

D.L. AUGUSTINE, *Patricians and Parvenus. Wealth and High Society in Wilhelmine Germany*, Berg Publisher Ltd., Oxford - Providence, USA, 1994, pp. 303.

Dolores L. Augustine's thesis for her doctorate was written under the supervision of Hartmut Kaeble and discussed at the Free University of Berlin in 1991. It was entitled *Die Wilhelminische Wirtschaftselite: Sozialverhalten, Soziales Selbstbewusstsein und Familie*. The book, published posthumously, is a piece of research in economic and social history which is very important in the study of German industrial development during the Empire (1890 - 1914). It covers a new field of great interest today: the role of the élite in a lively, developing society.

Dolores L. Augustine has worked on a very large quantity of documentary material from many archives, both public and private, and has also closely examined many publications on political economy. Biographies, autobiographies, newspaper cuttings, letters and other private papers provided further important information. The statistics published by Rudolf Martin in the *1912-1914 Jahrbuch der Millionäre Deutschlands*, the list of aristocratic families in the *Neue Deutsche Biographie* ("Gothaer") and the genealogical collection of the *Benscheim Institut zur Erforschung historischer Führungsschichten* were all indispensable for this research. There is one very surprising omission in this excellent interpretation of the sources: there is no mention of military offices and the military line of conduct and the relationship between the state and the army, which had so much influence in Wilhelmine Germany. However, this criticism is not intended to diminish the value of a very instructive book which, because of the great detail it contains, opens up new horizons, such as, for example, the history of the effects of wealth on social conduct, a subject which interests the author more than the origins of the great economic fortunes.

Poor and backward, mainly rural and agricultural, as well as politically divided, Germany was the last great Western country to start industrialisation. There were small pockets of industry, for the most part involving handicrafts and primitive forms of industrial organisation, only in Rhineland, Saxony, Silesia and the city of Berlin. A weak transport and communications system and the existence of many different political entities with separate monetary systems and trade policies hindered economic development. Nevertheless, in the years preceding the First World War, Germany, by then unified, was the most powerful nation in Europe, thanks to its modern iron and steel industries, electrical energy industry, and machinery and chemical industries. The railway network now covered a fairly wide area and had contributed to a high level of urbanisation.

During the period from 1870 to 1913, German steel production was even greater than British steel production. The most dynamic sectors of German industry were those that produced capital goods and intermediate

products for industrial use. The emphasis placed on capital and intermediate goods in Germany to the relative detriment of consumer goods was a feature of the German industrial structure which had repercussions on the social structure too.

In a country experiencing such rapid expansion, with an increasing need for raw materials and markets, it was inevitable that a 'social question' should arise, based on an awareness of social roles that had to adapt continually to changing circumstances. Alongside the dominant social bloc, made up of the old *junker* landed aristocracy and the bureaucratic and military authorities connected with the Court, new, more aggressive social forces began to emerge from Germany's dazzling industrialisation process: namely, the big industrial groups, the steel, coal and chemical trusts who wanted a more enterprising foreign policy, both in Europe and in the colonies, and who wanted to play a more active part in big political decisions. The change which had come to maturity between 1885 and 1889 actually took place in 1890 with the new *Kaiser* Wilhelm II. German politics thus became increasingly conditioned by the militarism and the authoritarian spirit of the bureaucratic, agrarian and industrial classes, who were launched towards continental leadership and who sought a greater *Lebensraum*.

Dolores Augustine investigates the social conduct of the emerging classes, and discovers the characteristics, the aspirations and the problems of the business élite, made up of the *nouveaux riches*. In the first two chapters, the group of the richest businessmen is analysed with data on their ages, the regions they came from, their sector of economic activity, their wealth, the level of their social position, their public relations and the role some of them played in politics and administration. The author defines the phenomenon of so-called 'feudalisation' or 'aristocratisation'. In Hamburg, for example, the title of baron had become a valued status symbol among the main banking families who, despite their acquiring titles of nobility, continued to be the backbone of the business community and defined themselves as the socially and politically dominant patrician class.

The *nouveaux riches* élite resembled more and more the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie, because of the popularity gained through the honours conferred on them by the university, and because of the increasing similarities in their upbringing and careers with the sons of the rich land-owning bourgeoisie and the academic and professional bourgeoisie. Dolores Augustine stresses a certain tendency to social isolation among the bourgeoisie, in that at least 90 percent of the 502 businessmen examined were sons of businessmen's families. Marriage, the procreation and upbringing of children, the power structure within the family the children's professional and matrimonial choices are all very interesting subjects found in this book. The decline of the patriarchal structures defined women's new role which, alongside motherhood, called for other obligations such as cultivating friendships, social relations, organising and managing a big household and

being involved in charity work. And so a businessman chose as a wife a woman able to share his social and therefore economic 'interests'.

As authoritarian family structures declined, so young men of the Wilhelmine middle classes allowed themselves time for some recreation, frequenting fashionable society, shooting, riding and swimming, travelling and even fostering left-wing political convictions. Fathers put strong pressure on their sons to take control of the family firm or to work in their joint-stock company, but the bourgeoisie did not always succeed in finding businessmen in their own family who were as dynamic and capable as they themselves were.

Although bourgeois upbringing was steeped in humanist, intellectual and artistic values, it was rarely anti-capitalist and anti-semitic, whereas it often refused the traditional values of the ruling élite and the military establishment. Social relations, linked to the acquiring of aristocratic titles that elevated the social class to which people belonged, became the indispensable basis for any business activity worthy of respect. They confirmed the power of the rich bourgeois by means of various symbols: becoming an aristocrat, one's address (the new residential areas on the outskirts of towns), the architecture of the bourgeois 'villa', furnishings, receptions (very useful to show off the household's wealth) and marrying into the nobility (an attitude more common amongst sons than daughters).

The Jews, on the other hand, did not show much interest in titles of the nobility. Their sense of ethnic identity was based essentially on cultural ideals and ideals concerning upbringing, on business success and social integration into the upper ranks of the Jewish bourgeoisie. These ideas combined with the mentality of the German élite, and to a great extent determined the economic and social successes of the Jewish élite. Among Jews too, women played an important role in the social progress of the wealthy élite. Women were responsible for the image and the social traits of the rich bourgeoisie in the ranks of high society.

The last chapters of the book deal with important aspects of social life: children's upbringing, the house and life-style, new social networks, sets of friends, neighbours and acquaintances. The businessman's villa had several features in common with the style of German aristocratic residences. This could be because the business élite tried traditionally to convert power and wealth into social prestige, which was not an end in itself but a necessary prerequisite for business activity. Moving away from industrial zones to planned suburbs or other exclusive residential areas was a feature of the Wilhelmine period. It was possible to separate the workplace from the dwelling place because of increased bureaucratisation in the factory system which substantially reduced the need for continual controls and supervision, or else transferred these responsibilities to managers. The quality of life in the expensive residential districts reveals some interesting aspects, especially concerning the social composition of those districts: Tiergarten (Berlin) had a

population made up mainly of bankers, whereas Harvestehude (Hamburg) was inhabited by both upper and middle classes.

Whereas in Hamburg or cities such as Elberfeld and Mannheim the wealthy élite were well integrated into the patrician classes, in Berlin the wealthy élite maintained social connections with the traditional ruling classes, but did not merge with them. The inadequacy of the aristocratic example was clearly perceived by Berlin society. Berlin's business families were not at all interested in currying favour with the old aristocracy as such, but in building a network of contacts with the political and administrative élite that could facilitate access to confidential information, make it easier to intervene in the forming of the government and in the regulations concerning bureaucratisation, and make government contracts easier to obtain. This was the case of, for example, the Krupp family.

Industry became increasingly financed by the banks, and this encouraged strong social cohesion among industrialists, bankers and merchants. Nevertheless, the Jews were rarely accepted by the business élite. One reason was without doubt anti-semitism, but it was not the only reason; the highly exclusive élite of Wilhelmine Germany socialised only with those who belonged to the highest ranks of society.

And so the property-owning bourgeoisie of the German Empire emerges as an élite that manifested its progress in the upper ranks of society through a new life-style, as members of the *haute bourgeoisie*. The frenetic social life and the flaunted consumerism that went with this progress were also the result of the quest for useful relations and the result of social competition and of the rapid accumulation of huge fortunes which made these extravagances possible. However, a frenetic social life and flaunted consumerism were above all the expression of new social attitudes towards wealth. Encouraged by the Emperor, the *nouveaux riches*' enthusiasm for luxury spread everywhere.

The book is easy to read and never weighed down by lengthy quotations. The notes are almost always restricted to the sources of quotations, tables of statistics and other data, and to controversial or, at first sight, curious statements. Figures throughout the book are drawn from standard sources or from valuable statistical abstracts compiled by Dolores Augustine herself, and are hardly ever accompanied by specific quotations. German socio-economic history, based on primary sources and with a large range of implications taken into consideration, has seldom been described so thoroughly.

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J.L. BALDAUF-BERDES, *Women Musicians of Venice. Musical Foundations, 1525-1855*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. XIV, 305.

Until now there has been no book which summarised the centuries-long activities of the Venice *Conservatori*. Although the subject has been dealt with many times, research has been sporadic, and published in the form of essays, conference proceedings, university dissertations and chapters in monographs (1). Little interest has been shown in the history of the aims of these musical institutions, their organisation, administration and their prestigious benefactors. The history of four Hospitals in Venice - the *Pietà*, the *Mendicanti*, the *Incurabili* and the *Derelitti* - needed to be placed in a broader context that took into account the economic bearing the society of the time had on these institutions, what music was performed and who went to hear it.

Applying rigorous historiographical method, Jane L. Baldauf-Berdes has used all the available documentation to fill this gap, and has provided the scholar and research student with a valid tool for furthering our knowledge of the history of music and its wider context: the hospitals were part of an economy in which professions were bound up with crafts, art became a merchandise and production became increasingly specialised and sophisticated. The founding of a charitable institution for education, such as the sixteenth-century *conservatorio* in Venice, cannot be merely considered as the setting up of a school of music: music has to be related to the way it was produced and to those who commissioned it, in an attempt to outline a socio-economic history of music in Venice from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

The book is divided into three parts and begins with a summary of the history of Venetian society's relationship with the institutions and a history of religiosity and worship in Venice over the centuries. The description of the independent types of religious charitable associations that gave rise to the founding of *luoghi pii* is followed by an analysis of music in Venice and the places - religious and non-religious, public and private - where music was performed. The second part is entirely about the hospitals, their founding, their internal organisation and the creating and running of the 'choirs'. The four institutions were all of long-standing (2), and aimed to provide assistance to abandoned children, to isolate and treat patients suffering from syphilis, to aid the poor, and to provide shelter for the homeless, the sick, the elderly and

¹ Denis Arnold and Sven Hansell should be mentioned as scholars who have done research on this subject.

² The oldest was the Mendicanti Hospital, founded in 1182 to succour the elderly and the infirm; the Pietà Hospital was founded by Franciscan friars in 1346, but before that date had taken in foundlings; the Incurabili Hospital was founded in 1552 as an isolation hospital and a hospital where contagious diseases were treated; the *Ospedaletto*, or hospital of Santa Maria dei Derelitti was founded in 1528 to stem the devastating effects of a terrible famine.

the disabled, irrespective of their age or sex. The hospitals were organised like monastic convents, but lay committees were entrusted with their running and sought the support of benefactors, which was vital to their maintaining a certain independence from both church and state. The internal organisation of the hospitals is very clearly illustrated, despite a wealth of detail: at the head of each institution there was a committee made up mostly of nobles. Committees had between twenty-four and fifty members, three, four or five of whom, including the *deputati sul coro*, had to keep a check on, or run, specific sectors of the institution. If a candidate for the *Governo* declined office, he was fined 500 ducats. The governors had power of decision in matters of administration, morals, culture and discipline; they were instrumental in preparing young people for independence, sending them out into the world when they were eighteen years old (as at the *Pietà*) with 50 ducats and clothes for their 'new' adult life. Members of the most outstanding patrician families of Venice, including nine future doges, were actively involved in the administration, whilst religious assistance was provided by Dominican and Somaschi friars.

Jane Baldauf-Berdes has paid particular attention to the financial accounts of the four hospitals, considering them evidence of the birth of the Venetian school of music and its complex productive and artistic systems. The economic conditions of the four hospitals were at times very different from one another. The budget of the *Ospedale degli Incurabili* amounted to 7,000 ducats in 1583, whereas that of the *Mendicanti* amounted to 6,000 ducats in the same year. In 1700, the *Pietà's* total income amounted to 80,000 ducats whereas the *Derelitti's* amounted to only 24,000 ducats. Income derived for the most part from benefactors' large bequests, often solicited by granting special indulgences, but also from capital investments deposited by private investors and from the *figlie's* handwork. The state's annual grant to the hospitals was insignificant: merely 0.05% of the Venetian Republic's total income (about 1,803,000 *scudi*). The state's first grant to the *Incurabili* was awarded in 1527 when the latter's Church was built: a sum of 600 ducats was granted.

The first-time musical activity of the *figlie* brought in money was in 1525, at the *Pietà* Hospital, when the *figlie di comune* collected monies in the streets of Venice, ringing the little bells with which they begged for alms. But in the seventeenth century, a *figlia* working as a silk-washer earned 40 ducats per month, and contributed to an overall annual income of about 2,000 ducats. However the little washergirls were soon out of work and many of them were taken into service by the same families that had sponsored the wash-house.

Income from the musical activity of the *figlie* in the choirs was decidedly higher. Choir members were chosen by the Governors both from the girls who lodged in the *Conservatorio* and were dispensed from ordinary duties when recruited into the choir, and from fee-paying external pupils, called *figlie a spese* or *figlie d'educazione*. In the seventeenth century, up to one hundred

girls could be in the choir, but in the first half of the eighteenth century numbers were reduced to forty. Choir members were divided into beginners (under sixteen years old), apprentices (who continued their musical studies for a further five years) and old choristers who, on finishing their studies, stayed with the choir as singers or teachers for at least a further ten years.

As their musical ability increased, the *figlie del coro* were granted privileges and financial rewards: they did less arduous physical tasks and they earned more money, but the fact that musical activity took the place of more traditional work constituted a threat to the equilibrium of the financial organisation of the female sector. The fact that *figlie del coro* were totally or partially dispensed from manufacturing work constituted a considerable financial burden for the hospitals in terms of loss of income. In 1738 in the Derelitti Hospital, the cost of 'total dispensation' for thirteen singers and eight instrumentalists was L. 840, while that of 'partial dispensation' for six singers and seven instrumentalists was L. 260, amounting to L. 1,100 in all. In 1755 the cost of nine total dispensations and fifteen partial ones was L. 660. And so musical activities had to be funded by benefactors' sizeable legacies, donations, allocations for dowries, monies given to celebrate masses for the souls of the dead, lotteries, fees from the *figlie di spese*, by state grants and by *scagni* (concert chairs). Donations for *scagni* were essential, not only as a source of indirect income, but also to safeguard the musicians' morale, enabling them to live decently and independently. The importance of *scagni*, voluntary contributions that were exchangeable, like cash donations made at charity concerts nowadays, is documented at the *Mendicanti*, where income from *scagni* amounted to L. 1,392.38 in a mere eighteen months, between January 1729 and August 1730.

Income to support the choirs was needed to cover performance costs, including the purchase of candles, costumes and other accessories, the purchase of instruments, the maintenance of instruments used by the musicians and the commissioning and the copying of the work to be performed. An exceptional event occurred when the *figlie dei cori* of the four *Conservatori* performed together at the Russian court in 1782. Costs were extremely high and costume expenses alone for 82 girls amounted to L. 10,400, 16% of the total cost of the performance. On that occasion another L. 813.10 were spent on copying the parts of the cantata and L. 630 on having the first thirty copies bound in silk to give to the authorities of the *Casa dei Filarmonici*.

At one time the choirs were permanent and the choirmasters' salaries were included in the budget of the institution to which they belonged. The Governors of the *Pietà* allocated 1,000 ducats annually to the choir until 1790, when the sum was increased to 1,318 ducats. In 1781, when the annual income amounted to 9,148 ducats, the choir received 1,000 ducats; the *maestro di cappella* was paid 400 ducats and the singing teacher, strings teacher and wind instrument teacher 200 ducats each. In 1729 at the

Mendicanti, the teachers' salaries amounted to 570 ducats, in 1730 480 ducats, in 1731 342 ducats and in 1777 440 ducats.

Jane Baldauf-Berdes point to an interesting parallel between the Venice Conservatories and the Naples Conservatories. She makes a curious observation, which has yet to be verified, about the payments made in the mid-eighteenth century to those external *maestri* at the Venice hospitals who had done their musical studies in Naples: it seems that they earned 10 ducats per month more than in Naples.

By stating facts about the *maestri*, the living conditions of the *putte*, which performances took place when, special occasions and special performances, income and costs for theatrical performances, and the variety of instruments taught, Jane Baldauf-Berdes takes the reader through the most significant stages in the development of the Venetian school of music.

The vastness and the originality of the subject make this book memorable, although it does suffer from a surfeit of information, some misprints and references which are not always reliable because of inaccurate dates. We have here a huge mass of material which is extremely difficult to organise and summarise and which requires an efficient research method to avoid as far as possible false interpretations, hasty deductions and misreadings of sources.

I myself well understand these difficulties because I have done similar research on the four Neapolitan *Conservatorii* in the same period. The risk of getting bogged down in inductive arguments, in an excess of superfluous data or in digressions that muddle the line of thought stems from the huge amount of documentary material, but it also confirms the complexity of the social, religious, anthropological, economic, institutional and musical relations the *Conservatorii* had in the historical context of that period. Perhaps the methodological error lies in the fact that, for a work of this scale, one person's research is not sufficient, no matter how meticulous, constant and broad it may be. A research team, on the other hand, comprising a specialist in anthropology, a specialist in sociology, a specialist in the history of religions, a specialist in the history of institutions, a specialist in the economy, a specialist in musicology and so on would have more chance of producing a work based on a rigorously scientific and interdisciplinary orientation.

Sadly, Jane Baldauf-Berdes' untimely death occurred in the very year her book was published. Her ability to have accomplished so arduous a task must be recognised, and above all her courage to have done so. Moreover she has pointed the way quite clearly to other areas of research, to the specific problems involved in such research and to the methods to be applied.

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L. DE ROSA, *Economisti meridionali*, Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici, Naples, 1995, pp. 332.

In what way has southern Italian economic thought contributed to European culture? What are the distinctive characteristics of this school? To what extent can it claim to be *meridionalista*? These are the questions that Luigi De Rosa sets out to answer in this collection of essays which portray eight great southern Italian economists.

At a time when economists are themselves expressing new concern over the 'Southern Question' as a return to a clear divide between the South and other Italian regions after a period of realignment with the rest of Italy, the publication of *Economisti meridionali* is extremely timely. It gives historical depth to an old debate which has arisen time after time. Yet, although the debate has often taken very different forms, its basic arguments remain the same. The debate thus represents a long historical phase: and southern economic culture is still very far from losing impetus.

An integral part of the great cultural movements beyond the Alps which marked the rise of classical economic thought (Galvani, for example), several southern writers actually foreshadowed such movements. Serra was the first to outline the general and common causes of a state's prosperity and greatness, identifying ways of government, laws and political and institutional security as the condition for any kind of economic prosperity. Before Adam Smith's suggestions on public finance, Broggia had made the subject of finance a discipline in its own right. Genovesi made far-sighted observations on the effects of the English Revolution and on the revolutionary role of the secondary sector in the economy before the English themselves did.

The writings on south Italy represent only one aspect, therefore, of their thought. Nineteenth-century commentators, for example, tended to stress the importance of other aspects. In the century of the triumph of free trade, classical economy and the marginalist school, the scientific aspects of their work which were more related to economic analysis in the strictest sense, interested contemporaries most. When *meridionalismo* also embraced positivist principles, De Viti De Marco viewed Serra as a specialist in the study of money and exchange.

'Southern', therefore, does not necessary mean '*meridionalista*'. The problem is one of interpretation, or better still, of historiography. De Rosa's merit is that of having 'historicised' the meridionalistic interpretation of these writers, placing it within a precise cultural context. Traces of this new cultural outlook appeared in the first decades of the twentieth century but it most fully emerged in the period following the second World War with the debate on economic development which in the 1950s had a big impact not only on politics and policies but also on economic theory and historiography (think of Hirschman, Rostow, Gerschenkron and Habbakkuk). One aspect of the debate was that it showed up the inadequacy of neo-classical economic

propositions founded on individualism for explaining and resolving the continuing inequality between different areas of the world. New methodologies were proposed that took account of aspects which traditional economic analysis had considered residual: institutional and political factors, sociological and anthropological factors.

If this new way of viewing development pervaded economic culture from the 1950s onwards, it also affected historians' perceptions about southern Italian economists. In this new perspective the latter are seen as the originators of a theory on backwardness. Throughout the twentieth century this aspect of southern Italian economic thought has progressively gained currency; from the very start of the century new theories emerged which were to prepare the ground for the major turning point in the 1950s. In the 1920s Arias had already pointed to those aspects of Serra's thinking which were later to form the basis of the meridionalist interpretation of the economist's work, namely those which identified the historical and economic causes of the disparity in development between industrial and commercial regions of Northern Italy and the Southern Kingdom on the basis of geographical, economic and political factors. For Arias Serra's merit was to have understood that the South could only solve its problems after its economy had fully evolved, that is after having industrialised. Thus, apart from urging private citizens to set up industries, Serra laid great emphasis on state intervention. After the second World War, this interpretation gained ground. According to Pepe, Serra denounced the South's depression and helped to provide suggestions for policies which could start a process of development to revive the economy. Genovesi was subject to the same kind of revision during the second World War.

As far as Galiani is concerned, interest in his *Dialogues* - that is, in the more philosophical and political aspects of his work - was rekindled at the start of the twentieth century after almost a century of neglect. Alongside the writings of Arias and Gignoux, the most influential work to appear in the period between the two wars was that by Tagliacozzo. In his study of eighteenth-century Neapolitan economists, Tagliacozzo sees the *Dialogues* as a reaction to the prevailing tendency to abstract theorising and as a statement about the need for human judgement to be shaped by 'relativistic' considerations regarding circumstances and ends.

For Tagliacozzo, Venturi, Einaudi and Bresciani Turrone the importance of Galiani lay in his having demonstrated the limits of abstract reasoning and in his conviction that economic science was subject to external circumstances. De Rosa recalls that even Schumpeter cites Galiani as the only eighteenth-century economist to have insisted on man's variability and on the temporal and geographical relativity of politics.

It is in the light of this new interpretation that interest has grown for a group of writers who, more than other scholars, have explored disciplines which border on their own, such as law, politics, technology and who have

more awareness of the influence of institutions and economics on historical events. The interest shown by Pepe and Caristia in Giannone, for example, is directly related to this tendency. The same can be said for the interest in Bernardo Tanucci who was mainly concerned with economics as a study on the balance of payments and government expenditure and whose writings show clearly the links between economics and politics, the art of government and knowledge of law.

Yet the relation between institutions and the economy, between the state and economic development, is brought out more emphatically in the works of Ludovico Bianchini. More than other writers Bianchini appears to be closest to Luigi De Rosa's own point of view and to have been the principal source of inspiration for the Neapolitan economic historian's own contribution to south Italian historiography. De Rosa explains the singularity of the process of change which modern and contemporary south Italy has undergone within the wider context of change affecting the western world, bearing in mind the complex interplay of institutional and economic factors, such as financial opportunities and the rules of capital markets, the complexity of ownership laws and tax policies and the crucial role of the state in any modern economy.

According to Bianchini the principle of free trade was extremely ambivalent. The *laissez faire laissez passer* formula was difficult to apply without adequate state intervention. Bianchini saw the complexity and the fragility of the concept of economic freedom and believed that the state had a vital role in creating the conditions from which economic freedom could arise. According to the type of policies pursued, the state had the main responsibility for economic decline or economic progress. By controlling revenue and expenditure, the state had a big influence on economic development. Economic policy and the management of the economy were two inextricable aspects of the same problem. A healthy economy required both an effective economic policy and efficient management. Bianchini's remarks on south Italy are linked to this concept regarding the relationship between state and the economy. The southern regions' failure to develop, or their slow development, are related not so much to the poverty of the soil, unfavourable conditions, their geographical position or the will of the inhabitants. Rather it depended on the fact that state finances were never healthy and that the national debt weighed down on government and private initiative since it required stifling impositions and prevented the capitalisation of savings.

Finally, the widest and most complex concept concerning state intervention and the economy in southern Italian economic thought is to be found in Nitti's works. This concept can be traced to the German historical school's state socialism and to the meridionalism of the *Rassegna settimanale* according to which the state was able to correct geographical and social disparities and to control economic sectors which were of definite public

interest. In this theory the state was not only the repository of high values such as social responsibility and justice but was also an economic agent which could pursue efficiency and development often more effectively than individuals.

Although each study has its own particular emphasis, overall this collection of essays provides a unified and coherent view of the term 'southern' which undoubtedly derives from De Rosa's own point of view and his interpretation of the writers' 'meridionalism'. According to this view, the 'Southern Question' is not merely an acknowledgement of backwardness and suggestions for resolving such backwardness. The term "southern" influences theory and implies a definite cultural approach. This approach is based on a view of the world and of knowledge which rejects abstract hypotheses, pre-conceived theories and single and over-simplified interpretations of historical events. Rather it is based on a strong sense of historical reality and of the context within which any economy must be related to institutional and sociological factors in order to be meaningful. Still less can an economy be measured through simple calculations of 'gross domestic product', the basic sum of its components. We can draw a very important lesson from this idea regarding the historical context of each economy: to work for the future with policies which are founded on abstract analysis can cause incalculable damage and dreadful errors. These analyses treat the economy as if it were regulated by fixed and unchangeable laws which transcend the historical variable of context.

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N. KONING, *The Failure of Agrarian Capitalism. Agrarian Politics in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and the USA 1846-1919*, Routledge, London and New York, pp. XII-292.

The need for a far-reaching, comparative history of the processes of economic development in agriculture appears all too evident, especially if we consider the many studies which in recent years have focused on specific geographical areas within narrow time frameworks. The need is even more pressing if we consider the fact that certain fundamental and general developments linked to the profound and irreversible changes which have affected agriculture since the mid-eighteenth century - and which have cut across national boundaries - have not been explored and await a full analysis.

The basic aim of the present study is not so much to open a new field of enquiry but rather to bring together and to re-examine all the material which currently exists about the subject and to provide a general interpretation of

the processes of agricultural development in Great Britain, Germany, Holland and the United States of America. This is undoubtedly an ambitious task which is not devoid of risks and problems, as Koning himself acknowledges. Nonetheless it has the merit of placing at the centre of the analysis the questions regarding the unitary nature of historico-economic processes and the comparison of development models between different countries.

The two categories used by Koning are the large farm and the small or family farm; the whole analysis revolves around them. The methodological approach is justified by Koning's overall aim to provide a schematic analysis and to suggest clear and well-defined theories. However, adopting such a sharp and extremely polarised dichotomy carries the intrinsic risk of oversimplification and providing reductive theories about economic processes.

Some of Koning's conclusion are in clear contrast with the established and generally accepted historical scholarship on the subject. He argues that in the first phase, dating from the mid-eighteenth century to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, rather than being a protected sector which was continually in difficulty with respect to the radical technological changes sweeping through industry, agriculture was actually one of the sectors which offered greater opportunity for making large investments and profits. The favourable trend in agricultural prices stimulated an increase in overall production and especially in mechanisation; new agrarian rotations were innovated and the first artificial fertilisers were adopted. Innovations were entrusted to researchers who were scientifically qualified, even though attempts did not always produce the desired results. In this way the large farms considerably increased their profit margins, benefiting from economies of scale and from the advantages deriving from technological progress. The whole process occurred in a more or less spontaneous way. The reluctance of governments to intervene is explained by the absence of necessity and by the implicit will to favour large farms. Not surprisingly, during most of this phase *laissez-faire* policies were encouraged, supported by both big farmers and landlords alike.

1873, which was the beginning of a period of protracted deflation, was a watershed. The falling trend in agricultural prices in the last quarter of the nineteenth century marked the beginning of a new and very different economic situation. From a series of statistics regarding the countries under study it emerges that after 1870 the prices of agricultural products, especially corn, continued to be depressed and well below levels of the preceding periods. To add to the difficulties in this period was the general and rigid increase in agricultural wages; agricultural and industrial labour markets became increasingly distinct from one another and many agricultural labourers abandoned the countryside for the towns. Therefore an adjustment in agricultural wages became in many cases inevitable in order to stem the further loss of labour. Both factors, the fall in agricultural

prices and the rise in wages, created the conditions for a substantial and rapid fall in agricultural capitalists' income which 'in a few years' was to lead to the crisis of the large farm and to the contemporaneous burgeoning and spread of the small family farm.

This leads Koning to propose a general interpretation of events which differs for the most part from traditional currents of thought. Firstly, during the initial phase, from 1750 to 1873, the affluent rural classes did not use their political power for exclusively anti-liberalist purposes; rather they were interested in reforming old structures and in keeping abreast of the most advanced and progressive groups in society. According to Koning, the same protectionist policies brought in just after the Restoration were not welcomed by the big capitalist farmers, many of whom on the contrary, became free-trade supporters, especially after the repeal of the corn laws.

The attitudes of the large farmers changed radically only after the shift in agricultural fortunes towards the end of the century. In many countries they clamoured for protectionist tariffs, even though this period saw a rapid decline in the power of the rural classes. Conversely, the economic rise of small farms was favoured by the greater elasticity shown by such enterprises both in ensuring low production costs and in reducing opportunities for supplementary occupations, as was the case in the past. In such drastically changed circumstances, while agricultural profits everywhere gradually decreased, it was the large farms which were the most affected. As a result many of them began to go out of business (hence the title of the book) while other substantially reduced the volume of business; some were forced to turn their farms into family concerns.

Koning also takes issue with classical theories regarding the cause that determined the irreversible decline of large farms. According to Koning, the causes were not linked to their inefficiency nor technological shortcomings but rather to the fact that they were unable to allow profits and income to fall below a certain level at a time when wage increases led to a substantial increase in labour costs, to the advantage of smaller farmers who apparently were not affected by this type of problem.

In the light of this analysis it is thus possible to divide agricultural development into two distinct phases: in the period of the first or classical industrial revolution, agriculture and industry underwent a more or less parallel development. During the second industrial revolution the two sectors went their different ways: while industry followed the path towards oligopoly, agriculture became structured increasingly around family-run enterprises. Contrary to many schools of economic thought, therefore, the modern family farm was not a pre-capitalistic structure which accepted or resisted the complex process of industrialisation in a passive way; rather it was itself a product of the capitalistic, industrial system.

Against this general background government intervention was carried out, although the role of the government varied from country to country. In

the United States and Holland, as well known, the demand for intervention to sustain the primary sector was limited and unorganised, even among farmers. In Germany and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, both systems had high production costs, high and inflexible labour costs and fewer possibilities for restructuring production along more profitable lines. Therefore the German and British governments faced the alternative of either increasing protective tariffs or sacrificing agricultural interests. Right from the start Germany was resolute in carrying out the first option. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, adopted the second option; such a decision was influenced by the fact that a wide, international network of services, centred on the City of London, existed which was still firmly anchored to liberalism. As a result, in the United Kingdom the agricultural depression led to struggles and rifts among the rural classes rather than to a general movement in favour of protectionism.

However, as Koning rightly points out, state intervention was not exclusively a question as to whether governments opted for protectionism or for free trade. All countries helped small-holders in the process of land reform and by the end of the century government departments in charge of agriculture had become more effectively organised and were able to plan and direct production and to implement well-defined and coherent policies.

Paradoxically, the decline in the power of the landed classes coincided with the spread of an agrarian ideology which Koning defines as fundamentalist. Such an ideology insisted on the crucial importance of agriculture for a country's wealth and on the need to protect the sector from the negative effects of free trade. It had a broad social base composed of both rural and urban groups who were united in their demands for greater commitment by governments to promote national interests. The World War encouraged once more a demand for agricultural policies which, however, did not change with respect to preceding policies and continued to favour small farmers.

Koning's book is interesting for the novel and in some ways contrasting interpretation it provides about crucial events in the history of agriculture's economic development, although it is, perhaps, too anchored on cause and effect, probably through the author's need to provide a tidy reconstruction and clearly-stated theories. This may be a meritorious aim but there is a risk of oversimplification, especially in the context of a comparative history involving different countries' economies. While it is true that such countries shared a common capitalist system, the reality was complex and a more cautious approach to the subject, less tied to preconceived ideas and assumptions and showing more elasticity in linking events to one another and an understanding of a wider range of variables, would have made for a more balanced study.

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S. POLLARD - D. ZIEGLER (eds), *Markt, Staat, Planung. Historische Erfahrungen mit Regulierungs- und Deregulierungsversuchen der Wirtschaft*, St. Katharinen, Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 1992, pp. 299.

I suggest that the reader should attack this book in the way one should never attack a novel, especially a detective story, i.e. starting from the end with the afterward by D. Ziegler that states clearly the book's origins. This book is a collection of papers from a conference in honour of Sidney Pollard held at the University of Bielefeld and, despite Pollard's being the editor, is, for the most part, a *Festschrift* in his honour. Pollard taught for many years in England and wrote *Britain's Prime and Britain's Decline*. Explicit and implicit references to his work in these collected papers help the reader to grasp the consistency and originality of an anthology which, at a cursory glance, may seem to lack a central, cohesive theme. There is, in fact, a coherent comparative analysis running through the various papers. However, this comparison is not dependent on the fact that several national cases are put together, but is determined by constant reference to the English model.

It is, however, true that the economic history of the modern Western world is an implicit comparison with the first industrial nation. This book is bold in its intent, therefore: it is a critique of the English model which Rostow first set down in a somewhat simplified way and which Gerschenkron developed in a much more sophisticated analysis. The argument is even more fascinating given that the specific area compared is the relationship between the state and the economy.

The first long paper by Pollard may be taken as a guide to the whole book. After defining the state, Pollard takes issue with the conventional view about England being a country with a market which was free from government interference and so criticises the automatic contrast between England and 'latecomers', according to Gerschenkron, such as Prussia, Russia and Italy, where events in the economy were constantly influenced and often speeded along by state intervention. Pollard re-examines the image of an England that rigorously supported *laissez-faire*, starting with Smith's doctrines: in contrast with the common opinion that they were radically and dogmatically opposed to the state, Smith's doctrines regard the state as the indispensable precondition for market development, and provide for specific, albeit limited, areas of state intervention. Pollard goes on to stress the role of bureaucracy in the evolution of the relationship between the state and the economy, making specific reference to Germany in contrast to England. It would appear that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the much reviled Prussian-style bureaucratic tradition played an important and positive role in Germany's industrial development, whereas one of the causes of England's decline lay in the feebleness of state influence or, at least, of state supervision, despite there being a marked increase in the number of civil servants in that period in England. Once Gerschenkron's mechanical contrast between

England, a land of *laissez-faire*, and the rest of Europe loses weight, concepts like the *Organisierter Kapitalismus*, which enjoyed a certain success especially in Germany, lose heuristic value.

Other papers analyse a range of cases regarding different nations, different problems and different periods. J. R. Harris writes about industrial espionage in the eighteenth century as an activity encouraged by the state; he recounts the adventurous lives of two French engineers who, with the support of the finance ministers then in office, attempted to get hold of the secrets of the British textile industry. Crouzet's paper is also on France: he examines the economic policy of the Terror and the role of *assignats*, paper money guaranteed by public property, one of the main causes of the hyperinflation process in the 1790s. What he portrays is a dirigisme upheld by the army which did not succeed in stabilising French finances in the years of the Revolution nor in the Napoleonic era; French finances did not become stable until after 1815.

Berghoff and Ziegler write about Britain. Berghoff concentrates on the various problems inherent in the relationship between the state and the economy in Britain in the nineteenth century, the period when Britain was at the height of its power as the leading industrial nation, before it began its slow decline. Berghoff criticises objectively both the theory that England was a valiant bulwark of *laissez-faire* and the much less widely-held belief that the much-extolled British non-interventionism was a myth; the supporters of this latter theory speak of a 'nineteenth-century revolution in government' characterised by an increase in state intervention and by greater bureaucracy. Discarding these two extremes, Berghoff embraces the moderate view put forward by the English historian C. Crouch who judges the nineteenth-century system as a 'refined *laissez-faire* regime'. This consisted firstly in a form of state intervention that was still within the limits set by Adam Smith (intervention concerned with regulation rather than with direction), secondly in a still very slight expansion of bureaucracy and thirdly in local government accounting for a large proportion of public expenditure.

In a declaredly comparative paper, Ziegler tackles a complementary problem and one that stems from Pollard: he examines the relationship between the state and the economy in Prussia and in England in the nineteenth century in order to find an explanation for the 'relative decline' in England by comparing the two nations. But it is not a matter of setting *laissez-faire* against interventionism (these appear to be two theories which were never fully put into practice in any specific historical reality). The differences between Prussia and England - where *laissez-faire* was integrated by increasing state intervention in the economy - are outlined with an extremely detailed historical analysis, and the importance of distinct traditions emerges in a way which is often unexpected. The mercantilist and bureaucratic nature of the Prussian state was very important and lasted for a long time.

The case of the railways - so often used as a ground for testing out

economic history theorems - is illuminating. In England the 'railway Interest' used liberal ideology instrumentally to oppose a substantially anti-monopolistic system of state control. In Prussia the state was at first against railways for fear of competition with the state-owned road network. Then - what would be unthinkable in England - the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie requested government aid and, between 1835 and 1840, the government issued a legislative framework for the building of railways. After 1848 the middle class took the initiative itself - and purely for fiscal reasons. Thanks to centralisation and an efficient bureaucracy, the Prussian experience was more positive as far as growth of the sector and functionality of infrastructure were concerned (for example, consider the ratio between main lines and branch lines in the railway network).

Richard Tilly also compares England and Germany, with reference to the banking sector and universal banks. As regards universal banks, even today opinion is divided between political censure on the one hand and recognition of their positive economic role on the other. Tilly's analysis confirms the importance of universal banks as a vehicle for growth: they were a product of nineteenth-century Germany, and were an innovative response to economic backwardness and the great demand for capital. The comparison with Great Britain reinforces positive opinion on the connection between banks and growth in Germany. Since close interaction between banks and industry meant that information gaps were avoided, diseconomies of scale which are typical of highly concentrated institutions, were more than compensated by an efficacious diversification of risk.

R. Petri analyses the delicate period between the two World Wars which was characterised by the crisis in *laissez-faire* and a reduction in international trade. Petri examines Italy's autarkic policy from the original stand-point of technological innovation. In this case too, the economic historian's analysis adds to our understanding of the subject, at least with regard to more properly economic aspects, even though this kind of analysis cannot, and indeed does not set out to change a value judgement, which, as stated by Einaudi, for example, maintained that autarky destroyed the natural development of Italian industry. With special reference to the chemical industry, Petri points out that autarky did not mean breaking off relationships with foreign countries but meant continuously seeking technologies and capital that led to greater autonomy. In the context of international relationships at that time and considering the general trend towards isolation, Italian autarky seems neither exceptional nor irrational.

Although in a different political context, the economic policy of authoritarian regimes is again the subject of other papers. Wellhoener examines Franco's Spain. In that regime, the state managed to overcome times of crisis and so perpetuate its existence by closely interweaving economic power and political power, thereby starting partial modernisation. However this strategy proved inadequate to cope with the oil crisis in the 1970s that put

the economic system on the ropes and in the end overwhelmed the political subsystem. Wellhoener makes a thorough analysis of the problems of Franco's Spain, although, perhaps, his theory of an economic policy that served mechanically to enable the state to survive runs into tautology.

Papers by Teichova, Wixforth and Wachtler enable the reader to extend the comparison to Eastern Europe. Teichova examines Czechoslovakia between the two World Wars, from the setting up of a bourgeois-type technocratic regime in 1918 to the Nazi invasion of 1938, which wiped out the country's strategic position in mediation and trade between East and West. Wixforth looks at Russia between 1890 and 1941, adopting an unusual periodisation. His paper emphasises continuity between the Imperial regime and the Soviet regime regarding the centrality of the state and the state's basic motivations i. e. the attempt to overcome Russian backwardness compared to other countries, and the pursuit of hegemonic projects. Regime after regime, failure after failure: over this long period responsibility for the weaknesses of the Russian economic system lay with the state. Wachtler's research on labour productivity in the German Democratic Republic throws light on the complicated workings of the economy under a military-type dirigisme and on its harmful effects, not least in terms of loss of quality in the work-force.

The book ends with a return to England - not the heroic England of the industrial revolution, but the England of a regime that attempted to revive the glories of *laissez-faire*: the Thatcher regime. Siegenthaler analyses Thatcherism's early days as an economic and social doctrine which in the crisis of the 1970s put itself forward as a clear and simple solution to the destructuring in progress. As Hobsbawm provocatively remarked, this 'masterpiece of minimal art', which denied state involvement in the economy, bordered on anarchic doctrine. In practice, from eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, a model for other European nations - at least from the historians' viewpoint - down to the days of Thatcherism, *laissez-faire* was never to be found in its pure state, but was always contaminated by the influence of the state, whose presence and pervasiveness in the economy and in society is one of the fundamental characteristics of modernity.

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W.D. RUBINSTEIN, *Capitalism, Culture and Decline in Britain 1750-1990*, London-New York, Routledge, 1994, pp. VIII, 182.

The aim of the author is to examine and to challenge the traditional view about Britain's economic decline, providing an alternative view based on a rethinking about the importance of the industrial sector in economic growth.

Scholars have pointed to many different economic and social causes to explain the slow-down in Britain's economic growth from the end of the nineteenth century to the present compared to the performances of other countries. The most widely accepted of these is the so-called 'cultural critique' advanced by such writers as Anthony Sampson, Corelli Barnett and Martin J. Wiener. Basically this theory argues that British culture, especially that taught in public schools and universities, had a negative influence on the creation of a modern class of entrepreneurs at the end of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century. The social and economic values propagated by the institutions which educated the economic and social elites were anti-capitalistic and anti-industrial. The pursuit of profit was considered vulgar and the preferences of the new generations were moulded according to pre-modern values linked to the lifestyle of the landed aristocracy. According to these theories, economic and industrial decline occurred as a direct result of the spread of such values among the heirs of the northern middle class which had played the leading role in the industrial revolution. The new generation of industrialists were contaminated by aristocratic lifestyles and lost the entrepreneurial drive needed to modernise British industry. Although the United Kingdom was the first industrial nation, the social structure of British society continued to be rigid. Instead of undergoing a process of social renewal, the new generation of industrialists were assimilated by the traditional ruling classes whose values continued to be pre-modern.

Rubinstein attacks this theory on three counts. His first point is essentially economic, the second regards the basic characteristics of British culture and the third concerns the education of the ruling groups, focusing on the presumed role of public schools in fostering anti-capitalistic values among British industrialists.

As far as strictly economic considerations are concerned, Rubinstein argues that it is wrong to speak of a real economic decline in Britain in the long term. Available figures show that as regards individual living standards, the United Kingdom is on a par with other economically-advanced countries. Such standards have risen continuously even though the classical indicators used to study economic performance have produced worse trends than in other countries.

It is the industrial sector which has declined, especially after the second World War. However, according to Rubinstein this fact should not be confused with a declining economic position. Although traditional industries (textiles, iron and steel, ship-building etc.) closed down, other sectors, particularly the sector linked to financial services in the City of London, expanded and increased the general level of wealth.

Rubinstein's view draws much from Petty's Law, the significance of which had already been underlined by Colin Clark. According to this law, an economy develops quite naturally from the primary sector to the tertiary

sector by way of the secondary sector. However, in the case of the United Kingdom, this law of development did not follow the same stages. Up until the eighteenth century, Britain's economy was mainly agricultural. In the second half of that century it became a commercial economy with an efficient primary sector and it continued to be commercial and financial during the period of the industrial revolution, when the secondary sector grew rapidly.

Rubinstein concludes that, since the eighteenth century, Britain's economy has never been an overriding industrial economy but rather a commercial and financial economy, and that the importance of industrialisation has been overstated, largely because of the significance ascribed to it by Marxists. Rubinstein upholds this thesis even though he himself admits that, up until the 1960s, the secondary sector was the one which absorbed most of the active population. At this point his reasoning does not appear convincing.

According to Rubinstein, the North's industrial decline can be explained by the increase in international competition which deprived traditional British industries of their outlets. Given the increase in opportunities for profit in sectors in which the United Kingdom had traditionally built up comparative advantages, like services in financial and commercial mediation, capital abandoned industrial sectors and was attracted to the City. What occurred in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth and twentieth century was therefore a 'natural' transition from industry to commerce which weakened the industrial structure but at the same time increased Britain's overall wealth. For these reasons Rubinstein considers the decisions of the economic élites to be economically rational and not at all dictated by anti-entrepreneurial values.

By arguing that economic decline has not really taken place, Rubinstein implicitly argues that British culture did not have any great influence over Britain's negative economic performance. On the contrary, after making some critical remarks about the difficulty in identifying a specific national culture, the significance of which changes according to the point of view and period, Rubinstein carries out a sophisticated comparative analysis for establishing the existence of anti-capitalistic social and cultural forces in the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and Japan, that is, the countries which have dominated the world economy in the twentieth century. Such analysis shows very clearly that it is British culture which has the smallest number of anti-capitalistic positions. In this connection Rubinstein stresses the importance of the empirical philosophical tradition in both political practice and ideology which was always favourable to modernity, liberalism and capitalism. He points out that unlike Britain's great continental rival, Germany, British culture, social conventions and politics were totally free from anti-liberal and anti-capitalistic influences which pervaded both right-wing and left wing politics in Germany.

The third point that Rubinstein makes in his criticism of the decline

theory regards the education and behaviour of the ruling elites which was the central point of Wiener's theory. According to this theory, the institutional culture imparted in public schools and universities at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, produced a ruling class imbued with pre-modern values. What is more important, in these schools a whole generation of sons of industrialists abandoned the path laid out by their fathers and their fathers' social values to embrace those of the aristocracy.

To invalidate this thesis, Rubinstein has conducted a statistical survey of the *curricula vitae* of the pupils and their fathers who attended eight of the most important public schools in Britain (including Eton, Harrow, Rugby). An astute analysis of these data allows Rubinstein to make two very revealing observations. Firstly, in the majority of cases the sons of industrialists attending the schools from 1840 to 1900 continued to be industrialists. Secondly, the great majority of industrialists from the North did not send their sons to public schools. Therefore, even if we accept that the culture imparted in public schools was anti-capitalistic - something which is to be strongly doubted - its influence in drawing whole generations of sons of industrialists away from the 'vulgar' pursuit of profit was negligible. Rubinstein concludes that the theory of the 'cultural critique' is not founded on empirical data.

Rubinstein concludes his study with a concise reconstruction of the groups which held power in Britain the period under study, showing that the landed aristocracy's influence in government was visibly weakened. At least from the beginning of the twentieth century the dominant group within the Tory party, the party of the Establishment, was no longer the landed aristocracy but rather the business and professional elites, leading up to the Thatcher governments whose social base was formed by the middle class that had benefited from free-trade and whose policy was to give up the protection of traditional industries, allowing the City - which according to Rubinstein was the real driving force of the British economy - to fully develop.

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T. M. SAFLEY - L. N. ROSENBAUD, *The Workplace before the Factory. Artisan and Proletarians 1500 - 1800*, Ithaca - London, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. XI-252.

In recent years, there has been increasing impatience among historians with studies that set out to give a too rigid definition of the complex changes in the labour world during the transition from an *ancien régime* society to an industrialised society, offering broad and sweeping theories which are often

highly coloured by ideology. The book under review is a significant example: it consists of eleven papers from a conference held in October 1990 at the University of Pennsylvania. Although the papers are concerned with different geographical areas, different periods of time and different types of production, they all aim to reconstruct, by means of careful research based on primary sources, the stages and the ways by which the artisan became progressively marginalised in the capitalist process. The results of their work show the weakness in the traditional view which gives a single, uniform explanation of the historical and multi-faceted dualism between proletarians and capitalists; instead, the authors choose to analyse the differences in working conditions, the huge range of productive systems and the large and small markets to which they were linked. Because this book's greatest merit lies in the originality of the individual pieces of research, it is worth looking more closely at each of them.

Several papers are concerned with textile production. C. Clark examines rural manufacture in New England between 1750 and 1830. Clark observes that, over that period, the growth in cottage industry as a result of the increase in population and the break-down of commercial relations with England, became "an example of the kind of alternatives to mass-production". However, during the decades after 1830, the development of the capitalist system and the ensuing concentration of industry destroyed the original industrial production system: families that owned their land withdrew from manufacturing, the work-force became the proletariat, underemployment declined, and the work-force was subject to more assiduous controls and to the discipline imposed by a new kind of entrepreneur.

C.H. Johnson's research is not dissimilar, although the geographical area examined is very different: Johnson studies Lodève, a small town with a population of about 8,000, situated north of Clermont. In the eighteenth century, a factory system had developed at Lodève without the adoption of particularly innovatory technology. The government had been the main driving force: through Colbert's reforms, and also through subsequent measures, the government strongly promoted the development of the textile industry, which was based essentially on the exploitation of the work-force. It was thus possible to both obtain better-quality goods and lower production costs.

The third paper, by T. M. Safley, examines the textile industry in Upper Swabia between 1580 and 1660. The production unit was the family, and the weavers could not be considered proletarians; they did not, in fact, sell their work in exchange for a wage that was agreed in advance. However, despite their independent status, they were nonetheless subject to evident constrictions which made them vulnerable. Their vulnerability lay essentially in the negotiations that the weavers had to enter into with the middlemen, who supplied them with raw materials, in order to decide on the quality, the quantity and the type of production.

J. Torras bases his research on the changes that undermined the traditional organisation of clothing manufacture in Igualada, a flourishing town near Barcelona. In the first centuries of the early modern age, Igualda's manufacturing system seemed well integrated into the broader network of specialisation at a regional level, as can be seen in the fact that the total sale of woollen products in Igualda amounted to about one sixth of overall local production. However, in the last years of the seventeenth century and the first twenty years of the eighteenth century, the Catalan economy suffered as a result of the political and military events, which brought radical changes to the entire manufacturing structure: after 1730 the regional economy, and in particular Igualda's economy, was more geared towards industrial production, which became concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs, who became mainly Government contractors.

Other papers are based on the very crucial role played by the state in starting and developing capitalist processes in mining production. S. C. Karant-Nunn examines Erzgebirge, a hilly region with many silver mines in the southern part of the ex-German Democratic Republic. The state, in its various ramifications, played a fundamental role, its influence becoming more and more marked from the end of the fifteenth century onwards. The fundamental principle underlying this greater intervention was dictated by the necessity to invest large sums of capital in order to expand enterprises and increase production more rapidly. Consequently, following a series of royal decrees, the miners, who up till then had been independent workers in small enterprises - in which they were often investors and co-managers - became mere employees of the royal household.

R. Morelli examines entrepreneurs in the iron industry in sixteenth-century Tuscany. He notes a definite connection between technological development, production systems and ways of using the work-force. Here again, the supreme political authority, in the person of the Granduca, was responsible for a radical and rapid change: through his agents, he exercised assiduous control over the mines, again transforming the entrepreneurs from independent workers into salaried employees.

R. C. Davis' paper on the naval dockyard in Venice in the seventeenth century also stresses the state's direct control and its aim to centralise production. This attitude stemmed from a precise necessity: from 1650 the state embarked on the planning and development of ship-building as part of an integrated system, based essentially on the standardisation of design and on mass-production. This new production method meant that every artisan's work became simpler and very repetitive.

C. Vanja's research concerns mines in the first centuries of the early modern age. Vanja's paper is original in that it focuses on the role and functions of women in mines. Vanja begins by pointing out that traditional documentary sources reveal very little information on the subject, and therefore it is not easy to draw any wholly reliable conclusion concerning

numbers, such as, for example, the exact number of female mine-workers. However this paper brings out other aspects, related to the fact that women were employed only for limited periods and all the work they did was practically unskilled. Vanja argues that the gradual exclusion of women, which became very evident from the seventeenth century onwards, was a symptom of the proletarianisation process, in which miners changed from being independent workers into employees in large-scale enterprises.

H. Burstin's paper is on unskilled labour which constantly fluctuated from employment to unemployment and semi-poverty. The case in point is Paris, and the whole paper is concerned more with continuity than with change. This seems an appropriate choice; in a large metropolis opportunities for non-specialised labour increased, even though they remained fairly constant over the years. However there was a substantial lack of strategy concerning the family as a whole: many non-skilled labourers were immigrants, and so their families often lived a long way from Paris. The French Revolution brought a sudden and radical change to this type of work, but did not bring new work opportunities immediately for this category of labourers.

The last two pieces of research are on paper manufacture. J. Materné and L. N. Rosenband show that, despite the workers' opposition in an attempt to preserve their independence by perpetrating the family model, managerial techniques totally transformed the traditional figure of the artisan, whose status was consequently degraded: he was no longer able to establish and control individualised methods of production.

In conclusion, this book makes it clear that there were many different courses of action connected with the processes of proletarianisation. There is no time-framework or single account that can portray all the stages on this total and yet multifaceted transformation. Capitalism's only common denominator lay in the fact that capital became more and more available for investment in the economy, thereby totally upsetting traditional production systems. In this sense, although the ways and stages by which capitalists exercised their power varied enormously in the different contexts examined, they hugely influenced overall labour structures and the very philosophy of labour, and were consequently inevitably responsible for the workers' increasing vulnerability and dependence.

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