
REVIEWS OF BOOKS

L. AVAGLIANO, *Alessandro Rossi e le origini dell'Italia industriale*, Napoli, Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1970, pp. 554.

Recent historiography appears to be bent upon making up for the silence which for many decades had surrounded the figure and work of Alessandro Rossi, textile entrepreneur, senator and theologian of industrialism in the moderate Italy of King Umberto I. To the contributions made by Egidio Cabianca and Ferruccia Cappi Bentivegna have been added more recently a rich series of studies devoted to Rossi, and others, it appears, are being prepared or are already in the press. In short, to use a metaphor, one might say that after a period of famine the situation has suddenly become such that a glut on the market is to be feared. Can it be that a group of initiates in the field of industry is forming around Rossi such as Macchiario pointed out some time ago in speaking of Pareto?

In spite of the silence of historiography, Alessandro Rossi was not a person unknown to the political and economic chronicles of liberal Italy. His battle for integral protectionism, after his shorter but no less convinced championship of free trade, his close ties with the industrial and political world of Venetia, Lombardy and Piedmont, his solidarity with Crispi, had already attracted the polemic attention of free-traders of the Giolitti era, such as Luigi Einaudi who considered the senator from Schio one of the most intransigent leaders of the protectionist movement. Rossi the industrialist was actually the head of the « agrarian party » which, in 1887, was to give its support to a more energetic protection of the textile industry in exchange for customs on grain, in accordance with a plan which sacrificed consumers in order to obtain a disputable advantage for the industrialists in the north and the big landowners of the south. In its assessment of the 1887 tariff, the

historical opinion of the second post-war period shares this judgment, but not without significant changes. I say not without changes because Einaudi's judgment is based on a static and sectoral view of the « alliance » between industrialists and agrarians, whereas later analysis (it is sufficient to mention Sereni's essay *Il nodo della politica granaria*) has drawn attention to its dynamic and structural aspects. In any case there can be no doubt that Rossi played a role of outstanding importance in the crucial decade between the 1878 and 1887 tariffs. Consequently, although the « consumer myth » which led the free-traders to argue polemically against the 1887 tariff is contemptuously refuted today by the students of the ideology of development in our country, the practical political significance of this judgment of Einaudi's remains substantially valid even if it still needs to be analyzed more deeply and expressed more appropriately by historical research. Rossi's protectionism appears in fact to have been dictated not only by contingent motives, which were not lacking, but also by a broader ethical and civic view of Italian society complying with the model provided by the more advanced capitalist countries of the nineteenth century. This seems to be the soundest result emerging from the book considered here. The figure of Rossi the industrialist and protectionist is confirmed, but through an analytic regeneration revealing many links with the country's fundamental economic and social problems — relations between industry and agriculture, development of workers' and employers' unions, peasant-landlord associations, defence of the lower income consumers, technical training, aversion to financial capitalism, hostility to bureaucratic centralization and so on — regarding which Rossi's attitude was very often « divergent » and even « heretical » but always directed towards more general targets than those pertaining to his interests in the textile industry. In Rossi's case, therefore, the well-known Sombartian-Schumpeterian theory on the « exceptional » nature of the entrepreneur's behaviour and mentality as the foremost element of growth and innovation appears, at the socio-historical level, to fit Avagliano's interpretation perfectly. Unlike other writers such as Are and Lanaro — who have also devoted important pages and contributions to Rossi — Avagliano pays particular attention to the Venetian senator's connections with the economic problems and leading class of his age instead of describing his ideas alone. As a result Rossi's contribution to the birth of an ideology of industrialization in our country and the value his positions assume in a research on the « subjective factors » of economic development appear more consonant with the real political and economic context in which they arose and evolved. It is in fact necessary to have the courage to recognize (at the risk of being considered old-fashioned or incurably provincial) that in the Italian culture that sided with Croce but not with Cattaneo, the search for a « philosophy » of industrialization runs the risk of repositing, with the necessary revisions, methodological and cultural orientations of long standing. Or, at least, of

taking for granted that the problems of contemporary Italy's economic and social history, which are anything but clear, have been solved. Avagliano's study therefore provides a methodological example that deserves to be stressed and followed.

His work is based to a large extent on documents in the private archive of the Rossi family which includes the letterpresses in which the senator kept his copious correspondence with many outstanding political, cultural and economic personalities of his day, as well as on other papers in the « Lane Rossi » files and on the endless stream of writings, articles and pamphlets which flowed from Rossi's pen in the many decades of his busy life. This copious material has been arranged by Avagliano more around precise and sometimes strictly circumscribed problems than around a biographical *excursus* of the Venetian industrialist in the form of entrepreneurial history. The result complies not with abstract choices of methodological criteria, but with Avagliano's image of Rossi, in whom he perceives a deep-seated and undeviating coherence, « the implacable incentive of a firm interior conviction » consisting in the « industrialist choice ». As a result of this conviction there are no uncertainties in Rossi and no contradictions between the young wool manufacturer of the Austro-Hungarian Venetia of 1848, deeply immersed in the experience gained from his studies and travels in the pilot-countries of industrial civilization, and the mature entrepreneur of the post-Unity period, absorbed in the growth of his firm and attracted by the Utopian dream of a harmonious solution of class war based on good labour-management relations and having close socio-cultural ties with the values proper to rural civilization, or the tireless old man in the Italy of Umberto I, strenuously and incessantly criticizing the economic policy pursued by the leading class. This is a monolithic image — which it might have been better to break up and shade off — but which seems to reflect fairly adequately the essential traits of Rossi's personality.

His economicism, for example, which was a mixture of Catholic corporativism and Darwinian organicism, half way between Saint-Simon's Utopia of a technological society guided by the entrepreneurs' desire for reform and the harmony of interests based on the autonomous action of agricultural and industrial production forces and on an interclassism of the neo-Thomist type, has an eclectic and polemic meaning which constantly leads Rossi to assume positions at variance with those prevailing in the economic and political world of his days. In his eclecticism, however, there are a number of practical and political ambiguities which Avagliano quite rightly points out when speaking of the senator's relations with the workers' movement. In Rossi's eclecticism, in his daring syncretism — distrusting « schools » and established doctrines and therefore ready to appropriate any particular thesis that suited his purpose — there is, in reality, not only the brilliant and unbiased commitment of the polemic writer, prolific to the point of graphomania, but also an

inclination for a type of political action based on a pervasive and individual work of persuasion, propaganda and pressure. What Rossi aims at, in short, is not so much theoretical coherence and the investigation of ideas as a change in individual intentions. In fact he is not for the party of opinions and « programmes », but for the party of interests and sometimes actually for the pressure group. Evidence of this is provided by the relationship between the senator and the Lombard and Piedmontese agrarians in the period of the preparation of the 1887 tariff, the analysis of which is one of the most interesting aspects of Avagliano's work. Rossi's attempt to form a protectionist bloc based on the interests of industrialists and landowners fails because of the indifference or lack of understanding shown by the latter for this programme in « defence of national labour » which epitomized the political and economic changes advocated by the Venetian wool manufacturer. Was this failure entirely due to the short-sighted and reactionary mentality of the landowners or was it also due to serious errors in the political orientation of Rossi, who was under the illusion that a mere propaganda campaign, which he very often bought by granting large-scale financial backing to a number of widely different newspapers, was sufficient for this purpose? Avagliano favours the first assumption, but in reality Rossi's failure is to be ascribed chiefly to his scant parliamentary influence and his limited political capability. Thus, as the 1887 tariff shows, it was not Rossi's protectionist programme that was defeated, but his attempt to place himself at the head of a protectionist party. In other words, the landowners' indifference to Rossi's efforts set the limit to his political action just when the 1887 tariff attested the success of his ideas. This was also accounted for by Rossi's economicist and sociological view of the country's problems which he seldom succeeded in raising to a lucid and precise political synthesis. Avagliano does not think the 1887 tariff was the outcome of any real understanding between industrialists and landowners; he believes, on the contrary, that the southern landowners, interested in supporting the commercialization of agriculture given rise to by free trade, were hostile to it and that the northern landowners were not very convinced. In industry the entrepreneurs in the engineering sector were also against any tightening of tariffs. Conversely the entrepreneurs in the textile and iron and steel sectors desired protectionism and succeeded in imposing it also on the others by taking advantage of Crispi's strong hostility towards France. According to Avagliano, therefore, this measure was not the outcome of any real convergence of interests in an organic economic policy, but an anti-cyclical measure adopted because of the crisis and of the anti-French character of Crispi's foreign policy. Although Avagliano pays too little attention to the contradictory physiognomy of the southern agrarian structure, which did not consist entirely of latifundia and backward systems — the owners and tenants of the inland grain lands, suffering from the slump in agricultural prices and eager to avail themselves

of the customs duty on grain, were one thing, while the more advanced agrarian entrepreneurs in the coastal and suburban areas, definitely interested in the maintenance of free trade, were quite another — there can be no doubt that a clear and conscious « understanding », such as Avagliano would have liked to find, was not there and did not need to be there. In dealing with the corporative roots of the interests at stake at the time of the 1887 tariff, the author endeavours to trace them one by one, through the thick piles of Rossi's papers, ending by denying the existence of explicit pacts of alliance or of an immediate convergence of interests. But, contrary to what he believes, this confirms the corporative and classist nature of the so-called industrial-agrarian bloc. In fact it was not a party with an autonomous and explicit economic and political programme, which would have made it a force for the middle-class promotion of Italian society instead of an impediment curbing the country's development such as the « bloc » was. As a matter of fact it was this very absence of a conscious pact of alliance that gave birth to that « reality of the agrarian bloc » which Avagliano considers an immediate political fact instead of the objective result of the country's structural imbalances, of the accentuation of the dualism between North and South and, at the same time, a decisive element for the definitive capitalist unification of the national market according to the well-known Prussian « model ». Rossi was the man who recognized the necessity of outgrowing this classist and corporative conception, but the clarity of his ideas concerning economic and social matters was not offset by an equal capacity for political action and synthesis. The Italy of Umberto I, parliamentary and ready for change, was a political society that suited Rossi to the extent in which he refused its economic and social effects. The underlying moralism of Rossi's position and the polemic and eclectic character of his ideology stem from this unsolved contradiction.

In conclusion, this book of Avagliano's is important just because it leads us to reflect upon and debate the essential problems of Italian economic and social history, even if the subtlety and originality of many of his opinions are offset by other observations that seem disputable. And it is no mere accident that this is noticeable particularly in the part of the work which is clearly influenced by the methodology of Are and Lanaro: in the part in which the author ceases to be himself. To quote an example, one cannot help feeling perplexed when Avagliano likens Rossi to Sturzo along the same lines as Lanaro likens to Rossi to Rocco. The Venetian wool manufacturer's polemic against State centralization and in favour of local autonomy cannot be likened to Sturzo's later analogous position. The alternative suggested by Rossi is of economic productive origin: to the centralization and predominance of the State he opposes the organizational dynamism of the firm, to the red tape and procrastination of bureaucracy the efficiency and enterprise of businessmen. Sturzo's alternative is political: it refers to the autonomous

management of basic economic and administrative interests by the middle and lower classes. But Rossi is a figure who is only beginning to be discussed and it will be necessary to return to this and other problems for the individuation and raising of which we have to thank Avagliano.

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K. H. CONNELL, *Irish Peasant Society. Four Historical Essays*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 167, £ 2.50.

In these four studies Professor Connell's subject is the nature and structure of Irish peasant society in the nineteenth century, and in particular the effects and pressures arising from the Famine of 1845 which modified significantly its traditional characteristic in the succeeding generations. While his initial essay — on 'Illicit Distillation' — stands somewhat apart in having a more purely economic interest, all four contribute to an interestingly complimentary and homogeneous analysis of the relationship between the economic and demographic forces on one hand, and the institutional or authoritarian pressures, be they clerical or administrative, on the other, which effected intimately the structure and habits of that society. Concentrating on a number of the activities and customs of this peasantry, the production and consumption of illicit spirits, or their substitute ether, the changing demographic pattern of marriage which was accompanied by an extraordinarily stringent attitude toward, and practice of, sexual continence, and on the peculiar social influence of the clergy, the author examines not only the complex interaction of economic pressures from below and changing authoritarian attitudes from above on the often independent habits of the peasantry itself, but at the same time illustrates in a wider sense the nature and effect of the physical limitations within which that society functioned.

Examining first the importance and decline of the production of illicit grain spirit — 'poteen' — Prof. Connell stresses both its function in the budget of the individual peasant, and its importance to the agrarian economy as a whole. 'Until after the Famine poteen-making was no amusing trifle in Irish life... it was amongst the most widely distributed of Irish manufactures; few industries gave so much employment, none gave more pleasure'. Well endowed with idle manpower due to the disastrous subdivision of holdings which plagued the peasant economy before 1845, and lacking alternative subsidiary profit making activities, both peasant and land-lord, the one in meeting, the other in receiving inflated rents, found a common interest in turning a blind eye to the law. Not only was 'poteen' relatively simple to

produce — avoiding detection presented the chief technical problem — but given the universally wretched state of communications it often provided the only practical form in which to market the harvest. The decline in 'poteen' production, which the author deduces from the decrease in the number of stills discovered by an increasingly vigilant and efficient excise force after the Famine and in particular after 1870, is credited to the increased prosperity of the peasant farmer, now more often himself a proprietor and so with more to lose by breaking the law, to improving grain prices, and to a correspondingly more severe and hostile attitude on the part of the local clerical and lay hierarchies. The nature of the quantitative data used by Prof. Connell, drawn from excise statistics, does not allow this trend to be fixed with any precision, and while the economic position of the peasantry did improve, it is difficult to see this happening in the years immediately after the Famine. It would also seem that the latter must have had a considerable effect on demand, and one wonders to what extent a numerically reduced consumer market itself served to undermine the economic basis of production. In order to provide some perspective on the 'poteen' industry, it would be valuable also to examine further the situation of other traditional 'cottage' industries in the same period.

The connection between this and the subsequent essays lies in the fact that drink as well as being an economic activity was also a social habit, as the ready adoption of ether as a substitute illustrates. It is significant that in both cases clerical censure was apparently only effective when in alliance with the State. In the cases of marriage and chastity priestly pressure and its influence, however, provides a more complex problem. Drawing on the 1835/6 Irish Commission of Inquiry findings and also widely on literary sources, Professor Connell maintains that in the period before the Famine the illegitimacy rate among the peasantry was surprisingly low, and, in the absence of either contraceptive practice or evidence of abortions, the standards of chastity extremely high. The causes of this seem to have lain most immediately in the certainty of social ostracism: 'In the Irish countryside before — and probably long after — the Famine it was the lucky mother, or likely mother, of an illegitimate child who was not shunned by her neighbours and despised, if not cast off, by her own family'. The austerity of this social prejudice may certainly have been more effective a deterrent than the certainty of economic hopelessness; it is also clear that such prejudice is by no means generally common to peasant societies, and certainly not to other Catholic peasant societies — although on this point it would be worth forming much wider comparison than the author attempts.¹

After the Famine the phenomenon became even more remarkable. Under-

¹ Cf. «Annales» (ann. 24, no. 6, nov.-dec. 1969), devoted to «Histoire Biologique»; in particular J. L. FLANDRIN, *Contraception et mariage*, p. 1388.

standing the economic dangers inherent in subdivision, the author holds, the peasants attempted to concentrate their holdings. Only one son could now expect to inherit, and then at a late age. Previously adolescent marriages were the rule, now the heir alone might hope to marry, and then by 'arrangement' and not until he was in his thirties; other children must remain celibate and landless, or emigrate. 'Few comparative communities have acquiesced in celibacy as has the Irish peasantry'. The problem on which Professor Connell concentrates is that of assessing the importance and efficacy of clerical influence. He illustrates clearly not only the peculiar social and economic power possessed by the priest in the peasant community by virtue of his control over cultural and often commercial patronage, but also the results of the particularly narrow training he would have received at the Maynooth seminary. The Maynooth clergy, unlike its traditional European trained predecessor, was drawn from the peasantry, shared its prejudices, and through its Jansenist curriculum was imbued with a strongly misogynist bent and an attitude which was at least ambiguous toward matrimony. It returned to its rural parishioners, at any rate, convinced of the mission not only of defending but also of enforcing their morality. Why did the peasantry acquiesce so wholeheartedly in this kill-joy dictatorship? 'The people's piety and the Church's grandeur' were not without influence, but in the last analysis such submission was only possible because economic advantage and the priests' teaching bore the same logic: 'the peasant's respect for the Catholic code as transmitted to him has sprung, not least, from its compatibility with his patriarchal and material ambition'.

The breadth and originality of his sources, and the skill with which they are applied, have permitted Professor Connell to draw a startlingly detailed picture of the authoritarian structure of Irish peasant life, yet his analysis does not escape a certain confusion arising from an ambiguity inherent in the problem which he confronts. He treats as one sole phenomenon the fact that after 1845 the peasantry submitted to economic necessity in modifying and retarding traditional marriage patterns, and the fact that in the then extended meantime they remained continent. But these surely are two separate phenomena. The author himself shows that even in the late eighteenth century (i. e. before the Maynooth discipline existed) these same peasants exhibited a similarly reserved sexuality, so its preservation after the Famine might more usefully be seen more purely in terms of social custom, and its historic origins examined more closely. It would also appear that the quantitative material relates to Irish society as a whole, so it would be valuable to know something more of the habits and attitudes of the other nonpeasant sectors. In terms of social customs the traditional taste for alcohol which the author illustrates but does not develop, would seem to provide an interesting parallel; it is also significant that in this case priestly censure alone apparently had little effect. An equally serious problem is raised by the

author's assumption of the auto-didactic nature of the economic lesson taught by the Famine. The influence of land legislation apart, which the author does not examine here, how did the peasant realize that the Famine was the fruit of his 'improvident pleasures'? He himself argues that the peculiar nature of the Maynooth training left the priest ill equipped to assist in material matters, quoting Nassau Senior: 'The priest was the enemy of improvement, the enemy of education, and the enemy of emigration'. This would suggest that, powerful as they were, the priests did not hold a total monopoly in institutional influence over the peasant.

These qualifications apart, there can be little doubt that Professor Connell's studies form an important, stimulating, and original contribution not only to Irish agrarian history in the nineteenth century, but also, by virtue of the breadth of source material which he uses in a field where more traditional material is scarce, and also of originality of the problems which he studies, an equally important contribution to the field of social history in general.

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I. ERCEG, *Trst i Bivse Habsburske Zemlje U Medunarodnom Prometu* (Trieste and the Former Habsburg Lands in International Trade), Zagreb, JAZU, 1970, 231 pages, no price indicated.

Trieste's trading fortunes starting from the 18th century have, as is known, been the object of a number of studies, from Kandler's, Tamaro's and Laneve's by now classical works to the more recent studies by Babudieri (*Trieste e gli interessi austriaci in Asia nei secoli XVIII e XIX*, Padova, CEDAM, 1966), De Antonellis Martini (*Portofranco e comunità etnico-religiose nella Trieste settecentesca*, Milano, Giuffrè, 1968) and Torbianelli Moscarda (*Vicende giuridico-amministrative a Trieste da Carlo VI a Leopoldo II*, Milano, Giuffrè, 1971). This flow of studies, rich in valuable contributions not only to the trading history of Trieste, but also to the broader history of the Habsburg empire, has seldom however gone beyond a description of the economic policies of which Trieste was the object under the Habsburgs. As a consequence these studies of the Julian city are often pervaded by a certain monotony and repetitiveness, while the « quantitative » aspects of Trieste's economic history have for a long time been almost completely neglected. It is only recently that economists have centred their attention on the structure of Trieste's economy and trade in the 18th and 19th centuries and even now the most recent researches concerning the 18th century are not by Italians. One of the economists in question is

W. Kaltenstadler (see W. KALTENSTADLER, *Der österreichische Seehandel über Triest im 18. Jahrhundert*, in « VSWG », 1969, pp. 482-500 (55) and pp. 1-104 (56).

The author of this work, professor at the Institute of Historical Science of Zagreb, has a rich *curriculum* of much appreciated publications to his credit, although the language difficulty has certainly not helped to make them more widely known. A valuable study by this author on Istria's demographic and economic structures deserves particular mention (see I. ERCEG, *Prinos poznavanju stanovništva i njegovih ekonomskih uvjeta života na području nekadasnje Istre*, Ljetopis, JAZU, 1965). As regards the present study on Trieste and the Habsburg lands in particular, it must be recalled that the subject, along general lines, had already been announced at the 4th International Conference on Economic History at Bloomington in 1968 to which the author submitted a report on foreign trade in the northern Adriatic sea towns in the 18th and 19th centuries (*Aussenhandel der Nordadriatischen Seestädte als Faktor im Entstehen der kapitalistischen Beziehungen in Oesterreich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, published in « VSWG », 1969 (55), pp. 464-480). It must be added that the author does not feel he had exhausted the subject in the present volume since he is at present making a survey of trade in salt and other articles of wide consumption in the northern Adriatic in the 18th century.

The work we are discussing, founded mainly on documents in the Hofkammer und Finanzarchiv in Vienna, provides an outline of the structure of trade in Trieste and the other provinces of the Habsburg Empire in a particular period in the second half of the 18th century, the years between 1760 and 1766. More or less the same years are also at the centre of Kaltenstadler's above-mentioned work, but whereas in the latter the analysis of trade movements is confined to Trieste and its object was only to examine the success of a certain type of Habsburg economic policy, in Erceg's study the years 1760-66 are viewed with regard not only to Trieste's transit trade, but also to trade movements in the other provinces of the Empire, while the economic policy trends, although their effects are analyzed, are merely adumbrated. It ensues that figures count more than words in Erceg's study, although it is certainly not merely archivistic or documentary.

The author first approaches the Empire's trade currents through an analysis of the structure of Trieste's transit trade in 1760 which accounted for a value of 5,315,773 florins. The goods of greatest interest to the seaport of Trieste in this year were olive oil for imports and copper for exports, both of which accounted for a very large share of the total value of Trieste's trade. However high trade values were also reached by other goods: steel, soft goods, leather, meat, spices, sugar, coffee, silk and wine.

As regards territorial participation in this trade movement, to which the author devotes a meticulous analysis, for exports Hungary ranked first, fol-

lowed by Slovenia, Carinthia and Austria with percentages of respectively 33.50%, 22.74%, 15.72% and 6.15%, while for imports the first place was occupied by Austria, followed by Styria and Hungary with percentages of respectively 29.52%, 12.55% and 11.80% (p. 139). More or less the same provinces ranked first for total trade, with the following percentages: 25.84% for Hungary, 16.52% for Slovenia, 14.39% for Austria and 13.68% for Carinthia. Conspicuously absent from the first places, on the contrary, was the Empire's foremost manufacturing province, Bohemia, which only accounted for 4.83% of the total trade passing through Trieste. It must be recalled in this connection that Bohemia preferred Hamburg to Trieste as harbour for its exports even when the old Hanseatic city, in the second half of the 18th century, was going through a period of temporary decline due to non-economic factors such as the epidemics that reduced its population and economic activities (see H. MAUERSPERG, *Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte zentraleuropäischer Städte in neuerer Zeit*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960, pp. 47-48).

The Empire's principal trading partners through Trieste were firstly the Italian States and next the Ottoman Empire, Moscow and Hamburg. Altogether exports through Trieste in 1760 far exceeded imports, the former amounting to 3,438,870 florins and the latter to 1,876,903. Would the situation remain the same in the immediately following years? This is the question Erceg answers in the second part of his study.

On the whole the years from 1760 to 1766 witnessed a progressive increase in trade through the harbour of Trieste even if there were temporary halts in this upward trend in 1762 and in 1765. Trieste's transit trade rose from 5,315,773 florins in 1760 to 7,393,633 in 1766. Export trade continued to account for higher values than imports even if the conspicuous difference between the two currents registered in 1760 suffered a shrinkage of a few hundred thousand florins in some years, such as 1765. There were changes, however, in the territorial shares of both exports and imports of the provinces of the Empire. Hungary's share of exports fell from 33.50% in 1760 to 27.48% in 1766 although it continued to rank first among the Empire's exporting provinces, while Slovenia's share rose from 22.74% in 1760 to 26.30% in 1766. Carinthia's and Austria's shares remained more or less stationary, while Styria's share showed an increase (from 4.56% to 8.20% in the same period) and so did Transylvania's (from 3.09% to 3.46% over the same period, but with a peak of 8.68% in 1763). In speaking of the latter province it must be mentioned that in the second half of the 18th century it enjoyed the benefit of an energetic programme of economic recovery to which its larger share of Trieste's transit trade in the sixties of the 18th century bears witness (see the recent study on Transylvania's economic recovery in this period by B. SURDU, *Contributii la problema nasterii Manufacturilor Din Transilvania in secolul al XVIII-lea*, in

« Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Din Cluj », 1964, VII, pp. 147-237). As far as imports are concerned, it must be mentioned that whereas Austria's share remained more or less stationary between 1760 and 1766, Hungary's share increased appreciably, rising from 11.80% to 21.38% and ranking second among the importing provinces, while Styria, whose share dropped from 12.55% to 9.84%, ranked third in 1766, closely followed by Slovenia (9.53%).

Erceg's work closes with an analysis of the trade balances of the various provinces of the Empire in the light of their transit trade through Trieste in the years 1760 to 1766. The balance is positive and is an implicit recognition of the merits of the economic policy, and particularly of the trade policy pursued by the Habsburg in those years.

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C. FOHLEN, *Qu'est-ce que la révolution industrielle?* Paris, Editions Laffont, Collection « Science Nouvelle », 1971, pp. 320.

It is not presumptuous, as the author seems to think in his introduction, to send a new book on the industrial revolution to the press, but it may, for obvious reasons, appear presumptuous to entitle it: What is the industrial revolution? This may well lead the reader to expect to find in it some new and ingenious interpretation of the industrial revolution, whereas he will see, when he gets to the end of the book, that this is not the case. Claude Fohlen's book is in fact a simple and sufficiently up-to-date repertory of what has been said and written about the industrial revolution in recent years. The reluctance shown by the author, as he confesses himself, to draw conclusions that might appear premature to some people and dogmatic to others is understandable. It would have been impossible for him to give a convincing reply to the question asked since he has not undertaken any research to discover the factual elements that caused the industrial revolution. But is it possible for a historian to speak of *one* industrial revolution in the abstract and not of the *many* industrial revolutions which, beginning with the first British industrial revolution, contributed — each with its own special features — to bring about a sweeping change in life on our planet between the 18th century and today? The book reviewed here may therefore be said to open and close with a big question mark.

The contents of the book may be roughly divided into three parts, the first of which recapitulates the history of the expression « industrial revolution » and the interpretations of the industrial revolution and economic development given by historians and economists. The second part is devoted to

an analysis of the factors of the industrial revolution, divided into endogenous and exogenous, and the third and last part examines the social consequences of the industrial revolution. The central part is the most important and deserves to be examined.

The explanation of the industrial revolution as the outcome of a single cause has fallen completely into disuse today. No historian, with few exceptions, advocates it any longer. It is universally recognized that it is not one cause that must be spoken of, but several causes or factors, concomitant and interacting, which contributed in a number of countries, and at different periods in history, to raise the rate of growth of the production of goods and services to a level never known before. Everybody seeks, however, to discover the mechanism by means of which these factors combined to produce that determinate result and, in doing so, efforts are apt to become confused with those of the theorists of economic growth, intent on fixing the laws regulating industrialization in an absolute sense. The degree of abstraction entailed by a procedure of this kind is indubitably risky and the historian is of course not supposed to run risks. It is for this reason that Fohlen has confined himself to merely giving a list of the causes of the industrial revolution as suggested so far by historians and economists. His only personal contribution is to distinguish the causes directly concerning industry, such as technical progress, investments and entrepreneurship, from those that concerned the other sectors of economic life, such as the agricultural revolution, population growth, development of schooling and government action.

All historians agree in recognizing the prominent part played by technical innovations in the development of modern industry. «One thing that is clear about modern economic growth», says P. Deane, «is that it depends on, more than anything else, a continuing process of technical change» (*The First Industrial Revolution*, London 1965, p. 118). They no longer agree when it comes to indicating the causes that promoted technical changes or, to quote Fohlen, that turned inventions into innovations. There are some authors, like Usher, who consider technological development as a separate process, moving forward according to its own precise, gradual and orderly internal logic, and others, influenced by Schumpeter, who attribute it to the action of «innovatory» personalities. According to Fohlen both theses are right, but there is also a third important factor that must not be forgotten: the stimulus of the increase in demand. To quote Deane again, «it was only when the potential market was large enough and demand elastic enough to justify a substantial increase in output that the rank and file of entrepreneurs broke away from their traditional techniques and took advantage of the technical opportunities then open to them» (*ibidem*, p. 124).

Innovations alone would not have been sufficient to create a modern industry had there not at the same time been an intense accumulation of capital and a change in the rate and direction of investments. The signi-

finance of this statement is evidenced by the principal development of the British industrial revolution.

Until the eighteenth century agriculture and sea trade had absorbed a considerable part of the existing capital in Britain, while industry, not yet concentrated in big factories and with a technical equipment that was still rudimentary, had operated with a very restricted stock of capital. With the invention of the new machines, which were complex and costly, industry's need of capital soared rapidly. The capital required to expand manufacturing output came from various sources: from the land, from overseas trade and, according to some, as Ashton observes, also from branches of secondary industry. However investments were not large in the beginning; even small amounts of capital were sufficient to establish thriving industries. Robert Owen, for instance, started out with a capital of £ 100 and was able twenty years later to pay back £ 84,000 to his partners. In a great many cases expansion was financed out of the conspicuous profits gained in a very short time; in this first stage, therefore, the ploughing back of profits was the form most frequented used to finance investments in the new industries. Also significant was the fact that industrial investments in Britain developed at a slower rate than capital accumulation. It is not hard to discover the reason for this: public works, government securities and land succeeded in securing the biggest share of national capital and industry had consequently to rely on itself. This spontaneous aspect of the autonomous and organic growth of the British industrial revolution exalted by Crouzet was redimensioned by Ashton who, with his development theory based on a declining rate of interest, called attention to the connection between industry and banking. Fohlen, on the contrary, sustains that — in the beginning at least — British industry received very little support from the banks. Since both industry and banking developed at the same time it is not possible, in his opinion, to establish which caused the development of the other. Discarding also the assumption that the capital required for industrial investments may have been obtained by setting up joint stock companies, the only plausible explanation of the first investments in British industry is self-financing.

After machinery and capital, entrepreneurs were one of the principal causes of the industrial revolution. Starting from Schumpeter there is plenty of literature on this particular category. According to Fohlen however, some eighteenth century French writers were the first to define the figure of the entrepreneur. Today the latter is a figure who recurs very frequently, especially in English language economic literature where a rich harvest of studies on this subject is to be found. In historiography the clearest example of history of the entrepreneur is provided by D. Landes, who holds the absence of the spirit of entrepreneurship to have been the greatest obstacle to industrial development in France in the last century. This is refuted by R. Cameron, however, who succeeds in demonstrating the role of outstanding importance,

in no way inferior to that of their British and German colleagues, played by French entrepreneurs in the industrial development of several regions of Europe. Recently, moreover, Max Weber's old thesis that the capitalist spirit stems from Protestant ethics, has returned to favour. First Ashton and then Mathias have insisted on the prominent role of the Non-Conformists in the British industrial revolution. But, passing from Britain to the Continent, the same phenomenon is recognizable as regards the Jews; also a religious minority and figuring very frequently as daring entrepreneurs, while in the north of France the opposite is true, for there we find many members of the Catholic majority engaged in thriving industrial enterprises and closely linked with one another by strong family ties. The conclusion, therefore, is that the religious factor was not in itself sufficient to mould the entrepreneurial spirit. At most, as Rostow observes, it was the revolt against the barriers of a traditionalist society that gave birth to the entrepreneurial élite, but these barriers were flexible enough to allow the new group to forge ahead on the road to material success and political power. It is interesting to note that Gerschenkron resorted to a similar explanation when studying the religious and ideological background of the first groups of entrepreneurs in Russia (see *Europe in the Russian Mirror*, London 1970, Chapter II).

Also in his analysis of the exogenous factors of the industrial revolution Fohlen confines himself mainly to illustrating the interpretations given by other historians, rarely expressing opinions of his own, which are often far from clear. With regard to the agricultural revolution, for instance, he first rejects Rostow's and Bairoch's theses that the industrial take-off stemmed from the growth of agricultural production and incomes, quoting all the contributions that have demonstrated the flimsiness of these authors' arguments. Later, however, impressed by the particular structures of Latin American underdevelopment, he ends by acknowledging that without an agricultural revolution, such as took place in Britain, modern industry is unable to develop. Many other examples could be added to the foregoing, but they would be superfluous as what has been said so far is sufficient to give an idea of the contents and limits this essentially popularizing work.

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E. W. Fox, *History in Geographic Perspective: The Other France*, W. W. Norton, New York 1971, pp. 190+8 plates, \$ 6.95.

France enjoys the distinction, as Raymond Aron has said, of ranking no lower than second among nations as an object of study and commentary. And this state of affairs tends to be self-perpetuating, commentary feeding

on commentary and reinterpretation on interpretation. How surprising, then, for a re-examination of French history to dispense with footnotes and a bibliography. Yet this is not the only surprise in Professor Edward W. Fox's short and provocative book on « The Other France ». The title, for one, does not prepare the reader for a study centering on French politics of the modern period, and yet it is apt. Although neither written by an economic historian nor purporting to be economic history, the book's conceptual key is the distinction between « trade » and « commerce », while much of the argument intertwines with the familiar debate on causes of retardation in French industrialization. The present review will focus on this aspect of Professor Fox's thesis, which may be less than fair but does serve to bring out the richness of his hypotheses.

It is difficult to summarize usefully a subtle and already dense argument. Going back to Mediterranean antiquity, Fox traces out the development, in France and Europe, of two parallel and yet distinct political and economic system: the territorial *Imperia*, on the one hand, and, on the other, the commercial cities, legally independent or not, that might be in, but were never really of, territorial states. The two systems are contrasted in a series of arresting oppositions, usually in order to accentuate the « other » and neglected, system. And indeed, it is curious how the commercial towns and cities of pre-industrial Europe, which loom so large in economic and cultural history, shrink to the status of awkward footnotes in any but the most detailed political-military chronicles. However, the failure to give commercial cities their due is not ascribable so much to neglect of geography as to the implicit identification of power with control over area, as in the two meanings of « dominion ».

The commercial societies have been linear, in Fox's term, rather than areal. They have been based on maritime commerce, not overland trade, and have given preponderant weight to property over authority. Emerging from slavery, rather than serfdom, they have been oligarchies rather than hierarchies, and their governance has been political more than administrative. A most valuable aspect of the dichotomy is to draw attention away from the cliché distinctions of right and left, of order and movement, of tyranny and democracy. According to Fox, the two types of European societies have had their progressive and conservative forces and factions, and cannot usefully be contrasted on this spectrum. They have interpenetrated each other closely without interacting much, essentially because their histories were being worked out on different planes. Indeed, almost the only important link Fox sees between them derives from the recurring monetary surpluses of the commercial societies, matched by chronic deficits in the treasuries of territorial princes. So the princes borrowed; so, also, they tried for centuries to tame and control the linear commercial societies, an attempt Fox sees as the essence of Mercantilism.

Coming now to France, the fresh point of view serves to demythify regimes and events that have dominated French historiography, and to give luster to correspondingly neglected episodes. In Fox's view, the key to French politics since 1815 is the struggle of the « other » France to share in, if not take over, political control of the nation. Periods of relative success for them have been marked by the unspectacular, quiet achievement characteristic of commercial, and essentially private, societies. The Restoration, particularly the July Monarchy, and the Third and Fourth Republics, have thus been slighted, if not maligned. Meanwhile, the strong men of France, from Louis XIV down through the Napoleons to De Gaulle, have received far too much credit and notoriety for perfecting or shoring up a rigid and over-centralized agricultural-administrative-military state incapable of steady modernization.

Most interesting, perhaps, is the treatment of the French Revolution, which Fox sees as a definitive working-out of the conflict between the administrative state and the remnants of feudal class privileges. The commercial societies in their provincial strongholds, though active in the constitutional phase of the Revolution, were really irrelevant to the essential drama. (It is, of course, no coincidence that the constitutional party bore the name of Girondins). The Revolution and Empire firmly entrenched royal power, dispensing only with the royal person. In contrast to England, power did not pass decisively to « new men » who would champion capitalism.

To the economic historian, the real stake in the contest between the two French societies, after 1815, is growth, in particular industrialization. And here, appealing as Fox's model undoubtedly is, it and he get lower marks. Capitalism, the child of the « other » society, simply did not make more rapid strides under the Orleanist and post-1870 regimes than in Napoleon III's time. To put the matter bluntly, Professor Fox's heroes (as they clearly and legitimately are) must be adjudged the most timid of capitalistic apostles and pioneers. Industrialists clung to protection, not as Listian advocates of « national economy » but as prudent masters of the bird-in-the-hand; and, having eventually established a most modern set of institutions to finance industrialisation, the financiers channeled capital into the same old state and foreign loans that had enticed their ancestors. Nor was the industrial proletariat, the peasantry of the Other France, less vulnerable to co-optation by the dominant society. Whether in 1905 or 1963, they could always be enlisted in defense of the conquests of 1789, particularly freedom from clericalism.

Whatever its success in explaining the turnings of French politics, Fox's model, or his heroes, must be adjudged failures in the economic sphere. However, even the relative failure is uncommonly constructive and stimulating. First, we gain from it a sharper appreciation of the distinction between trade, with low fixed and high marginal costs, and commerce, where the

infrastructure is costly, but the ports, ships, and merchant houses can easily increase the volume and scope of their activity once organized. Second, the puzzling, if familiar, lack of integration between pre-industrial rural society and the commercial cities can be interpreted as real, rather than the product of ignorance. An incidental, but timely, moral can be drawn from the discrepancy between the achievements of dull, hard-working commercial societies, and the monopoly of glory enjoyed by military-administrative rulers. Finally, and most important for the student of modern French economic history, the search for causes of retardation can now get down to cases. Instead of talking about French values, resources, or industries, we must look at developments in specific regional contexts, at particular ventures and their interactions with the central administrative power. Economic histories of Rouen, Nantes, Marseille, Bordeaux (we know somewhat more about Lille and Lyon) are clearly needed. Indeed, their absence takes from Professor Fox's book what should have been its core: a close study of the social, political, and economic development of the great peripheral cities. As matters stand, it is the Prince, rather than the King of Denmark who is a ghost in Fox's *Hamlet*.

Once the necessary detailed studies are available, it may well prove that French economic retardation was due more to excessive centralism, already denounced by the Tocqueville, than to either a lack of natural resources or an inappropriate value system. If so, Professor Fox will have done a great service in pointing the way to an understanding of the past, and also to the roots of today's *société bloquée*.¹

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R. HORVÁTH, *A közgazdasági elemzés Berzeviczy Gergely műveiben* (Berzeviczy külkereskedelmi elméleti, gazdaságelméleti és pénzügyi nézeteinek elemzése alapján) (Economic Analysis in the Works of Gergely Berzeviczy. On the Basis of his Pure Theory, Foreign Trade Theory and Financial Theory). Acta Universitatis Szegediensis, Juridica et Politica, tomus XVIII, fasciculus 1., Szeged, 1971, pp. 11 (with english summary).

The present monograph represents part of the author's wide analytic research work in the history of Hungarian economics, financial theory and statistics undertaken from the mid-fifties on and covering also many European problems.

¹ M. CROZIER, *La Société bloquée* (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1970).

The subject, Berzeviczy's entire life's work in economic science, is a first high-level modern approach on a broad basis to the first outstanding theoretician of classical economic thinking in Hungary. With regard to his overwhelming influence on later economic literature in this country, Professor Horváth's treatise may prove a useful starting point for a new and enlarged synthesis of studies on the scientific history and development of Hungarian economics.

The six chapters of the monograph are constructed so as correspond to the organic development of Berzeviczy's economic thought and supply an exhaustive analysis of his methodology and concepts. His work in the field of statistical theory and its economic and demographic applications was analysed separately by the author in a twin-volume at present in the press. However, as Berzeviczy's was a very scholarly mind, with the best contemporary university education and good experience in the Hungarian central economic administration, the development of his theoretical scientific apparatus proceeded apace with its historical deployment.

In the first introductory chapter Professor Horváth sums up the standing of former Berzeviczy-studies, points the gaps in them and elucidates the framework of his own work. In the second chapter the analysis starts from Berzeviczy's ideas on foreign trade policy, passing rapidly from late-mercantilism to physiocratic free-trade requirements and culminating in classical Smithianism. In the third chapter, however, his foreign trade theory is shown to synthesise the balance of trade theory with that of the balance of payments and on the basis of Say's «*théorie des débouchés*» Berzeviczy gives a complete exposition of the theory of comparative costs before Ricardo. As a consequence of his realistic scrutiny of the obstacles standing in the way of the classic free-trade policy he succeeds in recognizing the role of time-lags in underdeveloped capitalist countries which is followed by the exposition of the growth theory of national economy, anticipating List.

Chapter Four gives an exhaustive analysis of Berzeviczy's value and price theory, including his theory of interest and profit and his monetary and credit theory. Professor Horváth emphasises that his value theory is rooted not only in objective, but also in subjective momentums and that his capital theory contains equally immaterial elements despite its striking similarity with the loanable-fund theory of our days. His monetary theory, with its charalist features, leads to Knapp. Chapter Five is a first systematised recapitulation of Berzeviczy's public finance theory in Hungary, which amalgamated classical economic theory with the Cameralist tenets foreshadowing Rau's later achievements. The sixth and last chapter gives an evaluation of Berzeviczy's theories from the national and international point of view. The author is of the opinion that Berzeviczy was far ahead of his era as far as Hungarian economic thought is concerned and even by comparison with first-rank classical economists, with whom he was practically on a footing of equality,

despite the unhappy circumstance that geographic, linguistic and political isolation prevented his ideas from spreading and influencing contemporary economic thought.

Critically Professor Horváth's study may be said to be a thorough and scholarly presentation of the subject but perhaps his main points might have been better illustrated by a less condensed arrangement of his material. The chief merit of Professor Horváth's enterprise lays in the general scope of the study, in its close connections with social and economic historic conditions and with the governing ideas of the period. Because of these merits it would certainly deserve to be published in English or French so as to reach a wider European public of scholars.

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B. R. MITCHELL & H. G. JONES, *Second Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1971, pp. X-228, £ 3.40.

In 1962, in the collection of monographs edited by the Department of Applied Economics of Cambridge University, B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane published a first Abstract of British Historical Statistics which stopped at 1938. When this work was reprinted some years ago, the first idea was to enlarge it so as to include both statistics referring to the years after 1938 and series prior to this date which, only having appeared later, were not contained in the first edition. Fearing, however, that this might make the book too cumbersome, the idea was given up. But the intention remained of producing a second Abstract which would complete the first one in the above way. This promise has now been kept.

Of the authors of the first Abstract only Mitchell has remained, Deane having been replaced by H. G. Jones. But in spite of the change of authors, the criterion has remained exactly the same as in the first Abstract. The purpose is to provide people who use historical statistics with a wide range of economic data ordered and translated into time series which are comparable with one another. As in the first Abstract, the data are preceded by a critical comment confined to a few notations only, and the authors are convinced that the difficulties implicit in statistical series only become recognizable after they have been used for analytic purposes. Again as in the preceding volume the authors have preferred, wherever possible, to use crude data rather than processed statistics. The reader is informed, however, that in the more recent series, which are the result of complicated calculations made by the local authorities, the relevant data are crude more in appearance than in reality. The statistics collected in the volume have been divided

under the following headings: population, labour force, agriculture, fuel and power, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, textiles, transport and communications, building, miscellaneous production statistics, overseas trade, wages and standard of living, national income and expenditure, public finance, banking and insurance, prices, miscellaneous statistics. Attention will here be devoted only to what is new as compared with the first Abstract.

The population statistics now include also statistics on divorces and some variants have been introduced in the statistics on the general growth of the British population between 1801 and 1966 and on the distribution of marriages by age groups between 1851 and 1961. As regards agriculture, the only novelty are the statistics on the United Kingdom's meat imports between 1840 and 1965. A more important innovation is found under the heading Fuel and Power; whereas only statistics concerning the mining, consumption, export and other important uses of coal were included in the first Abstract, in the second Abstract we find, in addition to the continuation of the preceding series from 1938 up to about 1965, statistics concerning sales of electricity and gas and crude oil imports and re-exports. The statistics concerning iron and steel now include the number of workers employed in this sector between 1940 and 1965, while the statistics for non-ferrous metals have been enlarged by the addition of the series for aluminium, nickel and zinc and the series for tin, copper and lead. However comparison between the series prior to 1938 and the series reproduced here is rendered problematic by evident dissimilarities in the data collecting method used. The chapter on transport and communications has also been altered and enriched. Some statistics, those relating to the strength, in number and in tonnage, of the British merchant fleet, for example, have been compiled with systems differing from those previously adopted, while others, such as the statistics on air traffic, telegraph and telephone services and wireless licences, are completely new. Among the statistics on sundry lines of production must be mentioned the index of industrial production presented in the dual version provided by Lomax in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* (Series A, 1959) and by the *Board of Trade Journal*. The statistics on overseas trade have been touched up at several points so that they are only partly comparable with those in the first Abstract. In the geographical distribution of British foreign trade, for instance, it was not possible not to take into consideration the big new economic units, such as EFTA, EEC and COMECON, which have replaced the old national units since the last war. Statistics on wages and the cost of living have also been extended and improved. The series on average weekly wages and on hours of work in some manufacturing branches and in the coal mines are in fact new, whereas the series concerning the per capita consumption of coffee, tea, sugar and tobacco has been retained because, even if it is hardly indicative of the average standard of living today, it does, through its connection with series contained in the preceding volume,

to provide a homogeneous and continuous picture of a particular economic phenomenon over three centuries. No innovations of particular importance have been introduced either for the estimates of national income and consumer and investment expenditure, taken from the Blue Books or from the Royal Statistical Society, or for the estimates concerning public finance or for those referring to banking and insurance, except for two new series of data in the latter sector referring to the amount of deposits in some joint stock banks between 1834 and 1857 and to life assurance funds and premiums between 1881 and 1965. Nor have the authors made any important changes in the price series, only adding estimates of the prices of exported cotton piecegoods and of iron and steel. The reader will come upon the greatest surprises in the last chapter where, collected under the heading « miscellaneous statistics » he will find series of data absent from the first Abstract but which, owing to their content, cannot be neglected when studying the development of modern societies. These data, which start roughly from the middle of the last century, refer to the trend followed by criminality, bankruptcies, electoral participation and, most important of all, the development of schooling. These series, as the authors hasten to point out, unquestionably suffer from a number of imperfections, but the fact of having drawn attention to these aspects is definitely one of the most important merits of this Second Abstract.

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G. RUDÉ, *Paris and London in the 18th Century. Studies in Popular Protest*. London, Fontana Library, 1970, pp. 350, £ 0.60.

Professor Rudé's work on popular insurrectionism and radicalism in the XVIIIth century has for some time held an important position in the bibliography of modern Anglo-Saxon social history, and so it is very interesting to have reprinted together a number of articles which provide a useful synthesis of the themes which he has developed over the last twenty years. The present collection contains ten articles published during this period in various journals, some already well known, others less readily accessible, with two new comparative essays and a new introduction.

Professor Rudé's subject is the 'inferior set', the 'sans-culottes', who formed the flesh and bones of the insurrectionary crowds of the Paris 'journées' and of the London Mob. Relegated by both contemporaries and subsequent historians to the anonymity of a criminal sub-culture — L. Chevalier's 'Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses' providing a clear and recent

example — the author's purpose is to restore the historical identity of popular protest and protestors, first by a detailed examination of the social composition of the revolutionary or rioting movements, relying on police and judicial records, and subsequently by studying the degree of autonomy of aim and motivation exhibited in the behaviour of the activist crowd. For Paris his studies — and they are the earliest of those reprinted here — are confined almost exclusively to the disturbances immediately preceding the outbreak of the Revolution and to the principle insurrectionary events that followed, the Reveillon riots, the storming of the Bastille, the Champs de Mars riots, the fall of Robespierre and the massacres of Germinal-Prairial Year 3, which marked the end of popular participation in the Revolution. Analysing the composition of the crowds involved the author establishes clearly its 'respectability', that is to say formed of small master, independent craftsmen, wage-earners rather than an anonymous rabble of unemployed and unemployable, of cut-throats, robbers, smugglers and the like; its relative stability of composition, and the essentially localized nature of its recruitment. He also demonstrates the crowd's selectivity in choosing its targets — the Bastille for example was not a random choice; the objective was not a handful of insignificant prisoners it contained, but its arsenal. These were facets which were reproduced in the behaviour of the London mobs, yet their differences are equally significant. In Paris, unlike London, the price of bread proved fundamental to the course of popular activity; as prices rose so the crowd became more single-minded in its insistence on subsistence matters and less concerned with the political radicalism of the Jacobins. The failure of the *Maximum Général* forfeited Robespierre his popular support, and the continued increase in the cost of living (the effect of which on the budgets of various sections of the 'menu peuple' is examined minutely by the author for the period 1789-95) led to the collapse of that mutuality, or coincidence, of interests between the 'révolte bourgeoise' and the 'sans-culottes' which had formed the Revolution.

It is London and her 'Mobs', her city politics and her social peculiarities, that receive the greatest attention, however. The author explores a series of central and highly original problems. Working from detailed studies of the main disturbances, the rioting of 1736 against Walpole's Excise Act, the disturbances of the Wilkes affair from 1768, and the apparently anti-Catholic orgy of the Gordon Riots in 1780, Professor Rudé shows clearly the comparative maturity of the London 'mob', its greater emancipation from such purely economic stimuli as price fluctuations, the greater exclusion of the *lumpenproletariat*, and its practical awareness of social disaffection demonstrated in the precision of its destructiveness even when cloaked by ostensibly 'sanfedist' motivations as in the Gordon Riots. The central problem examined is that of the degree of parallelism and collusion between the political disaffection of the City of London, expressed through the

Common Council dominated by 'middling tradesmen', and the activities of the mob; a parallelism at its most complex and most intimate during the Wilkes affair. While the practical mechanism of this collusion is far from clear, the coincidence of violence in the streets added a weight to the political protest of the City which contributed largely to its effectiveness. Yet this parallelism broke down as the independent motivation of the 'street' became more explicit, above all in the wholesale destruction of property during the 1780 riots, in the course of which little distinction was made between Catholic and Protestant proprietors or even supporters and opponents of the government; even more significant was the mob's neglect of the Irish navvies' ghettos — the objective was explicitly the rich. After 1780 the City Council did not look to the streets again, but rather lent its support to the government and to the younger Pitt. The tendency had already been personified in the figure of Wilkes, the Radical hero of the Westminster hustings of 1768, firing on the assailants of the Bank of England in 1780. But despite independence of expression, the mob evolved no organization or leadership of its own — deprived of guidance from above at the moment when it appeared that that guidance was to be contested, the mob paradoxically lost its importance in the politics of the capital. The defection of the middle-class radicals then seems to have been as decisive in halting popular political violence in London as the newly expressed political disaffection of the Paris *Tiers-État* in 1788 proved in initiating it. For both capitals Professor Rudé's studies provide a most detailed and important analysis of this dual, social and political, process. The value and originality of the contribution to our knowledge of the social mechanism of political process lies precisely in the author's ability to maintain the duality of focus; his preoccupation with the isolation and relative influence of the various social and economic pressures, his interest in the practical mechanism of both spontaneous and organized protest, is always projected against the wider context of both municipal and urban politics. That these subjects are necessarily treated cumulatively and often repetitively is however an unfortunate consequence of the structure of the book.

It is in the author's attempt to reach a comparative and generalizing synthesis of the factors emerging from the particular studies, however, that the weakness of the collection lies. Professor Rudé's approach is essentially empirical; his 'mobs' are studied through what they did and who they were, and the value of these studies lies in the demonstration of the reactions to changed and changing conditions and pressures. His conclusions seem to be working against him when he attempts to draw the 'universal' aspects from these reactions. In the first place his hypothesis of a certain type of 'pre-industrial' crowd — its behaviour characterized by spontaneity of action, by mixed social participation, lack of internal leadership or political programme — is honoured as much in the breach as in the observance by

the disturbances he examines. The model is too rigid — much more so than E. J. Hobsbaum's contemporary application of the notion of the 'pre-political' urban mass,¹ for example — and implies too simplistic a contrast with both the past and the future. It is a pity that Professor Rudé does not widen his argument to examine in detail these contrasts, to define more closely the nature of 'traditional' protest which is identified with 'taxation populaire' without going much further; the research done by C. S. L. Davis into English popular revolts of an earlier period,² for example, suggests a much more complex traditional picture than the author allows. It might also be argued that the province-capital contrast in the two countries might provide a more rewarding comparison, given the continuity of social and administrative institutions, than that attempted.

While the author does examine carefully the differences between these institutions, and between the reactions they conditioned, he does not make any qualitative distinction between the London riots which took place in a situation of comparative 'normality' (in so far as they were not accompanied by any major political or social upheavals, nor did they explicitly threaten such, but corresponded more closely to a sort of 'trades-unionism by collective riot', to borrow Hobsbaum's description of the later Luddites), and those of the Revolutionary period, in which one feels the administrative upheavals together with some degree of organized incitement must have had particular effect and contributed to the characteristic of repeated, if far from continuous, popular action — and this in itself compares markedly with the proverbial 'fickleness' of the rioting Londoners. Under the Ancien Régime, as under the Revolution, the author argues, price fluctuations had caused popular discontent and disturbance, but of an intrinsically different type because the peculiar conditions of the Revolution — 'not to mention the particular insurrectionary temperament' — were lacking; but this, it might equally be argued, is the crux of the problem. Professor Rudé's concern with the positive aspect of his subject does not lead him to neglect the existence of its corporate phenomena, its 'collective spirit', but the latter does remain outside his grasp. His positivist, empirical methods are not able to take him very far when it comes to tracing the influence of 'La Grande Peur' or the panic element in the Gordon Riots. To reach such explanations the application of wider disciplines to wider fields — traditional protest, crowd psychology, popular beliefs and ideals as expressed in popular literature etc. — are needed. Professor Rudé's methods then can take us only so far along the road to answering the questions to which his subject gives rise. His studies

¹ In « Primitive Rebels », Manchester 1959, pp. 108-125.

² C. S. L. DAVIS, *Révoltes populaires en Angleterre 1500-1700*, in « Annales », an 24, n. 1, jan.-fév. 1969, pp. 24-60.

do more than 'elucidate a number of problems that have beset the political historian' (p. 197), but when he attempts to take us from 'natural' to 'anthropomorphic' causes we are perhaps in less illuminating hands.

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B. SEMMEL, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism*. « Classical Political Economy: the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 1750-1850 », Cambridge University Press, 1970, 250 X pages, £ 3.50.

M. Dobb, stressing in *Political Economy and Capitalism* the « surprising accord » with which the more advanced capitalist countries flung themselves into a policy of colonial expansion between 1870 and 1880, remarks that « ...It seemed to come unprepared by gradual steps in retreat from the previous policy, as represented by Cobdenite ideal of international free trade. For thirty years the tide of British policy had been setting steadily in the direction of loosening the bonds between Britain and her old colonies of the Mercantile period ». But historical changes of such importance cannot be ascribed to an abstract State voluntarism. Any serious attempt to explain the phenomenon must therefore take into account two variables.

The first is the objective element consisting in the structural evolution of the various capitalist countries. In this sense the simultaneousness with which England, France and Germany launched their expansionist policies must be traced to a politico-economic condition determined by the degree of maturity reached by these countries after their industrial take-off.

Controversy exists, as is known, in the economic-historical — no less than in the political — debate concerning the elements constituting this condition of maturity and themselves responsible, at the same time, for the imperialist phenomenon. Is a fundamental insufficiency of real demand necessary to create this condition or are labour market difficulties or a heightening of the organ composition of capital enough? Certainly it is the relations among these elements that provide the explanation and it is to be hoped that in the future less controversial results will be reached thanks also to a more reliable disaggregation of time and statistical series.

The second variable is the continuity-break ratio in the theoretical tradition of economic analysis. What this amounts to is reconsidering, in determinate theoretical positions, the elements which, held by historians and economists to be in contradiction with these positions, have been pushed into the background and finally completely left out of the general considerations made by the various authors.

This is in fact the approach chosen in the book reviewed here, which endeavours indirectly to find an answer to the apparent contradiction pointed out by Dobb's by explaining through his theoretical premises the relationship between two models of political behaviour which are only contradictory in appearance. It must be stressed, however, that the reference frame is not confined solely to economic theory. On the contrary, one of the book's principal merits lies in the concern constantly shown to relate the theoretical frame to the political context of the period considered so as to make even the less important positions clearly intelligible. The pages on Henry Brougham are exemplary in this sense.

Semmel's chief intention in any case is to individuate the specific factors and the relationships making up Free Trade Imperialism. On this problem there already exists considerable historiographic literature which may be summed up in the following terms. In 1945 Schuyler claimed that the fall of the old colonial mercantile system, defined by the abolition of the Corn Laws (1846) and of the Navigation Acts (1849), opened the way to a new trade system which, owing to its pacifist, humanitarian and universalist traits, may in a vaguely ideological sense be termed «anti-imperialist». This thesis, already dear to Schumpeter, still finds supporters today; D. K. Fieldhouse, after stating that it is nonsense to make a distinction between imperialist and anti-imperialist periods, since in each period there were discussions and partisans for and against colonialism, claimed that the classical concept of imperialism only exists at the level of the history of ideas! But Gallagher's and Robinson's later researches altered this picture, showing that the period running from the end of the 18th to the first half of the 19th century already contained imperialist premises, and not at the conceptual level only.

The necessity was therefore felt, with regard to this set of problems, of identifying the contents fundamentally typifying the period in question in order to unravel the continuity-break knot in relation to the following period of 1870-1914 which was imperialist both in form and in substance.

This connection is worked on by Semmel in his research in which he shows how the new science of political economy satisfied the exigency of developing Britain's trade positions, providing the new middle class with the theoretical instruments required for this purpose. Over the whole span of the development of classical political economy the other side of the picture is carefully considered. Such is the case of A. Smith who, though he stands as an utterly trustworthy and reliable watershed between the two theoretical traditions, is nevertheless caught up in the most contradictory aspects of the standard picture passed down to us by the tradition of economic thought (pp. 26-28). It is therefore no easy task to re-define Smith in the light of the evidence provided by Semmel. Together with clear indications of Smith the free-trader, there are others that allow traces of mercantilism to be glimpsed («defence is of much more importance than opulence»).

The solution provided by the author — substantially correct even if restricting Smith's position — consists in distinguishing between mercantilism and promotion of national interests: « ...Smith's dictum in favor of the Navigation Acts; that 'defence is of much more importance than opulence' and his willingness to protect 'particular' manufactures necessary 'for the defence of the society' by tariffs are undeniably mercantilist in tone, though when set in the context of Smith's free-trade system and outlook, it can readily be argued that Smith was primarily a spokesman of the national interest » (p. 29).

Semmel has done well to give ample space in his work to the positions and politics of E. G. Wakefield and to his attempts at « systematic colonization ». The importance of his position did not escape K. Marx since book I of his *Capital* closes with a chapter devoted entirely to Wakefield and the « Modern Theory of Colonization ».

But Semmel, it is hard to understand why, does not even take these pages into consideration, thus missing, among other things, the opportunity of refuting the arguments of those who, starting with H. DENIS (*Histoire de la pensée économique*, vol II), maintain that Marx failed to understand the role played in capitalist economies by outlets abroad and particularly by colonial outlets.

Wakefield's importance lies not so much in the value of the indications he provides as in the fact that he is aware of the instability of social relations in capitalist Britain and supplies one of the first « positive » solutions in the ambit of the middle-class world. Not so much in the sense that this solution is fit to settle the contradictions inherent in capitalist development as because it sets itself up against both the pessimism of Malthus and the inevitableness of the Marxian revolution.

« The whole world is before you », claimed Wakefield, as Semmel quotes, « Open new channels for the most productive employment of English capital. Let the English buy bread from every people that has bread to sell cheap. Make England, for all that is produced by steam, the work-shop of the world. If, after this, there be capital and people to spare, imitate the ancient Greeks; take a lesson from the Americans, who as their capital and population increase, find room for both by means of colonization ». It was only in this way that England could « escape from that corrupting and irritating state of political economy, which seems fit to precede the dissolution of empires! » (p. 91).

Opposite the indication of a target that was common to a social class (England work-shop of the world) there is the awareness of the contradictions this target entails and the positive indication (in the sense described above) of the instruments for their solution (systematic colonization).

The connecting of the several theoretical positions with the political frame

in which they naturally developed is most successful in the description of the dynamics of internal relationships within the warring factions battling over the Corn Laws. As Semmel clearly shows, these factions were not of an exclusively parliamentary nature. In fact the division was not between one party and another but inside the two parties. Whole social forces were involved. Not even the economists, supposing they had wished to, were able to remain neutral. A case in question was Ricardo, whose authority was appealed to more than once although the illustrious economist had been dead for a long time. The triumph of Cobden and Bright was not only a parliamentary victory, but the irreversible affirmation of the industrial middle-class's leadership, world and real and ideological values.

What role is played by the building of the empire in this continuous strengthening of middle-class society in England? Semmel's object is precisely to identify and develop this relationship. The key to the reading of his text is provided by two dominant concepts regarding why and how this empire was built.

The first concept sees England building what the author describes as an *informal* dominion by means of its industrial monopoly and its position as work-shop of the world. « ...Orthodoxy thought of transforming England into a commercial and industrial state, in conformance with the principle of comparative advantage, thus tying England's destiny to manufactures and to foreign trade, of creating an informal empire so that, as Ricardo has proclaimed, a vigorous foreign trade might avert the consequences of the law of diminishing returns in agriculture. To do this, it was necessary, by repealing the corn laws, to create a vast English market for foreign grain; in this way, the agricultural nations of the world might be given a stake in England's Empire of Free Trade. Wakefield, as we know, insisted, even more forcefully upon the necessity of non-industrial areas to the new capitalism, upon the need for virgin land to extend 'the field of employment' for super-abundant capital and labor » (p. 205).

The second concept stresses British activities in the field of colonization and leads to the building of an empire which, in contraposition, the author refers to as *formal*: « ...The Colonial Reformers, far from being ideological opponents of colonialism, were advocates of positive programs of colonization. The Colonial Reformers were convinced that England needed a formal empire for investment and market conditions of special safety. They sought, through their programs of systematic colonization, to construct that empire upon middle-class foundations, and proposed a plan of colonization which would be undertaken by private companies, for profit, and in which free labor would take the place of the slave labor of eighteenth century tropical plantations » (p. 205).

This discussion of positions is sufficiently precise and rigorous. The

conclusions pertain to the course of history which, towards the end of the 19th century, witnessed the affirmation of the second position, in coincidence also with international conditions that were favourable to Great Britain.

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R. G. WILSON, *Gentlemen Merchants. The merchant community in Leeds 1700-1830*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1971, pp. 271, £ 3.60.

Dr. Wilson has provided not only the first extensive study of a merchant group in the eighteenth century outside London, but has chosen a group who dominated the country's single most important trade in the very area in which that trade — in wool and worsteds — made the most spectacular progress in the period discussed. It was also to be subjected, by the turn of the century, to far-reaching structural changes arising from the demands of new markets and the infiltration of industrial, or at least mechanized, manufacturing processes. A study then which beyond its immediate empirical subject relates at every stage and conclusion to the wider issues of the nature and process of English industrialization. It is the strength of Dr. Wilson's study that this relationship is never ignored, is developed with persuasive persistence, and yet never obtrudes.

The author's thesis is that the wealth built up by the eighteenth century merchants — at any rate in the case of Leeds — was not, as has been generally assumed, simply transferred to new industrialised, or industrializing, manufacture, but was in fact withdrawn from trade altogether at the moment when the new techniques of production and the new demands of more distant and less stable markets made themselves felt. To explain the nature of this 'defection' Dr. Wilson analyses the structure and expansion of the West Riding in terms of the national woollen and worsted trade, and in particular the local predominance and subsequent decline of Leeds conjoined to that of its merchants, illustrating especially the mercantile expertise of the latter which contributed importantly to the trade's expansion, but was to prove increasingly inapplicable in the changed conditions after 1783.

The merchants of Leeds revolved around a tight oligarchy of some thirteen dynasties which had dated from the late seventeenth century and were thereafter recruited largely from within the same group or from the local gentry. Only the wealthy might hope for admission as apprenticeship premiums were high. They seem however to have paid good dividends; examining the stages by which the expanding West Riding trade broke successively into markets previously dominated by southern competitors, Dr. Wilson

stresses the contribution made by the merchants' wide knowledge of European commercial practices and their equally wide range of contacts. But in the American boom market which developed after 1783 accompanied by a parallel falling off of the European markets which was to be accentuated after 1815, they were more hesitant. In the more distant markets, those of Central and Southern America, which opened up after the French wars the traditional merchants did not — as a group — seriously compete. The norms and patterns of the traditional European markets, carefully established concepts of trust, highly cautious credit arrangements, no longer obtained; they were suspicious of the new practices and new conditions which went against all their training and experience. Quick profits, Dr. Wilson argues persuasively, were as alien to the eighteenth century Leeds merchant's approach to trade as were risks, by and large, to his enterprises; rather than entrepreneurial ambition his goal was above all a steady and reliable return on his capital which might allow him to participate in that aristocratic society of which his wealth, culture, and tastes made him a member.

At the same time these changed conditions tended to encourage a fusion of the manufacturing and merchanting functions. Those who profited most from the post 1783 American boom were precisely those who attempted such a fusion. This suited the demands of a more speculative trade in which traditional profit margins were being reduced, and was made possible by the mechanization of many of the initial stages of cloth production. While the progress from this initial mechanization to a full factory system was in fact very slow, it at once crystallised a series of interests which threatened the merchants' predominance. The new machines, welcomed and it would appear purchased by the clothiers for whom they provided both quick profits and the means to under-cut the merchants, were opposed, often violently, by the cloth workers, and received a very mixed greeting from the merchants themselves. Some it is true adapted to the new movement, but the older and more powerful families showed little inclination to extend their activities to manufacturing. 'The result was that the lead in the woollen industry and the changes which took place were centred on the manufacturers of Halifax, Huddersfield and Bradford rather than those of Leeds and Wakefield who possessed the larger capitals'.

The motivation for this 'defection', Dr. Wilson argues, lay not only in the particular social status of the traditional merchants, but was equally in conformity with the interests that they had always practised. Eighteenth century society had a unity which was not carried over into the post-napoleonic age; the wealthy merchant suffered none of the social stigma borne by his manufacturer successor, not least perhaps because he had never involved himself in the productive aspects of his own trade. The 'bother' of running a factory was not only degrading to him, but also would have infringed intolerably on what he considered to be his true function. It is not surprising then that when unable to escape totally, the wool merchant

looked for employment rather in those commercial services such as banking or insurance of which he had much closer experience. But even merchant families engaged in trade for many generations had their most immediate roots and social contacts among the country gentry. From the gentry came their trading recruits, their wives and husbands, and with the gentry they shared local administration and political influence. They had always invested in land, either through economic expediency in momentary preference to government consols or private lending, or for dynastic ends. In commercial services such as transport, merchant investment had initially been very high. Yet in their management of the Aire and Calder Navigation or the Turnpikes, as in their management of the municipal corporation, they displayed no particular awareness of commercial interests as a whole. Security of income was the priority, and often in the industrializing process they represented a reactionary force. But although their institutional power persisted long after their economic monopoly had been undermined, they were unable to obstruct this process due to the manufacturing diversity of the West Riding.

Dr. Wilson's analysis is by no means confined exclusively to charting this central process. He explores the minutiae of the merchants' operations, the origins of their capital, their profit margins, their credit organization; he examines their influence in national politics, in particular the formation of a mercant-landowner alliance in nascent Tory radicalism opposed to the manufacturing interest, and the influence of their religion — itself of strong political importance as Anglicanism was the prerequisite of participation in the municipal oligarchy.

That the merchants of Leeds evolved a homogeneity which had little to do with their trading interests, that even in these they emerge as commercial rentiers rather than operators is significant. It suggests that their contribution to the expansion of the woollen trade may not have been as positive as Dr. Wilson suggests, that they were riding the wave, and, in its European phase, it was not a very difficult wave to ride; not so difficult perhaps as gaining access to the oligarchy. It also means that it is necessary to look much more closely at the way in which the clothier-merchant broke through in the late eighteenth century, and the means which allowed him to do so. But in concentrating not so much on the decline of the merchants, who had after all the means and the opportunity to control the new developments, but on their 'defection', on their decision not to participate, Dr. Wilson has made a very original and widely documented contribution to our knowledge of the relationship between trade and industrialization. Their previous neglect and their 'dull press' has most certainly been righted in his hands. At the same time in combining the technical precision of the economic historian with the attentiveness to environmental pressures and responses of the social historian he provides a very fresh and valuable approach.

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