1 a_{iy}^1 - \sum x_i^0 a_{iy}^0.$$

This may be partitioned into

$$\sum_i (a_{iy}^0)(x_i^1 - x_i^0)$$
$$+ \sum_i (x_i^0)(a_{iy}^1 - a_{iy}^0)$$
$$+ \sum_i (x_i^1 - x_i^0)(a_{iy}^1 - a_{iy}^0)$$

and the three terms in this expression correspond respectively with lines 5 and 9, 7 and 10, and 11 of Table 6.