
REVIEWS OF BOOKS

P. BAIROCH, *Commerce extérieur et développement économique de l'Europe au XIX siècle*. (Mouton, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. 1976. pp.355).

Professor Bairoch has made very important contributions to economic history with studies on the labour force, the industrial revolution, the economic development of the Third World and urbanization. In the present volume, he examines Europe's free trade experiment between 1860-1880 and its effect on economic growth in the nineteenth century. The volume provides historical perspective on trade in the early stages of development and on economic relations between developed and less developed countries in the contemporary world. The study falls into two parts: the first examines Europe's role in the world economy, the evolution of international trade, tariffs, industrial development, foreign investment and international migration. The second part focuses more directly on the effects of free trade in the developed country (Great Britain) and the less developed countries — France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Russia, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium, Switzerland and Sweden — and on the re-introduction of protectionism on the continent between 1890 and 1913. The volume contains eighty seven tables on population, tariffs, foreign investment, overseas migration, trade balances, imports and exports, annual growth rates of agricultural and industrial output and indexes of real income for the most important European states for benchmark years between 1800 and 1913.

It is impossible in a short space to do justice to the work or to summarize adequately the scope and content of the volume. Free trade started in the U.K. with the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846. It spread to the continent with the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860, and to Italy, Germany, Belgium,

etc., in the following years. It led, for about a quarter of a century, to the creation of a unique low-tariff area in Western Europe. Bairoch claims that free trade had radically different economic consequences for the developed (U.K.) and less developed (continental) countries of Europe — positive for the U.K., the established industrial leader supplying thirty per cent of Europe's exports in the 1860's; negative for the continental countries, predominantly agricultural and still technologically and commercially backward in 1860.

Free trade in classical theory allows for production to be distributed according to laws of comparative costs and leads to specialization of labour. It speeds up the pace of economic growth and reduces disparities between countries. In a more updated version, international trade tends to the equalization of returns to factors of production and to equalization of income levels and factor costs among countries. This implies that industrialization will result from international trade and will lead to equal levels of development. As long as inequality in the levels of development among nations remained moderate, and earnings differentials in the advanced and less developed countries did not diverge sharply, specialization and the benefits from the international division of labour were accepted as orthodox doctrine. Basic assumptions concerning specialization have been called into question, however, in the light of more recent evidence showing greatly increased inequality in development levels among nations.

Bairoch then offers an historical test of classical theory. The U.K., of course, had an early start in the industrial revolution — British national income was $2\frac{1}{2}$ times higher than that in the rest of Europe in 1860; British agricultural productivity was twice the European average and British industrial production *per capita* was between nine and eleven times higher than on the continent. Yet, as Bairoch shows, under free trade the gap in development levels between Britain and the continent became *more* pronounced, income differentials between the U.K. and the continental countries widened between 1860-1880 and investment and innovation on the continent declined. With the re-introduction of protective tariffs between 1890-1913 on the continent, however, there was a total reversal of economic trends; per capita incomes in the less developed (continental) countries rose, while growth in the U.K. lagged. Yet the reversal gives only limited support to protectionism as growth was accompanied by a long term swing in prices — agricultural prices on the continent falling to 1895 then rising relative to industrial prices, and with a higher rate of increase of agricultural relative to industrial production before 1895 and the reverse thereafter.

Free trade accelerated the process of structural transformation in Britain—a country with a vast colonial market, booming exports, advanced technology, high wages, and an agricultural sector already in the process of liquidation in 1860 (agriculture accounting for only one-fifth of GNP and employing only 22% of the active population). Free trade in continental Europe, on the other

hand, where 60% of the active population was still employed in rural occupations, served only to deepen and prolong the Great Depression. Furthermore, as Bairoch points out, deceleration in the continental countries under free trade was most pronounced in agriculture. It was not caused by a surplus of manufactured products from the U.K., but by falling transport costs which made possible the import of cheap grains and food stuffs from regions of higher agricultural productivity overseas. The contraction of local agricultural markets had highly negative effects for the less developed countries — it greatly hindered the acceleration of the rural exodus on the continent which would have enabled industry to absorb agricultural unemployment. It led furthermore to deceleration in the growth of agricultural productivity and a fall in farmers' purchasing power, and thus stagnation in global demand for industrial products. In addition, through complex links connecting economic activity, trade, migration and foreign investment, it led to the displacement of huge quantities of capital and labour at the end of the XIXth century from Europe to North America, Australia, Argentina, etc., which resulted in staggering losses to the European economy. Bairoch estimates these losses at approximately 25% of Europe's GNP in 1913. Free trade then led to a larger gap in development levels in the nineteenth century, not to the convergence of levels forecast by classical theory.

The volume offers, in addition, many valuable insights into historical relationships between foreign trade and economic development in the nineteenth century. Trade expanded at an unprecedented rate in the last century about one half the annual 7% rate attained during Europe's post-war boom 1950-1970. Trade was moreover relatively independent of commercial policies, price movements and demographic developments — increasing in periods of both falling prices (1840's and 1860's) and rising prices (1850's and 1890's) and during periods of liberalism (1845-1875) and protectionism (1815-1846; 1900-1913). Europe's trade grew faster on trend than national product or industrial production between 1870 and 1913. Europe's share in world trade, Bairoch shows, began to decline in the late nineteenth century with growing competition from North America, Australia and Japan. The Third World, however, was peripheral to the European economy in the nineteenth century, taking under 10% of Europe's exports and contributing less than 3% of Europe's GNP in 1913. The improvement in Europe's terms of trade between 1860-1880 followed a long secular decline which coincided with a period of stagnation in subsistence agriculture overseas and de-industrialization in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

This book then contains enough ideas, historical insights and imaginative and provocative hypotheses for a dozen PhD dissertations. It deserves to be very widely read.

IRA A. GLAZIER
Temple University and
University of Naples

- I. ERCEG (ed.), *Bibliographia historico-oeconomica Jugoslaviae*, Komisisija za ekonomsku historju Jugoslavije, 1978, pp. xi, 229.

Those interested in our field of studies will certainly welcome the publication of this bibliography of Yugoslavian economic history. It covers the period 1945 to 1976, which is precisely the time when the study of economic history in Jugoslavia took shape, even though there had been some important earlier contributions. The chronology also coincides with the ways in which problems tended to be viewed, which in turn reflect the political changes which the country experienced following the Second World War.

Over 3,000 titles are listed, and these give a picture of what Yugoslavian historians have accomplished in this field. It is a pity that the information does not include articles published in the principal foreign reviews, such as the *Annales ESC* or the *Journal of European Economic History*, to mention only those which have given space quite frequently to articles by Yugoslav historians. As an example, we were unable to find the name of Traian Stoianovich, to mention one of the best known, while others like Bariša Krekić are only partially listed. On the other hand, the advertised principle of attempting to cover only what has been published in Jugoslavia itself has the advantage of including works contained in collections or reviews which are not always easily accessible for the non-specialist.

Another advantage is to be found in the fact that titles of the works listed have been translated into English, and there is also an indication of those which contain foreign language summaries. The material has been divided into 14 sections: Mining and Forestry, Population and Migration, Fishing, Salt, Trade, Money, Agriculture etc. Consultation is also facilitated by the provision of an author index. It would perhaps be overdemanding to ask for a geographical index, although this would certainly be useful.

On the basis of this bibliography alone it would be quite superficial to attempt any overall assessment of economic history in Jugoslavia. However, one can still point to the relative absence of studies on price history, especially in view of the massive number devoted to metrology. In fact there are only ten articles on prices, and these deal almost exclusively with Ragusa, with three studies by Vuk Vinaver and one by Bogumil Hrabak. But the history of prices was one of the great themes in economic history in this period, which leads one perhaps to think that the Yugoslav historians were to some extent isolated from the main themes of research which were being developed in other countries. The same could also be said for problems of financial history and economic growth, which have again played so large a part in our own economic historiography, and which cannot have been held back by any shortage of sources.

It is no surprise that in the section dealing with agriculture the main theme is that of property and farming systems, together with studies on particular types of farming, especially wine and tobacco production, as well as three studies on opium growing. It is also to be hoped that this synopsis will serve to encour-

rage the younger historians to make for the areas where the most noticeable gaps are to be found.

Ivan Erceg merits our thanks for this undertaking, and for the way in which he has succeeded in coordinating and encouraging the collaboration of a huge number of local institutions which have organised the collection of the bibliographical information in the areas which concern them.

UGO TUCCI
University of Venice

P. MATHIAS and M. M. POSTAN (editors). *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. The Industrial Economies: Capital, Labor, and Enterprise.* vol. VII; part I, XVI, 832; part II, XII, 639 pages. Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Here we have economic history written as economists would have it. These two volumes, which cover the period roughly from the Napoleonic years to World War I, begin with a chapter entitled *Inputs of Growth* by two economists, Robert Solow and Peter Temin, both of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They present a theoretical statement about growth, how to measure it, and how to analyze it. For them this is the way to write economic history. Their schema consists of grouping the many elements of production into the traditional categories of land, labour, and capital and then of studying the role and importance of each. They stress, however, that the growth of productive inputs does not explain completely the growth of output. The excess between the two, if any, is attributed to a "residual", "The importance of the residual is that it provides the output, so to speak, out of which can come all-round increases in the rewards to factors of production".

From this base one proceeds to historical investigation. Obviously, investigators will encounter numerous pitfalls -- inadequate data, unmeasurable factors, and illusive materials -- but one should persist within the schema and do the best one can. The more the profession does persist, the more precise and adequate history will become.

The entire two volumes before us are, then, a statement of where economic history stands on this kind of an analysis. The economic histories presented here are by selected countries -- Great Britain, France, Germany, Scandinavia, Russia, and, although they are outside Europe, the United States and Japan. Conspicuous by their absence are Italy, Spain, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and, as usual, all the Balkans. Allocations of space to various countries vary considerably -- 229 pages for Russia, 202 for Great Britain, 130 for Japan, and 38 for Scandinavia. The persons chosen to prepare these country histories are obviously sympathetic to the orientation of economic history according to the schema determined by the editors -- Peter Mathias, Professor at All Souls, and M. M. Postan, Professor Emeritus of the University of Cambridge -- and are recognized leaders in the areas about which they write.

In my opinion, the enterprise undertaken is eminently successful. I think that every economic historian should study with care the introductory statement by Solow and Temin to know at least one way to proceed, to be alerted to things to look for, and to be warned of the dangers which lie ahead. Among the dangers are the paucity of trustworthy quantitative materials, particularly as one goes back in time, and the temptation to rely on "estimates", which may be exceedingly tenuous. In fact, in the "country studies" presented, "estimates" by scholars cited vary by as much as fifty per cent.

A second obvious danger to be encountered from following the proposed schema is to play down issues that are not directly concerned with growth. For example, in the two volumes under review almost no attention is given to tariffs, and to the debates concerning them, nor to economic pressure groups at work to secure governmental action favourable to them, or to matters of the welfare state. In fact, the schema seems to minimize to a considerable degree a basic consideration — that the end of economics is man. The role of the "great man" in general has been played down here and especially is this the case in technology. Thomas Edison is not even mentioned, Alexander Graham Bell is given a page, and James Watt as inventor two and as entrepreneur three. Yet a substantial part of the "residual" may be identifiable with technological progress. (vol. I, p. 27).

To give the reader of this review some appreciation of all the "gold" which can be found in these volumes is an absolute impossibility in the space available. A bringing together of findings would have added greatly to the value of this work, although I would be the first to recognize the magnitude of such a task.

I cannot resist the temptation, however, to mention some of the "nuggets" which I found of especial interest as I proceeded with my own reading. Throughout I was impressed with the findings regarding savings and investments in the process of industrialization. Apparently much of early financing of industry came from ploughing back profits but subsequently came more from banks, governments, and financial markets. This was especially noticeable in the case of Germany and Japan.

I was also impressed with the contributions of labour to industrialization. In every case presented here, wages and living conditions were slow to change in the beginning, which meant relatively cheap labour, but subsequently the material lot of workers was greatly improved by industrialization. In the case of Great Britain the clear turning point in this change came at the middle of the nineteenth century. This phenomenon seems to be confirmed by the movement of population toward industrialized areas.

So far as the role of the entrepreneur is concerned, much attention is given to it. In the case of France, the notion that industrialization was retarded by the "family nature" of business and that entrepreneurs lacked drive to move forward has been greatly modified. In fact, retardation in France is now accounted

for by a multiplicity of factors, as I tried to do years ago, and not by any one factor, as I was charged with having done in the piece on France.

In the treatment of Germany, the interesting point is made that because of the lower cost of production in Great Britain for articles in stable lines of expansion, German investors up to the 1840s did not put their funds in plants to meet British competition but instead in real estate and government bonds. Government subsidized railways changed all this, however, for the multiplier effect from building them resulted in investment over a wide spectrum of industry. Furthermore, railways did much in Germany to lower transportation costs, to make the area of the Germanies more of an economic unit, and to expand institutions for saving and investment. Indeed, investments in Prussia increased by only 51 per cent from 1816/22 to 1840/49, but they increased for all of Germany by 200 per cent from 1851/60 to 1881/90.

The treatment of Russian economic history is noteworthy for the presentation of a mass of statistical materials which are mostly drawn from Russian sources — sources which have not been available to persons like myself who do not know the language. I commend especially to my readers the section "State-Led and State-Run Capitalism", which provides a sketch of the history of entrepreneurship from Peter the Great to the New Economic Policy, ending in 1931.

The section devoted to the United States is marked by the treatment of capital formation by two devotees of econometrics, Lance Davis and Robert Gallman, and of the evolution of enterprise by Alfred Chandler. The economic history of Japan stresses the manner in which Japanese society adapted itself to industrialization without becoming westernized. Finally, the treatment of Scandinavia by Karl Hildebrand of Uppsala University in only thirty-eight pages, is a masterpiece of synthesis.

Withal, the two volumes under survey here are a great contribution to economic history. They provide not only a guide as to how to proceed in making sense and some order of the bramble-bush of economic growth, but they provide a wealth of useful information. They are far better than the volume which preceded them in the *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, that on industrial revolutions. Both the editors and the authors are to be given an accolade for their work.

SPHEPARD B. CLOUGH
Professor Emeritus of
Columbia University

M. MOLLAT *Les Pauvres au Moyen Age* (Paris Hachette 1978 pp. 395)

Michel Mollat is already well known for his studies on poverty (*Ongles bleus, Jacques Coeur, Ciompi* 1970; *Etudes sur l'histoire de la pauvreté* 1974) and he has for the last 14 years been directing a major investigation into poverty in Eu-

rope, the first general results of which are included in this volume (covering the Vth to the XVth centuries). It is a very interesting survey which poses questions affecting every aspect of society. If we change position, the title might even have been 'Charity and welfare in the Middle Ages', as this is examined as an economic problem, as a social problem, as a spiritual and religious problem, and as a problem of government. We meet the voluntary and involuntary pauper, vagabonds, the sick and the mad. And as it reaches the threshold of the modern age, the study leaves us with the 'precedents' of a whole series of problems which are still very much alive today.

How do you define 'the poor'? A pauper is someone who either permanently or temporarily finds him or herself in a situation of weakness, dependency and humiliation, deprived of the means of social influence and consideration which vary according to time and place but include: money, acquaintances, influence, power, knowledge, skills, birth, physical health, intellectual ability, freedom and personal dignity'. Existing from one day to the next, the pauper had no hope of escape except through the help of others.

In the Middle Ages various events could bring about involuntary poverty — dearth, war, pestilence, bad weather. Some were born poor and remained poor, others were born wealthy and became poor on account of robbery, drought, or flooding. Poverty meant above all under-nutrition, malnutrition, or more fortunately irregular nutrition, but in any case this was normally below the vital minimum, so that poverty was normally accompanied by illness and especially diseases due to vitamin deficiency. One should mention, while on this, that when a region was hit by famine, it was not only the poor who went hungry. In Gerace in Calabria, in the XVIth century, a widow and her baby children went without bread for many days even though they owned houses and lands.

The book establishes two fundamental facts. Throughout the Middle Ages, even in the final stages, there was a substructure of poverty. Secondly, many of those who had work and wages should really be thought of as paupers because their living standards were below the vital minimum that is they did not earn enough to feed themselves and their families. With variations from place to place, either a peasant or the lowest paid of the ranks of artisan craftsmen might in effect be a pauper. Among the many kinds of poor, there were those for whom poverty had resulted from a 'fall' down the economic ladder — typified by the 'poor knight'. The case of nobles or landowners fallen on hard times was similar, but there were also many for whom population expansion had meant that they became 'surplus' in their native lands, and were then forced to emigrate with the frequent result that they became vagabonds. The conditions of the working poor did improve somewhat in the mid-XIVth century when the Black Death put wages up, but the situation was short-lived.

Mollat also shows how war caused poverty not only directly but indirectly, as well, through blind and extortionate taxation.

It is not possible to quantify either the extent of poverty or the volume of the assistance given by private, religious and public bodies to alleviate it. It can safely be stated, though, that the poverty was very much greater than the resources devoted to alleviating it. This gives rise to another important problem, that of assessing each country's ability to 'reabsorb' its poor. This takes us from the reasonably clearly defined issue of poverty to the much more difficult one of backwardness.

Clearly the poor did not constitute a class in the Middle Ages, but rather a very fluid group which was constantly being fed with new recruits. At a certain stage charitable networks of alms, hospices, religious and public charity proved inadequate. Then came the problem of those who were poor because they would not work, of those who became involved in crime, or were considered criminal because they were poor. By the end of the XVth century, however, poverty was becoming a major problem for individual governments, and they tried to tackle it in a very disorganised way probably because they did not comprehend it. Ferdinand of Spain, for example, instituted the so-called 'Lawyers for the poor' who were paid by the state to look after the interests of widows and wards. Shortly after, Charles Vth had no idea how to defend the established order from the bands of armed vagabonds, and allowed the gypsies to enter his dominions, even giving them self-government. At the same time, landowners were obliged by law to pay an agricultural labourer his wages before accusing him of theft. But from the XVIth century onwards the army of poor received new recruits — disbanded soldiers, younger sons, rogues, 'adventurers', knaves (the dialect equivalent often meant 'intelligent') which society was unable to reabsorb.

Southern Italy and Sicily receive little attention in the book, probably because the bibliography is thin, but those familiar with the sources will see that Mollat's general line of interpretation is certainly applicable to Sicily. But there is one question posed by Sicily which is important and unanswered: why was it that although there was considerable poverty and many paupers, slavery survived until the mid XVIIIth century — including domestic slavery? Why was it that the poor showed no hostility towards these foreign slaves who upset the labour market? A cause which also confirms the picture of a substructure of poverty in Sicily in general, occurred in the XVth century when those engaged in tunny fishing enjoyed the privilege of not being constrainable for debt during the tunny season, and in the XVIth century sugar-workers received the same privilege. Such privileges can be interpreted in various ways, and take us into the field of the history of labour. Mollat's book is very impressive both as a summary of the research which has been carried out so far and also, and in my view this is its greatest merit, as a stimulant for further research.

CARMELO TRASELLI
University of Messina

H. RUNBLOM and H. NORMAN, eds., *From Sweden to America. A History of the Migration. A Collective Work of the Uppsala Migration Research Project.* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, and Upsala, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, University of Uppsala, 1976. Pp. 391.

Rather than a narrative, this book is a research summary, a synthesis of findings in the form of a collection of essays. Each essay is devoted to a different aspect of the work of the Uppsala Migration Research Project, and refers in turn to a large number of books, articles, and published and unpublished theses by the members of an on-going research group first led by Håkan Berggren (1962-66), then by Sune Åkerman (1966-73), and since 1973 by Harald Runblom.

The importance of research on Swedish emigration is enhanced by the wealth of information on which it is based. Sweden is blessed with an extraordinary fund of historical statistics, which include local population registers, registers of emigration, passport application records, central emigration statistics after 1861, passengers' lists from emigration ports, and others. Some of these records have been used before, for instance by the "Myrdal group" in the 1930's, particularly by Dorothy S. Thomas in her still fundamental *Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements 1750-1933* (New York, 1941). But the Uppsala researchers have looked behind the aggregates, the trends, and the ecological correlations characteristic of earlier work and tried to follow individuals from place to place, to undertake longitudinal analyses of migration streams, and thus to ask the hard questions concerning repeated migrations, return migrations, the social origins of migrants, their ultimate destinations, their careers in America, and others.

Before the 1860's Swedish emigration to the United States involved relatively few people. The large migration waves reached America in 1868-73, 1879-93, 1900-13, and finally in 1920-29. Each wave was characterized and induced by its own peculiar interplay of push and pull forces, that is, by Swedish economic downturns and favourable transatlantic conditions. It all added up to 1¼ million people between 1851 and 1930, of whom 200,000 returned to Sweden. Before the large waves, most Swedish migrants has come with their families with the purpose of "taking land". Later on, however, most migrants came as unattached individuals with the intention of "taking jobs".

Even though chronological analyses show that the Swedish domestic economic problems which produced emigration were not the same in every wave, since they sometimes affected one industry, sometimes another, or agriculture, yet there was a remarkable stability in the distribution of emigrants by regional origin throughout this sequence of waves. This may well be one of the most significant findings: waves of migration were triggered by intersections of push and pull factors highly specific to each one, yet a constant ecological infrastructure determined which areas produced the emigrants.

It appears that large Swedish towns and transatlantic ports were alternative destinations for rural migrants. Consequently rural areas near Swedish towns

sent out fewer migrants to the United States than remote rural areas. In turn, rural areas were less likely to send out migrants if there was a great deal of agricultural land, more likely if there was rural industry (for instance in iron) and if that industry was subject to severe economic fluctuations. Urban emigration from Sweden was slightly greater than the emigration of rural people, but many urban migrants were originally in-migrants from rural areas. (In the case of Stockholm, however, U.S.-bound migrants from that city tended to originate from other Swedish industrial and urban centres, not from rural areas). Finally, areas of Sweden that had sent out emigrants to the U.S. at an early point, sometimes even before the first great wave, continued to do so throughout the period. This suggests the operation of what is called here the "stock effect", sometimes also called the "friends and relatives effect", consisting in a self-perpetuating and self-sustained stream of migration attributable to "tradition", that is, ultimately to socio-psychological factors.

From the standpoint of the social composition of migrants, the findings tend to indicate that farmers and crofters played a leading role in the early phases (before the great waves). However, the great streams that followed were dominated by unmarried farmer's sons and daughters formerly living at home, by farmhands, and maid-servants. In other words, in a society where the land was inherited at every generation by the select few, the non-heirs were likely candidates for emigration, unless they had married or, like certain types of farmworkers, were too poor to afford the voyage. As for the social composition of non-agricultural migrants, it appears that the dominant economic characteristic in common among them was the lack of stability and security of income, rather than its size. For example, trades and industries with great sensitivity to business cycles sent out many migrants; the civil service and the professions very few (except during the pioneering period before the 1840's). This suggests that if an interplay is to be found between the measured level of temporal migration on the one hand and economic considerations on the other, the latter are just as likely to be captured by measures of "permanent income" or other indices of lifetime expectations as by transitory impulses measured at or close to the point when migration actually took place. In fact most migrations took place within a narrow age bracket and a well-defined phase of the life-cycle, so the decision to migrate belonged to a larger class of social and demographic phenomena that are similarly age-specific, such as savings, marriage, fertility, or family structure.

Many Swedes returned home from the United States. In the period 1880-1930 returning migrants accounted for 19 percent of the emigrants. Upon re-entering Sweden, the return migrants tended to head back for the agricultural districts whence they originated. The study of return migration thus becomes illuminating for our understanding of the entire phenomenon of transatlantic mobility: *ex ante*, migration to America was not always considered as a sharp or irreversible break in one's life. Many migrants must have looked upon mi-

gration as a means of accumulating an income and spending time until a niche in the village had opened up. A later chapter in the book reveals that the majority of Swedish immigrants postponed the process of naturalization, often by 20 years or more, despite the obvious advantages of citizenship (p. 271). So, for many, migration to America was seen as a reversible process, only differing in degree from the domestic and seasonal migration that was so common within European societies. Indeed, the economic structure of the emigrants' home parishes influenced the choice of the area for immigration in the U.S. Emigrants from rural areas moved to a great extent to the America farming states, people from sawmill districts moved to lumber and industrial regions in the Midwest, and so on. This is another facet of the "friends and relatives" effect already mentioned above, and it contributed to the formation of Swedish communities in America that persisted beyond the movement of individuals to and fro, as migrations streams from specific localities in Sweden to specific localities in America perpetuated themselves through successive waves. Much of this supports the intuitions of Frank Thistlethwaite's "Migration from Europe Overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", (*XIe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques Stockholm 1960 Rapports*, Vol 5 [Göteborg-Stockholm-Uppsala, 1960] pp. 32-60)

When Swedish communities, also helped by high fertility, took shape, congealed, and formed strong national concentrations, they often became a dominant political influence in a county, even though many immigrants never joined ethnic organizations. Then opportunities were created for Swedes to acquire positions of authority in the county administration and assert themselves in other fields (p. 263). Channels of upward mobility opened themselves to them.

Clearly we should be grateful to the Uppsala Migration Project for publishing its findings in English. These findings represent not only the conclusions of a very large and exemplary project. Others will profitably meditate upon them before they engage in further work on other migration streams.

FRANKLIN F. MENDELS
University of Maryland
Baltimore County

S. A. SCHUKER *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976, xiii, 444 pp.

The judgment that France ceased in 1924 to play the part of a great power was made very long ago. It has, however, never been so fully argued and so carefully documented as in the present volume. Doubtless other scholars may point out that some archives have not yet been fully exploited (those of the Quai d'Orsay, for instance, or those of the Ministry of Finance). It is clear that

another account might be written more obviously from the French point of view. But this study is the best narrative and analysis we have had of the collapse of France's attempt to hold fast to the settlement of 1919 and to impose it on the Germans.

There are two parts to the book: the first deals with the coming of the assault on the French franc as a consequence of domestic and external factors, and with the confused internal attempts to combat this attack and with the loan from J.P. Morgan which helped to win this first battle; the second part is an investigation of how Premier Poincaré sought to compel the Germans to respect their obligations over reparations, moving into the Ruhr only when he had failed to get British cooperation within the procedures laid down by the Treaty, and of how Premier Herriot after him failed to make use of the small amount of room for manoeuvre he inherited and finally went down to defeat in the Dawes negotiations during the summer of 1924. Dr. Schuker's presentation of Poincaré is revisionist (in English-language historiography, at least). He is judged to have been thorough and competent in his defense of French interests, if not imaginative and bold. By contrast, Herriot is shown to have been neither thorough nor competent, let alone imaginative or bold. More clearly than in most scholarly literature, he comes off here as an agreeable, engaging politician, but a disaster for the Republic; totally out of his depth in the financial complexities of the reparations problem, naive in dealing with German or British politicians, a good man perhaps, but an unfortunate leader for his country. He was quite unsuited to the very tough struggle which this crucial partial liquidation of France's victory involved.

On Dr. Schuker's reading, Herriot was opposed by well-informed and unscrupulous Germans, and by former British allies who perceived France as the wrecker of attempts at post-war recovery and who were therefore hardly less unfriendly than the former foe. Both the Treasury and the Foreign Office in London found Herriot's stubborn good intentions, fumbblings and tears, like Poincaré's unilateral acts and French generals' now quite antedeluvian ambitions, insupportable. Their lively opinions about it all passed back and forth to each other in scathing terms. Only the American bankers appear to have had a little charity, especially those of the house of Morgan. They were perhaps irked by the dilemma of the French position but anxious to help find a solution; they believed France's economy to be basically sound but were increasingly in agreement with Montagu Norman that the French must yield in the London negotiations.

The bankers have a high profile here. This is probably because the papers of Thomas Lamont, Dwight Morrow and others have yielded so rich a harvest, but also because these men were so especially attuned to Europe's political problems in general and to the problems of France in particular. At the very least, their quite central place in this study is a fruitful correction to the old diplomatic histories in which they were off-stage, if mentioned at all. Cor-

rected, too, is the picture we have normally had of an aggressive Poincaré, almost spoiling for a fight. Here he appears being thrust forward by generals and politicians to take the action in the Ruhr which he had wished to avoid. It is a much more convincing portrait than that of the narrow-minded germanophobe lawyer meanly intent on crippling Germany for all time, the caricature which British and American textbooks have so often presented. In many ways, this superbly researched and well-written narrative is remarkable for its balanced approach to every nation in the struggle of 1924, and to the whole caste of politicians, civil servants, soldiers and bankers. It brings to life with great skill and a nice mixture of telling details persons both famous and scarcely known to history at all: Clémentel, Saint-Aulaire, Mannheimer, Auriol, Bergery, Blum, MacDonald, Peretti de la Rocca, Logan, Snowden... just to list a scattering of the French, British, American and other names.

The underlying thesis is that the struggle was about the maintenance of the French hegemony and, more deeply, access to capital and resources at a time when international competition was intense and markets were shrinking. Unable effectively to distribute in any equitable way the fiscal burden of their foreign and domestic policies (because of prevailing economic illiteracy in the political class and lack of consensus in the bureaucracy), the French brought their financial system to the point of breakdown by early 1924. Caught in the Ruhr, attacked by speculators against the franc, unable to force the Germans to pay up, under pressure from the United States' financiers, and openly opposed by the British, the French had no choice but to accept the fact that they could not go it alone. Really it is difficult to see that, even had the Cartel election victory not intervened to replace Poincaré with Herriot, there could have been any other outcome. The adventure begun ten years before was over.

Dr Schuker's most excellent book is firmly founded on an array of public archives and private papers. In every way it is an exemplary study in international history. What is new here is less the political conclusion than the fresh details, marvellously dovetailed to show how the fatal *conjoncture*, as the French love to say, developed. This kind of brilliantly constructed political, economic and diplomatic history, free of jargon, literate, precise, effectively responds to the tiresome song and dance of the reigning, equally brilliant but insistently intolerant "social historians" who for the last thirty years have proclaimed *urbi et orbi* their exclusive orthodoxy and mission.

Pervading the crisis of 1924, Dr Schuker reminds us, was "a mood of profound fatigue" in the French nation. What was it, where exactly did it come from, when did it end? People spoke of it then, historians continue to allude to it now, but has anyone tried seriously to define and to examine it? Such a study would fittingly complement this splendid analysis of the origins and acceptance of the fateful Dawes Plan.

JOHN C. CAIRNS
University of Toronto

- A. SPICCIANI *La mercatura e la formazione del prezzo nella riflessione teologica medievale* (Memorie dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze morali, storiche, filologiche, Serie 8, xx, pp 125-293, with 10 tables, Rome 1977).

This is a study of medieval thought on the nature of commercial activity, based on the analysis of the writings of four XIIIth century theologians, this being the first period in which there are texts devoted specifically to trade and prices. The view point that has been chosen therefore deliberately excludes that of the lawyer and also that of the practical businessman.

Up to what point was the Church prepared to recognise the legitimacy of trade and the profits drawn from it? There can be no hesitation in extending the warmest praise to Dr Spicciani for the perceptive and rigorously imaginative way in which he has tried to answer this question in the course of his highly concentrated essay. And both historians of ideas and of the economy will benefit from reading this book, where they will find ample material to reflect on.

The theologians considered are Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus and Pietro di Giovanni Olivi. The author has devoted other studies to the latter in the past, and in an appendix has included a critical edition of the text of his *Tractatus de emptione et venditione* which has not previously been edited. Naturally, one cannot expect to find in these authors an organic and systematic treatment of economic problems such as might make them precursors of later writers on political economy, for they were concerned with such problems only in so far as they posed questions of moral theology. This is something which Spicciani always bears in mind, and he argues openly against the error of seeing 'continuity in an analytical process which began in embryonic form in the Middle Ages and was later to find its culmination in the theories of political economy'. The ideas which are dealt with here, it should be repeated, derive from speculative thought concerned with quite different goals and are to be set against a quite specific conceptual background, so that the continuity suggested by the similarity of the material discussed loses much of its meaning.

In Scholastic thought on economic ethics, however, analysis did not always set out from a theological premise. But although concerned with things that formed part of everyday experience, they were still treated in terms of a speculative theory which bears little relationship to the empiricism of later centuries. The author has quite rightly limited the scope of his analysis to the issues of trading and prices, excluding for example a problem such as usury which has already been dealt with extensively elsewhere. This adds considerable weight to the study, and makes the new ground that it uncovers all the more evident.

Aquinas was able to go beyond the Aristotelian condemnation of trade as being something inherently 'without any honest or necessary purpose', and was able to find a justification in the moral correctness of the utility which the community derived from it, for it provided the goods which were required for the community's existence. It was in this way, claimed Duns Scotus, that

the merchant differed from the whore or the actor, whose professions were dishonourable for the 'do not serve the *respublica*'. This argument couched in terms of public utility was one that would frequently recur in the treatises of the XVth and XVI centuries — but by then it was no longer a question of tackling the problem in a religious context, but rather of defending the social and political aspects of trade in situations where it functioned in a discriminatory fashion. Spicciati shows how this was related to the reality of the times, because it was impossible to acknowledge the public function of trade and yet deny that those involved in trade should draw from it their just reward. How could trade be conceived of without profit?

The legitimacy of trade was accepted by nearly all the Schoolmen, and the question which concerned them was whether it was right to sell something for more than had been paid for it, which meant that in the act of exchange the obligation of acknowledging the equality of price and value overlooked. In other words, if someone sold something for more than he had paid for it, either he had paid less for it than it was really worth, or he was selling it at a price above its real value. The answer was then that this was admissible, and in the central part of the study the different ways in which the problem was tackled are examined. This is done with frequent and highly relevant reference to the various works studied, and there is a fine analysis of the debate which emerged. This runs from the conclusion of Henry of Ghent, who argued that it was not trade in itself that should be condemned, but the greed of the merchants who were rarely prepared to respect the dictates of justice, to those of Olivi, which were to be particularly important due to the way in which they were taken up by San Bernardino of Siena and by St. Antonino. But as Spicciati so rightly points out, the moral justification of commerce ran into a major obstacle in a static society such as that conceived by the medieval theologians, when it led to the condemnation of all forms of accumulating capital. It was only when a more dynamic vision of the economic process began to be established that someone like St. Antonino could claim that the accumulation of gains would increase invested capital and thereby enlarge the productive cycle to the general benefit of all.

In discussing price, the Scholastic writers were not able to free themselves entirely from the notion that cost played the largest part in determining price (perhaps because this also formed part of the logic of trade), but they did also recognise the importance of the purchasers' estimation of the commodity in question, and hence indirectly the relationship between supply and demand as it operated in the marketplace. This enabled them to accept as morally right the current price in a given place at a given time ('*hic et nunc*'), and to exclude only those situations where price was arrived at artificially, for example, due to hoarding, or else was patently unjust. Spicciati would seem to be right when he claims that the verdict on price changes in periods of economic difficulty — which would also include seasonal fluctuations — was not fully developed,

but it would also seem difficult to argue that these were not also accepted implicitly. And in fact it was on the basis of this tacit admission that the system of speculation on the exchange rates at the fairs in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries was based at least in part.

UGO TUCCI
University of Venice

H. VAN DER WEE and E. VAN CAUWENBERGHE (eds.), *Productivity of Land and Agricultural Innovation in the Low Countries (1250-1800)*, Leuven/Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1978, pp. viii + 187.

Inspired by a request from Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie and Joseph Goy to offer a view from the Low Countries to a section on "Peasant dues, tithes and trends in agricultural production in pre-industrial societies" at the VIIth International Congress of Economic History at Edinburgh in 1978, the editors of this volume solicited contributions from various specialists in the field and assembled these with a synthesising introduction by Professor Van der Wee. The resultant collection emphasizes patterns of change in long-term statistical series relevant to agriculture.

Van der Wee's interpretive essay, "The Agricultural Development of the Low Countries as revealed by the Tithe and Rent Statistics, 1250-1800" attempts a major synthesis, drawing on all of the studies which follow and legitimately seeking to generalize from their circumscribed findings. He argues that changes between 1250 and 1800 in the productivity of land in the Low Countries departed significantly from the west European (i.e. French) pattern. Goy and LeRoy Ladurie have inferred from French tithe returns that the levels of productivity achieved by around 1300 (the end of the medieval growth phase) were, due to subsequent alternations between periods of agrarian crisis and expansion, not again reached until the eighteenth century "Agrarian Revolution". In contrast the productivity of land in the Low Countries, which also peaked in the early fourteenth century, suffered no major decline in the later middle ages and then in the sixteenth century began a new trend of increase that soon passed medieval levels and continued upwards, with some regional variations, into the eighteenth century. Van der Wee would, therefore, detect the birth of the "Agrarian Revolution" in the sixteenth century Low Countries and assert long term growth there while France endured net stagnation. In so arguing, Van der Wee differs with but one of his contributors' essays. C. Vandembroeke and W. Vanderpijpen assert in their "The Problem of the 'Agricultural Revolution' in Flanders and in Belgium: Myth or Reality?" that per hectare yields of traditional grains did not increase steadily and significantly in the long term except by the reduction of regional differences. Van der Wee counters, however, by explaining that net productivity rose through a process of intensification wherein ever smaller farms absorbed greater labour and capital inputs

by abandoning traditional cereal grains in favour of specialized crops and/or animal husbandry. The protagonists do not, therefore, quite agree on the issue they are debating. And some explicit mention in this context of the relevant theories of Ester Boserup would presumably be enlightening.

Most of the book is devoted to nine quantitative and source-based analytical studies which defy separate and brief summary and criticism. Tithe returns from two, three, or a handful of villages tabulated and indexed over periods of two to four centuries enable F. Daelemans, M.P. Gutmann, and J.C.G.M. Jansen to infer long and short term productivity changes in southwest Brabant, the Meuse basin north of Liege, and the south of Limburg, respectively. F. De Wever, M.-J. Tits-Dieuaide, and A.M. van der Woude studied rent returns and sale and rental contracts from a west Flemish village, a farm near Louvain, and pasture land in the province of North Holland. Tits-Dieuaide offers as well an investigation of seed-yield ratios on lands directly farmed by a Louvain hospital. Longest and most complex is the essay of the editors, who analyze variance in yields of sheaves and of land, the relationship between production and price, the evolution of rents, and trends in farm size on royal estates in Flanders and Brabant during the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries. This study especially supports Van der Wee's thesis of a reciprocal relationship between farm size on the one hand and intensification and land productivity on the other.

All the authors exhibit a strong methodological consciousness, articulating carefully the strengths and weaknesses of their data series and employing simple but effective descriptive statistics. Some greater editorial control over the particular techniques used would, however, have improved comparability. The first four articles variously calculate ten-year means, annual moving averages, five-year means, and thirteen-year weighted moving averages to discuss similar sets of data. Differing emphasis on long and short-term variation is disconcerting, too.

Readers who require accuracy in every detail should be sure that their library has bound or otherwise attached to their volume the four-page Errata and Addendum sheet which is published as a separate tip-in.

The book has substantive and methodological value beyond its apparent concentration on the minutiae of particular texts and localities. Van der Wee's thesis of continual productivity growth through the early modern period challenges other interpretations and each essay exemplifies the complex variety of endogenous and exogenous variables which jointly affected agricultural production. Viewed as a set of methodological exercises, the studies together suggest the inspiring array of informative sources and techniques we can use to quantify important aspects of pre-industrial European agriculture. May the example here set be emulated in and beyond the Low Countries.

RICHARD C. HOFFMANN
York University,
Ontario, Canada

warning that 'statistics' (e.g. on population) are often imperfect: hence occasional divergences between e.g. tables and maps (pp. 94 and 95). It is a great pity that no adequate index is provided.

CHARLES WILSON
European University Institute Florence

R. E. ZUPKO, *French Weights and Measures before the Revolution: A Dictionary of Provincial and Local Units* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London, 1978) pp. XLVII + 208.

Before the Revolution, France bore the hallmark of variety. Variety in laws, institutions, customs, expressions, and especially in markets. What the Physiocrats tried to achieve in loosening the system had to wait long years behind a façade of centralisation; and markets, both wholesale and retail, continued to use all kinds of weights and measures in their daily transactions. Finally, in the 1790s, metric units took over, but they required a law in 1837 to make them obligatory in 1840. Here and there forms lived on, and even today, a stall-keeper will happily return half-a-kilo as *une livre*, so persistent are deeply-rooted customs.

How can this variety of weights and measures of the ancien régime be assessed? The answer from Robert Zupko is a succinct compendium, and, as the sub-title of the book indicates, in the form of a dictionary. A whole range of texts and reference books (mainly from the eighteenth century onwards) has been combed. Each unit finds its place in alphabetical order, with its etymology, an exhaustive series of quotations, metric equivalents and often listings by localities. The emphasis, almost by definition, is on the needs of an agrarian life. The *acre*, for example, comes in for extensive treatment; and so does the *boisseau*, the *journal*, the *livre*, the *muid*, the *sesterée*, the *setier* Here, the dominant weights and measures of pre-revolutionary France focused on the central task of producing and distributing the staff of life, dealing with land, grain, and bread.

However, some other items could have been included to round out the "tools of the market". If weights and measures are there to fix the quantities, why not the measure of value, the *livre tournois*, which ousted other units such as the *livre parisien*, and itself finally succumbed to the *franc* of the Revolution, almost, but not quite, its equal? And there is not much to satisfy the curiosity of how the measures worked in practice. Was the *boisseau* of grain, for example, "patted" and "stricken", as was the case in some other parts of Europe, before being delivered to the customer? The documents appear to be silent on the topic. Nevertheless, the dictionary has much to offer and bursts with useful information. It has tables of metric equivalents of U.S. and British units, lists of rulers and monarchs (which must be used with care), of

Reviews of Books

départements and cities, and a glossary of terms. A working bibliography of sources cited and some other references completes the study.

In presentation, the dictionary follows some of the style of Littré, and the format probably intends it primarily for American researchers. It opens up a difficult field, offers numerous signposts for further investigations, and in the present vogue of quantitative economic history, sets an example for the future. Perhaps in time, this initiative will lead to a data-bank to receive and distribute information on historical metrology. Many a scholar in the field would be more than grateful.

FRANK SPOONER
University of Durham