
ARTICLES

Spices and Sulphur: Some Evidence on the Quest for Economic Stabilization in Portuguese Monsoon Asia, 1668-1682

Glenn J. Ames

The University of Toledo, Ohio

The economic history of Portugal's Asian empire has attracted a good deal of scholarly attention over the past century. The works of V.M. Godinho, C.R. Boxer, Niels Steensgaard, T.R. de Souza, M.N. Pearson, A.R. Disney, and James C. Boyajian, to name but a few, have all done much to advance our knowledge of the economic structures of the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* during the early modern period.¹ As with the general historiography on *Índia Portuguesa*, however, much of this work has concentrated on two periods in the long history of that imperial edifice. First, the glorious years of the early XVIth century, when Portugal, much to the chagrin of her European and Arab competitors, constructed a geo-political and

¹ Cf. V. Godinho, *Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial* (2 vols, Lisbon, 1965-71), *L'Économie de l'empire portugaise aux XVe et XVIe siècles* (Paris, 1969), and *Les Finances de l'état portugais des Indes Orientales (1517-1635)* (Paris, 1982); C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825* (New York, 1969), and *From Lisbon to Goa, 1500-1750: Studies in Portuguese Maritime Enterprise* (London, 1984); Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade* (Chicago, 1974); M. N. Pearson, *Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1976), *The Portuguese in India* (Cambridge, 1987); A.R. Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge MA, 1978); and James C. Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650* (New Brunswick NJ, 1983), and *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640* (Baltimore, 1993).

commercial empire in Asia which sought to dominate the lucrative and longstanding trading network of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea basins. And second, the generally disastrous years of the mid-XVIIth century when that edifice was all but destroyed by the combination of internal political strains in the metropole and the much vaunted threat of the proto-capitalist joint stock companies of the Dutch and English in Asia. The general acceptance of the dictum of "stagnation and decline" for the years after 1663, and relatively sparse and widely scattered archival material for that period, have ensured very little work on the late XVIIth century *Estado*. This dearth of secondary work is unfortunate, since the 1660s and 1670s in fact witnessed a notable rehabilitation campaign in Portugal's Asian empire. This campaign was orchestrated by a Crown that had been rejuvenated after a late 1667 palace coup in Lisbon that witnessed the overthrow of the hapless Afonso VI and accession to power of his brother Pedro, who soon took the title of Prince Regent. In Asia, this rehabilitation was effected most particularly during the Viceroyalty of Luis de Mendonça Furtado e Albuquerque (1671-1677).²

In a significant break with the imperial policies of his father João IV, who had sought above all to retain the fledgling colony in Brazil, Pedro refocused the Crown's attention on the plethora of problems confronting the *Estado da Índia*, in the Marquis de Fronteira's words, the "most important and glorious of all the conquests"³. Pedro and

² Traditional surveys of the *Estado* include F.C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India* (2 vols., London, 1894), R.S. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 1497-1550* (London, 1899), Bailey Diffey and George Winius, *Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580* (Minneapolis, 1977), and Boxer, *Portuguese Seaborne Empire*. A recent attempt to update this historiography can be found in S. Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700* (London, 1993). For details of the rehabilitation of the *Estado* during the late XVIIth century under Pedro and Mendonça Furtado, cf. Glenn J. Ames "The *Estado da Índia*, 1663-1677: Priorities and Strategies in Europe and the East," *Revista Portuguesa de Historia* XXII (1987) pp. 31-46, and "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1668-1682: Maritime Enterprise and the Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire", *The Journal of European Economic History* 20 (1991) pp. 7-27.

³ From an analysis by Fronteira of Colbert's proposed anti-Dutch triple alliance in Asia with the English and Portuguese. Cf. *Biblioteca Nacional*, Lisbon (BNL) Codex 748 fos. 130-165 for the "Instrução da Secretaria de Estado e pareceres sobre a liga de Franca e Inglaterra." For Fronteira's views, cf. fos. 153v.-56.

the grandee members of his *Conselho Ultramarino* or Overseas Council were convinced that the remaining Asian possessions, if properly and efficiently administered, in conjunction with the development and exploitation of the rich Zambesi river basin in Mozambique, the *Rios de Cuama* as it was known, could indeed serve as the basis for a viable and profitable *Estado*.⁴ This campaign would touch virtually all aspects of the eastern empire in the decades that followed. Political, administrative, religious and economic reforms would all be mandated by the Lisbon hierarchy and be carried out, with varying degrees of success, in the Asian possessions.⁵ The task was indeed formidable. The *Carreira da Índia*, or the annual seaborne interchange between Lisbon and Goa carried on by the Crown's carracks, the very lifeblood of the empire, was in shambles. Between 1640-1663 a nadir of sorts had been reached on the *Carreira*, years when a renaissant Portuguese Crown was forced to fight the independence struggle against Habsburg Spain in Europe and a vicious military and economic campaign in Brazil, Africa and Asia against the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Between 1647 and 1649, the *Atalaia e Sacramento* sank off South-east Africa, over 1200 men and scores of vessels were lost in the Mandovi during a storm in April 1648, two carracks destined for India in 1647 were lost, as was the richly laden São Lourenço two years later off Mozambique. None of the five ships in the *frota* of the Viceroy Count of Aveiras reached India that year. Between 1658-1663 an average of one ship a year arrived in Goa, while not even that number made the return voyage successfully. In 1659, the Queen-Regent Dona Luisa de Gusmão told the French ambassador, in only slightly exaggerated terms, that no news had been received from India in three years! The final debacle took place in 1662, when Antonio de Mello de Castro was forced to sail to Goa as Governor in an English fleet.⁶

Dona Luisa, in a desperate attempt to salvage something of the

⁴ Cf. *Arquivo Historico Ultramarino*, Lisbon (AHU) Codex 17, fos. 122v.-24.

⁵ Cf. Ames "The *Estado da Índia*, 1663-1677", pp. 31-46.

⁶ For details on these generally dismal years for the *Carreira*, cf. Boxer, *A Índia Portuguesa em meados do século XVII* (Lisbon, 1980) pp. 39-49.

Estado in the early 1660s, had contracted the famed marriage alliance with Charles II on the dubious belief that one of Portugal's major European competitors in the trade would act to protect Portuguese interests, as the marriage treaty promised. Whatever the exact nature of Portuguese expectations regarding this alliance at the outset, Lisbon was promptly acquainted with the harsh realities of *realpolitik* in Europe and the mandates of merchant capitalism in Asia: the English Crown, with pressure from India House, did nothing to protect the *Estado* from Dutch aggression on the Malabar coast in late 1662 and early 1663 when Cochin and other key outposts were lost. Moreover, as Mello de Castro noted at this time, the financial state of the *Estado*, after decades of warfare and royal neglect, was indeed lamentable: "The needs of this State are so many and so great and ... there is not ... even one *real* [in the Treasury] to meet immediate and necessary expenses⁷." A fundamental challenge in this rehabilitation campaign was clearly to re-establish regular maritime interchange and commercial activity between Lisbon and Goa on the *Carreira*. Contrary to the traditional view in much of the recent historiography which holds that the monarchical monopolism of the Portuguese was simply unable to meet the challenge embodied in the proto-capitalist structures of the Dutch (VOC) and English (EIC) Companies, I would argue that there is evidence to show that in the years after 1668 the Portuguese Crown sought to utilize the example set by these companies at least in part as the basis for innovation and reform. As the loss of Ormuz in early 1620s had prompted a brief, albeit unsuccessful, experiment with an East India Company, the losses of the 1650 and 1660s in Ceylon and the Malabar coast of India to the VOC also prompted radical reform.⁸

⁷ *Historical Archive of Goa, Panjim, India (HAG) Livros das Monções do Reino (MR) 28A* fo. 157, Mello de Castro to Queen Regent, 6/II/1663.

⁸ On the impact of the loss of Ormuz on Portuguese trade and the ensuing experiment with an East India Company, cf. Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*; Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire*; and C.R. de Silva, "The Portuguese East India Company, 1628-1633", *Luso-Brazilian Review* 11 (1974) pp. 152-205.

The traditional penchant of the Portuguese Crown for secrecy in all matters regarding the sea route to India and its trade, the tragic loss of vital documentation from the *Casa da India* and Council of State meetings during the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, and the incomplete and scattered nature of the extant sources have long poised significant roadblocks to historians of the economic history of the *Estado* and particularly the *Carreira*. Bills of lading, invoices, and cargo registers have "with few exceptions disappeared⁹." Such problems have forced historians like F.C. Lane and V.M. Godinho to rely largely on summaries of cargoes dispersed throughout European archives from London to Venice, including the famed Sanudo diaries, to calculate the volume of spice imports into Europe even for the glorious years of the Portuguese "pepper empire" during the early XVIth century. We are therefore fortunate to have located three hitherto unexplored documents which facilitate the process of analyzing the official Crown trade between Lisbon and Goa for the years 1668-1682. On the actual sailings of the *Carreira* ships, from the *Biblioteca Publica de Evora* we have Francisco Luis Ameno's "Noticia Chronologica dos descobrimentos que fizerão os Portugueses até India Oriental, e das Armadas que os Reys de Portugal tem mandado aquelle Estado até o presente anno de 1762." Ameno's work provides a yearly list of the captains and ships of the *Carreira*, as well as relatively accurate arrival and departure dates, data that can be supplemented by information available in other documentary sources including the *Livros das Monções do Reino* (Monsoon Books) and the *Assentos do Conselbo da Fazenda* (Decisions of the Royal Treasury Council) at the Historical Archive of Goa (HAG), and details found in the *State Papers, Foreign* series for Portugal at the Public Record Office in London.¹⁰

⁹ Cf. Niels Steensgaard "The Return Cargoes of the *Carreira* in the 16th and Early 17th Century," in T. R. de Souza (ed.) *Indo-Portuguese History: Old Issues, New Questions* (New Delhi, 1985) p. 13.

¹⁰ For Ameno's work, cf. *Biblioteca Publica de Evora* (BPE) Codex CXV/1-21. The famed Monsoon Books (HAG/MR 33-44 for the years 1668-1680) contain the official correspondence between the Crown in Lisbon and the Viceroyalty in Goa. There are frequent references in this correspondence to ships of the *Carreira*, including arrival and departure dates, delays and mishaps, and occasionally to cargoes. The *Assentos* of the

As I have previously argued, beginning in 1668 significant reforms were instituted regarding the *Carreira da India*, reforms which resulted in a notable degree of success by 1682. Increased royal supervision designed to ensure prompt departures from Lisbon and Goa, the revision of traditional sailing instructions or *roteiros* for the voyage, stricter enforcement of prohibitions against stopovers in Brazil, and the shift towards constructing smaller, more seaworthy, frigate-type vessels along English and Dutch lines all played a role in this process. As opposed to the virtually moribund status of the *Carreira* in the late 1650s and early 1660s, when seaborne contact between the metropolis and India was interrupted for years at a time, the period after 1668 witnessed a marked rehabilitation of Portuguese maritime interchange with Asia. From 1668-1682 there were 31 sailings from Lisbon to Goa or an average of 2.2 per year. Of that number, 30 made the voyage successfully, an impressive 96.8% with the average voyage time of 8.2 months. During these same years there were 28 sailings on the return voyage from Goa to Lisbon or an average of 1.87 per year: 23 of these ships completed the voyage successfully, 82.8% of the total, with an average voyage time, once again, of 8.2 months. An important component of this definitive re-establishment of regular seaborne contact was once again reforging a regular trade between Lisbon and Goa.¹¹

An analysis of the cargoes carried at Royal expense aboard the ships of the *Carreira da India* during this period also reveals much about the priorities of the Crown and the question of change and

Treasury Council at the HAG (Codices 1168-1172) for vols. 11-14 (1666-1686) are also useful for arrival and departure dates since this Council was charged with approving expenses incurred by pilots conducting these ships from the normal anchorage at Mormugão. The *State Papers Foreign* (SPF) series at the Public Record Office (PRO) in London is also valuable, since it contains the correspondence between English diplomats resident in Lisbon and the Crown in London. Given the interest of the English in the Asian trade, such reports frequently contained references to arrival and departures of *Carreira* ships, as well as other gossip from the docks and court regarding the efforts of the Portuguese in Asia.

¹¹ Detailed in Ames, "The *Carreira da India*, 1668-1682," pp. 20-27.

continuity in Absolutist Portugal during the late XVIIth century. For detailing the composition of the *Carreira* cargoes, we have the "Registro das Cartas gerais que vão para a Índia, 1666-1784," from the *Arquivo Geral de Alfandega* (Customs House Archive) in Lisbon. This codex contains 15 folios and *versos* for the years 1666-1677, and consists of letters from the *feitores* (Crown factors) of the *Casa da Índia* in Lisbon and their counterparts in Goa summarizing the *Carreira* cargoes at Royal expense. Finally, from the HAG we have a hitherto neglected document titled "Contas das Cabedais das Naus de S.A. q' vierão desde o anno 667 the' de

TABLE 1: Sailings from Lisbon to Goa, 1668-1682

Ship	Type[1]	Captain or Master	Departs	Arrives	Other[2]
1. São Gonçalo	[G]	Antonio Correia de Oliveira	22/IV/68	30/III/69	Socotra
2. Nossa Senhora da Ajuda	[N]	C. Ferrão de Castelbranco	5/IV/69	IX/69	
3. Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes	[N]	D. Antonio Mascarenhas	10/IV/70	20/V/71	Moss.e
4. Santa Catarina	[N]	Ver. mo P.ca Correa	10/IV/70	20/V/71	Moss.e
5. Nossa Senhora da Guia	[G]	Ruy Horta Castelbranco	10/IV/70	20/V/71	Moss.e
6. Nossa Senhora dos Remedios	[P]	Simão da Costa de Tavora	10/IV/70	Los[3]	Moss.e
7. Bom Jesus de Trisidade	[P]	Thomas Gomes da Costa	11/IV/70	20/IX/71	Moss.e
8. B. Jesus de São Domingos	[G]	C. Ferrão de Castelbranco	2/IV/71	25/IX/71	
9. BJT/N Senhora de Nazareth	[P]	Manoel Pereira	2/IV/71	25/IX/71	
10. Nossa Senhora da Ajuda	[N]	João Correa de Sa	12/III/72	15/IX/72	
11. NS de Nazareth e S. Antonio	[P]	Joseph Roiz da Silva	12/III/72	V/73	Bahia
12. São Pedro de Rates	[N]	Jeronymo de Carvalho	12/III/72	V/73	Bahia
13. NS da Ajuda e S. Antonio	[P]	Pedro Lourenço	3/III/72	V/73	Bahia
14. B. Jesus de S. Domingos	[N]	D. Rodrigo da Costa	13/III/73	IX/73	
15. Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes	[N]	Barnabé de Barros	15/III/73	IX/73	
16. BJT/N Senhora de Nazareth	[P]	Pedro Lamego Falha	IV/73	IX/73?	
17. Nossa Senhora do Rozario	[N]	Simão de Sousa de Tavora	2/IV/74	V/75	Bahia
18. BJT/NS de Boa Memoria	[P]	Manoel Carvalho	2/IV/74	1/IX/74	
19. São Pedro de Rates	[N]	João da Silva Guia	6/IV/75	IX/75	
20. Nossa Senhora dos Remedios	[N]	Andre de Sa	1/IV/76	IX/76	
21. BJT/NS de Boa Memoria	[P]	Francisco Roiz Lisboa	1/IV/76	IX/76	
22. São Pedro da Ribeira	[N]	Francisco da Sa da Silva	19/IV/77	27/IX/77	
23. Nossa Senhora do Pillar	[P]	Antonio Vaz Saigado	6/IV/78	IX/78	
24. Nossa Senhora dos Milagres	[P]		6/IV/78	IX/78	
25. NS do Rozario e S. Antonio	[P]	D. João Lourenço da Cunha	1/IV/79	IX/79	
26. S. Maria Izabel de Saboya	[N]	Manoel Pinto da Costa	1/IV/79	IX/79?	
27. Santo Antonio	[P]	Ver. de Carvalho	3/IV/80	IX/80	
28. Nossa Senhora da Visitacao	[P]	M.el Goncalves de Amorim	IV/80	IX/80	
29. S. Maria Izabel de Saboya	[N]	D. João L.e Alvarez da Cunha	25/III/81	IX/81	
30. Nossa Senhora dos Milagres	[N]	Manoel dos Santos Pinto	IV/81	IX/81	
31. S. Antonio e S. F. Xavier	[N]	D. Henrique Manoel	IV/81	IX/81	

[1] N=Noe or Great Ship. Carrack; G=Galeao or Galleon; P=Patavio or Pinnace; F=Frigata or Frigate

[2] Location of Stopover on Voyage

681.”¹² This document of 11 folios and *versos* was compiled under the direction of the *Contador* of the Royal Treasury of the *Estado*, João Cabral de Mello, and completed in January 1682. As its title suggests, these folios contain a list of receipts for revenues and expenditures relating to the *Carreira* as recorded by the five Crown *feitores* in Goa from 1667-1682: Miguel d’Almeida da Silva, Urbano Arejo Lisboa, João Esteves, Francisco Gomes de Mello, and Agostinho Coelho de Sousa. The document lists the composition and value of the royal outward and homeward bound cargoes on all the *Carreira* ships for this period. Of the three documents, the “Contas das Cabedais” is perhaps the most important for economic historians of the *Estado*. Ameno’s work, while very useful for analyzing the rehabilitation of the voyages of the *Carreira*, contains no information on the cargoes of these vessels. While the “Registro das Cartas gerais,” from the AGA does provide an important summary of cargoes aboard these ships, there is in fact an incomplete run of letters from the *feitores*. From Lisbon, only the letters of 1666-1670 have survived. From Goa, we have only those from 1666-1669 and 1673-1677. The “Contas das Cabedais,” however, summarizes all of the Crown cargoes from 1668-1682, with frequent references to the prices paid for these commodities, and it is therefore the most complete source available for documenting the late XVIIth century *Carreira da Índia*.

From the arrival of Vasco da Gama onward, the Europeans trading in Asia had discovered, much to their economic detriment, that their manufactured goods held very little attraction in eastern markets. The demand for heavy woollens in Monsoon Asia proved to be indeed limited. Over time, the Portuguese and their European competitors, would increasingly attempt to compensate for this unwelcomed reality by developing a large “country” or inter-Asiatic trade as a means to finance the purchase and shipments of spices and other goods to Europe. Above all, this trade helped to avoid the “harmful” export of

¹² *Arquivo Geral de Alfandega*, Lisbon (AGA) Codex 47 fos. 2v.-14v. (for the years 1668-1682). For a printed version of this codex, cf. *Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa* ed. by Silva Rego (5 vols., Lisbon, 1960-67) IV: 3 ff.; and HAG Codex 2316 *Livro de Registro dos alvaras etc. de diferentes feitorias*, fos. 28-39v.

specie to Asia in opposition to the bullionist tenets of mercantilism. The traditional composition of outward-bound cargoes at Crown expense had thus been armaments, munitions, and other products with military uses, including sulphur for use at the *Casa de Polvara* or Royal Gunpowder Factory in Goa. These military goods could either be utilized by the *Estado* for its own rather formidable defensive purposes or at times sold to finance the purchase of return goods for Europe. Nevertheless, it was invariably necessary to despatch silver to Goa to finance the purchase of return cargoes augmented by other products like coral that were also in demand in Asia.

As noted above, between 1668-1682, 31 ships sailed from Lisbon to Goa, with all but one, the *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios* that ran aground off Mozambique in April 1671, making the voyage successfully. The chart below summarizes the royal cargoes aboard those vessels.¹³

As these figures demonstrate, the composition of Crown cargoes despatched to the *Estado* remained fairly traditional throughout the formative years of Pedro II's reign. Military armaments and munitions remained staples of the outward-bound cargoes. Between 1668 and 1681, the Crown despatched 3676 *quintals* (over 235 tons) of lead, 187 *quintals* (nearly 12 tons) of sulphur to be used in the Royal Gunpowder Factory in Goa, 42 *quintals* (2.6 tons) of lead shot, 853 *quintals* (54.6 tons) of metal chain, and 1483 *quintals* (nearly 95 tons) of iron. To assist the Viceroyalty in the struggle with a host of European and Asiatic rivals and enemies, Pedro also embarked some 143 cannon of various sizes, nearly 48,000 cannonballs, 1200 chainshot to assist the work of the yearly armadas that left Goa to enforce the long-standing monopolistic pretensions of the *cartaz* system, nearly 700 muskets, over 200 swords, 1383 pikes, and 1000 lances. It was certainly no coincidence that by far the most impressive concentration of such products sailed aboard the 1670 fleet of the *Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes*, the *Santa Catarina*, the *Nossa Senhora de Cuia*, the *Nossa Senhora dos*

¹³ Based on figures from HAG Codex 2316 fos. 28-39v. and AGA Codex 47 fod. 2v.-14v.

TABLE 2: Royal Cargoes on Outward
Bound Ships of the *Corriere da India*, 1668-1981

	Artillery Pieces	Cannon balls	Lead	Tar	Sulphur	Lances	Chain shot	Lead shot	Copper	Powder flasks	Metal Chain	Muskets	Pikes	Swords	P/SCloth	Pbelts	Iron	Other
1. SG	18	1000	50Q	100B	24Q													
2. NSA	12	6000	100Q	100B	20Q	1000	1000											
3. NSC	11	5950	150Q	50B	30Q			10Q		400	20Q	25	50					
4. SC	10	800	151Q	50B	20Q			8Q		200	80Q	217	533	29		07		
5. NSG	10	700	350Q	50B	33Q		100	15Q		200	80Q	200	350	90		51		50
6. NSRC*	10	700	226Q	50B	40Q		100	9Q		400	80Q	150	350	100?				50
7. BJT					20Q						140Q	100	200					
8. BJSB	40	7000?	903Q	186B							453Q							470Q
9. BJT/NSN			1Q															
10. NSA	10	9836	164Q	100B														
11. NSN/SA																		
12. SFR			200Q	97B														
13. NSA/SA			97Q															
14. BJSB	10	5009	489Q	100B														
15. NSC			203Q	100B														
16. BJT/NSN																		
17. NSR/SC	12	750	196Q															96Q
18. BJT/NSBM																		
19. SFR			99Q	100B					8Q									
20. NSR/SFB			19Q	80B														122Q
21. BJT/NSBM				20B														42Q
22. SFR			47Q	150B														435Q
23. NSP															4059			
24. NSM																		
25. NSR/SA			80Q	80B														318
26. SMIS																		
27. SA*		8150?	152Q	150B														
28. NSV*																		
29. SMIS		2000		25B														7317
30. NSM				50B														5150
31. SA/SFX				25B														7193
TOTAL	143	47,895	3676 Q	1663 B	187Q	1000	1200	42 Q	8Q	1200	853 Q	692	1383	219	23,719	118	1483 Q	100

Q=Quintal=128lbs.

B=Barrel@6 almasdes

Remedios, and the *Bom Jesus de Sao Domingos*. These ships carried 41 artillery pieces, 8150 cannonballs, 1000 lances, 692 muskets, 1382 pikes, as well as large quantities of lead, sulphur, and powder flasks.¹⁴

This fleet was despatched at a crucial moment in the history of the *Estado*. Pedro and his Council of State may have resolved to rehabilitate the Asian empire after long years of neglect but their plans were significantly complicated by the approaching storm of the Dutch War of 1672 and Colbert's spirited attempt to lure Lisbon into an anti-Dutch alliance in Asia that would facilitate grandiose plans that Louis XIV's great minister harboured for his own *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales*. Rejecting this tempting offer, Pedro had instead appointed Luis de Mendonça Furtado, one of the most capable men to ever serve in the *Estado*, as Viceroy. Created the Count of Lavradio, the new Viceroy and his fleet departed from the Tagus in April 1670 and anchored in the Mandovi in May 1671. Pedro was determined to provide his friend with everything deemed necessary to effect a rehabilitation of the *Estado*, a fact that was well reflected in the cargoes carried aboard the 1670 fleet. Mendonça Furtado would make the most of this promising start in the years that followed in the midst of the Third Dutch War in Asia, when all his European competitors were preoccupied with warring against one another.¹⁵

Although the return cargoes of the *Carreira* have been much more extensively studied than those carried aboard outward-bound vessels, there has also been a tendency to focus on the glorious years of the early to mid-XVIth century when the annual traffic in spices via the

¹⁴ Cf. AGA Codex 47 fo. 4v.-5v. "Carta geral que vay para a India nesta nonção de 670 e por vice rey Luis de Mendonça Furtado, capitam mor D. Antonio Mascarenhas," Ruy Fernandes d'Almeida and Luis Alvarez Carneiro to Miguel d'Almeida da Silva, Lisbon 31/V/1670; and HAG Codex 2316 fos. 29v.-30v.

¹⁵ For details on Colbert's *Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales* and his attempt to lure Pedro into an anti-Dutch triple alliance at this time, cf. Glenn J. Ames, "Colbert's Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal," *French Historical Studies* 16 No. 3 (1990) pp. 536-59. Pedro's reasoning in declining this tempting offer can perhaps best be gleaned from examining the opinions of his Council of State members on the proposed pact found in BNL Codex 748 fos. 130-65.

Cape route probably averaged c. 40,000 *quintals* a year, huge profits were made for the Crown, and fleets of 5-14 ships made the voyage annually. After the nadir of 1640-1663, a rehabilitation also took place on the return voyage of the *Carreira*. As Table 3 reflects, between 1668-1682 there were 28 sailings from Goa to Lisbon or an average of 1.87 per year. Of that number, 23 ships or 82.8% made the passage successfully.


Chart 1 provides a yearly breakdown of the Crown pepper cargoes carried aboard these ships.¹⁶

What do these figures tell us? A cursory examination of this evidence clearly reveals that the quantity of Crown spice imports had dropped precipitously from the XVIth or even early XVIIth centuries: Instead of tens of thousands of quintals, we find hundreds, and at times a thousand or two *quintals* had become the rule. Nevertheless, we should temper this assessment with two vital considerations. First, the fact that the size of the *Carreira* fleets carrying these goods had modified significantly over time. On the outward-bound voyage the average from 1500-1530 had been from 7-14 ships. By 1550, this had been reduced to 5, by 1640 the average was 2-3 ships per fleet, and in the 1660s, the average had fallen to 1-2 per year. Return fleets throughout these years had generally averaged half that of the number leaving Lisbon. Another important consideration is that the welcomed and needed reformation in shipbuilding techniques which began in the mid-XVIIth century, a campaign which ultimately yielded more seaworthy vessels for the *Carreira* along the lines of the English and Dutch Indiamen, had also ensured a drop in possible cargo space aboard these vessels. The unwieldy 1500-2000-ton monsters of the 1590s were gradually reduced to sleeker, more seaworthy frigate-type vessels of perhaps 500-600 tons by the 1670s.¹⁷

¹⁶ On the sailings from Goa to Lisbon cf. Ames, "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1668-1682" pp. 20-27. The figures for Chart 1 are based on data found in HAG Codex 2316 fos. 28-39v., and AGA Codex 47 fos. 2v-14v.

¹⁷ On the transformation of the ships and fleets of the *Carreira* over the years c. 1500-1680, cf. C.R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire* pp. 205-27; "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1650-1750," *The Mariner's Mirror* XLVI (1960) pp. 35-54, "Admiral João Pereira

CHART 1: Royal Pepper Cargoes, 1668-1680



Therefore, it is perhaps more fruitful to judge these figures not in comparison to the glorious days of the empire that had long since disappeared, but in comparison to the dismal period immediately preceding Pedro's reforms. Judged in this light, these royal cargoes tell us several things. First, they demonstrate that the stabilization of the sailings of the *Carreira* after 1668 also ensured a regular supply of pepper at royal expense after the lean years of the 1650s and early 1660s. Compared to the generally dismal sailings and cargoes of the Regency years of Dona Luisa and Afonso VI's reign, Crown shipments of pepper remained relatively stable throughout the first decades of Pedro II's reign, with at least 250 *quintals* being despatched each year with the exception of 1671 and 1678. It should be noted, however, that the departure of the *frigata Bom Jesus de Nazareth e Nossa Senhora de Boa Memoria* in December 1677 with 50 *quintals* of Kanara pepper slightly distorts the figures for the latter year. The annual totals at Crown expense (excluding 1671 and 1678) ranged from a low of 203 *quintals* in 1668 to a high of 1903 in 1674. An almost steady rise is also detectable from 1668-1674, with by far

Corte-Real and the Construction of East-Indiamen in the Early Seventeenth Century," *The Mariner's Mirror* XXVI (1940) pp. 338-406; and his collected essays on the subject published as *From Lisbon to Goa, 1500-1750*.

the largest amounts of 1625, 786, and 1903 being despatched from 1672-1674. These 4314 *quintals* constituted some 48.3% of the total Crown pepper shipments for the entire period.

There can be little doubt that the timing of these “large” shipments related to both geopolitical and economic factors. It is likely that Luis de Mendonça Furtado, following the lead of Pedro and the Overseas Council in avoiding involvement in the Dutch War of 1672, exploited the fact that his European rivals were indeed busy warring with one another at home and in Asia, to oversee the purchase and despatching of significant amounts of pepper during these three crucial years. This policy not only confirmed the wisdom of Pedro’s decision on the war, but reflected a fundamental shift in the priorities inherent in the monarchical monopolism that had forged the empire in the early XVIth century and had largely guided its major strategic decisions throughout the Aviz Habsburg, and early Braganza periods. Instead of embracing the traditional allure of military action and conquest that had previously guided Lisbon’s policy in struggling against both Asiatic and European competitors from the outset, Pedro and Mendonça Furtado instead opted for peace, reformation, and a practical economic strategy that in many respects surpassed the anachronistic reversion to warfare and conquest totally unsuited to the stated goals of the proto-capitalist companies of England and Holland that Colbert was in the midst of challenging. As Chart 2 demonstrates, Mendonça Furtado was also prompted to despatch such cargoes during the years 1672-1674 by the simple laws of supply and demand and the prices resulting from these economic realities.¹⁸


As Chart 2 demonstrates, there was a close correlation throughout this period between the price paid by the Crown for its pepper in Kanara, Tanor, and elsewhere on the Malabar coast of India and the amount that was purchased and despatched to Lisbon. The average prices paid varied from 17.4 - 32.8 *xerafins* per *quintal* for these years, certainly a significant variation. The two periods when the price was

¹⁸ Derived from data on quantities and prices found in HAG Codex 2316 fos. 28-39v.

lowest, that is from late 1668 through late 1671 for the four cargoes despatched from January 1669 through January 1672 at an average price of 21.8, and from late 1673 to late 1674 at an average of 17.4 *xerafins* per *quintal* for four cargoes despatched through December 1674, resulted in by far the largest shipments of pepper to Lisbon. These cargoes were carried by the *Nossa Senhora dos Remedios* (428 *quintals*), the *Nossa Senhora da Ajuda* (712 *quintals*), the *Bom Jesus de Sao Domingos* (902 *quintals*), and the *Nossa dos Cardaes* (623 *quintals*) in the initial period; and the *Sao Pedro de Rates* (1000 *quintals*), the *Bom Jesus de Sao Domingos* (903 *quintals*), the *Sao Miguel* (596 *quintals*), and the packet *Bom Jesus de Nazareth e Nossa Senhora de Boa Memoria* (292 *quintals*) in the latter. The 5456 *quintals* carried aboard these 8 ships alone constituted 61% of the 8921 *quintals* despatched during this period.


Although the nature of the extant sources make it difficult to trace the precise reasons for these two troughs in prices, it is likely that the tension and uncertainties engendered by the warfare between the English, French and Dutch along the western coast of India during

CHART 2: Royal Pepper Cargoes, 1668-1680, By Weight and Price



these years may have played a role. It is also interesting to note that Colbert's grand Asian fleet of 1670 under Jacob Blanquet de La Haye, the single greatest threat to Dutch predominance in the trade, had been decisively defeated by the fall of 1674 and that England had also made a separate peace, effectively ending the Third Dutch War in Asia.¹⁹ The resumption of regular trade on the Malabar coast was characterized by a significant jump in prices between 1675-1679, from 27.5 - 32.8 *xerafins* per *quintal*, nearly doubling from 1674 levels for the cargoes despatched throughout 1677 and in January 1679. These figures suggest that the indigenous merchants who dominated the pepper trade in Kanara, Tanor and elsewhere were indeed sensitive to the vagaries of the market, at least as they affected the European demand for such products, and may have exploited the realities of the diplomatic situation in Europe and by extension Asia to increase their own profits in the trade. At the same time, these figures reveal that the Portuguese, in the face of such inflated prices, either severely restricted their purchases, as in the period from late

CHART 3: Royal Expenditures on the Carreira da India, 1668-1682



¹⁹ Cf. Boxer, "The Third Dutch War in the East, 1672-4," *The Mariner's Mirror* XVI (1930) pp. 341-86; and Glenn J. Ames, "Colbert's Grand Asian Fleet of 1670," *The Mariner's Mirror* LXXVI (1990) pp. 227-40.

1672 to late 1673, and again in late 1677, or abandoned the purchase of pepper altogether in favour of commodities with higher potential profit margins at home; as from late 1680 onward, when the Viceroyalty purchased *bizalbos* of diamonds instead of pepper at Royal expense for the return cargoes.²⁰

As Chart 3 demonstrates, however, the composition of Royal cargoes aboard the *Carreira*, even during this period of reform, remained exceedingly traditional. In terms of value, pepper remained by far the most important commodity. Of the 246,111 *xerafins* in direct Crown expenditures on return cargoes, 188,549 *xerafins* or 77% were made on pepper. The 29,799 *xerafins* spent on the *bizalbos* of diamonds despatched in 1681 and 1682 aboard the *Santo Antonio de Lisboa*, the *Nossa Senhora da Viziacao*, and the *Sao Pedro da Rbeira* represented 12% of overall expenditures, while the 20,216 *xerafins* used to purchase saltpetre equalled 8% of the total. The remaining 7547 *xerafins* or 3% was used to purchase the products contained in the "other" category, that is to say teak and angelim planks, and naval riggings. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the composition of the return cargoes as reflected in Charts 1-3 is the fact that the Crown, even in peak years, was only despatching from 900-1000 quintals per ship. The rated hold capacity of the 500-600 *tonelada* ships utilized on the *Carreira* during the late XVIIth century was probably between 7500 to 8500 quintals. Above-deck areas and living quarters that were also jammed with products probably constituted an additional loading space of 20-25% or some 1900-2200 quintals to the total capacity of these ships.²¹ The obvious question is what use was made of the remaining c. 8500-9500 *quintals* of space aboard these vessels?

The answer to this important question is two-fold: First, a reasonable amount of this space was taken up by the *caixas de*

²⁰ Cf. HAG Codex 2316 fos. 39-39v. On the high profits made on diamonds and other precious stones or *pedraria* in Lisbon, cf. Boyajian *Portuguese Trade in Asia*, pp. 49-51.

²¹ Based on estimates of Magalhaes-Godinho and others examined by C.H.H. Wake "The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700," *The Journal of European Economic History* 8 (1972) pp. 378-81.

liberdade or liberty chests that had traditionally been granted to officers, crews, and noblemen travelling aboard the *Carreira* in lieu of regular wages. These *caixas* could be loaded with spices or other products that could be imported into Lisbon either wholly or partially duty free. King Manuel's decree (*regimento*) of 1515 provided that captains of voyages and fortresses in India received four chests each, gentlemen of the royal household two or three, soldiers one chest, pilots and other officers of the ship one chest each, one chest for each two sailors, and one chest for each three cabin boys. Boyajian estimates that with a typical crew on returning Indiamen at 120 officers and sailors, and an additional 200 soldiers and *fidalgos*, these liberties amounted to c. 300 chests or 450 bales during the first half of the XVIth century. At 2 *quintals* per bale, these goods would have occupied some 900-1000 *quintals* of storage space, or nearly all that available above the hold. By the late XVIIth century, the *liberdade* system, after a short-lived attempt to abolish the system altogether and instead substitute an adequate pay scale, was re-defined in a *regimento* of 11 March 1652. Under this decree, the captain-major of any voyage was entitled to 15 liberty chests, 12 slaves, 300 *quintals* of blackwood, 100 *quintals* of lac-dye, and thirty of camphor. In addition, he might designate 12 servants as men-at-arms who were allowed one chest and two *fardels* of cinnamon, with each *fardel* fixed at the maximum weight of 1 *quintal*. At the bottom of the scale, each sailor was allowed one liberty chest and 12 *fardels* of cinnamon and each grummet or apprentice-sailor was allowed one *fardel* of liberty goods and ten *fardels* of cinnamon. In 1664, well after being expelled from Ceylon, the Crown provided that under certain conditions pepper and other spices might be substituted for cinnamon.²²

Based on evidence on the "Cartas Gerais" collection at the AGA in Lisbon, it appears that the size of the crews had not significantly diminished on the return voyages. Although the invoices for the

²² For details on the *liberdade* system and the *regimentos* of 1515 and 1652, cf. among others, Boxer, "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1650-1750," pp. 37-40; and Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia* pp. 38-40.

liberdades have not survived, letters from Manoel de Saldanha dated Goa, 26 January 1674 and from Pedro Ferreira dated 26 January 1676 inform us that the carrack *Sao Pedro de Rates* carried the following crews in those years: 16 [and 18] officers, 53 sailors, 25 apprentice sailors, 24 gunners, and 5 cabin boys, for a total of 123 and 125 crew members.²³ It is not unreasonable to assume that the numbers of returning soldiers and other passengers must have also remained relatively close to c. 200 per carrack. At the same time, the 1652 regimento had increased *liberdade* allotments by approximately 60%: the captain-major's limit had risen from 4 to 15 chests, the

TABLE 3: Sailings From Goa to Lisbon, 1668-1682

Ship	Type	Captain or Master	Departs	Arrives	Other
1. Santa Teresa de Jesus	[N]	Francisco Rangel Pinto	10/II/68	Lost[1]	
2. NS dos Remedios	[N]	Manoel Pereira Coutinho	15/II/68	4/XI/69	Bahia
3. NS da Ajuda	[N]		30/II/70	25/IX/70	
4. São João da Ribeira	[F]	João da Costa	15/X/71	7/VIII/72	Bahia
5. BJ de São Domingos	[N]	C. Ferrão de Castelbranco	25/II/72[A]	7/VIII/72	
6. NS dos Cardaes	[N]	Ruy Horta de Castelbranco	25/II/72[B]	7/VIII/72	
7. BJ de Nazareth	[P]	Simão de Sousa Tavora	22/IX/72[C]	22/VIII/73?	Bahia
8. NS da Ajuda	[N]	João Ferreria	24/II/73[A]	Lost[2]	
9. NS da Ajuda e S Antonio	[P]	Manoel de Souza	11/X/73[E]	18/IX/74	Bahia
10. BJ de Trindade	[C]	Diogo Delgado	11/X/73[C]	24/VIII/74	Bahia
11. São Pedro de Rates	[N]	D. Rodrigo da Costa	21/II/74[A]	19/VII/74	
12. BJ de São Domingos	[N]	Antonio Machado	26/II/74[E]	Abortive	Goa
13. São Miguel	[G]	Ver.mo de Carvalho	10/XII/74[C]	7/IX/75	
14. BJN/NSB Memoria	[P]	Jeronymo da Maya Diniz	10/XII/74[D]	10/IX/75	
15. NS de Oliveira	[F]	Antonio de Banhos	25/II/75	14/IX/75	
16. São Pedro de Rates	[N]	Simão de Souza	28/II/75	18/XII/76	Bahia
17. BJ de São Domingos	[N]	Andre da Silva	30/II/77[A/B]	Lost[3]	Bahia
18. BJN/NSB Memoria	[P]	Manoel Borges	15/XII/77[C]	IX/78	
19. NS dos Milagres	[N]	Francisco Martins	20/II/79	5/VII/79	
20. NS da Vizitacao	[P]	Manoel Roiz	20/II/79	14/VII/79	
21. NS da Conceicao	[N]	Jozeph Dalgado	I/80[A/B]	6/X/80	
22. NS do Pillar	[P]		I/80	15/VII/80	
23. SMaria Izabel de Saboya	[N]	D. Lourenco Alz. da Cunha	I/80	2/IX/80	Sofala
24. Santo Antonio	[F]		IX/80	26/IX/81	Bahia
25. SA de Lisboa	[N]	Verissimo Carvalho da Costa	I/81	26/IX/81	Sofala
26. NS da Vizitacao	[P]	Manoel Roiz	I/81	26/IX/81	Sofala
27. NS dos Milagres	[N]		IX/81	Lost[4]	
28. São Pedro da Ribeira	[N]		I/82	27/IX/82	

²³ AGA Codex 47 fos. 7v-8v, and 11v.-13.

common sailor's limit had risen from half a chest to a full chest plus 12 fardels of cinnamon or other spices. Using these figures, it is likely that the amount of cargo space devoted to *liberdade* goods, whether carried at the direct charge of those entitled to them or, as Saldanha's letter implies, leased out to private merchants, was probably close to some 700 chests or 1050 bales at 2 *quintals* each or c. 2100 *quintals* overall. Is it, however, possible to come to a more precise estimate on the makeup of *Carreira* cargoes during the late XVIIth century? Well, yes and no.

Although the dearth of construction data on the *Sao Pedro de Rates* and other ships plying the Cape route during these years and the destruction of the *Casa da India* records in the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 prevent a definitive analysis of its overall cargo, we can utilize available information to make the following estimates. The *Sao Pedro* like most *naos* during this period was probably close to 600 *toneladas* in burden with an available cargo space (including both the hold and elsewhere) of c. 10,000 *quintals*. Based on the Saldanha's letter and the *Contas das Cabedeis* listing of receipts and expenditures on the *Carreira* for these years, we know that this ship carried 1000 *quintals* of Tanor pepper at Crown expense, c. 10% of the total.²⁴ We should assume that D. Rodrigo da Costa, the captain-major, as well as the remaining members of his crew all utilized their *liberdade* allotments to the utmost. As Table 4 demonstrates, the cargo space devoted to *liberdade* products on this *não* must have been over 3000 *quintals*, or about 30% of the available cargo space. Overall then, Crown pepper and *liberdade* allowances must have constituted some 4000 *quintals* or so, leaving some 6000 *quintals* or 60% available for strictly private trade.

These estimates on the composition of the cargo of the *Sao Pedro de Rates* suggest that various trends regarding the *Carreira* characteristic of the Habsburg period continued during the initial stages of the Braganza dynasty in Portugal. Above all, these estimates suggest a continuing decline in the percentage of overall cargo weight absorbed by Royal pepper and other products, and the

²⁴ Cf. AGA Codex 47 fos. 7-8v., and HAG Codex 2316 fos. 37v.-38.

increasingly vital role that private trade played in the *Carreira* traffic around the Cape, a trade that in some cases reached 5 million *cruzados* per year. Boyajian argues that from 1620-1640 the breakdown of royal *vis-à-vis* private trade was 54% versus 46% by total weight, and for the entire Habsburg period (1580-1640) this ratio was 62% versus 38%.²⁵ The figures for the *Sao Pedro de Rates*, as rough as they are, seem to demonstrate that the percentage of cargoes absorbed by Crown trade continued to shrink during the Braganzan period. The King's pepper shipments, which had once absorbed virtually all of the cargo space on such vessels, about 95% in the 1540s, had now been reduced to a mere 10% of the total. This figure and the 30% privileged *liberdade* cargo still constituted less than half of the total by weight. Moreover, since a good portion of the *liberdade* allowance was no doubt lent to private traders, perhaps half of the total, the actual cargo space absorbed by the Royal trade and crew *liberdades* was probably less than 25% by weight. We should also note that the *Sao Pedro de Rates* carried the largest Crown pepper shipment of the entire period. Thus, on the other carracks of these years, which carried c. 500 or 600 *quintals* at Crown expense, the percentage of private trade was even higher and at times probably approached the 90% range that Boyajian has

TABLE 4: Estimated *Liberdade* Cargo Aboard *Sao Pedro de Rates*, 1674

	Chests	Fardcls	Other
D. Rodrigo da Costa	15		12 Slaves, 130Q of dye etc., 300Q of bwood
12 Men-at-Arms	12	24	
16 Officers	32		4 Slaves
53 Sailors	53	636	
25 Grummets	25	250	
24 Gunners	24	288	
5 Cabinboys	5	50	
Total=3176 Quintals	166=498Q	2248Q	430Q

Fardel=1 Quintal

Chest=3 Quintals

²⁵ *Portuguese Trade in Asia* p. 42.

profered for the percentage by value for such cargoes for the Habsburg period!²⁶

Nevertheless, the increasingly important role of the private trade on the *Carreira* route, which these figures suggest, should not be taken *a priori* as a definitive sign of increasing infirmity on the part of the Portuguese Crown. In fact, such evidence may be interpreted as one sign of the logical maturation of the Braganza dynasty and the rising centralized state in Portugal that Pedro strove to construct for the remainder of the XVIIIth century. One of Lisbon's primary goals during this formative period of Braganzan "absolutism" was to re-establish, once and for all, the seaborne interchange between the metropole and Asia, a link that had been all but severed by the years of warfare from 1640-1668. As the evidence indicates, Pedro and his Overseas Council most assuredly succeeded in this quest in the years after 1668.²⁷ As this fundamental task was accomplished, Pedro and his advisors looked to the example of the Dutch, English, and French joint-stock companies for lessons that would resuscitate the economic fortunes of the *Estado*. Although additional archival work remains to be done, it appears that the Prince Regent decided in the early 1670s that it was not only practical and legitimate for the Crown to utilize private capital in order to facilitate the economic recovery of the *Estado*, and thus indirectly to increase the power of the Crown in those regions, but also that hitherto royal monopolies like the Mozambique trade should be opened up to private trade and investment as well.²⁸ In short, while the direct Crown share of the *Carreira* trade may have stabilized in the 1670s at levels far below what it had once been, Pedro was willing to accept this reality as long as the lucrative private trade on the Cape route was re-established after the dismal years of the 1650s and 1660s, and private profits (and at times

²⁶ *Ibid.* It is likely that cotton cloth became an increasingly important component of return-bound private cargoes as the seventeenth century progressed.

²⁷ Cf. Ames, "The *Carreira da Índia*, 1668-1682," pp. 23-27.

²⁸ For details on Pedro's declaration of *Commercio Livre* on the East Coast of Africa in 1672 for all Portuguese subjects and the eventual foundation of a *Junta* to oversee this trade in the 1670s, cf. Ames, "The *Estado da Índia*, 1663-1677," pp. 43-45.

those of royal administrators) in the inter-Asiatic trade expanded as well.

Pedro and his leading advisors like the powerful Duke of Cadaval recognized, as the lesson of the Aviz dynasty in Asia and the Habsburgs in the New World demonstrated, that Crown monopoly did not necessarily ensure huge Crown profit's nor an expanding internal economy. The time was clearly at hand for innovation in the administration and exploitation of the rump empire in Asia. Throughout the 1670s, the Crown considered a series of radical reforms, most of which included the wealth of the New Christian community in Lisbon, a community which had played a vital role in the private sector of the Cape trade for a generation or more.²⁹ Yet, before such innovations could be attempted, the *Carreira* itself, that traditional economic, political, and social lifeline, had to be secured once again. By the early 1670s, this crucial task had been accomplished: a reasonable level of pepper was once again assured at Crown expense, and, more importantly, the level of confidence regarding the *Estado* on the quays of Lisbon, at the *Casa da India*, in the merchant houses of the New Christians and in the *solars* of the nobility was regained. This was a fundamental pre-condition for the rehabilitated *Estado* since, in the final analysis, the Portuguese State of India "for its survival", depended "not so much upon the quantity of spices and drugs annually transported to Europe as upon the strength and loyalty of the soldiers and gentlemen" who administered it, fought for it, and above all, as time went on, invested in it.³⁰

²⁹ On the vital role of the New Christians in this trade, cf. Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia*, especially pp. 14-17 and 31-33. For Pedro's plan to lure sizable New Christian capital into a scheme to resuscitate the commercial and military prowess of the *Estado* in return for protection against the abuses of the Inquisition in the early 1670s, cf. Carl A. Hanson, *Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal, 1668-1703* (Minneapolis, 1981) pp. 94-100; and for a contemporary account, PRO SPF 89/12 fos. 186-87, Parry to Arlington, 26/XI/1672; Parry to Williamson: fos. 248-49, 18/VII/1673, fos. 252-53, 15/VIII/1673; and fos. 279-79v., 5/XII/1673.

³⁰ A slight revision of sentiments expressed by Niels Steensgaard in "The Return Cargoes of the *Carreira*," pp. 27-28.

