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## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

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C. B. BRETTEL, *Men Who Migrate, Women Who Wait - Population and History in a Portuguese Parish*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. XV, 329.

*Men Who Migrate, Women Who Wait* is the work of an American anthropologist well versed on Portuguese matters, and with previous important contributions to our understanding of the Portuguese culture. This time, Brettell's central theme is the impact of emigration on demographic patterns and gender roles, on a Portuguese parish (Lanheses) from 1700 to 1960. Accordingly, the book is divided into four major chapters dealing respectively with emigration, nuptiality, fertility and illegitimacy, preceded by a chapter on the socio-economic structure of the community being studied.

To analyze her topic and to build up her arguments, she combines archival sources — parish registers, electoral lists, *Rois da Desobriga* (lists of households kept by the priests), and wills — with ethnographic fieldwork and puts both to good use. This combination allows her, for example, to explore household formation (chp. III) quite creatively. The tabulation of the temporal evolution of the several types of household, gathered from the Census and the *Rois da Desobriga*, are a first step to a deeper analysis of the complex and wide variety of adaptive strategies in household arrangements Lanhesens went through in their life spans. In this last step, Brettell ably uses wills and family reconstitution to argue that although neolocality and nuclearity are cultural ideals (and the most statistically prevalent type of household during the time period studied), they cannot be readily identified with cultural norms. Recreating through case histories different types of household formation, she documents a diversity of situations — the absence of the husband (male migration), the need to care for

elderly parents, or the availability of housing — which lead Lanheses' people to different types of household arrangement during one life span. They demonstrate, she argues, a practicality that at times made extended and multiple households very satisfactory economic arrangements.

Brettell is at her best when discussing the intricate relationship between emigration and demographic phenomena (chp. III-V). An assessment of the stage of knowledge concerning these topics, and the comparison with other community studies allows her to pin-point the similarity and diversity of demographic behaviour and of women's roles in Lanheses vis-à-vis other European communities. Brettell concludes that, because emigration from this area occurs within an ideology of return and, for centuries, as part of the daily life of this community, similar demographic outcomes in Lanheses and other European communities do not necessarily have the same meaning.

In summary, her main conclusions on the relationship between emigration, demographic phenomena and sex roles in Lanheses, are as follows: 1. male migration was part of the region's "cultural ethos and social strategy" from at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. This constant absence of a male segment from the parish created the necessary conditions for women to take over roles ascribed to men in other communities — farm labourers and/or heads of household; 2. although leaving with the firm intention of returning, many single Lanheses' men never came back or they came back later in life. This *de facto* situation biased the sex ratio making marriage impossible for an important percentage of women while raising ages at marriage for those that eventually married; 3. because emigration was a common social strategy to improve one's socio-economic status, married males also represented an important share of the migratory flow. This situation helped to lower the number of conceptions within married couples, by diminishing the "period at risk" of married females. In other words, until at least the 1930's, Lanheses' female fertility spans were "artificially" lowered by male migration and not by any conscious attempts to reduce births by the married population; 4. Finally, in a community where migration took place with the idea of return, promises of marriage went several times unfulfilled. The possibility of women caring for themselves and society's acceptance of children born out-of-wedlock further strengthened the propensity to have illegitimate children in this Portuguese parish.

Brettell is not as comfortable in the two first chapters as she is in the rest of her book. When for example she discusses emigration from Lanheses in the broader context of emigration from Portugal she mentions the main positions on this topic but she does not substantially discuss them.

From the reading of her book, it is however clear she has a lot more to say on this subject. Furthermore, there is a major inconsistency in what we are told in Chapter I and II concerning the migratory movement from Lanheses. Either the major period of out-migration occurred between 1864-1878 at levels only attained in the 1950's and 1960's, as the data presented on Table 1.1 (p. 20) indicate, or they occurred "between 1878 and 1890 and again between 1900 and

1911" as we are told on page 92. What is wrong, in this case, are the net-migration rates of Table 1.1. With incomplete and unreliable data, the standard technique used for their computation yields poor or, as in this case, totally erroneous results.

Overall, this is certainly a small flaw in an otherwise excellent work. The study which makes an important contribution to our understanding of a subject which still remains in large part unexplored, and which by its broad thematic scope and comparative framework will appeal to a wide range of scholars.

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L. E. DAVIS and R. A. HUTTENBACK, *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912* (Interdisciplinary perspectives on Modern History), Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sidney, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 394.

This is an impressive collaboration between a cliometrician (Davis) and a political historian who worked together over 10 years, with 21 research assistants, presumably at one time and another, to test the Lenin-Hobson thesis that financial imperialism was a response to the falling rate of profit at home. The amount of material collected and processed was prodigious, collected in far more than the 70-plus enumerated tables, some ranging over 4 or more pages. Chapters deal with the economics of imperialism, statistics of capital exports from 1870 to the eve of the first World War, the profitability of British business and of lending abroad, government expenditures on behalf of business, on defence, and on other subsidies to Empire investment, the distribution of costs and benefits of Empire within Britain, and the political forces shaping the whole. The elaborate exercise concludes that within Britain, the middle class paid and the elite reaped the benefits. Also benefiting was business abroad, apart from the Indian textile industry, especially in the self-governing parts of the Empire which paid nothing for their own defence. Davis and Huttenback deny, however, that foreign investment starved British industry of capital.

The amount of statistical material masticated and digested on spread sheets staggers the imagination. This is accompanied by material from four pages worth of registers from colonial office archives, almost a hundred collections of private papers, and a random sample of more than 400 company records, not to mention a 24-page bibliography. The reader is dazzled by the historiographical virtuosity displayed. A dogged sceptic might wonder how robust the statistical results are to the many necessary assumptions to overcome gaps in the data or inherent in *ex post* instead of *ex ante* data, whether the moderate redistribution

of income within Britain found by the authors was intended or merely happened as a result of the political forces supporting imperial designs, and whether more attention should not be paid to the public-good quality of the Empire and the free-riding overseas empire, except for India.

There are many fascinating sides to the story. The major subsidy to the Empire was defence. But the mother country found itself unable to overcome the reluctance, even refusal of the self-governing parts of the Empire, and some of the dependent colonies through their governors-general, to bear any of the cost of defence. The authors claims that Britain paid more for defence, its own and that of the Empire, than other developed countries,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times the average and more than twice as much as France and Germany, evokes the thesis of Paul Kennedy in *The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers* (New York, Random House, 1987) that empires collapse because of spending too much on military adventure and defence. The reason that Britain held back from pushing harder to distribute the burden more equitably, it is said, is because of the failure of a similar attempt in 1775 and 1776.

Just as there were two defence establishments, so there were two capital markets, one in London lending abroad, the other in the provinces investing in British enterprise. The book claims that British enterprise was more profitable than the conventional wisdom has it, and more profitable than business in the Empire. There is a fascinating study of tax revenues by source for Britain, the dependent Empire, self-governing Empire and foreign countries, developed and underdeveloped, that is used to make the point that the middle class paid the subsidy and the elite of peers and gentry collected it. The biggest winners, however, were the businessmen in the Empire, lightly taxed, ready to impose tariffs on British goods. The exception here was India where the India Office, at the behest of Manchester, forbade the Indian Civil Service to impose a tax on cotton textile imports, even when the protective effect was negated by an equivalent tax on domestic production.

In spite of the brilliance of the acres of tables, difficult to recapture because of the absence of an index to tables in the table of contents, this observer ends up with a feeling that Schumpeter is more right than Lenin, and the Empire can be looked upon as a public good, for which the country as a whole was willing to pay in its pride. There are hints of this (e.g. p. 305), but the case is not made strongly, as for example in the case of France by Henry Brunschwig (*Mythes et réalités de l'impérialisme colonial français, 1871-1914*, Paris, Colin, 1960) who quotes d'Etournelles de Constant as saying in a speech against colonies "First the joy of conquest, and then the necessity to pay." Public goods theory also helps explain the dependent and independent colonies unwilling to pay because of free riding.

The book will be combed for material and insight for a long time. It has already been reprinted in 1987. I suggest, however, that in the next printing a little more justice be done to E.J. Hobsbawm whose name is misspelled in two

different ways on pp. 346 and 358, and then omitted altogether from the bibliography.

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A.C. FRERIS *The Greek Economy in the Twentieth Century* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986, pp. iii + 226.

Modern Greek history is characterized by a consistent continuation of drama, tragedy, resistance, and survival. Indeed, Greece during the twentieth century has experienced two World Wars, the Balkan War, the Asia Minor catastrophe, a brutal civil war, several military dictatorships, unconstitutional manoeuvres by the royal family, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The apparent plethora of political events during the period 1920-1980 forced Freris to put economics second in emphasis. Obviously, the spectacular episodes in modern Greece attract the attention of every political scientist; economists, though, would judge differently the six chapters of Freris's book. Thus, the title of the book in its present form is misleading given that two-thirds of the material covers sociopolitics with each chapter set in a chronological order per decade.

The lengthy *Introduction* is succeeded by Chapter One which deals with the turbulent 1920's and the Asia Minor tragedy; Chapter Two is engaged with the depression of the 1930's; WWII is the main theme of Chapter Three, while Greek reconstruction and development efforts are in Chapter Four. A discussion on economic 'take-off' and the widening horizons of Greece after her association with EEC cover Chapter Five and Six respectively.

The introductory part should study agriculture, commerce, shipping, manufacturing, the rural underemployment problem, the despotism of the oligarchy, and the oppression of landlords on the peasant majority of the Greek population. Freris describes the revolt against Turks, the role of monarchy, the leadership of Venizelos and his contribution to democracy, the Balkan War and WWI, the Asia Minor catastrophe, and the social repercussions of successive dictatorships. Discussions of those events are easily found elsewhere.

Interestingly, Freris provides a good analysis of Greek modernization after the revolt against Turkey, and questions the contribution of the International Commission of Economic Control (ICEC) in Greece which forced the Greek government to provide all payments to this Commission in physical gold even during periods of extreme foreign exchange instability or rapid devaluation of the drachma. Characteristically, in March 1941, one month before Germany occupied Greece, ICEC commissioners in the Bank of Greece continued to

remit gold payments abroad. The analysis of the landlord system (*tsifliki*) is, from a pedagogical point of view, very constructive.

The disaster of Asia Minor generated an inflow of refugees to Greece; the resettlement problem was gigantic considering that 1,221,849 Greeks and 45,000 Armenians congregated in wretched camps and squatter villages. Without any detailed elaboration, Freris claims that "the influx of refugees in itself had no specific economic effect." Although a brief reference on some cost/benefit analysis is made, I did not find any quantifications.

In a trivial analysis on monetary developments and the foundation of the Bank of Greece, the author looks at a few trees but ignores the forest. He concludes that a) foreign investment perpetuated the BOP deficit; b) direct foreign investment made little difference to Greece's economic development; and c) this economic dependence on overseas sources produced a political dependence as well. Overall, Chapter One is confusing by touching too many subjects.

The financial crisis of the early 1930's, the country's fourth default, and various banking manoeuvres start Chapter Two. Foreign investment during the interwar period proved to be unimportant for Greek development due to their substantial repatriation of capital, interest, and profits.

With respect to the Balance of Payments (BOP), only a brief reference is devoted to Greek exports, to seamen's contribution (which helped finance more than 50 percent of the BOP deficit in the 1930's) and to the Greek "diaspora"—Greeks overseas. Freris is not well informed by stating that BOP figures for Greece before 1928 are scarce. They are not; relevant figures for Greek imports and exports exist disaggregated by value, volume, per country of destination and origin and per commodity since 1850, all being available on request from this author. As a funny anecdote, Freris quotes a segment of a speech by the Finance minister in early 1930's: "I am completely indifferent towards industry. Indeed, industry causes problems in the balancing of the budget for the simple reason that it causes fewer goods to be imported and therefore, less tariff revenues for the state." Although government intervention was more of a paternalistic type, fiscal irresponsibility of the state is to be blamed for all economic ills.

More than half a million Greeks perished during WWII which was succeeded by a civil war which could have been prevented by Britain. In March 1947, the vacuum left by the British was promptly filled by the U.S. when the right-wing government was well established. The reduction of Marshall aid to Greece in September 1950 (from 14.9 percent of Greek GNP to 1.9 percent in 1957) limited the extent by which industry could be re-equipped at the same moment that defence expenditure were accelerating. A summary of Chapter Four, the first in the book, is helpful.

Under a strange heading (the take-off that never was), Chapter Five is probably the only source of economic information. Despite state intervention, the government did leave industrial investment in the hands of the private sector. The importance of dwellings is marked, but estimates on ICOR and K/L ratios

in the Greek economy are absent. During the 1960's and 1970's, agriculture made relatively slow progress with its population falling from 56 percent in 1951 to 30 percent in 1970. Industrial exports, as a percentage of the total, increased from 3.5 percent in 1961 to over 50 percent by 1980, a rise of more than 1450 percent. Receipts from tourism and remittances from emigrants made up half of the visible deficit; shipping's contribution was another 27 percent. Since 25 percent of all industrial exports are energy-intensive, increases in exports will not necessarily reduce the trade deficit. Also, given the high proportion of fixed investment devoted to construction, "increases in investment associated with an upswing in the business cycle will have an immediate adverse impact on the BOP." Given that multinational firms are to be blamed partially for the absence of a genuine take off into industrialization, Freris should mention that Greece is the only country protecting foreign corporations in its constitution!

The last Chapter (Six) is completely dedicated to the Greek full association with EEC in 1981. Since the price elasticity of demand for Greek exports is quoted to be approximately equal to one, Freris concludes that Greek exports will have to compete via quality, standardization, and marketing rather than by price alone. The Greek Memorandum to EEC in March 1982 on tariffs, VAT, tariff harmonization, and industrial imports deserved more attention. It is disappointing that Freris does not bother to show any econometric evidence on the trade diversion and trade creation; simply, he finishes his book by stating that "EEC turned out to be neither a panacea nor the instrument of destruction of the Greek economy."

The author ignores important references on education, tradition, the labyrinth of bureaucracy and favouritism, the strong family-orientation of firms, and the heavy industrial concentration in the metropolitan vicinity of Athens. The text does not offer any policy recommendations. Econometric studies on the Greek economy are markedly absent while all references are exclusively of Greek origin with the selected bibliography of 14 references being too poor. Econometric estimates cannot be ignored even by texts of this nature; the word "regression" is found only once in a footnote of this book.

Two more items are disturbing: a) statistical tables are scattered in an unorganized manner making the reading uncomfortable; the material of these tables is readily available not only in Greek sources but in international publications; b) Greek titles of books and organizations expressed in English look funny.

I am sympathetic to Freris' thesis on foreign involvements in Greek affairs, the ineffective and corrupt performance of several "appointed" administrations, the input of multinationals in Greece, and the fact that repeated loans generated political domination by the creditors. His optimism about the future is equally shared if self-determination prevails.

The aforementioned criticisms by no means intend to discredit Freris who uses an elegant and articulate style, strict language on valid criticisms, and exhibits experience and knowledge of Greek affairs. A revision of the book,

though, should incorporate, at least, more economics and empirical econometric conclusions on the Greek experience.

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P. HALL, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, 341 pp.

This is a very good book about the making of economic policy. It argues strongly for the linkages between politics and economics, between state and society, between national and international economies. It also exhibits a strong theoretical bent. The post-1945 record of economic decision-making in Britain and France provides empirical data for an attempt at middle-range model-building. In order to design such a model this study carries on a running debate with alternative theories of state action such as functional analysis. The author proposes an institutional model as the best way of explaining distinctive national patterns of public policy. Such a quasi-historical approach by an American political scientist should be applauded by historians.

Peter Hall opens his study with a succinct, yet critical, survey of current theories of state action. He then examines the problem of Britain's long-term economic decline; the patterns of postwar British economic policy stressing the rise and fall of Keynesianism; and follows with an appraisal of Thatcher's conservative experiment. France is handled differently. Hall focuses on the evolution of economic planning as a paradigm for postwar policy and follows with a chapter on Mitterrand's socialist experiment that parallels the Thatcher chapter. His study builds to these two contemporary efforts at transformation and his judgments on these experiments is remarkably fair-minded. The closing chapters synthesize the narrative analysis into a model of institutional explanation.

Hall's principal achievement is to demonstrate that the making of economic policy in these two countries (and by logical extension elsewhere as well) is "a quintessentially political process" (p. 229). He shows how it is less economic rationale, or economic experts, or economic doctrine that determine policy than it is the political process, or more precisely, the institutionalized distribution of power in society. Thus Hall identifies five "organizational" variables as the basis of decision-making. These are: the organization of labour, capital, and the state; the political system; and the place of the nation in the international economy. He contends a proper comprehension of these variables provides some predictive capacity about policy outcomes. In most, but not all, instances Hall's approach works. It yields sound, perceptive, retrospective explanations though

not necessarily original ones. For example, he attributes British determination to maintain the sterling exchange rate to the organization of capital and the state, e.g., the international orientation of the City of London and the relative autonomy of the Bank of England.

"Organization" is crucial for Hall's analysis since he argues the organization of socio-economic relations, which encompass the state, determines national patterns of economic policy, e.g. the French state-led pattern. But he employs the term "organization" in a special manner. When, for example, he writes "the British Treasury has simply not been organized in such a way as to render key economic-decision-makers especially sensitive to industrial interests" (p. 264), "organized" suggests Treasury traditions and attitudes. Thus organization carries a broad historical meaning. The author acknowledges the historical character of his thesis yet prefers to cast his presentation in the language of social science.

Such an extensive comparative analysis requires high-level generalizations. Usually Hall's generalizations ring true. At times, however, he oversimplifies. In writing, for example, that "stimulating investment above all else" characterized macroeconomic policy under the Fourth and Fifth Republics (p. 244) he slights the stiff counter-currents to investment. If, on balance, France leaned toward investment this outcome was invariably the result of a process marked by struggle, setbacks, compromises, and inconsistency. In his search for sharp characterization and explanation of policy Hall on occasion omits nuance and complexity.

In his discussion of France Hall selects planning to represent postwar policy. This may not have been the best choice since so much decision-making escaped the Plan even during its prime. And by the mid-1960s it had begun its fall from grace. The author acknowledges this growing marginality of planning and discusses the importance of other agents and other controls which often contradicted the goals of planning. Yet he insists that the Plan was "the centerpiece of French strategy" which is dubious (p. 140). He might have been wiser to relegate the Plan to a lesser place among the several policy-brokers and to conceive it as one actor and programme within a more complex and continually evolving system of bureaucratic and political give-and-take. Moreover, several of Hall's interpretations of planning, e.g., that it "generated" business power or contributed to fragmenting the state, are questionable.

There is an inviting and paradoxical quality to this study's conclusions. While Hall insists on the quintessentially political nature of economic policy-making, politicians and political parties (especially for France) are not central actors in the story. Though this is a study of state intervention the narrative ends with the recession of the state and the turn to the market under Thatcher and Mitterrand. And while both these governments basically failed in their attempts at socio-economic transformation, in Hall's view there is still reason to believe the political system can innovate and overturn structures. If this book does not furnish many novel findings for economic historians it offers a persuasive

synthesis of postwar policy and it wisely directs the attention of social scientists toward institutions and toward the linkages between politics and economics.

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C. LIS, *Social Change and The Labouring Poor. Antwerp 1770-1860*. New Haven and London. Yale University Press, 1986. Pp. xii, 237.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the city of Antwerp had become an industrial centre. Close to 50 percent of its labour force was employed in textile manufacturing. The principal branches of the textile industry were weaving of linen, cotton, and mixed cloth, lace making, cotton printing, and silk weaving.

By 1820 the cotton textile industry had collapsed. Unlike the nearby Flemish city of Ghent, Antwerp did not experience an Industrial Revolution. Its cotton, lace, and other textile industries shrank, and very little of them was left by mid-nineteenth century. Perhaps the explanation resides in Antwerp's advantage in commerce and finance. The city was becoming a first-rank port, with easy connections to the sea and good dock facilities.

The decline of textiles and the rise of port-related activities form the background of this study, whose focus is on the social consequences of these economic trends. The documentation relies on a variety of unpublished sources, particularly from poor-relief institutions. The shift from textiles to port-related work implied the decline of "honourable" crafts and the growth of casual labour. The population of Antwerp doubled between 1800 and 1860. There was a shift towards more seasonal, less regular employment, and towards work demanding more physical force, less skill. The author argues that there was a massive impoverishment of the working class, and is able to demonstrate the decline of real wages, the deterioration of diets, the increase in outdoor relief, the rise of rents and the growth of slums.

These dismal trends were not limited to the sectors experiencing economic decline. On the contrary, the great majority of the males receiving welfare help were listed as workers in the growing harbour-related occupations. The author concludes that economic or industrial backwardness is not the main cause of poverty. Rather, the development of capitalism brings about massive social dislocations.

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L. MARTZ, *Poverty and Welfare in Habsburg Spain: The Example of Toledo* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), xvii, 266 pp.

The first part of Linda Martz's book is an account of writings and royal

legislation dealing with care of the poor in sixteenth-century Spain, and the second is a detailed study of organized charity in the city of Toledo. The reader comes away with the impression that there was little relation between the two. At the national level, Spain took part in a debate inspired by the Reformation and Counterreformation on whether the poor have an inalienable right to beg or society should eliminate uncontrolled public begging because it leads to immorality and crime. Both points of view had their Spanish defenders, but the rulers took the side of control. Poor laws of 1540 and 1565 called for a system of licensed begging which would deny this activity to able-bodied vagabonds. (Relief of unemployment was evidently not understood as a concern of public policy in the sixteenth century).

A different and inherently more promising approach put forward for the elimination of begging was to confine the genuinely unfortunate in "hospitals", where they could be maintained, given spiritual guidance, and possibly taught useful crafts. Toledo founded such a beggars' hospital in 1581, followed by Zamora, Madrid, and Barcelona. These experiments had to be abandoned within a decade, however, for lack of funds, although in Toledo both ecclesiastical and municipal officials were proponents of the institution.

Beggars' hospitals were a failure, but other kinds of hospitals were the main instrument for the care of the poor. The one royal policy which had a practical effect was the consolidation of hospitals, in which Philip II took a personal interest. In past centuries pious Spaniards had founded hundreds of tiny hospitals, to care not only for the sick but for pilgrims, travellers, any one in need. With time, their staffs absorbed more and more of their income, while their services declined. Consolidation involved closing small hospitals and assigning their endowments to multi-purpose "general" hospitals. In Seville, for instance, seventy-five hospitals were consolidated into two.

The study of welfare in Toledo reveals that, at the local level, authorities struggled to deal with immediate social problems, of which begging was only a symptom. Their most pressing concerns were the care and isolation of the sick and the relief of the hungry. The city and the cathedral both countered hunger by distributing wheat and bread to the needy, especially during subsistence crises, with care not to reveal the identity of genteel persons whose exposure would bring disgrace. Martz reaches "the untidy conclusion that poverty, as defined in sixteenth-century Toledo, cut across all social classes" (p. 202).

Care of the indigent sick was done in hospitals. Most of Martz's study of Toledo is taken up with these institutions. It is based on extensive use of available archives, and provides information on a number of topics, among them, the social structure of the city; the age, sex, marital status, and residence of hospital patients (the largest number in the hospital for curable diseases were young unmarried males, perhaps because they were more likely to have left home); hospital diets (in 1557 patients received almost a pound of meat a day, by 1630 still 6 ounces — food was the best medicine administered); the care of foundlings (with data on wetnursing); the administration of hospital property;

and outdoor relief, its recipients, and the confraternity that handled it. Martz complains of the fragmentary quality of her documentation, and her chapters do give the impression of not having enough information on any single topic to produce a thorough study of it. Some of her social and demographic analysis could have benefited from the criticism of specialists, and, to the confusion of anyone who has been in Toledo, her maps of the city have north at the bottom, apparently because El Greco once painted it this way.

The main failing of the book, however, is that too much of it is a series of disjointed accounts lacking a unifying focus, as though the author were not really clear about what the issues and limits of her subject should be. Historians of urbanism, public health, and poor relief will be grateful for her book, but Martz does not convey adequately to the general historian what is the significance of her findings.

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J. RICHARDS - J.M. MACKENZIE, *The Railway Station. A Social History*, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1986.

Some years ago, in 1978, the Beaubourg organized a fascinating and stimulating exhibition, subsequently held, under different titles, in other European cities. It was called "Le Temps des Gares" and was a tribute to an urban, or non-urban, space, cherished by the Art World but sadly neglected by historiography. In the past few years, the voluminous catalogue of the exhibition has constituted the only serious attempt to approach the history of railway stations. In this respect, therefore, the book by Richards and Mackenzie should be a source of great satisfaction, and is destined to fill a vacuum which is still, for the most part, open.

As a premise, however, it is necessary to point out immediately that the study has not been conducted according to a strict, scientific approach. It is rather an entertaining "pot-pourri", a palatable dish, whose ingredients include not just history, but also a lot of sociology, and, naturally, architecture, as well as the anecdote, which is perhaps the most unexpected element of the work. On the other hand, the authors are sincere, and clearly set out their intentions in the preface: in it, they explain they have no wish to consider the station as an inanimate object, but rather "as living, breathing places which, better than any other building type of the last 150 years, reflected the Societies around them" (p. VII).

The volume is thus immersed in an atmosphere pervaded by romanticism, which has the aim of not only informing the reader, but also of impressing him. In fact, at certain points nostalgia for the world of steam emerges, a world which has been inexorably supplanted by the internal combustion engine. It is hardly a

coincidence, therefore, that the first chapter is dedicated to the mystique of the stations, with particular reference to Great Britain.

The book is, then, agreeable and entertaining, enriched, moreover, by a plethora of precious information for the scholar. If up until now, one has had the occasion to read about railway stations, the approach has always been one related to the history of architecture and, to a lesser degree, to town-planning. The most significant aspects of these buildings which have provided the greatest challenge to engineers and architects, have been conveniently underlined: from the use of new materials, metals, and, above all, glass, to building typology, and innovations in technology and design. Such interest is certainly justified, given that the railway station has represented, from the architectural point of view, the most substantial contribution made to XIXth Century architecture; and, at the same time, it is perhaps the building which enjoys the highest number of exemplars in the world.

It is the social aspects, on the other hand, which have been up until now neglected by writers on stations, and which, in the present volume, are placed in the forefront. The greatest attention has been reserved for the analysis of social classes, of sex and of race, in their relation to railway stations; it is this which makes the study so interesting, much more so than the parts dealing with politics, war, and town-planning, which in many places have not been adequately examined. In the last section, the two authors, with great taste, deal with the artistic aspects of the railway station: literature, cinema, postcards, poetry and painting.

The examination of social questions is extensive: Richards and Mackenzie stress, for example, how the station became one of the most contentious centres of order, discipline and rules, on the one hand, and of crime, violence and immorality, on the other. If it is true that stations became noted for their strict discipline and their staff dressed impeccably in their uniforms, it is also true that the rise of the station marks the end of "divine time" and the bible of the traveller becomes the railway time-table — in an amusing passage of the book Phileas Fogg appears, who left for his round the world trip with Bradshaw's Railway Guide. It is also true, however, that stations become ideal shelters and places of refuge for the destitute of the city and for thieves, attracted by the mass of travellers.

The authors insist, then, on the station's capacity for mixing and at the same time for segregating social classes and race: the station was one of the few places where, in spite of the class distinctions of the travellers, everybody met each other, even if there was an enormous difference in the quality of service. The authors make one reflect upon the relation between the social differences of the passengers and the colour-scheme of the carriages in the Russian railways; and upon the fact that at Porta Nolana, as afterwards, in subsequent Italian stations, the entrances for the rich and the poor were separate. Then, with time, there has been a levelling in Europe which has not, however, occurred in Africa and Asia.

Richards and Mackenzie's book succeeds in convincing us that stations are

truly an urban spectacle: once, people went there just to visit them, without the intention of using them; now, following the authors' advice, we should arrive a little before departure time in order to have the opportunity of observing the surroundings and the scenes around us. The London station of St. Pancras is famous and valued for its beauty, on a par with the most important monuments of the city; La Gare d'Orsay has become a museum, after the restoration carried out by the Italian Architect, Gae Aulenti.

Another undoubted merit of the volume lies in its examination of a world which is quite unknown: that of the extra-European countries, thereby allowing the reader to discover authentic gems built in Asia, Africa, and South America. It is a shame that the authors have not included more illustrations than the few which appear in the volume; this would have certainly rendered what they describe more vivid.

The authors' handling of economic issues, on the other hand, appears to be the weakest feature of the volume. Their outline is somewhat obvious and in parts approximate, above all when they try to summarise with few references the great debate on the relation between railways and economic development — a debate which is far from being concluded, moreover. There are no references at all to problems inherent to the running of the station, an aspect which would have deserved attention.

To conclude, it is worth quoting the witty initial dedication: at the end of the list of friends acknowledged by the authors, they add: "Whose homes regrettably can only be reached by car".

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J.C. RILEY *The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France. The Economic and Financial Toll* (Princeton University Press, 1986) xxii + 258 pages.

One of my American friends never fails to tell his students that what ruins economic history is not the errors that its practitioners commit but the boredom with which they burden their subject. I am only 30% in agreement since I remain convinced that error is a fundamental vice, and perhaps also because my sense of boredom does not coincide with his. For me, boredom arises not from the way in which we set out our ideas but rather from the taste that is shown by some for endless restatement and uncritical repetition of the same old things. This is what really makes one yawn — but fortunately my American friend will have no difficulty in agreeing with me when I say that J.C. Riley's new book successfully evades these criticisms on every ground.

Here we have a study that is prepared to venture beyond the confines of financial history, and moves out gradually towards the mainstream of economic

history which, as J. C. Riley notes (particularly in his fourth chapter), has now assembled a wide and generally accepted stock of data that is constantly being enlarged and improved. It is a study that concentrates on a short but probably crucial episode in the development of the finances of the French monarchy in the XVIIIth century and makes a critically important contribution to the collective body of research on the Ancien Regime economy. It should not be any surprise therefore to discover that in addition to those which he has studied for the Kingdom of France itself the author has also worked through a further six or seven archives outside France. Foreigners watched French affairs very attentively in these years, and one of the most detailed accounts of the state of French finances was drawn up shortly after 1750 on the instructions of an English ambassador! Economic espionage does not seem to have been recognised for what it was in the XVIIIth century, at least in this case.

J. C. Riley's study is not only concerned with assessing the impact of the cost of the war on royal finances. His perspective is a wider one and embraces the impact of the war on the economy as a whole and the author seeks to set his finding in the context of long-term trends and broader debates on the development of the French economy. In the final chapter he discussed the debates to which the war gave rise and the various remedies that were proposed to meet the crisis which it provoked. There were many phrases that had a "revolutionary" ring about them in these debates, although their meaning was probably less radical than appears at first sight. But it is a little surprising that there is no reference to the long-term problems posed by the need to cover the deficit that resulted from the Seven Years War, and there is no mention in the index of either the abbé Terray or Turgot.

The author's conclusions are important and need to be cited in full:

"As a result, old regime war resembles not that 'fait essentiel de l'histoire économique du XVIIIe siècle', but a much less important economic event. It had limited effects not because the economy was geared to war, which, except for merchants, it was not. The effects were limited because war was geared to the economy" (p. 226).

The formulation is both elegant and debatable. If J. C. Riley has succeeded in revealing for us in part the complexity of events, his analysis is not entirely comprehensive; nor can it be given the still far from complete state of the documentation. From my own experience I would suggest that the wars of Louis XV (albeit each with quite distinct characteristics) need to be set against the broader context of the European economies and the continuing importance of the imports of American precious metals. This was symbolised by Spain's delay in allying with France in the conflict, by the part played by the neutrals in nullifying or weakening the effects of the maritime blockade, and also in each of the belligerents by the consequences of requisitions and increased taxation on the peasant economies, and so forth. For example, the history of minting in XVIIIth century France indicates that the peaks coincided with times of war (see my essay in the volume by J. Day, *Etudes d'Histoire Monétaire XIIIe-XIXe*

*siècle*, Lille 1984) and points to the wider question of how the mints obtained precious metal, the links with the deals won by Court bankers and the "placements" made by the great in state loans as Daniel Dessert has argued.

But all history that is not boring takes us forward and it would be wrong to hide the pleasure that comes from reading this study. No matter that there are points on which wider research is needed, nor that some of the conclusions could be modified, this is a book that must be read. Its great merit is that it is systematically based on a wide range of documentary sources and poses highly realistic and important questions. The numerous forthcoming publications which are announced will extend the scope of the author's work and offer us all new food for thought. This is precisely the sort of work that will get economic history out of the rut.

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