# REVIEWS OF BOOKS

E.B. Ackerman, *Village on the Seine: Tradition and Change in Bonnières*, 1815-1914: Cornell University Press, 1978, pp. 185.

Concise, clear and sensible, Evelyn Ackerman traces the history of the French village of Bonnières-sur-Seine from 1815 to 1914. Based on " serial " sources (parish registers, *état civil*, census data, notarial archives, municipal minutes, election lists, pastoral visits, and health records), Ackerman's monograph moves beyond " serial " answers, attempting to determine the changing mental life of some thousand inhabitants in a village nestled in a bend of the Seine, 43 miles northwest of Paris. For the most part, the author does not press her serial data beyond what it can legitimately tell us about attitudes, tastes, and sentiments. At the same time, Ackerman is anxious to recapture " real, identifiable common folk " and to examine individual reactions to the larger pressures for change. Economic growth, administrative rationalization, geographic and occupational mobility are treated, not simply as aspects of a sociological abstraction — " modernization " — but also as imposed changes with human costs as well as human gains. The book makes no blanket claims for the unmitigated benefits of nineteenth-century " progress ", nor does it identify economic growth with human well-being. In fact, Ackerman concludes that the slow pace of Bonnières economic and demographic growth was a social blessing, permitting the village to avoid the horrendous social ills of Luois Chevalier's Paris and other lesser towns of the century.

Nevertheless, the balance between unrestrained growth and unrelieved stagnation is not easily achieved. Bonnières experienced a special configuration of developments, the amplitude and timing of which fortunately produced that happy equilibrium. By 1914 the Bonnièrois emerged with greater mastery over nature and a wider range of choice in their marital, occupational, educational and cultural alternatives; yet they had not paid for this personal freedom with pollution, crime, social conflict, and urban blight. At Bonnières it was possible to practice the well-known French ideal of a life " *plus facile* " and " *plus douce* "

What were the transformations that merged so felicitously at Bonnières over a century? First, a shift in the demographic and medical determinants. Birth control came early; the average size of completed families fell from 5.6 children (1756-1785) to 3.9 (1786-1815) and to only 2.9 (1816-1845). Public health measures — small pox vaccination, proper sewage and waste disposal to reduce typhoid and cholera, higher standards of mid-wifery — were much slower to take hold. Only after the germ theory gave confidence to doctors and health officials and after the inhabitants began to prefer the medical treatment to the illness did Bonnières begin to reduce its high death rate. And this was in the last two decades of the century. Improved diet and nutrition also played a part in the material improvement of life. By 1836 Bonnières' agriculture shifted from wine to wheat, and by 1856 the fallow field had disappeared from the communal cadastre. Like most of France, the land of Bonnières was extremely fragmented. In 1829, 73 percent of the 364 proprietors owned less than one hectare each. This was not the Beauce with its *grosses fermes.*

However, alongside of the micro-holders was the estate of the duchess of Berry, covering about 40 percent of the village area of 700 hectares. Fortunately, after 1830, about half of this estate (124 hectares) was purchased by one Jules Michaux, the classic example of the local notalbe, *propriétaire-patron*, whose influence flowed in all directions from *mairie* to *prefecture*, from farm to mill. Michaux was an innovating farmer in the 1840s and a versatile factory owner in the 1860s. In fact, most of the economic growth and diversification in the commune can be ascribed to Michaux, who appears to have been a hard-nosed *patron* with no concern for the " inhealthful odors " of his glue factory and not much more for the housing of his Breton workers. By 1876 Michaux was employing most of the industrial work force at Bonnières, about 25 percent of the population. But there the proportion remained. Bonnières retained a substantial majority of independent farmers, artisans, and shopkeepers into the twentieth century. Michaux's entrepreneurial talents were kept within bounds.

On balance, modernization at Bonnières followed a pattern close to that described by Eugen Weber (*Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France*, 1870-1914 [Stanford, 1976]). The railroad and public school, conscription and public health, emigration and immigration slowly achieved unforeseen goals, undermining the traditional rules and habits of the rural village, greatly reducing the burden of endless toil and rudimentary *comfort*, the menace of disease, the narrowness of vision, and the constraints on independent choice. Yet I wonder if Ackerman does not misinterpret some of the aspects of her gentle modernization. That marriages were less constrained by communal tradition, agricultural necessity, and religious prohibition seems clear enough, but whether this reveals

" a quiet assertion of a sentimental individualism " (64) may still be doubted. " Sentiment " requires positive evidence and can not be easily deduced from lower marriage age or even identified with " personal choice " That Bonnières would one day become a " child-centered culture " (69) seems even less convincing about by immigration and making Bonnières in 1890 " more tolerant " and " more modern " (110), this I also doubt. Ackerman's examination of political and religious life does not suggest that the good citizens of Bonnières acted on ideology — political or religious — at *any* time since 1800. And they took rather good care of their own poor and sick. Perhaps their community sense was sufficiently cohesive *before* the arrival of the immigrants to make it possible to absord them without undue social friction. Does not the whole proces described by Ackerman suggest that the older communal norms were not completely shattered by an unrestrained individualism and a relentless ubanization? In short, was not " tolerance " an ' old usage ' at Bonnières?

There are relatively minor caveats and matters of legitimate debate. This is a solid and well-written monograph, one more proof, to me at least, that the best social history is researched on the local level.

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L. FEBVRE, *Life in Renaissance France* (edited and translated by Marion Rothstein) Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 163.

Translating Lucien Febvre is so difficult that only one of his books was ever rendered into English; his *Martin Luther* (1929). *Life in Renaissance France* was not a book to begin with. Marion Rothstein deserves credit for seeing that these five essays, written fifty years ago, make up a coherent and lucid book which can serve as a fine introduction both to the French Renaissance and to the idiosyncratic ways of one of the most influential historians of our century. This short book is something like a series of recorded master classes given by someone, say, of Pablo Casals' stature. It can be read with profit and pleasure by a high school student and a specialist as well.

Febvre begins with simple observations. He tells us how rural, how nomadic, how rude, how uncomfortable and dangerous life was, even for the rich and powerful, in the sixteenth century. Compared to our ancestors, who " grew in the open air," we are all hothouse products. This introduction is followed by short chapters on Renaissance art, scholarship, religion and commerce. There is, of course, no new information to be gleaned from these pages written half a century ago. This is a breviary. It reminds us, humbly, of the virtues of analysis without jargon. Ideology is absent. Lucidity and imagination reign.

Febvre's history moves like music. He does not tell a story, he does not arrange facts systematically. Instead, he alludes to a series of sights pigs wallowing in the streets, hanged men turning in the wind, chickens roosting in a lawyer's study, the royal court itself; trabersing the realm like a three-ring circus. The historian's voice skips, as would a stone on the surface of opaque waters, touching upon cemeteries, hand-hammered gold coins, painted altar pieces — all this with such economy, in so few words, that you find yourself led, inexorably, to Febvre's conclusions. There is a theme throughout, unobtrusive but inescapable: namely, that the weight, the shape, the texture of this epoch bears the mark of a new class, an aristocracy of capital.

The translation is good enough, with only occasional awkwardnesses. The book should be sold in a cheap paperback edition for classroom use. Perhaps the time is ripe for reprinting *Martin Luther*? And how about the chef d'oeuvre, the *Franche Comté* (1910), of symphonic dimensions?

GEORGE HUPPERT
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J.A. GARRATY, *Unemployment in History*. New York, Harper & Row, 1978, pp. 273.

John Garraty makes clear at the beginning of his book that his intent is to write a history of unemployment that is social rather that economic in orientation. A survey of existing statistics and an analysis in depth of unemployment's varying causes this is not. In the author's words, the book is a " study of how the condition of being without work has been perceived and dealt with in different societies from the beginning of recorded history to the present, and of how the idea 'unemployment' has been understood and evaluated, both before and after the term itself was invented " (p. xi). Interest is in how economists have viewed unemployment and, at least as importantly, in how their views have influenced public policy.

Though à few pages are devoted to Egyptian, Greek, and Roman views on idleness, the Middle Ages represent the true starting point of the study. The effect of the disastrous XIVth century on drawing the peasantry to the city are described as well as the resulting first traces of unemployment among the able-bodied. The assumption that work was available for all being dominant, state-operated workhouses made their first appearance, " Leviathan replacing the good Samaritan " primarily for purposes of successfully separating those who couldn't work from those who merely wouldn't.

Approximately one-half of the book (chapters 3 through 8) covers the period from the early XVIth century up to the Great Depression of this century. Theories of unemployment over this period receive some attention, but not surprisingly, theory being relatively scarce prior to the Classical era and Say's Law minimizing the attention given unemployment by economists up until the time of Keynes, Garraty's main focus throughout these chapters is on the views and actions of the policymakers. The institution of the workhouse receives much attention as it periodically fell into and out of favour over this period. Detailed description of the workings of several such institutions are included from French, German, and English sources. The pessimism of Malthus and Ricardo concerning the reproductive habits of the working classes and their belief that real wages could not rise significantly combined with acceptance of Say's Law and the distrust of state interference in the economy to cause the function of the workhouse to change in XIXth century. From being an environment designed to train and inspire those capable of work they became "so unpleasant that anyone who could possibly do so would shun them like the plague, or, — leave at the first glimmer of a chance to get by outside." (p. 84) Garraty does not neglect those who differ with the English classical view. The views of Marx on the creation of a "reserve army of the unemployed" as well as the ideas of such "underconsumption" theorists as Sismondi and Hobson receive attention. On the policy front, the introduction of unemployment insurance from the 1880's through the 1930's is described in considerable detail as is the chronic ambivalence toward such insurance caused by the fear that work disincentives would result.

The final five chapters cover the last 50 years. An entire chapter is given over to psychological surveys of the unemployed that were conducted during the 30's. A good treatment is given to the erosion of the Pigou-led "classical" school (to use Keynes' term for his predecessors). Some underinvestment theories of unemployment that pre-dated Keynes are described, Michael Kalecki's contributions being a notable omission. The drift of official opinion toward the basic Keynesian position receives particularly good treatment. Garraty's description of the General Theory is brief and clear, though considering the controversy that still surrounds the theory, his treatment will naturally not be satisfying to all readers. In relating the gradual acceptance and synthesis of Keynes' views within different countries, Garraty artfully explains how events and circumstances peculiar to each country hampered or aided the flow of his ideas. Somehow John Hicks, probably the most noted popularizer and synthetizer of Keynes' work, escapes mention. The positions taken by the labour unions as well as by political parties receive attention, particularly the tendency of the unions to direct their energies to bettering the condition of their constituencies while neglecting those out of work and without union affiliation. The steady rise in respectability after WWII of stabilization policy and the growing reliance on functional finance is described. The next to final chapter, "The End of the Golden Age," relates the by now well-known failure of Keynesian Orthodoxy to come to grips with inflation over the last decade, and the accompanying controversy over what constitute an "acceptable" level of unemployment.

Garraty at several points expresses the opinion that the plight of the unemployed has become much less severe over the last half century because of the steady growth of unemployment insurance and, as importantly, because of growing realization that some unemployment is inevitable and hence not a reflection of personal inadequacies. He fails to consider that (1) a great segment of the public has not been familiarized with the fact of " involuntary unemployment," (that all can find work remains gospel to many, at least in the U.S.) and (2) even if recognizing that some must be unemployed, popular opinion does not necessarily view joblessness as striking capricioysly, but instead might be said to regard the least competent and least deserving as the victims of unemployment.

In the final chapter Garrity editoralizes on the current status of unemployment in Western nations. His opinions are far-ranging and make for interesting reading, and, to my mind, at times reflect the new conservatorism currently so strong in the U.S. Inflation fears grip Garrity and, the trade-off between inflation and unemployment seen as inevitable, he somewhat indirectly seems to argue that more unemployment must be accepted to lessen the other of the " twin curses." This final chapter serves to underscore a significant gap in the book. The Soviet Union, China, and all other nations of the world outside of the U.S. and western Europe receive no mention. The scarcity of relevant sources may explain this neglect for the pre-Depression chapters, but certainly sufficient material exists on unemployment in non-Western nations over the past half-century. While attempts to range too widely often result in patronizing and incomplete treatment of some of the subject matter, the social history of unemployment is certainly not so narrow and exclusively Western to justify the omission of other nations and cultures. This narrowness of perspective stands as the most serious in an otherwise fine book.

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M. GRICE-HUTCHINSON, *Early Economic Thought in Spain 1177-1740*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 189.

The rapid rise and decline of Spain is a commonplace among historians, and since its seventeenth-century decline Spain has occupied a secondary place among the European states. Yet to conclude from the difficulties it endured that Spain lacked competent economic analysis would be to represent reality. In many areas of economic thought Spain was in the forefront. To show that this was the case and to explain how it came to be, Marjorie Grice-Hutchinsin offers us a survey of economic thought in Spain from the Middle Ages to the first half of the eighteenth century. Of the two main sections of two chapters each, the first deals with the Middle Ages and takes into account theoretical writings on usury by Jewish, Muslim, and Christian writers and the transmission to the west of Greek economic thought and commentaries on it by Spanish writers. The second part concerns the early modern period, focusing on the survival of the scholastic method among members of the School of Salamanca and on the development of the work of the *arbitristas*. Her approach throughout is to trace the evolution of economic ideas by a biographical and chronological treatment of the authors involved.

In the section on usury, she examines Américo Castro's theory — that Spanish historical development is the product of an amalgamation of Jewish, Islamic, and Christian elements — and concludes that in this case, at least, its fits the facts. The scriptures of all three groups contained injunctions against usury, and each group worked out similar ways of living with or avoiding those injunctions.

One of the most important stimuli for the development of economic thought in medieval Europe was the recovery of Greek writings, which, along with many other intellectural matters, had been preserved by the Muslims, in translations and in logical and penetrating commentaries. The transmission of Greek theory and Muslim analysis to the west, where it served as the basis of Aquina's synthesis and of scholastic doctrine, was due to the group of translators working in Spain and (to a lesser degree) Sicily.

After 1500 Spain underwent a process therefore unique among European countries. The influx of American bullion put a severe strain on an economy that lacked a sufficiently developed infrastructure to absorb it and helped create an unprecedented inflation. Grice-Hutchinson makes clear that Spain had a distinguished group of analysts in the scholastic tradition who were able to explain what was occurring and to suggest remedies for it. They were succeeded in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the *arbitristas*, a group that should be better known outside the circle of Hispanists. The term *arbitrista* is usually rendered as "projector," but it defies a one-word definition. It should be something like "one who identifies problems and offer solutions." The analyses of the *arbitristas* were often to the point, and some of their solutions were quite sensible. The Spanish government was aware of many of their proposals, but for governments, either early-modern or late twentieth-century ones, knowledge of problems and their possible solutions does not automatically bring reform.

Grice-Hutchinson's book is a useful synthesis of a wide range of secondary sources as well as the economic writings. Her forte is the history of economic thought, and she occasionally goes astray when she deals with economic history. For example, she portrays fifteenth-century Aragón as prosperous and contemporary Castile as weak; just the opposite is closer to the truth. Yet for a review of economic thought in Spain and an introduction to a host of Spanish economic thinkers, the book is admirable.

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S. B. HANLEY and K. YAMAMURA, *Economic and Demographic Changes in Preindustrial Japan 1600-1868*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, XIV, 409.

This detailed yet lucid account of Japan in the Tokugawa Era provides a convincing analysis of the economic and demographic conditions of the period. About half of the book consists of expanded versions of previously published studies, this volume provides that material in an accessible and integrated form.

The book opens with an overview of socio-economic conditions in the Tokugawa period and their interpretation in the Japanese literature. The common depiction of the latter part of this era is one of poverty and economic stagnation resulting from oppression of the peasants by the samurai and larger landholders. A reinterpretation of the evidence by Hanley and Yamamura leads them to conclude that while oppression, personal hardship and ruin undoubtedly existed, and while economic growth was not rapid by modern standards, the second half of the Tokugawa Era in fact showed a steady economic growth and improvement in living conditions. We are reminded by the authors that this pattern was not too different from the contemporaneuos experience of European countries.

The economic conditions of three regions are studied in detail: the Kinai (which includes Osaka), Morioko (in northeastern Honshu), and Okoyama (about 100 miles west of Osaka, on the northern shore of the Inland Sea). While the selection was partly dictated by the availability of data, it deliberately spans the range of economic development observed in the period. A picture of growing real incomes and labor mobility in the villages emerges, partly the result of increasing productivity, partly that of labour shortages because of population control and emigration to the cities and towns. The effective tax on rice (after correction for differences between assessed and actual yields and cultivated areas) at most stayed about constant and otherwise decreased. While it may be true that total output of rice decreased in some areas, its cultivation was replaced by that of other vegetables and by other economic activities yielding higher returns. Famines took their natural toll, but the general picture is one in which attempts at exploitation are increasingly ineffective as commerce spreads.

An analysis of the demographic evidence follows, with first a general discussion of population control in Tokugawa Japan and then a more detailed study of the evidence from four specific villages (of which three were in the Okayama region, thus allowing their statistics to be evaluated in the context of the regional economy). An entire chapter is devoted to a case study of Fujito, one of the Okoyama villages.

The authors conclude that (p. 320):

> " The low rate of population growth was not primarily due to famines and the economic misery that led people to limit their numbers through

> infanticide, but rather to the desire to maintain and improve their standard of living, and thereby their relative status in the village."

This conclusion is offered in contradiction of the predominantly Marxian analyses of the period by Japanese scholars. The authors cite other supportive studies but note carefully the limitations of the available evidence, which is, however, persuasive. Hanley and Yamamura suggest that the use of biased data and an overdue reliance on a few "journalistic" contemporary accounts with no careful check on the consistency of these accounts with other available information, may have been an important contributory factor to the conclusions of the "received doctrine". The credibility of the various sources is discussed in detail.

If the Marxian analyses of the period are interpreted as asserting that insofar as economic growth occurred, it was restricted, even severely, as a result of exploitation, their proof or refutation rests on the shaky foundation of an exercise in counterfactual history. Exploitation is certainly a fact of human existence and the evidence here shows that living standards rose regardless of that fact, but we cannot yet state with authority that they would not have risen more in its absence. On the other hand, if the charges emphasize a lack of growth and assert a diminishing standard of living, during the XVIIth and early XVIIIth centuries the evidence must be accepted as contra-indicative.

Overall, at least to this reviewer, the interpretation of recorded events by Harley and Yamamura is very satisfying, it establishes the existence of economic growth, which is explained in terms of underlying economic forces in the context of the social conditions of the time. Earlier finding of stagnation are shown to be possibly the result of using biased data. Low rates of population growth are shown not to be primarily the result of famine, but rather of "anti" Malthusian social behaviour in a desire to increase living standards and status in the community.

This volume will already have a place in the libraries of specialists in the field. It should also be found valuable by all students of economic growth and development. For those not familiar with the Japanese language the book closes with a useful glossary of Japanese terms.

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T. KAPLAN, *Anarchists of Andalusia 1868-1903.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 266.

Spanish anarchism has long been a popular topic among foreign observers, but this interest has focused more on the politics and ideology or culture of the anarchists than on systematic examination of their socioeconomic base. Moreover, most writing about Spanish anarchism has been tinged with romanticism and/or condescension, depending on the case.

Temma Kaplan's book is one of three works in the past few years that have significantly deepened our understanding of anarchism. Whereas José Alvarez Junco's, *La ideología del anarquismo español* (Madrid, 1976) was devoted to ideas and doctrine, and Gerald Meaker's, *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923* (Stanford, 1974) mainly examined the politics and syndical organization of industrial anarchosyndicalism in Catalonia, Kaplan deals with the early development of rural anarchism in a framework of regional economics. Though her work is more overtly pro-anarchist than the other two, she demonstrates that political bias and the pleading of a cause need not necessarily vitiate scholarship.

One important feature of this study is that it presents the first reasonably detailed account, based on empirical research, of the economic structure of the early decades of development of peasant and small town ararchism in Andalusia. In the process, Kaplan gives us a stimulating description of the economic changes that occurred in Cadiz province in the middle and later decades of the nineteenth century, particularly in the wine industry, and their consequences for peasant society. Spanish regional economic studies for the nineteenth century are disproportionately concentrated on the major industrializing areas of the north. Thus detailed attention to a southern province, even if only as introduction to a politico-social study, is in itself a welcome contribution.

In the process we can also observe the political transformation of the Cádiz viticultural oligarchy from left to right during the course of the century. The restrictive and shortsighted policies of the early nineteenth century liberal system sometimes excluded major economic interests from political consideration, and thus millionaire wine producers were among the major supporters of the original Democratic party in the name of broader access, free trade and a laissez-faire policy that would incidentally reduce production costs. By contrast, the stable liberalism of the post-1875 constitutional monarchi reconciled most of the major economic interests behind a protectionist system balanced with tax adjustments.

Chief losers in both phases of the process, whether that of early élitist liberalism or a more sophisticated protectionism, were Andalusian peasants, who came to support Europe's first example of a mass revolutionary peasant movement. The main significance of Kaplan's book lies in the clearer understanding her research provides of the structure and politics of that peasant revolutionism, which is traced from its initial upsurge amid the democratic interlude of 1868-1874 through the visissitudes of the last decades of the century to the momentary eclipse of peasant anarchism after the failure of the general strike of 1903. Andalusian peasants early anticipated much of the theory and practice of the subsequent "anarchosyndicalism." They tended toward a structure of what in a more complex environment would be termed industrial unionism, and apparently were often sympathetic to the more individualist doctrines of anarchocollectivism as distinct from anarchocommunism.

A major goal of the book seems to be the rehabilitation of peasant anarchism from the sneers of pseudosophisticated Marxists on the one hand and liberals or conservatives on the other, and the concluding discussion of " Spontaneity and Millenarianism " is the most stimulating part of the book. It seeks to refute the " primitive rebels " interpretation of the English social historian, E. J. Hobsbaum, pointing out that in terms of literacy such rural provinces as Andalusia were not more backward than the industrializing north, and that anarchism did not take root specifically amid the most primitive parts of Andalusia. Kaplan has already demonstrated a not inconsiderable capacity for rational organization on the part of anarchist syndicates, and argues not unconvincingly that this merits as much attention as the failure of Andalusian activists to become liberals or Marxist socialists. Peasant syndicalism was undeniably weaker than urban industrial syndicalism, but that holds as much for Italian Marxist peasant organizations in the early twentieth century as for their anarchist counterparts. The ultimate proof of such debates should come with the pudding, and an appropriate comparison might be made with Walter L. Bernecker's *Anarchismus und Bürgerkrieg* (Hamburg, 1978), the best study to date of the major anarchist socioeconomic revolution during the Spanish Civil War, whose conclusions tend to support those of Kaplan for the earlier period.

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M. LÉVY-LEBOYER (ed.), *La position internationale de la France. Aspects économiques et financiers, XIXe-XXe siècles*, Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1977, pp. 472.

How long will we have to wait for an understanding of finance capitalism superior to that available to Rudolf Hilferding, almost a century ago? It is a commonplace that Hilferding's vision of finance capitalism (and Lenin's) was weakened because it was dominated by perceptions of developments in Germany. Attempts to solidify the concept by using the French experience, however, almost appear to be blocked by the huge amount of data we possess on French financial history - perhaps too voluminous to be captured by a simple set of generalizations. So far as the international aspects of French finance capitalism are concerned, many of us still rely on the work of Harry Dexter White and Herbert Feis, done almost fifty years ago.

Professor Lévy-Leboyer's collection of essays on French international finance during the XIXth and XXth centuries constitutes a kind of response to this challenge. The editor (who calls himself only " gatherer and presenter ") has brought together no less than 34 essays, originally given to the

1973 conference of the Association Française des Historiens Economistes. He sees the main purpose of this work as an attempt to come to grips with some classical questions: what are the connections between the relatively poor performance in certain modern periods of the French economy and the nature of France's investments abroad? Were the massive exports of capital harmful to France in the sense that they might have yielded greater social returns if employed at home? Or were these financial exports a necessary and healthy feature of general economic expansion?

Interestingly, almost half the essays here are by scholars from countries other than France. No one familiar with books based on the proceedings of such a conference will be surprised to find that not all of the essays here are directed to questions singled out by the editor as of prime importance. This is especially true of essays on French international finance after World War I, some of which give the impression of being bits and pieces of their authors' minor studies.

For the most part the essays are very short (six to fourteen pages) and are directed to narrowly-defined topics, for example J. Thobie's, "Placements et investissements français dans l'empire ottoman, 1881-1914." Other articles touch on China, Latin America, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Theree essays bring us up to date on the size and impact of the huge loans to Czarist Russia and the effects on France of the loss of these funds. There are three essays on investments in the French empire. Five pieces concern foreign investments in France or cooperation between French investors and those of other countries for joint ventures. There are also a few essays of a more general nature: Paul Bairoch gives us some welcome data in his "La place de la France sur les marchés internationaux," and Adeline Daumard has an interesting essay on "Diffusion et nature des placements à l'étranger dans les patrimoines des français au XIXe siècle" (which also shows regional differences and urban/rural contrasts as well as changes over time).

The quality of the shorter essays range from highly useful to stunningly boring. For the most part they ignore current standards of theory and methodology. Therefore the chief interest of this book — in fact its heart — lies in the two admirable and substantial essays by the editor: his introduction (30 pages) on "La capacité financière de la France au début du XXe siècle," and his massive article (70 pages) on "La balance des paiements et l'exportation des capitaux français."

The central interest of this book, says Lévy-Leboyer, is the way it sheds light on questions concerning the actual volume of, motivation behind, and impact of French investments abroad. The evidence, he feels, suggests that it is wrong to believe that each million francs sent abroad represented a million lost to France's domestic economy; better to see that foreign investments were both "support for and result of domestic growth, thanks to the (foreign) markets (such investments) opened, and the resources and revenues they produced." Anyway a large fraction of these investments, especially those after 1900, came not from surpluses in the balance of trade or from domestic growth, but rather from interest and dividends on previous foreign investments. In this sense the "surplus capital" approaches of Hilferding and Hobson are indeed borne out by the French experience. It will not do, according to Lévy-Leboyer, to attack the Hilferding-Hobson interpretation by pointing to the Czarist loans and a few other politically-motivated investments; in most cases the profitability of foreign as against French investments is clear enough.

Maurice Lévy-Leboyer's major article on relations between the balance of payments and French foreign investments before 1914 has as its main objective bringing together and correcting the data needed for a more accurate assessment of the changing magnitudes of these investments. One of the interesting improvements he offers us is the inclusion of tourist payments and migrant remittances. He also gives us figure allowing us to see how swings in the annual balances of payments coincided with trends in the domestic economy; and he concludes that periods of high capital exports were also periods of industrial prosperity and high interest rates in France — a coincidence which does not fit well into the "surplus capital" approach.

Both of Professor Lévy-Leboyer's contributoins to this large volume are crowded with useful data and attractive generalizations. These two articles, and the shorter essays by other contributors that can be used to supplement them, represent a major addition to the literature of economic history. A comprehensive, widely accepted picture of finance capitalism still seems far away; but Maurice Lévy-Leboyer has taken us a long step in the right direction.

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L. A. LOUBÈRE, *The Red and the White. The History of Wine in France and Italy in the Nineteenth Century.* Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1978, pp. xx, 401.

The French neo-Physiocrat, Dr. Jules Guyot, who believed that viticulture was the best source of wealth and the promise of French economic success, would have heartily approved of Leo Loubère's tribute to the fruit of the vine. In this lucidly presented work, carefully documented with government statistics and contemporary accounts and admirably illustrated with line drawings by Mark Blanton and Philip Loubère, Loubère has provided a rich and detailed comparative history of wine in XIXth century France and Italy. Indeed, this work is more than a history of wine; it is also a glimpse into the society and politics of the vinegrowers, labourers and winemakers themselves. Three themes emerge accross the comparative perspective: the gradual transformation of viticulture throughout the course of the XIXth century; the interweaving of political development, social structure and the economics of wine; and the links connecting the two countries' viticultural histories.

Over the course of the century, in both France and Italy, ploughs gradually replaced hand cultivation; the terrible phylloxera blight, by driving out the less hardy growers, facilitated the concentration of vineland in parts of both France and Italy; and chemists and professional vinicultural specialists as well as shrewed businessmen began to invade the cellars to professionalize, standardize and mechanize winemaking. Costs of production rose and with them, levels of capital investment. As consumption increased over the course of the century (primarily in large urban centres and among the lower middle and working classes), veritable wine factories began to appear in Languedoc-Roussillon, the Bordelais and Champagne in France and in the Mezzogiorno in Italy, to meet growing demand.

Although he demonstrates that the wine industry underwent considerable transformation prior to World War I, Loubère is understandably cautious about using the term "revolutionary" to describe the pace and depth of change. Strong resistance to technical modification (such as the introduction of fertilizer) characterized both countries (but was certainly stronger in Italy than in France). Although specialization and industrialization of wine production eventually occurred, at the same time, relatively small, individualistic wine producers survived and proved themselves capable of producing a beverage often far superior to that of their industrial counterparts. There was, after all, a limit to how much technical innovation could be introduced into the vineyards; vines continued to be dressed by skilled workers; harvesting could only be carried out by hand. Human attention and care remained critical factors in growing and production. In addition, if changes occurred in the technology of winemaking and even vinegrowing, the commerce of wine remained in the hands of traditional social groups and continued to be bound by guild-like regulations which preserved the monopoly of wine brokers (*courtiers*).

The fact that by the XIXth century, viticulture and viniculture had become integrated into the world of industrial capitalism did not insure the prosperity of the winemen. As Loubère correctly states, "Capitalist investment made possible advanced technology, wider markets and increased production. But it did not bring stability." (361) Regional specialization made growers particularly vulnerable to the variations of the wine market. In fact, the increasing instability of the market caused growers and producers to become dependent on government regulation and control and also made them increasingly attentive to political means to protecting their position. Nor were the winemen adverse to taking to the streets to defend their interests, as the French winegrower's revolt of 1907 showed. The expanding role of government in regulating quality, imports and taxation, a role imposed by the wine producers themselves, was one of the more dramatic aspects of the changing vineyard of the XIXth century.

The intimate connection between the economics of wine on the one hand and political climate and social structure which accompanied vinegrowing on the other hand, are made especially apparent when Loubère compares French and Italian vineyards and wines. The political fragmentation of Italy and the persistence of conservative landed elites did much to hamper the development of Italian vineyards by comparison to their French counterparts, at least in the 1860's and 1870's. Italian growers welcomed the *Risorgimento* in the hope that it would lead to the elimination of both international and external tariff barriers and facilitate the development of a national market for their product (255).

Even apart from the question of national political unity, there is much in the social system of XIXth century Italy which helps to explain the failure of Italian vintners to produce wines of quality comparable to those of the French. "... the distinction resulted not so much from the peasant growers as from the class that ruled over them during most of the century," (92) and the accompanying mentality of proprietorship. In contrast to France, where the landowner was also the producer (exploitant), Italian winemen frequently left the actual growing of grapes to others via sharecropping. Although the system permitted them to perpetuate traditional methods of social control, they took little interest in the process of production or in the final product. Political unity eventually ended Italian wine producers' tariff problems (at least temporarily), but it did not solve the problem of a poorly developed entrepreneurial mentality, nor did it eliminate the social hierarchies which controlled vinegrowing and winemaking.

Although conditions differed considerably in France and Italy with respect to politics and the power of social elites, in neither country was the history of wine entirely independent from that of the other. France was generally the leader. Italian viticulturalists and viniculturalists borrowed heavily from French writers and technical experts. It was no accident that the "golden age" of Italian vineyards occurred during the French phylloxera invasion of 1865-1885, when France was obliged to import significant quantities of Italian wine. Yet, Italian vintners who took advantage of the phylloxera to increase vine plantings and who became dependent upon exports for their economic survival found themselves in difficulty when French vineyards recovered in the late 1880's and the French threw up tariffs against Italian products.

An important part of the history of wine is the enormous regional variation in vineyard production and wine quality to be found in France as well as in Italy, ranging from the finest Champagne or quality Burgundy to the more common industrial wines of the Mezzogiorno or Lower Languedoc. Indeed, the history of wine which Loubère has written is not one history but several. If it is weighted more heavily in the direction of France, that is because of the less abundant documentation for Italy, a lack which is itself a product of Italy's particular political situation. What emerges on balance is not a picture of the bucolic peasant peacefully trimming his vines, but a lively narrative of all the complexity, instability and transformation which characterized the production and marketing of one of man's preferred fermented beverages.

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S. MEACHAM, *A Life Apart. The English Working Class 1890-1914.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Standish Meacham, Professor of Modern English History at the University of Texas, here turns away from the biographical form of his earlier books, and from their concentration on religious, intellectual and, political concerns at the top of English life in the nineteenth century.

To capture life at the bottom, Meacham has used the large number of surveys of working class life carried out in the 1890's and on up to 1914, the work of well-known figures such as Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree, together with the findings of about fifty other leser known investigators. Most adventurously Meacham has gone to " recent sociological surveys and commentaries " (268) — Elizabeth Bott, Madeline Kerr, Peter Willmott and Michael Young — in the belief that these accounts of workers' lives in the 1950's and 1960's provide glimpses and interpretations of a way of life that had not changed in some significant ways since the turn of the century.

The prose is clear and clean. The notes stand in comfortably large type, though maddeningly grouped at the back, which is now the cost-conscious but not the most cost-effective procedure, considering the annoyance that results. The intent of the book is praiseworthy: W.L. Burn and Walter Houghton figure in the first paragraph of the preface, where Meacham subscribes to the refusal of each to leave " his readers bewildered by trees as he searches out the the shape of the forest. Complexity is not permitted to deny pattern " (7).

Yet the book is not exciting either by virtue of its content or by the impact of its analysis. My guess is that Meacham wrote it too carefully. He stuck too closely to his note-cards. Paragraph after paragraph begins with a topic sentence that is then elaborated by further details; one stack of cards done for, the next is shoved into place. This cautious mode of presentation deadens the impact of Meacham's innovative decision to use the interviews of working-class men and women born before 1900 conducted within the last decade or so by Paul Thompson and Thea Vigna. Tailoring that material into well-ordered snippets destroys the narrative vitality so arresting in John Burnett's *Annals of Labour. Autobiographies of British Working-Class People 1820-1920* (1974). A few places (115, 116) suggest that Meacham restrained himself stylistically, an impression strengthened by the verve evident in the essay " Late Victorian London and Its People " that he contributed to a collaborative work, with Roy Flukinger and Larry Schaaf, on *Paul Martin, Victorian Photographer* (1977).

Analytically, as well, the book lacks the effectiveness that it should have had. One instance: Meacham's material on the origin and fate of neighbourhoods cries out for treatment in terms of David Ward's searching questions in " Victorian Cities: How Modern? " (*Journal of Historical Geography*, 1975), and " The Victorian Slum: An Enduring Myth? " (*Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 1976).

Another instance: on the matter of working-class habits of thought Meachan subscribes too readily to an all-forgiving cognitive cultural relativism: " When they [" Middle-class sympathizers "] charged the working class with an inability to think abstractly, they were often lamenting its unwillingness to think in abstractions akin to their own " (196). Precisely: as we think, so we are. (See Michael Cole and Sylvia Scribner, *Culture and Thought. A Psychological Introduction* [1974]).

Had the working class been able to manipulate abstractions with the freedom and daring that marked middle-class thinking, it would have ceased to be the working class. Meacham set out to trace " what I perceive to be the patterns of working-class consciousness ". " To penetrate the ' mind ' of any particular collection of men and women at any particular period in history demands an ability to perceive evidence thoughtfully and with some measure of imagination ". (7, both quotations) The mind depends upon how life is lived and itself orders how that life is carried on. Meachan has laid a good foundation through his reconnoitering of socioeconomic circumstances, but he has not really shown the mind at work. To do that, he would have had to remove the quotation marks with which he guardedly walled off the term.

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F.V. MOULDER. *Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy: Toward A Reinterpretation of East Asian Development, ca. 1600 to ca. 1918.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. x, 225.

From the outset of this book the author plunges into the controversy over whether domestic or foreign factors are dominant influences in the economic development of follower nations. Applying the analytical framework provided by Immanuel Wallerstein's " capitalist world-economy " thesis, the author argues that the socio-economic changes in XIXth and XXth century Japan and China derived primarly from the intrusion of the West into that (then) remote part of the world. What is of historical and theoretical interest is that whereas the two countries being considered here both highly developed nations, the response of two to that incursion has been so conspicuously dissimilar. It is this difference that Moulder attempts to explain.

In posing her problem she argues that state of socio-economic development in the two countries was at roughly the same level to show that this was not a significant factor in the divergent effects. She contends that the principal operative force was the degree of incorporation into the capitalist world economy: that "Japan remained relatively autonomous within the world system whereas China was incorporated as a dependent satellite" (p. 199). The involvement in the world economy is discussed in terms of four variables: trade, investment, political incorporation and missionary involvement; and she points out the well known and less known differences between the two in these respects.

This book is an important addition to the literature on Far Eastern history, Western imperialism, and economic development for three reasons. First, it is a highly competent discussion of important Western encroachments on the two countries, greatly enriched by the comparative perspective. The study has a deeper dimension because any writer taking its approach necessarily has to be well-versed in Western history. Thus the comparison is implicitly with the West as well. From this broader view derives the second reason for the significance of this study. Concepts such as feudal state, commercialization, bureaucracy and the like have derived from the Western experience. Because of the light shed by this study of two advanced socio-economic systems, a redefinition of these terms appears. Whereas Wittfogel and others regard China as a bureaucratic state, Moulder does not. Commercialization is divided into "extensive" and "intensive" types, the latter implying that exchange relations dominate production. The book provides an illuminating discussion of other relevant social, political and economic institutions informed by this broad comparative study. Thirdly, the book presents from this expanded outlook an enlightened discussion of the theories of development and under-development highlighting the differences between "traditional" and "world-economy" theories.

Yet the basic thesis of the book, that a world-economy perspective explains the divergent socio-economic development of the two countries, is not convincing. The paramount influences in the emergence of Japan as a powerful, respected member of the world capitalist family were developments that derived from its internal institutions and strengths rather than implantations from the outside. Contrary to Moulder's contention that Japan and China were at comparable levels of development, it is the differences that had come into existence before the Western incursion that primarily accounted for the varying reaction rather than the incursion itself. A wealth of postwar studies of the later Tokugawa period and early Meiji era reveal a Japan that had developed a national mass — as contrasted to elite — market (Moulder who is limited only to Western language sources denies the existence of a national market), become a unified nation, and had the wit to adopt that Western system, industrial capitalism, that made it possible for it to avoid becoming another satellite state of Western capitalism. A principal reason why the Western nations did not subject Japan to the abuses they inflicted on China (e.g., opium trade, foreign investment, political infringement; and missionary encroachment) is that Japan had a unified national market that made available to Westerners profitable and rapidly growing trade in a united, peaceful (except briefly) country under a single system of laws. Why jeopardize profitable trade by wilfully pushing for rights that were only of subordinate importance in a capitalist system?

It is probably correct for Moulder to argue that Japan's industrial capitalism would not have taken its shape without the intrusion of the West, and the speed of her industrialization probably could not have been attained without the threat to her independence posed by the West. But the fact that Japan alone among non-Western nations was able to mobilize her resources and achieve independent nationhood before World War I and none others before World War II is the principal problem that requires explication. The power and spirit that made this possible derived from domestic factors, just as China's weakness derived from her internal disunity.

The approach used here has stressed the importance of a world capitalist system and the powerful undertow it created that shaped the world around it. A serious weakness is the inability to discriminate the differing influences on states at varying levels of socio-economic development. The effect on China differed from the impact on Africa or Latin America or any other non-Western nation – and, of course, on Japan. A conclusion that places China, Latin America, Africa and a number of other areas under the single category of " peripheral nations " does not do justice to the history of economic development of nations. Nevertheless, it is only unorthodox perspectives that can provide new and original insights. Despite the factual and interpretive weaknesses, Moulder's use of a powerful analytical framework has provided historians and social scientists with a concise, lucid, and enlightening account of how the world capitalist economy (Western imperialism) during the peak period of its influence helped shape developments in two nations.

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S. S. Socolow, *The Merchants of Buenos Aires, 1778-1810: Family and Commerce.* Cambridge: University Press, 1978. pp. xv, 253.

This is a richly detailed investigation of the upper sectors of the merchant community in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. Concentrated in Buenos Aires, these merchants played a central role in the economic growth and administrative management of the region during the decades just preceeding independence. Professor Socolow employs " prosopographic techniques ", or group biography, to construct a composite picture of her topic, the porteno (wholesale) merchants of Buenos Aires. That picture carefully weaves together their economic, familial, religious, political (both locally and in relation to Spain) and military characteristics. What emerges clearly from her exhaustive documentation of various families' histories is a notion of the closely knit social position occupied by these merchants.

Of particular interest and unfortunately rare in such studies heretofore are her two chapters on " Women, marriage and kinship " and " Religious participation ". In these, Professor Socolow demonstrates the key functions played by marriages that porteno merchants arranged for their teen-age daughters. These included the maintenance, protection and enlargement of familial merchant businesses. Indeed, her empirical research suggests that such arranged marriages may well have been the key institution for perpetuating the porteno social position her book seeks to describe. The interpretation of the porteno merchant community and the local Church establishment is also intricately analyzed to show particularly the mutual economic benefits directly extracted by both parties.

In sum, the book's virtue lies precisely in the wealth of detail uncovered and organized into an excellent portrait of an interesting component of Spain's Latin American empire.

On the other hand, this volume repeatedly provokes or invites questions it refuses to consider or answer. This point may be put in other terms: what broader historical theme or themes are illuminated by this prosopographic study? What important historical issues, what significant substantive debates are affected by the results of this study? The author does not engage any issue along these lines. Thus, despite the fact that she does have to mention the roles both of the slave trade and of domestic slavery in the Viceroyalty, she does not consider how her researches might contribute to the many broad issues surrounding that topic. Given the rather unique post-colonial evolution of Argentina among the other Latin American states, one might have expected some comments on possible connections between the structure and functions of the porteno community and that uniqueness. None is offered. To select one more example, what complex relations existed between the portenos and the other socio-economic groupings in the Viceroyalty? Addressing this question carefully might well shed important light upon the political questions concerning the origin and composition of the revolutionary movements which swept Buenos Aires at the end of the very period which the author studies. Unfortunately, however, no such attention is paid, and the revolutionary upheavals are but passingly touched upon.

It seems to me a fair question to put to a piece of historical research as empirically concentrated as this: how and why does this study contribute something of importance to one or more of the central concerns that define contemporary historical research. Even to attempt nothing more than a demonstration of the analytical usefulness of prosopographic techniques would require an explicit connection of specific results to related major, general issues.

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T. Tholfson, *Working Class Radicalism in Mid-Victorian England*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1977

In *Working Class Radicalism in Mid-Victorian England* Trygve Tholfson addresses the question of the evolution of the English labour movement along reformist lines. Ever since the Webbs, historians have agreed that the triumph of bourgeois liberalism in the mid-nineteenth century marked a turning point in that evolution as the working class abandoned earlier revolutionary aspirations and accepted a more subordinate place in the new industrial world. Most recently, they have debated whether this discontinuity between the early and mid-nineteenth century labour movement was produced by a labour aristocracy's taming of working class radicalism.

Tholfson approaches this debate as a problem in intellectual history. He agrees that working class radicalism changed in the mid-Victorian period, but he denies this represents the triumph of an opposed system of thought, bourgeois liberalism. Instead, he contends that the two systems had important similarities. Both had enlightenment roots; both shared a commitment to common ideals such as progress, individualism, and rationality. Early nineteenth century class conflict obscured these points of agreement, but as this conflict subsided in the mid-nineteenth century, spokesmen for both the working class and the middle class came to appreciate their areas of agreement. Working class radicals, then, found it easy to accept middle class ideals because in some ways they had always agreed with them. Thus, the general acceptance of a mid-Victorian " consensus ", Tholfson argues, represents not the defeat of working class radicalism so much as its gradual assimilation by bourgeois liberalism. At the same time, however, although the working class voluntarily accepted a mid-Victorian " consensus " and necessarily acted within the limits of middle class " hegemony ", it did not totally accept bourgeois values. It still retained its earlier democratic and egalitarian assumptions, even when expressing " consensus " ideals. The change in mid-Victorian radicalism does not, Tholfson contends, represent simply an example of *embourgeoisement*, as has often been argued. Throughout the period the working class continued to elaborate its own distinct subculture and to build institutions, particularly trade unions, that often clashed with middle class " hegemony ". Hence, Tholfson writes, " we are not dealing with two discrete value systems, each socially determined, one which was achieving domination over the other. Rather there was a clash between divergent versions of common values, along with extensive overlapping as well as areas of unresolvable incompatibility ".

Tholfson has widely read in the literature of the period and his discussion of both middle class and working class ideas and of many, often obscure, figures is useful and informative. But *Mid-Victorian Working Class Radicalism* has serious defects as an interpretation of labour history because it largely ignores the real world it seeks to explain. It fails to relate changes in ideas to changes in the economy or society. Perhaps there was no relation, although one would think mid-Victorian prosperity had some consequences, but in that case even the lack of a relationship needs explaining. For example, he presents as given, but fails to explain, the " mellowing of middle class liberalism " which made possible the integration of working class radicalism. Similarly, and perhaps more important, he discusses both the middle class and the working class as two unified groups without any regard for distinctions of income, geography, religion, conditions of work, etc. While he may be right to reject current notions of the importance of a labour aristocracy, it simply will not do to treat the mid-Victorian working class as a unified whole. Although interesting and important, *Mid-Victorian Working Class Radicalism* is not the last word on the subject.

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