

# *English Financial Operations During The First Dutch War, 1652-54*

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England's victory in the First Dutch War of 1652 to 1654 made her a major power in the European state system. The English won this war against the strongest naval power in Europe by winning a series of large fleet actions in the North Sea and English Channel. These naval victories depended on England's ability to furnish the financial resources needed to double its navy's size and the logistics to sustain it with food, men, and munitions. The sources of revenue for the millions of pounds spent on naval construction and operations were predominantly taxation, contrary to Paul Kennedy's conclusion that "...the greater part of the funds for the Commonwealth navy came out of sequestered royalist lands"<sup>1</sup>. These unprecedented amounts of money paid for the logistics needed to support battle fleets of over 100 warships deployed at sea for long periods of time, undermine Martin Van Creveld's statement that "in no instance...is there any question of a force on the move being supplied solely by convoys regularly shuttling between it and its base and it has even been claimed that the mathematics involved in this kind of operation were too sophisticated for the military commander of the age to tackle"<sup>2</sup>. This article analyses how the English provided their navy with the money necessary for its successful operations from 1652 to 1654 and assesses the effects of this support on naval logistics and operations.

<sup>1</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. (New Jersey, 1986), p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. (Cambridge, 1977), p.25.

## I. Prelude To War

By late 1651, England's conquests of Ireland and Scotland had secured the republic from royalist counter-revolution and promised to usher in a period of military retrenchment and reduced taxation<sup>3</sup>. The army in England was reduced by roughly 30 per cent, cutting costs £35,000 per month, leaving the army's annual budget at £1,328,579<sup>4</sup>. Only the need to occupy Ireland and Scotland with large forces kept the expenditures this high.

Naval forces, on the other hand, had to be maintained at the level of the summer of 1651 due to the need to protect English commerce in British waters, the Mediterranean, and the Bay of Biscay. Robert Blake, one of the three Generals-at-Sea who commanded the navy, proposed to Parliament the following dispositions and costs for the "summer guard" to be sent to sea from April to October 1652.

### Naval Establishment and Cost, Jan. 1652:<sup>5</sup>

<u>Station</u>	<u>Size of Unit</u>	<u>Cost (£)</u>
British Waters	56 ships, 6244 men	224,784
In Straits	10 ships 1520 men	
In Caribbean	7 ships 860 men	195,480
Off Virginia	2 ships 260 men	
In Mediterranean	7 ships 1140 men	
Total:	82 ships 10024 men	420,264

Since the twenty six ships outside British waters were already on

<sup>3</sup> For accounts of how these conquests were successfully supported logistically and financially see J.S. Wheeler, "The Logistics of the Cromwellian Conquest of Scotland 1650-1651", *War and Society*, 10, (May 1992) and J.S. Wheeler, "Logistics and Supply in Cromwell's Conquest of Ireland", (ed) Mark Fissell, *War and Government in Britain 1598-1680*. (Manchester, 1991).

<sup>4</sup> *Journal of the House of Commons*, (hereafter cited *CJ*), VII, pp. 24-25 and 128.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70; Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A223, fos. 115-117.

station, only the squadrons for home waters had to be sent out. In addition, the winter guard of 1651-52 was to remain at sea until March and if the winter guard for 1652-53 was of similar size it would cost an additional £115,000. No new construction was anticipated in 1652 since twenty five frigates had been built in 1651<sup>6</sup>. The total estimated cost of the navy was thus about £535,000 for 1652, with another £237,000 in debt carried forward from 1651<sup>7</sup>. These estimates were for a peacetime establishment and reflected the widespread deployment of the navy.

The English Commonwealth was financially solvent in January 1652 and could afford these land and naval forces. It had sold over £3.3 million worth of state property and raised over £5 million in regular revenue from March 1649 to March 1652 to meet the nearly £7 million needed for the payment of arrears, prior debt, and the current costs of its armed forces in that period<sup>8</sup>. In January 1652 total expenses for the army and navy were £1,864,000. The three regular sources of revenues — the assessment, the excise, and the customs — were expected to raise roughly £1.8 million of this sum<sup>9</sup>. Receipts from smaller sources of revenues were expected to close the gap.

Though the Commonwealth was officially at peace in 1652, France had still not recognized the republic and was issuing letters of marque against English ships. England had banned trade with France and issued its own letters of marque against French shipping, but most French trade was carried in Dutch ships. Therefore, English privateers were seizing Dutch vessels and taking their French cargo. Tensions between the United Provinces and England grew over this question and over the issue of sovereignty in the Channel claimed by the English, but not always respected by the Dutch. The Navigation

<sup>6</sup> M. Oppenheim, *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy*, vol. I, 1509-1660 (London, 1896), pp. 332-7.

<sup>7</sup> Public Record Office, Exchequer (hereafter cited as PRO E), E351/2289, Navy Treasurers Account for 1649, f.37; only 112,289 was new debt. See Fig. 5-3.

<sup>8</sup> J. S. Wheeler, "English Financial Administration 1642-1660", (Berkeley: PhD dissertation, 1980), pp. 174 and 178.

<sup>9</sup> Bodl., Carte MSS 74, fos. 58, 63, and 65.

Act of 1651 was symptomatic of these conditions as well as a harbinger of English mercantilism.

Negotiations over these problems broke down in early 1652 and tensions mounted during the year as the Dutch moved toward a pro-Stuart foreign policy and started a 150 ship expansion of their fleet in preparation for a possible war<sup>10</sup>.

The English reacted swiftly to the increase in the Dutch navy. Blake was ordered to concentrate all available warships for possible action in the Downs, off the mouth of the Thames<sup>11</sup>. Food contractors, or victuallers, were told to increase the number of rations for the squadrons in home waters by 25 per cent<sup>12</sup>. The Ordnance office began to prepare 500 new naval gun carriages, and all ships in English ports were surveyed for possible military use<sup>13</sup>. By April Blake had increased the estimates for the costs of the summer guard to £729,000 for the support of 117 ships<sup>14</sup>. No estimate was provided for the increased costs in the coming winter.

As war became likely, the English Council of State put great pressure on its Navy Commissioners to get all available ships to sea. Unfortunately, it was not easy to increase the naval forces by 30 per cent in a single month. The victualling contractors were short of aged casks for storage of food and the government found it difficult to find the cash to pay for the accelerated supply of rations<sup>15</sup>. Short-term shortage of cash for the victuallers was overcome by giving them £15,826 from the sale of captured Dutch goods and ships<sup>16</sup>. However, fighting started before the increases in the fleet took effect and before taxes were raised to pay for them.

<sup>10</sup> Samuel R. Gardiner, ed. *The First Dutch War* (London, 1898-1904), pp. 85-86.

<sup>11</sup> *CSPD*, 1651-52, p. 168.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 180, 191.

<sup>14</sup> *CJ*, VII, p. 122; Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A223, fos. 118-119.

<sup>15</sup> *CSPD*, 1651-52, pp. 176, 252, 254, 272, 370, 373, 379.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 359.

## II. War: May-December 1652

The First Dutch War started on 19 May with an inconclusive fight between Tromp's Dutch squadron of 42 ships and Blake's of 22<sup>17</sup>. Both were eager for a fight and the pretext was Dutch refusal to dip colours in recognition of English sovereignty in the Channel. After the nearly bloodless initial engagement, both sides worked feverishly to get their main fleets to sea.

Blake and the Council of State decided in late May to increase the navy by forty ships. Most of these would be hired merchantmen<sup>18</sup>. Plans were also discussed to build more warships as part of an expansion that would eventually add 110 ships to the navy by the end of 1654<sup>19</sup>. As a result, the English main battle fleet grew from 20 ships in May 1652 to over 100 warships in the battles of the Gabbard and the Scheveningen in the summer of 1653<sup>20</sup>. But this process could not begin in May 1652 because of lack of funds.

Blake's fight in May was followed by a successful attack in July against a large Dutch convoy and by another serious encounter with De Ruyter's squadron off Plymouth<sup>21</sup>. English operations were increasingly hampered, however, by financial and logistical problems during the summer even though the victuallers had agreed to supply additional rations for the expanded fleet in June<sup>22</sup>. By 14 June Blake's fleet had received rations sufficient to feed its crews only until 1 September. Evidently, the victuallers were unwilling to loan more money to the navy until the large amounts advanced by them for previous contracts were repaid. By August Blake was forced to use the expedient of transferring food to outbound ships from ships inbound

<sup>17</sup> S. R. Gardiner, *The Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-56* (London, 83) II, pp. 178-180.

<sup>18</sup> Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A223, fo. 120.

<sup>19</sup> Oppenheim, *Administration of the Royal Navy*, I, pp. 332-337; These were purpose-built fighting vessels rather than dual-purpose merchantmen.

<sup>20</sup> R. C. Anderson, "English Fleet Lists in the First Dutch War," *Mariner's Mirror*, 24, 1938, pp. 430, 435, 441, 444, 449-50.

<sup>21</sup> Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, II, pp. 184-86.

<sup>22</sup> CSPD. 1651-52, p. 288.

to repair storm damage<sup>23</sup>. But this stopgap had obvious limitations.

In late August the Council found enough money from the sale of captured Dutch prizes to give the contractors some cash for purchase of supplies. But rations for one month only were available in September, significantly hindering Blake's operations<sup>24</sup>.

A solution to the food supply problem was offered by a group of London victuallers in August:

We can supply 12,000 men for one month if we can have present pay of what is already due, viz. £23,859 3s 8d. The balance, viz. £15,845 0s 8d could be paid by monthly instalments between now and March. What is now under proposal being £11,900 to be paid in 6 equal payments, at the rate of 8 1/2d a man per day. Authority should be given for taking up ships to carry the provisions to the General of the fleet, and the receipts of the shipmasters for the provisions should be our sufficient discharge, in passing our accounts<sup>25</sup>.

Money was the crux of the problem as this proposal indicates. Until cash could be found to pay for the food, the fleet's operations could not be sustained. This plan worked as long as cash was provided to pay for the supplies. Nevertheless, with the ration situation temporarily in hand, Blake prepared for action.

In September Blake's fleet crossed the North Sea to destroy a French fleet trying to resupply Dunkirk. He then returned to the Channel to intercept a large Dutch merchant convoy returning from the Dutch East Indies<sup>26</sup>. His move forced the Dutch to fight at the Kentish Knock off southeastern England on 28 September. There Blake aggressively attacked 62 Dutch warships with his 68 bigger and more heavily armed vessels<sup>27</sup>. The flight of twenty Dutch warships made the results predictable<sup>28</sup>. The Dutch retreated after the loss of

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 357.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 359.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 359-60.

<sup>26</sup> J. R. Powell, "Blakes Capture of the French Fleet Before Calais on 4 September 1652", *Mariners' Mirror*, 48, 1962, pp. 192-207.

<sup>27</sup> Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, II, pp. 190-94.

two ships, their merchant ships already having escaped. Blake's victory gave England mastery of the Channel, but failed to destroy the Dutch war fleet or to capture a major convoy.

English success in the Channel was not accompanied by success elsewhere. The Danes closed the Sound to the English, denying them the Baltic source for vital naval stores and forcing them to find substitutes. The Dutch also cornered the small English Mediterranean squadron off Leghorn, Italy, eventually driving the English from the trade routes to the Levant. Only continued victory in the vital Channel and North Sea would reverse these defeats.

Meanwhile, Blake's victory at Kentish Knock could not be exploited because his ships carried rations sufficient for operations only until the end of October and cash shortages in the shipyards delayed repair of his damaged ships<sup>29</sup>. Plans made to build 30 new frigates at a cost of £300,000 could not be carried out due to a lack of money<sup>30</sup>. Parliament's failure to increase taxation in the fall accounted for the cash crisis which caused these problems.

By October 1652, financial shortfalls had crippled English naval efforts. More than £292,000 was owed to the sailors and another £100,000 was due on separate bills. Additional large amounts were due for rations and munitions<sup>31</sup>. The Navy Commissioners estimated the total debt at £510,760 and concluded that £174,000 in cash was needed by 1 November to continue operations<sup>32</sup>.

The administrative system which should have matched financial resources to logistical requirements also failed in late 1652. The accounts of the Navy Commissioners and the victuallers did not match the amounts of food provided and money paid<sup>33</sup>. The Letter

<sup>28</sup> *Documents of the First Dutch War*, ed C. H. Firth (London, 1896), vol. II, pp. 293-98 for Dutch account (hereafter cited as FDW); pp. 272-280 for the English accounts. There are differences as to losses but not to results of the battle.

<sup>29</sup> CSPD. 1651-52, p. 384; Baumber, *General at Sea. Robert Blake*, p. 138.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 429, 493.

<sup>31</sup> Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A223, fo. 123.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25; PRO E351/2290, Navy Treasurer's Account for 1652, lists debt as £ 335, 148 in December, and £.148, 743 due to victuallers for 1652 alone and another £ 6,333 still due for 1651.

Book of the Navy Commissioners shows a growing preoccupation with routine matters in the fall of 1652 rather than attention to the pressing financial and logistical problems<sup>34</sup>.

Special commissioners were appointed by the Council of State to consult with Blake about future actions. Representatives of the Navy Commissioners and the victuallers accompanied them. Unfortunately, little could be done to meet Blake's needs for the supply and pay of his fleet without more revenue<sup>35</sup>. Blake presented an estimate of the costs of the current naval establishment and the forthcoming winter guard to Parliament on 4 November 1652. This estimate laid bare the financial condition of English naval administration and helps to explain the events which followed on 30 November at the Battle of the Dungenness.

"An Estimate of the present debt of the navy, as also what monies will be requisite for carrying on the Service at Sea Until the 25th of March 1653"<sup>36</sup>

<u>Item:</u>	<u>Cost (£) Unpaid</u>
Summer Freight, victuals, wages	510,760
This Winter's Freight, victuals, wages	363,000
Victuals for 16000 men for next Summer	89,600
Cost of 500 new cannon	22,500
Total:	985,860
Money already assigned by Parliament for Navy:	
From Customs, anticipated to March 1653	100,000
From sale of prizes	120,000
Receipts from sale of <i>traitors' Goods</i>	185,000
From Excise to March 1653	10,000
Total:	415,000
Additional Cost for 30 new frigates	300,000
Total needed beyond receipts promised	875,860

<sup>33</sup> CSPD, 1651-52, p. 417.

<sup>34</sup> Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A226, fos. 106-200.

<sup>35</sup> CSPD, 1651-52, pp 442, 450, 463, 464

<sup>36</sup> Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A223, fo 125; *CJ*, VII, p. 209.

Naval expenses were not the only obligation of the state in 1652. Army costs were £1,496,215 in 1652 and £1,443,680 in 1653<sup>37</sup>. Total revenue from the assessment, excise, and customs in 1652 was only £1,620,000, rather than the £1.8 million expected in January<sup>38</sup>. Receipts from land sales, sale of prizes, and Delinquent fines provided some income, but these expedient sources provided less than 10% of the money used by the navy from 1649 to 1659, as the following graph indicates<sup>39</sup>.

The Commonwealth faced a severe financial crisis by November. Payment of soldiers, sailors and contractors was badly in arrears. Consequently, recruitment and replenishment of the fleet lagged<sup>40</sup>. Blake's fleet was hamstrung by these difficulties and only a portion of his ships were fit for sea.

As English efforts slackened, the Dutch redoubled their efforts to regain control of the Channel. Defeat had shocked the Dutch into action and forced them to give Tromp unified command as well as logistical support<sup>41</sup>. By late November Tromp had 88 warships at sea. He knew that Blake's fleet was reduced due to unrepaired damage from the Battle of the Kentish Knock, shortage of seamen, and lack of money. He also knew that Blake was aggressive and probably overconfident from his earlier victories. Consequently, Tromp believed that Blake would put to sea with whatever force he had ready when he saw the huge Dutch Bordeaux merchant convoy moving south in the Channel in late November. Tromp positioned his warships to intercept Blake's fleet as it sortied<sup>42</sup>.

Blake rose to the bait, sailing with 40 undermanned ships to intercept the Dutch convoy. Dozens of English warships remained idle in port. On 30 November Tromp attacked the English fleet and

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224. The 1652 amount was more than the estimate made for it in late 1651 by several hundred thousand pounds.

<sup>38</sup> PRO E351/304-306 for assessment; PRO E351/652 for Customs, and PRO E351/1292 for excise declared accounts. I did some averaging to compensate for the slightly different periods covered by each account.

<sup>39</sup> Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, p. 45.

<sup>40</sup> CJ, VII, p. 91.

<sup>41</sup> FDW, vol. II, pp. 377-84.

<sup>42</sup> Letters of Robert Blake, pp. 184-86.



thoroughly trounced it. Command of the Channel switched to the Dutch, allowing them to use the sea lanes safely and to cut the vital coal trade from Newcastle to London<sup>43</sup>.

### **III. War Effort Revitalized and Financed: December 1652-January 1654**

Never was it more clear than in December 1652 that English naval success depended on the provision of adequate financial and logistical support. Tremendous effort were made, henceforth, to provide the support needed to maintain the fleet. These efforts were successful and brought about immediate results in the operational success of the navy.

Money was the first requirement. In December Parliament increased the assessment from £90,000 to £120,000 per month, allocating a large part of it to the navy<sup>44</sup>. During the next two years assessment revenues provided £726,233 to the navy<sup>45</sup>. The excise on coal was continued and the proceeds of the excise were dedicated to the navy<sup>46</sup>. Land sales were authorized to raise £100,000, fines on Delinquents were to provide another £100,000,<sup>47</sup> and the proceeds of the sale of Dutch prizes produced £208,655<sup>48</sup>. Even if the land sales and fines produced the amounts listed, it is clear that they were anticipated to raise only a small portion of the amount needed.

Manning of the fleet was expanded by adding fourteen thousand sailors to the sixteen thousand of the previous estimate. Plans were made for the first time to have merchant ships dedicated to serve as

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187; Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, II, pp. 207-210 gives a good account too.

<sup>44</sup> C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, *Acts and Ordinance of the Interregnum* (London, 1911), II, p. 653.

<sup>45</sup> PRO, E351/305 for 1652. In 1651 £200,000 was provided to the navy from the assessment in addition to money from the excise, customs, and land sales.

<sup>46</sup> *CJ*, VII, pp. 241, 269; *Acts and Ordinances*, II, p. 505.

<sup>47</sup> *CJ*, VII, p. 231; *Acts and Ordinances*, II, p. 690.

<sup>48</sup> British Library Museum, Additional MSS, 5500, f. 25.

underway replenishers when the fleet was out of its ports, allowing it to remain concentrated in the Downs from where it could attack Tromp as he returned to the Channel from Bordeaux.

Two additional Navy Commissioners were appointed to help oversee the expanded logistical efforts<sup>49</sup>. Facilities were enlarged in the navy dockyards to support the fleet and to give the victuallers additional space for food and drink preparation<sup>50</sup>. Victuallers were provided with casks and barrels from captured Dutch ships, and captains were to save and return empty casks and barrels to relieve a cooperage shortage<sup>51</sup>. Through these efforts the main fleet of over 80 ships awaited action in the Channel by mid-February.<sup>52</sup>

English success in putting their naval administration back together was timely. On 17 February approximately 200 Dutch merchant ships were sighted entering the Channel escorted by Tromp's battle fleet<sup>53</sup>. The English fleet sortied to intercept. Tromp attacked the English with his 80 ships, hoping to allow his convoy to escape up the Channel while his warships defeated the English.

Generals-at-Sea Blake and Richard Deane, in the van of 25 ships, engaged the bulk of the Dutch fleet initially, while the rest of the English fleet beat into the wind to join the fight. By 4 p.m. most English ships had engaged. Their superior size and weight of armament quickly swung the advantage away from the Dutch. Tromp broke off in the dark, but the battle was resumed in the next two days as the freshly provisioned English ships captured or destroyed 18 Dutch warships and dozens of their merchantmen. The English pushed the fight and broke Dutch cohesion. Only very skilful sailing by Tromp in the shallows off France saved the Dutch fleet from total disaster<sup>54</sup>. The three-day battle off Portland re-established English control of the Channel.

<sup>49</sup> CSPD 1652-53, p. 44.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 140.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>53</sup> *Letters of Robert Blake*, pp. 206-210; CSPD, 1652-53, p. 173.

<sup>54</sup> *Letters of Robert Blake*, pp. 206-210.

The English did not relax their efforts as they had previously. Estimates were provided by the Navy Commissioners that called for expenditures of £605,000 by the end of June. A further £1,115,000 was forecast for the navy for the period July to December 1653<sup>55</sup>. This £1.7 million estimate for 1653 included the cost of new construction and debt. The Letter Book of the Navy Commissioners and the Declared Accounts of the Navy Treasurer for this period document the ability of seventeenth-century administrators to handle the calculations and data necessary to organize and carry on the financial and logistical affairs of the navy. The estimates of costs they provided to Parliament and the Council of State were reliable, and proved to be adequate.

The money to pay for these unprecedented amounts spent in 1653 and 1654 came primarily from taxes. During this critical period the Commissioners of the excise, customs, and assessment taxes provided over £1.3 million in cash to the Navy Treasurer and a further £287,500 in bills of credit were issued by him to creditors<sup>56</sup>. The victuallers received over £249,000 in cash in 1653 and accepted bills for large amounts in addition. Navy debt grew little from 1653 to 1655 because the revenue came close to equalling expenditures. Equally important, for credit worthiness, over £765,439 in debt accrued from 1650 to 1655 was paid off by the Navy Treasurer, including £432,000 to the victuallers<sup>57</sup>. The effects on naval operations were clear.

Small ships called hoys were now routinely used to transport supplies to the fleet in the Downs to keep the warships concentrated and to prevent seamen from leaving their ships in port<sup>58</sup>. Forty additional merchant ships were pressed into service and at least twelve

<sup>55</sup> Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A223, fos. 127-128.

<sup>56</sup> PRO E351/2291, fos. 2, 124; bills of credit were "imprest on account" to the people who provided the goods and services.

<sup>57</sup> PRO, E351/2289-2296, Declared Accounts of the Navy Treasurers, the end of each account lists all debts of the navy according to the year in which they were obligated. The amounts are progressively smaller in each account indicating the rate at which they were paid as well as the amount paid to whom in each account year.

<sup>58</sup> Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A227, Letter Book of the Navy Commissioners, pp. 53, 54, 59.

of them were used as underway water and food replenishment ships. By April rations were available to sustain the battle fleet of over 100 ships into October, greatly enhancing its operational flexibility.<sup>59</sup>

By May 1653 the English fleet with its logistical vessels was operating off the Dutch coast near Texel<sup>60</sup>. Nearly two dozen supply ships were convoyed from Hull and Yarmouth to the fleet. The fleet thus remained concentrated in a location which allowed it to intercept large Dutch merchant convoys expected to attempt to run around the northern end of the British Isles since the Channel was closed<sup>61</sup>. The English hoped either to strangle Dutch commerce or to lure the enemy main fleet into battle again.

Admiral Tromp determined to break the English blockade in late May with 100 warships<sup>62</sup>. The two fleets met off the Gabbard on 2 June and fought for three days. By 4 June superior English organization, weight of guns and ships, and cohesion defeated the Dutch<sup>63</sup>. Tromp's fleet lost twenty ships while the English lost none. Shortly thereafter the Dutch put forth peace feelers, but English terms were too harsh. The war continued.

English efforts remained undiminished after the June victory. Once re-supplied, the fleet sailed to the Dutch coast to cut commerce and attack ports. Its activities were supported from logistical rendezvous points in Yarmouth Road and Harwich<sup>64</sup>. This strategy brought the Dutch navy out to battle again on 31 July near Texel Island.

The battle of 31 July is known as the Battle of Scheveningen. It was the last major fleet engagement of the war, and the bloodiest. The English destroyed or captured 26 Dutch ships while losing only two. Tromp was killed along with 2,700 of his men.<sup>65</sup> The English fleet was badly mauled also, but was quickly back to sea.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 63-66, 74, 76.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 82-85, 87, 90, and 95-96.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>62</sup> Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1653-1655*, p. 34.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>64</sup> Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A227, pp. 100-106.

<sup>65</sup> Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1653-1655*, pp. 46-48.

<sup>66</sup> Bodl., Rawlinson MSS A227, fos. 123-125

Cromwell, who had dismissed Parliament by force in April and was now Lord Protector, used the victory to offer peace to the Dutch. After long negotiations peace and an alliance were established in January 1654. The terms of the peace were clearly in English favour due to their victories and the Dutch loss of 1055 of 1,500 merchant ships during the war.

Though the Dutch had the larger merchant fleet and greater resources in 1652, superior logistical organization and operational leadership, supported by adequate taxation, gave the English victory. Dutch financial advantages of a central bank and an established funded deficit were matched by the English ability to raise cash and to borrow money from their creditors with a disguised credit system<sup>67</sup>.

The First Dutch War proved that victory at sea was only possible when adequate financial, logistical, and administrative support was provided by the state. Blake's and Monck's brilliant victories in 1653 were only possible once such support was provided on a steady basis. As two acute observers of war noted: "The sinews of war are infinitely money;"<sup>68</sup> and, "to carry on war, three things are necessary: money, money, and more money"<sup>69</sup>.

<sup>67</sup> See Appendix for analysis of how the English conducted what amounted to effective deficit finance before the establishment of a national funded debt.

<sup>68</sup> Cicero, *Philippics*, in 60 BCE, quoted in *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, ed. R. D. Heintz, Jr., (Annapolis, MD: USN Institutes, 1966), p. 115.

<sup>69</sup> Gian J. Trivulzio, in 1499, *Ibid.*

