
REVIEWS OF BOOKS

A. ATTMAN: *The Bullion Flow Between Europe and the East 1000 - 1750*, Göteborg, Kunigl. Vetenskaps — och Vitterhets-Samhället, 1981 (Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum et Litterarum Gothoborgensis, Humaniora 20), 149 pp.

The purpose of this monograph is to show that through the Middle Ages and down to the period of the French revolution, the European countries acquired great quantities of spices, drugs, silk, cotton and manufactured goods on the Middle and Far Eastern markets, so that there was almost without exception a negative balance of trade. The trade routes by which the Oriental commodities reached Europe changed in the course of the centuries, but the pattern of trade was the same as it had been in the time of the Roman emperors as it was described by Pliny the Elder. The thesis is substantiated by very rich documentation and appears convincing: the general line of the argument is followed consistently and at the same time all the factors that had an impact on the East-West trade are brought into consideration.

On the other hand, the author also deals extensively with the trade and the commercial balances between the countries of Eastern Europe and those of Central and Western Europe. Reading these chapters one cannot help asking whether the sketch of the commercial exchanges between Russia, on the one hand, and Western Europe, Poland and Germany, on the other, or of the trade between Poland and Hungary etc. is really relevant to the subject of the book, but in the chapters dealing with the history of the trade between the various regions around the Baltic, the author relies on his own research and presents his own findings.

The chapters surveying East-West trade in the Middle Ages follow the view

of the Swedish historian Sture Bolin. Some of the statements the author makes in this part of his book will arouse objections. He believes that the flourishing trade between the Eastern provinces of the Caliphate and the Russo-Baltic countries came to an end in the late tenth century, because the Moslem world suffered from a shortage of silver *dirhams* and could no longer pay for the European commodities (p. 60). The fact that Russian trade with Byzantium went on might support such a conclusion, but what one can learn from the chronology of the coin hoards found in Eastern and Northern Europe is only that there was a break in the flow of Moslem specie to these regions, an effect of the silver famine which began in the Moslem empire about the year 1000. This does not necessarily prove the end of the Moslem trade with Eastern Europe. However, there must have been a great decline in these exchanges in that period. The downfall of the Khazar kingdom, which fulfilled the role of intermediary in the trade between the Moslem countries and the Baltic regions, was probably a much weightier factor in the decline of these great interregional commercial exchanges. In the chapters on medieval Levant trade the author makes other statements that are not warranted or else mistaken: How does he know that the Armenians played a great role in the purchases of European commodities for the Caliphate (p. 11), and, again, the role of the Genoese in medieval Levant trade is utterly underestimated (p. 18).

European trade with the Ottoman empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is described following the lines laid down in the works of P. Masson on French trade in the Levant in that period and that of A. C. Wood on the English Levant Company. In the outline of the vicissitudes of Portuguese trade with India and the other countries around the Indian Ocean, the author sums up the findings of Magalhaes Godinho, whereas the survey of Dutch and English trade with India is based on the research of Glamann, Gaastra, Boxer, Meilink Roelofs, and Chaudhuri. The characteristic pattern of the East-West trade that emerges from the research of all these historians was a heavy deficit balance for the Europeans, who had to cover two thirds of their purchases by payment in cash or by the delivery of precious metals, mainly Spanish silver coins (that is American silver).

The author shows that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the export of various commodities, such as flax, hemp, skins (leather) and others, from Russia to the West had a much greater value than that of the goods imported from the West, probably twice as much (p. 73). The same was true for Poland's trade with the West until the middle of the seventeenth century (p. 85), whereas the trade between Russia and the West had a positive balance in the subsequent period too (p. 92). Hungary's trade with Central and Western Europe developed along the same line: it had a positive balance until the middle of the seventeenth century (p. 97 f.). The surplus that accrued from the exchanges with the West European countries enabled Poland and Hungary to cover the deficit in their trade with the Ottoman empire. Both countries purchased

considerable quantities of spices and other commodities from Turkey. The last chapters of the book deal with the trade of Russia with Turkey, Persia, Central Asia and China. Although the documentation for the history of these exchanges is rather sporadic, the author feels able to conclude that once more a similar pattern emerges: namely a negative balance for the Westerners, in this case the Russians, who could cover the deficit by the surplus from their exchanges with Western Europe, to a great extent paying with transit goods coming from there.

The knowledge the author has of the literature dealing with the history of world trade is truly impressive. He quotes a very great number of scholarly articles published in Russian and Polish reviews that are not easily accessible in the West, but we should also be grateful to the author for quoting the most recent publications on the subject which renders his study a uniquely useful and valuable book.

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P. CASPARD, *La Fabrique-Neuve de Cortailod: Entreprise et profit pendant la révolution industrielle, 1752-1854*. Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1979.

The "Fabrique-Neuve de Cortailod" was a calico printing manufacture, or "proto-factory" as it would now, probably, be termed, founded in 1752 in the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel. The extent, and the significance, of the growth in Europe's calico printing industry before and during industrialization are only beginning to be properly appreciated by economic historians. There are four principal reasons for this long neglect. Firstly, Britain and France, Europe's economic leaders in the eighteenth century, were relatively excluded from the early development of the industry because of governmental attempts to protect their traditional woollen industries. Secondly, the impressive growth in the branch, though it led to some technological progress, particularly in the dyeing and finishing process, and certainly stimulated fashion and design, did not give rise to any of those technological changes which have generally been regarded as fundamental to the industrialization process. Thirdly, the adoption of the large-scale, factory-type, production system by a large number of the firms in the industry for the purpose, largely, of achieving quality control and division of labour has not been judged of the same significance as the later adoption of this organizational form for the purpose of utilizing mechanical power. Finally, the current tendency to play down the previously highly-rated roles of commerce and overseas trade in early European industrialization has not encouraged emphasis on the growth of an industry so directly linked to the trading sector — directly linked firstly insofar as its growth was a deliberate case of import-substitution for Indian wares, secondly in that its development was financed to a great extent by that internationally mobile merchant and financial

capital whose growing prominence was so marked a feature of European experience between approximately 1650 and 1850 and thirdly in that both the skill-intensive nature of the calico printing processes, and the various, national attempts to restrict the industry, contributed to a considerable geographical concentration of production and thus to exceptional trading opportunities. But now, at last, the industry's importance is being recognized. Caspard's book since publication has been joined by two others, S. Chassagne's *Oberkampf: Un entrepreneur capitaliste au Siècle des Lumières* (Paris, 1980) and S.D. Chapman and S. Chassagne's *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century: A Study of Peel and Oberkampf* (London, 1981), and between them these studies will contribute to a revalidating of the importance of this industry. The last, a more general work, will contribute to this in particular for in its introduction large claims are made for the industry's role in the growth of European commerce and in the evolution of the factory system.

A variety of factors contributed to the prominence of the Swiss role in the early growth of the calico printing industry — geographical situation (closeness to principal European markets), the existence of an abundant supply of skilled labour and capital (Swiss cities were heavily involved in the growth of those financial and commercial circuits just mentioned and provided a refuge for Huguenot finance) and the fact that the new industry was actively encouraged (in contrast to its reception in England and France) by local administrations. The "Fabrique-Neuve de Cortailod" was founded in 1752 by the son of a notary and landowner who had gained his expertise in the trade by working first in Germany and then as a "chef de fabrication" in another Neuchâtel concern. It is a matter of note that the large scale production units which existed in the industry provided managerial employment opportunities for people of high status and the possibility of social mobility. Though far from the first of the canton's manufactures, it became the largest, with a production of 45,000 pieces and labour force of 700 by the end of the century. Caspard, after providing a background chapter on the Neuchâtel region and the early growth of the industry there, provides a precise and detailed account of, largely, the economic functioning of the manufacture — the relationship with Neuchâtel merchants is described, buyers and suppliers are listed, capital requirements calculated, the evolution of production followed and production costs, selling prices and profits estimated. Another peculiarity (for the period) of this (and other) proto-factories is, it is clear, the quality of their records. The "Fabrique-Neuve" worked on commission for Neuchâtel merchants for most of its existence (until 1818). This limited considerably the investment necessary and likewise simplified the entrepreneurial role of the concern's directors. It differentiates the concern, too, from those of Oberkampf and Peel described by Chassagne and Chapman in the books mentioned above. The main investment required of the entrepreneur consisted in buildings, tools and wages. Photographs and drawings included in the book show that industrial and residential buildings

adjoined each other to form a manufacturing village of a type frequently to be found in early industrial zones of continental Europe but more rarely in Britain. The most prosperous period for the manufacture was its first fifty years. Profits were large and regular and in some years exceptionally large. The explanation for this happy circumstance was that demand for the new product was growing rapidly throughout Europe whilst supply was effectively limited because of national restrictions and a shortage of skilled workers. The end to prohibitions on production in England and France, and a gradual mechanization of production, transformed the supply situation from about 1800 onwards and neither the "Fabrique Neuve", nor the Neufchâtel industry as a whole, fared so well in these new circumstances. Caspard provides less information about the manufacture after the turn of the century and with some justification — its importance within the local and European economy was declining, and likewise was its status within the portfolios of that mobile, financial world of Swiss and Protestant finance — from 1780 onwards investment in new industries and in cotton printing *outside* Switzerland was taking place.

Caspard accounts for the nineteenth century failure of the manufacture in terms of high labour costs, the lack of a large domestic market, the Swiss exclusion by tariffs from a growing number of foreign markets and a slowness to mechanize. Its Swiss situation, from being an advantage, did, indeed, apparently, become a penalty and the manufacture, rather like the British economy after 1870, was forced to produce for more and more remote markets. And not only was mechanization of the printing processes slow, the industry as a whole in the Neufchâtel region failed to make backward (into textile manufactures) and forward (into the chemical industry) linkages in contrast to its competitors in England and France. The completeness of Caspard's explanation of failure, however, is belied somewhat by another piece of information which he provides. The calico printing industry of another Swiss canton, Glaris, facing this same factor and market situation, performed very favourably during the first half of the nineteenth century, expanding whilst the Neufchâtel industry declined. In explaining this inconsistency Caspard argues that the circumstances in the two industries were distinct insofar that the Glaris industry, which was new and growing, and operating with small production units, was able to concentrate on the high quality sections of the market and thus profited from the local existence of relatively cheap, yet skilled, labour whilst the extent of capital accumulation in the Neufchâtel industry prevented such a unique specialization, enforcing the additional production of a large quantity of lower quality printed calicoes in the manufacture of which the Swiss enjoyed less comparative advantage. But the argument that the possession of a large accumulated capital was a handicap is a slightly curious one and, besides, Glaris's industry became itself quite rapidly a large and rich one (in 1868 22 manufacturers employed 5,516 workers between them), without, apparently, thereby losing its competitiveness. No, it seems necessary to consider the entrepreneurial con-

tribution rather more critically than Caspard does. The "Fabrique Neuve", as a concern which worked on a commission basis until 1818, was for much of its existence, Caspard points out, effectively no more than a "demi-entreprise". It was besides, as he also notes, favoured by the exceptionally buoyant demand and restricted supply situation which characterized the trade until the turn of the century. The circumstances cannot have been too dissimilar from those under which many subsidized and monopolistic royal and privileged manufactures operated. Such favourable conditions were not, perhaps, ideal for the generating of entrepreneurial qualities and it does indeed seem that the concern at no stage responded sufficiently positively to the more competitive environment which evolved after 1800 and to the extra obligations imposed on it by the need to assume full responsibility for its sales after 1818. Some of Caspard's documentation suggests, indeed, that the owner of the "Fabrique Neuve" continued manufacturing as much for reasons of family pride and tradition as for profit, and the retreat to more and more remote markets, the slowness to innovate and unsuccessful switch to watch-making, all suggest a lack of entrepreneurial dynamism and foresight. The Industrial Revolution extended the duties of the entrepreneur and the "pre-industrial" industrial environment, particularly if it was in any way a privileged one, was not invariably a good preparation for success in the new circumstances.

This is a most thorough and well written monograph which will be of great utility to economic historians in view of the still widespread ignorance about this trade and also about large scale manufacturing concerns before the Industrial Revolution. In particular it provides important insights into the contribution of "proto-factories" to the development of the factory system (though more information might have been provided, and is surely available in the records, on social and organizational aspects of the manufacture's history), and it illustrates, too, indirect consequences of the growth in European commerce. The existence of Cortaillod, and of many other such manufactures, was partly a reflection of the growing prosperity of eighteenth century Europe, but also an indirect consequence of the "commercial revolution". As J. de Vries has recently argued, exotic imports to Europe from extra-European areas were probably as important as exports in stimulating the demand for manufactured goods for they contributed to giving Europeans new tastes and stimulated the desire to consume. Something of a social revolution was involved in social groups of all statuses growing accustomed to clothing themselves and furnishing their houses with printed calicoes and the hundred years' existence of this large manufacture was a consequence of this revolution.

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S. CHASSAGNE *Une femme d'affaires au XVIII^e siècle: la correspondance de Madame de Maraise, collaboratrice d'Oberkampf*, Toulouse, Privat, 1981 160p.

These hundred or so signed letters which form part of the Oberkampf archive did not escape the attention of the biographer of the great French entrepreneur (Cf. S. Chassagne *Oberkampf un entrepreneur capitaliste au Siècle des Lumières* Paris 1980). S. Chassagne now introduces us to Oberkampf's partner and rescues Madame de Maraise (1737-1822) from oblivion, devoting his introduction to the career of this business woman who controlled half the company for the twenty-two years between her marriage in 1767 to Oberkampf's partner through to his resignation in 1789. A quite exceptional personality, she completely dominated her husband and acted as financial and commercial manager of the company, while her managerial skill was amply demonstrated by the steady accumulation of the company's capital (rising from an index of 100 in 1768 to 1547 in 1789). Under her management the Jony factory became the second largest enterprise in terms of capital resources in France at the close of the Ancien Regime, outstripped only by the royal lace factory at Saint-Gabain.

How did someone become a business woman in this period? S. Chassagne gives a very original answer to this question by drawing a vivid and fascinating portrait of this woman who was an expert both in commercial drafting and in double-entry book-keeping, could read English with ease, was well versed in the classics, and watched any change in the exchange rates of the pound sterling as attentively as shifts in the political situation; a woman who was cultured and humorous, who enjoyed playing musical instruments when she was not out riding, who worked like a man and despite her frequent pregnancies was never absent from her office for more than two weeks at a stretch. Chassagne also fills an important gap by providing a detailed description of her office work, showing that she was not only engaged in managing the day to day business of the factory but also organised the company's representatives with its clients in Paris as well as the company's other commercial contacts.

This carefully annotated correspondence serves to illustrate in a most original and vivid way the day-to-day routines of business in a major textile company of the last third of the XVIIIth century, and the letters provide a wealth of information on commercial uses, customs and practices of the period. The biography of this 'totally committed woman', who found time to enjoy life, was a friend of the *philosophes* yet at the same time serious, a Jansenist and an admirer of the golden age of Louis XIV, provides the first step towards the discovery of a new socio-economic group — the business woman.

The collection 'Resurgences' published by Privat in Toulouse deserves to be drawn to the attention of historians, since it is planned to produce a series of original and vivid documents which will enable us to communicate directly with the human realities of the past. Each volume will be based around a document that throws light on different aspects of the human experience in history,

with a presentation by a specialist historian. Drawing on correspondence, speeches, sermons, and newspapers, each volume will seek to bring to life the living sources of the past. One can only hope that the forthcoming volumes in the series will live up to the exceptional quality of Serge Chassagne's volume, and there can be no doubt that his wide experience of textile history in the XVIIIth century has for many years made him an unrivalled expert in this field.

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D. C. COLEMAN, *Courtaulds: An Economic and Social History*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, Vol. III, Pp. xiv, 345.

In January 1962, D.C. Coleman agreed to write a history of Courtaulds, Ltd., and two excellent volumes appeared in 1969, the first on Courtaulds in silk and crepe, the second on the firm's innovative role in rayon. The third book, under review here, covers 1940-1965. For his research, Coleman has had unrestricted access to the company's records during the period of the history. He gives us no bland statistical presentation (although the figures are all there), but rather a dramatic story of managers with foibles.

World War II saw Courtaulds lose its U.S. subsidiary ("the price" of U.S. lend-lease). Business was disrupted. Corporate plants in Germany and Italy produced, but an air raid in May 1942 disabled the facility of the company's French subsidiary, then under Vichy control. In Britain, Courtaulds' plants were used for war purposes. In 1940, Courtaulds and Imperial Chemical Industries established British Nylon Spinners, which in the war years made nylon yarn, used mainly for parachutes.

After the war, Courtaulds hired a distinguished scientist (Alan Wilson). His employment signaled the triumph of the London office over the "mill" men at Coventry, who were intent on the status quo. In 1946, Courtaulds also had a new board chairman, John Colbrook Hanbury-Williams who held that position until 1962. The chairman knew, in Coleman's words, "little or nothing about production technology, despised technical men, remained ignorant of science, and [was] wholly indifferent to industrial relations". He saw the company as a "Gentleman's Club", and he "was a snob". He was "devious". Hanbury-Williams' descendants will not like this history.

Courtaulds' internal debates on appropriate management structures (centralization versus divisions, committees, and delegation of responsibility) are splendidly documented, as are the clashes of personalities. Financial results and output data are properly assembled by product line; expansion, acquisition and diversification decisions, technological change, productivity information, sales performance, costs and prices, and exports are given careful attention.

Coleman considers the re-entry of Courtaulds into business in the United

States, as well as its Canadian, European, African, and Australian activities. Domestic expansion included acquisition of British Celanese (1957), diversification into paints and packaging, and the acquisition of a number of British firms, including most of its remaining competitors in rayon.

Coleman handles with good judgment the complexities, contradictions, and complications of Courtaulds' relations with its competitors in Britain, Germany, Holland, and America. Courtaulds sometimes had a minority interest in its rivals and sometimes had them as joint-venture partners and/or associates in technical agreements. Of the many difficult interactions, none was more stormy than that with Courtaulds' 50-50 partner in the nylon spinning company, Imperial Chemical Industries, Britain's largest chemical company.

Then on December 18, 1961, headlines announced I.C.I.'s bid to take over Courtaulds. The bid was part of a general merger movement that saw the disappearance of many British firms. But Courtaulds' Board, on January 5, 1962, unanimously recommended its rejection. I.C.I. gave up in March, after having obtained only 38 per cent of Courtaulds' equity.

In rejecting I.C.I., Courtaulds assumed a "new image". Sir Alan Wilson, the Chairman-designate, resigned. Hanbury-Williams' anticipated retirement occurred. Finally, in October 1964, C.F. Kearton — described as an entrepreneur, a "creative innovator" — became board chairman. That year, an I.C.I. — Courtaulds "disengagement" took place that included both the nylon spinning company and I.C.I.'s equity in Courtaulds. Coleman's writing of these events becomes spell-binding.

During 1962-1964, Courtaulds acquired various textile firms. By 1965, the company had secured 30-35 per cent of the Lancashire spinning industry, 27 per cent of the U.K. warp knitting capacity, 6 per cent of the circular knitting, and, by 1968, 4 per cent of the U.K. weaving capacity. In 1965, 80 per cent of Courtaulds' profits came from the manufacturing, processing, and converting of man-made fibres. Its acquisition efforts were toward vertical integration, geographical spread, and some diversification.

I missed a discussion of why after the early 1950s substitutes replaced rayon? What were the advantages of the other man-made fabrics? When Courtaulds took over the "old" established companies in textiles, was it able to bring them into the modern times? I would have liked a few paragraphs that evaluated the acquisitions of the early 1960s in the context of 1980. I was surprised how dependent the Company was on rayon even as late as the mid-1960s. (Some 36 percent of its profits still came from what had become — at least in the United States — an obsolete product. This was down from 69 percent in the mid-1950s). This is a readable, thoughtful, first-rate business history. I recommend it most highly.

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B. DINI, *Una pratica di mercatura in formazione 1394-1395*. Prato, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica 'F. Datini', ser. 1, documenti n. 2 (Florence 1980, pp. 293 + 8 tables).

It is often forgotten that there was a time when the Mediterranean archipelagoes and lesser islands played a vital role in the region, and this was particularly true of the Balearic islands. The chance discovery of a couple of coins unearched by some clandestine excavators (which makes one wonder how many similar discoveries have gone unheeded) prove that in the period of Phoenician-Carthaginian expansion Ibiza had close contacts with both the southern and northern coasts of Sicily. During the demolition of the San Berillo district of the old city of Catania in 1971, two workmen also came across a cache of coins, half of which came into my possession and included not only a number of Sicilian coins but also a silver coin from Ancona bearing the imprint of S. Ciriaco and three other coins with the image of Sanco 'Dei Gratia Maioricarum Rex', two of which were of silver. A handful of coins thereby enable us to reconstruct with considerable chronological accuracy flows of trade which would otherwise remain undocumented. And if nowadays we think of the Balearics mainly in terms of the publicity in the windows of travel agents, a rather different set of criteria are needed when it comes to explaining the significance of the Majorcan 'talayots' which in many ways resemble the Sardinian *nuraghi* and other similar constructions in Malta, or the fact that it was the Carthaginians that brought the manufacture of purple dyes to Majorca, while the Romans were responsible for introducing olive cultivation. And following the same train of thought, we should also remember that Majorca was at that period dominated by Arab culture and that it only returned to Christianity during the reign of James the Conquistador, and that it remained a semi-autonomous kingdom down to 1349; that in the later middle ages it was a centre of woollen textile manufactures, which were exported in large quantities; that in 1521 the island rebelled against Charles V. We should remember too that the name Majorca is also connected with the role of the *liber maiolichinus* in Italian history and also with the history of civilization through the production of pottery and ceramics. Majorca lay at the apex of a triangle composed of three points — Barcelona, Valencia, Majorca — forming a sort of closed Spanish sea.

All of these things come back to mind when reading Bruno Dini's book, the rather narrow chronological confines of which cover the close of the reign of John 1 and the beginning of that of Martin 1 — precisely the years (1394-5) which witnessed the consolidation of Martin's domination in Sicily and the revival of Catalan expansionism.

Dini has published (in so far as the state of the manuscript permits) the account books and memoranda kept between August 1394 and January 1395 in Majorca and between January and April 1395 in Valencia by Ambrogio di Lorenzo de'Rocchi, the agent of Francesco di Marco Datini. The mere fact that Datini had decided that it was worth replacing his correspondent Nofri

di Bonaccorso with a direct representative in Majorca indicates the commercial importance of the island which acted as a market for African, Spanish, French, Italian and northern European goods. No sooner had Ambrogio arrived than he set about describing his surroundings and his letters contain information on local customs and on the potential of local markets, providing a form of market analysis — or a '*practica di mercatura*' as it was then called, so explaining Dini's title. To give a fuller understanding of these issues, the author's introduction provides a general description of the types of commercial organization and practice then in use.

On one hand Dini's book provides a detailed technical study of commercial techniques, and painstakingly reconstructs the career and activities of Ambrogio from the information provided in the sources. But these same sources also provide us with a picture of Majorca and Valencia in an important moment of transformation: we find references to such typically medieval products as the so-called 'Hispano-Moorish ceramics' which were still being exported (p. 121), while in the first decades of the coming century Majorcan woollen cloths were about to invade the Mediterranean: in 1394 Martin 1 came to the throne and was soon to set up the *Taula de Canvi* in Barcelona (1401), to adopt a protectionist economic policy and to relaunch Catalan expansionism with the reconquest of Sicily and the installation of his son, also called Martin, as king of Sicily. By the beginning of the new century Valencia had already become a financial market capable of making conspicuous loans to Alfonso the Magnanimous. The years that Ambrogio de' Rocchi spent in the region cover an important period of preparation, and attention should certainly be drawn to the fact that Datini was eager to take part in that expanding market and to that end sought to establish direct representation in one of its key points. For that reason Dini's book has a wider significance than its self-consciously modest title might lead one to think, and it makes a worthy contribution to the tradition of research inspired by the late Federigo Melis.

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C.-L. HOLTFRERICH, *Die deutsche Inflation, 1914-1923: Ursachen und Folgen in internationale Perspektive*. (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980). pp. x, 360.

German inflation after the first World War attracted an impressive literature during the 1920s, and then lost interest for economic analysis when the major problem shifted to deflation. After World War II the subject has made a comeback, partly because of wartime inflation and effective avoidance of hyperinflation in the immediate postwar period, with fears of renewal after 1973, and partly because of the rise of monetarism. A number of economists

who fall into that class — Philip Cagan, J.A. Frenkel, T.J. Sargent and N. Wallace — have used the German case of 1921-23 as a test of their theories — generally finding them confirmed. It is of some intellectual interest that the bulk of the literature — outside of that produced in Germany which has not travelled well — has been produced by foreigners and economists, not by German economic historians.

This position has been altered — one might even say remedied — by Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich with a dissertation written at the Free University of Berlin now made into a magisterial book. While it does not use regression analysis — the tool of most recent monetarist scholars — it is the work of a well-trained economist as well as historian, who knows how to use both statistics and archival materials. He covers the subject with great thoroughness, with an exhaustive search and summary of both the numbers and the literature, the latter producing a bibliography of 21 pages and perhaps 500 items. The starting date, 1914, is significant as Holtfrerich covers German wartime finance from the beginning, as well as that of the Weimar republic.

Economists and economic historians without access to German will want the book in their university and college libraries — despite its sizeable cost — because of the statistical material. There are 62 tables, many with great detail, and nine diagrams, with definitive series on money supply, rates of exchange, governmental budgets, prices of all kinds, income, wealth, their distribution, consumption, health, foreign trade, the balance of payments, reparation payments achieved, and the like.

Die deutsche Inflation is not merely a review of the vast literature, as the foregoing may lead one to suppose. Holtfrerich assesses the two broad theories about the German inflation — the balance-of-payments theory held by Frank D. Graham and by most German writers, but especially the Reichsbank, Moritz Bonn and Karl Helfferich. This is the equivalent of the Banking School in the early nineteenth-century British dispute over the Bullion Report, and it is significant that both central banks, the Bank of England in 1810 and the Reichsbank in 1921-23, felt they were obliged to serve industry by discounting its paper (or in the case of Germany, the treasury bills issued to industry by government). Reparations, and to a lesser extent restocking the economy with imported raw materials, led to exchange-rate depreciation which raised foreign-trade prices, leading businessmen to demand more credit and the government deficit to rise, as subsidies, bad harvests and the Continental blockade provided the Banking School's explanation for the agio on gold in 1808-1819. In this theory the exchange rate was undervalued and led internal inflation; the money supply was endogenous and followed.

The Currency school, which flourishes today as monetarism, rested its case on the quantity theory of money, with causation running from the government deficit, its monetization by the central bank, price increases, and only at the end the worsening of the balance of payments as money spills over into

imports. Bresciani-Turroni was its original distinguished exponent, and of course the Chicago school today.

Holtfrerich, however, rejects the mono-causality and simple theorizing of both explanations, tending to follow the lead of Ragnar Nurkse who, in *The Course and Control of Inflation after World War I* written for the League of Nations (Princeton, N.J., 1945) maintained that both schools were right, but *seriatim*. In early stages, internal inflation led external, as the exchange rate was sustained, at least relatively to the rise of internal prices, by bull speculation in marks, largely by foreigners, based on the expectation that the currency would ultimately be restored to par. When these expectations were deceived — and Holtfrerich makes a strong case that this occurred principally in June 1922 when the French refused to reconsider the 132 billion mark bill for reparations, an international bankers' committee said that Germany was not worthy of an international loan unless reparations were scaled down, and Walther Rathenau, the then German foreign minister, was assassinated — foreigners precipitously changed their view, sold marks, and the exchange rate plunged, with external inflation leading internal. The dating of the reversal is strikingly demonstrated by a diagram on p. 290 showing the plunge of the forward rate from a premium to a sharp discount. Until the change in view, Holtfrerich notes, Germany had received as much help from abroad — largely from private United States citizens buying marks or mark securities as a quasi-charitable speculative investment — as it did after World War II under the Marshall plan, viz. \$ 1.7 to 1.0 billion.

The Chicago school is unhappy with the distinction between foreign and domestic holdings of marks. On *a priori* grounds they assert that foreigners and German asset-holders are privy to the same information and produce the same responses, presumably guided by rational expectations. They admit that expectations can change — calling for breaks in regression analysis, but see no reason for them to do so for one group differently from any other.

It is here that Holtfrerich has dug deeply into the records of the McKenna committee, appointed in 1924 to discuss German capital movements in connection with the Dawes committee, including the papers of Colonel Leonard P. Ayres, later economist of the Cleveland Trust Company, who served on the McKenna committee staff. These show that foreign deposits as a percentage of total bank deposits declined from 36 percent at the end of both 1920 and 1921 to 11 percent in 1922 and 2 percent in 1923.

Other revisions in the conventional wisdom concern its impact on income distribution: it narrowed the spread between income groups rather than widened it, and while real wages of all groups declined, those of skilled workers and higher-level officials declined more than those of unskilled and low-level.

If anything is missing, it is discussion of the extent to which German inflation was a political outcome from the impossibility of reconciling the interests of conflicting groups, as asserted by Knut Borchardt (noted by Holtfrerich, p.

194), and lately in the general case by Fred Hirsch and John Goldthorpe (*The Political Economy of Inflation*, London: 1978).

Die deutsche Inflation comes close to being definitive on its subject, except for those who insist on regression analysis. It would be a valuable service for a university press to have it translated into the more generally accessible language of English, for general edification and to force the monetarists to take account of more complex models and sets of facts than those they espouse.

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R. MANTELLI *Burocrazia e finanze pubbliche nel Regno di Napoli a metà del Cinquecento*, Napoli, Pironti ed., 1981, pp. 445

This study is based almost entirely on the papers in the Simancas Archive relating to the visitation made by Gaspar de Quiroga between 1559 and 1564. Such visitations amounted to a general inquiry into the whole administrative organization, seven being conducted in the Kingdom of Naples in the period 1536 to 1679, and they constituted one of the most important means of imposing control over the Empire. Their object was not simply to 'establish the precise responsibilities of individual functionaries, but also to regulate the functioning of the institutions themselves, as well as the collective behaviour of different groups of functionaries'. Although the visitations provide us with snapshots that are partial and incomplete, they throw considerable light on the objects of Spanish government and also on life in the Kingdom of Naples, especially on the complex relationship between the institutions and the men who gave them life.

The visitations have attracted considerable interest from historians of the Spanish administration, yet only Gentile and Coniglio have used them as the basis for a major study — although even they only touched on the Quiroga visitation in passing.

What were the reasons for the visitation of 1559? According to Mantelli, the Spanish Crown was using the period of relative tranquillity between the peace of Cateau Cambresis and Gerba to reorganize the Empire and especially, in the Neapolitan case, its financial administration. And the means? Gaspar de Quiroga was an intelligent interpreter of his sovereign's wishes. He was sent with precise instructions giving him authority to scrutinize the entire field of economic, administrative and juridical organization in the Kingdom, and he began taking evidence without delay. One of the most important and most difficult tasks for the Spanish monarchy was to assess the behaviour and loyalty of their functionaries so that they should not, either *de facto* or *de iure*, obtain any real degree of independence — a process made all the more difficult by the widespread diffusion of false evidence. The author claims that these defamatory

witnesses reflected the general hatred directed against office-holders which "in that period must have been very general and widespread since society was poorer, the State more repressive, and the revenues of civil servants came in large part from the fines, sanctions, commissions and rights which they imposed or exacted, while in most cases the administrative duties of an officeholder were often combined with even more detested judicial functions". But if, on one hand, false accusations were inspired by a spirit of rancour and vendetta, they were also restrained by fear of reprisals and by the 'omertà' generated within kin and clientage structures.

The results of the visitation were: relatively few sanctions against growing corruption, perhaps in an effort "not to make the political élite of the Kingdom too discontented, since they had contributed both money and men generously to support the grandiose imperial policies of the Hapsburgs"; on the other hand, a series of 'instructions particular and general' designed to regulate the kingdom's administration; a careful scrutiny of public expenditure; and 500,000 ducats in revenue, part of which was collected during the visitation and the remainder to follow after.

Mantelli argues, however, that Quiroga's visitation was essentially a means — "probably the most effective one" — to make the Neapolitan Parliament, which was closely linked with the officeholders under scrutiny, more malleable, and thereby to obtain not only the increase in the value of the *donativo* (1,200,000 ducats) but also transform occasional feudal levy into an ordinary tax (payable every other year). This makes better sense of the relationship between the visitation and the granting of the *donativo* of 1566 which, the author suggests, Gentile chose to interpret probably 'ironically' as an indication of the gratitude of the people for their sovereign's interest in their welfare.

But if the visitation enabled the Spanish Crown to achieve this essential objective, the records of Quiroga's visitation enable us to embark on a much wider analysis of the conditions of the Neapolitan state at this time. The first group to pass before our eyes are the indicted officials of the Spanish monarchy in Naples. The visitation revealed the widest conceivable range of abuses: bribery, favouritism, double office-holding, mistreatment, fraud in the Apulian Customs administration, and so forth. As the author points out, these were all abuses that the society of the period tended to accept since offices were bought, were poorly paid and a sense of personal duty to the sovereign played little part in the mentality of the state office-holder. Abuse was customary. But this was not all since "at least in financial terms a lower level of corruption would have meant a significant increase in state revenues and as a result a greater exodus of capital from the Kingdom, on the instructions of the ruler, in order to finance foreign policy; hence a greater impoverishment of the Kingdom". But that is to assume of course that the Spanish Crown could look elsewhere and in other states for the revenues which remained tied up within the Neapolitan bureaucracy, and hence were not forthcoming from Naples. Certainly,

by enriching the class of office-holders corruption did serve to encourage a degree of social mobility, but at the same time it also strengthened the 'anti-bourgeois tendency in the history of the Viceroyalty'.

Among the other indictments, the author devotes a chapter to venal office-holding, which was banned by a law of 1536 but then subsequently permitted in 1539. The task of the Visitor was to regulate these transactions and to ensure that a certain commission was always paid to the Crown, and despite the fact that venality was prohibited formally it became a deeply entrenched characteristic of Ancien Regime bureaucratic system.

The information provided by the sources gives considerable detail on many of the leading functionaries of the period, like the Secretary of the Kingdom Juan de Soto (Chap. IV) and the *Corriere Maggiore* (Chap. V) who was responsible for the postal services in the Kingdom (and whose interrogation led on to an examination of the functioning of the postal service which reveals 'the speed and ways of sending messages from one part of the State to another') as well as on various institutions such as the Wool and Silk Guilds (Ch VI) and the Vicaria prisons (Ch VII). For these and other topics the study constitutes a veritable mine of information which we cannot attempt to summarise here in a short space.

The two central chapters (VIII & IX) of the study deal with the Crown patrimony and the Public Debt. The main revenue possessed by the Crown in the Kingdom of Naples was the hearth tax (*focatio*), which together with the *donativo* formed the totality of direct taxation and was levied on each hearth, according to the author's calculations, at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ ducates per annum. To these should be added the indirect taxes which were farmed out to private contractors and known as '*arrendamenti*'. Each of these *arrendamenti* is examined in turn — no mean task — and the payments that were made by the tax-farmers are compared with the information arising from the visitation by Lope de Guzman which enables the author to conclude that: "the State was cheated, but the system worked without too many snags or uncertainties and was reasonably well-ordered. Later on the situation became more turbulent and less predictable: the value of the contracts increased considerably indicating an optimism on the part of the entrepreneurs with regard to the immediate future, yet the cases where the contractors failed to meet the agreed terms also became much more numerous... It seems likely that in the twenty years following Quiroga's visitation there were more speculators simply because there were more *arrendamenti* and hence more opportunities ».

As far as the finances of the city of Naples were concerned, the main factor here, according to Mantelli, was a marked increase in the city's long term debts due partly to the need to raise *donativi* but also to heavy losses sustained in grain purchases in the years 1571-84 to keep the city supplied with food. The situation of the finances of the Kingdom was similar, and despite the severity of the fiscal system all the budgets that the author examines (1507/8; 1549/50; 1564; 1571/2;

1576; 1591/2) closed in deficit. "In Naples, as in the Kingdom of Castile, war was the one and only protagonist in the drama of public finance".

These deficits were filled by short-term loans (known as *partiti*), which until the mid - XVIth century were contracted mainly with Genoese bankers, or alternatively by long-term loans against which creditors received assured income from the revenue of specific taxes. In 1560 the Kingdom paid 533, 333 ducats interest per annum on such loans.

An analysis of the distribution of income deriving from public revenues amongst different social classes in 1569 and in 1571/2 reveals that the largest share was held by the titled nobility, whereas the share of the Church and the religious houses was almost negligible. Interest rates were between 9% and 10%, since the State deliberately set out to attract investment away from competing claimants, with the result that a very considerable volume of savings were devoted to supporting unproductive expenditure largely beyond the confines of the Kingdom.

The volume closes with an analysis of the foreign payments made by the Treasurer of the Kingdom of Naples between 1541 and 1559, which were obviously destined for expenditure on "events and preoccupations which were quite foreign to the interests and influence of the Kingdom of Naples". "Charles V and Philip II exacted taxes from Naples on the basis of what they needed and what the other parts of the Empire could offer". Cash from the Neapolitan Treasury was therefore destined for Milan, Siena, Flanders, Germany, the war against Paul IV "but alongside these major flows there were persistent smaller trickles in all directions and for a wide variety of reasons".

In total, these foreign remittances amounted to 6,812, 338.61 ducats, although the author believes that the true figure must have been several tens of thousands of ducats higher. "The average annual payment was in the region of 358, 544.03 ducats — a very considerable sum in relation to the capacity of the Neapolitan Treasury, in view of the fact that in 1564 (at the end of a long period during which the weight of fiscal exactions had been steadily growing) the State's normal revenues were about 1,643,000 ducats per annum (although the annual interest payments on the public debt should be deducted from this figure)".

What revenues were used to pay the remittances? The author shows that only 40% of the *donativi* were spent outside the Kingdom, while over 50% was met through ordinary taxation or through sales of future State revenue. This flight of capital from the Kingdom which was destined to sustain the warlike policies of the Spanish Empire and which was aggravated, although in much lesser degree, by the preponderant role played by foreigners in the financial and commercial life of the Kingdom and of the Church, meant that the positive "trade balance that resulted from the excess of exports (oil, silk, wines and cereals) over imports through to the end of the XVIIth century was effectively wiped out".

As this brief resumé of some of the arguments developed in this study will

show, its great merit lies in providing scholars of the XVIth and XVIIth centuries with a really massive array of information, even if for some topics this is only for rather limited periods. The studies of Gentile and Coniglio were clearly informed by criteria rather different from those that underlie Mantelli's research, and he has now given Quiroga's visitation both a human and indeed an economic and a social perspective (arguing, for example, that the visitation was an instrument for exerting pressure in the sense that it aroused fear) which cannot be found in earlier writings. Although the debate on the effects of Spanish rule on Italy, and in particular on the internal dynamism of the Kingdom of Naples, is still far from settled, this book provides an exceptionally rich range of findings, information and ideas.

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D. SELLA, *Crisis and Continuity. The Economy of Spanish Lombardy in the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1979, pp. ix, 255.

This study marks a major and definitive step forward in a lengthy but lively process of historical revision over a number of decades which has undermined a series of traditional interpretations and in their place set XVIIth century Lombardy in a context which is at once less stereotyped and more convincing. The volume of historical writing both in the past and the present that has been devoted to Spanish Lombardy might at first sight appear to be totally out of proportion to the rather modest territorial limits of the Lombard state. Yet this interest is justified by the fact that at the start of the modern period this was one of the most densely populated regions in the known world, pulsating with cities rich in trade and advanced manufacturing industries, yet also endowed with highly specialised forms of agricultural production — in short, a region that enjoyed an indisputable economic primacy. In political terms its position was no less important, since the Milanese state continued even after it had ceased to be autonomous to play a key role in the complex game of alliances and enmities between the great European powers — throughout the XVIth and XVIIth centuries it acted as the nerve centre of the 'Spanish road', both protecting the communications between the Mediterranean and the Low Countries and providing supplies of men and materials for the Spanish armies struggling against the rebels of Flanders.

Lastly, and in more general terms, the economic fortunes of Lombardy in the XVIIth century also provide one of the most striking cases of 'unsuccessful industrial take-off', and economic historians continue to ask why it was that the Lombard economy failed in this period to move forward along the path towards modern capitalism, especially since it seemed to be well embarked in this direction by the close of the XVIth century. The problem has

been answered in a range of different ways, the causes of the crisis being explained variously in terms of international conflict and devastation resulting from war, the effects of plague and disease, the burdens of the fiscal system, the so-called 'betrayal by the bourgeoisie'. The over-riding factor, however, that lay behind these specific causes either directly or indirectly was generally held to be Spanish misgovernment. This was naturally an interpretation that remained extremely attractive to the nationalist mentality of the Risorgimento and post-Risorgimento generations, to such an extent that it took on the stature of incontrovertible truth.

But as Scellapoints out, "all too often these causes have been accepted on grounds of plausibility rather than on the strength of clear evidence". In fact, from the moment that the problem of Lombardy's economic decline in the XVIIth century began to be studied in more objective and open-minded terms, the historical contours of the situation started to emerge more clearly; while new and more fundamental features of the crisis that had hitherto been partly or completely neglected began to come to light, other factors that had traditionally been seen as the main causes of economic decline were at the same time either recast or else eliminated completely.

Sella's starting point lies in this tradition of historical revisionism which began in part with the work of Federico Chabod and was then followed up by Gino Luzzatto in a number of brilliant essays and given a more solid basis by the research of a number of scholars including Carlo Cipolla, Aldo de Madalena and Sella himself in earlier essays. He has succeeded in broadening the whole field of investigation on the basis of meticulous and wide-ranging research in archival sources, of which particular mention should be made of the collection entitled *Feudi camerali (parte antica)* in the Milan State Archive. This is a source that earlier scholars had almost completely neglected, but which proves to be of quite fundamental importance and provides the basis for the most original and interesting aspects of Sella's study.

His conclusions serve essentially to confirm in a more systematic fashion and on the basis of much broader documentary proofs a number of arguments that have already been suggested by other scholars. The most important of these conclusions are, firstly, the confirmation that the irreversible character of the Lombard economy in the XVIIth century was due primarily to the inability of manufacturing industries to reduce high labour costs, or to move away from methods of production and types of product that were becoming anachronistic, albeit still of high quality, at a moment when competition was becoming increasingly severe from the very foreign countries that had previously imported such products from Italy, but which were now developing their own products along lines that were both more modern and more attractive to the consumer. Secondly, he demonstrates that the so-called 'betrayal by the bourgeoisie', or the 'flight back to the land', was by no means an inert process of social involution whereby a previously dynamic and entrepreneurial mercan-

tile class became transformed into idle landowners, but rather a response to specific economic incentives which encouraged those possessing capital to transfer their investments from the cities to the countryside, with extremely beneficial consequences for agriculture. This was the sector that had previously constituted the region's main economic resource, and once the disturbed years of the XVIIth century had passed was beginning to show clear signs of improvement and progress from the 1670s onwards — at least a century before the advent of Enlightened Absolutism.

By focusing his analysis on the countryside, without at the same time limiting himself solely to purely agricultural activities, Sella has succeeded in significantly broadening our understanding of industrial development and has reconstructed an interpretation of the vitality evident in the countryside which is both new and convincing, particularly since previous historians have tended to concentrate mainly on the cities. Thanks mainly to the valuable material provided by the *Feudi camerati*, he has been able to show that in the Lombard countryside in the XVIIth century, unlike in the cities, it proved possible to preserve practically all the manufacturing activities that had existed in previous centuries, and at the same time to create new ones that served to make the rural economy increasingly diversified and complex. It was what we might today call a 'submerged economy' that escaped the oppressive restrictions of the urban guilds and also the more onerous feudal exactions, and was therefore in a position to produce at competitive costs articles which were not necessarily of high quality but which did have large markets.

From these important conclusions it is possible to identify two major features of simultaneous continuity and evolution in the history of Lombard society in the modern period. Firstly, in political terms there was a clear tendency throughout the XVIIth century for the countryside to react against the city-State system based on the supremacy of the city over the countryside and its attempts to monopolise anything of value that was produced. The economic revival and subsequent expansion of the agrarian economy at the end of the XVIIth century gave the countryside a quite distinctive character with regard to the cities, and although the formal domination of the latter was to survive through to the late XVIIIth century, major modifications in the relationship can be detected as much as two centuries earlier and were continually to increase, paving the way for a more modern and egalitarian system which would favour the countryside at the expense of traditional urban privileges, thereby anticipating the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II.

Secondly, in economic terms it becomes possible to trace a clear line of continuity between Renaissance and Risorgimento Lombardy. Since traditional historiography took an essentially 'urban' view of economic development, it paid little attention to rural manufacturing and therefore tended to see the first successful industrial ventures in Lombardy in the XIXth century as something quite new and with no links with the past. But, as Sella points out,

as soon as one stops to consider that the first example of the factory system proper occurred not in the city, but rather in the countryside and precisely in that region of Upper Lombardy, where rural manufacturing had prospered most fully for over two centuries, where water-power provided an abundant supply of energy, where there was also an abundant and cheap supply of labour with a wide range of manufacturing skills that could easily be adapted to more persistent rhythms of work, as well as to the discipline and work incentives provided by the factory, and where there was also an exceptional concentration of entrepreneurial ability, it becomes highly improbable that all this should be the result of mere chance or that there were no links between the new industries and the old traditions of manufacturing which had been the fruit of the humble and unrelenting toil of the peasants of the XVIIth century.

The study concludes with *A Postscript on Feudalism* in which Sella used both the material which he has collected and also his own characteristic skills of intellectual midwifery to knock down yet another of those pillars on which the traditional interpretation of the XVIIth century in Lombardy has long rested. While on one hand the nationalist historians were convinced that the region's economic decline should be attributed to the corrupt administration imposed by foreign rulers, more recently marxist historians have tended to favour the view that the crisis of the urban economies resulted in large part from the 'feudal restoration' which they have seen as an essential feature of foreign rule. This process brought to an abrupt halt the expansion of trade and industry that had been the glory of the Lombard cities, and at the same time brought about an involution in property and productive relations in the countryside which strengthened the economic, the social and the political privileges of the nobility while causing the conditions of the peasantry to deteriorate rapidly. But several authors have already shown quite clearly that although the Spanish governments were prepared to sell feudal estates on a wide scale in order to raise revenue, this never amounted to an attempted restoration of feudalism, but was essentially the continuation of a policy that had always been practised by the Visconti and the Sforza from the XIVth and XVth centuries onwards. But Sella lends decisive weight to such arguments when he shows — with incontrovertible documentary evidence in his hand — that the pretended hostility of the peasantry towards the feudalization of their lands is completely without foundation. The evidence provided by the documents relating to the feudalization of land shows clearly that the mass of the peasants, when faced with the prospect of being subjected to a feudal landowner, were either indifferent or relatively favourable — indeed in some cases genuinely eager to become subject to a feudatory. None of the examples provided here offer any grounds for believing that the prospect was ever considered to be so dire as to justify any means of avoiding or resisting it. Where efforts were made to avoid feudalization of land, however, the opposition came — for obvious reasons of economic convenience and social prestige — from the landowners in the areas where land

was to be placed under feudal control, and in other cases — for reasons of conflicting jurisdictions — from the cities or towns that were administrative centres of the region in question.

Sella's study is based on a meticulous use of archival sources, is written in a clear and direct style and shows enviable accuracy in technical descriptions (whether it is a case of agricultural technique, techniques of metal-working, or political and administrative systems). At the same time he succeeds in bringing to life the picturesque human canvas of Lombard society three centuries ago with all the affection of a son who is rediscovering the land from which he originated. The book has already been awarded a prize by the *American Historical Association* and is shortly to be published in Italian by *Il Mulino* of Bologna.

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La Statistique en France à l'époque napoléonienne. (Journées d'études, Paris 14 Février 1980), Brussels, Centre Guillaume Jacquemyns Paris, Ecole des Hautes en sciences sociales, 1981 196p.

There have now been a number of conferences and seminars on the history of statistics, and the organisers of these meetings (the INSEE and the EHESS) are to be congratulated on publishing the papers and discussions that have taken place. Four years after the publication of *Pour une histoire de la Statistique* Vol. 1, *Contributions* Paris INSEE, 1977, 593 p., Louis Bergeron has now provided us with a collection of papers relating to statistics in France during the Napoleonic period.

Lilian Viré deals with the Belgian *départements* and subjects the Napoleonic statistics to a detailed critical analysis both with regard to their source and their methodology. Her comments on the methods used for compiling the statistics (who was responsible for drawing them up, and by what means) provide the historian with numerous guidelines to help him find his way through the jungle of figures that litter the documents drawn up by 'functionaries who although they did not necessarily rely on invention were inclined to indulge in all manner of deduction'. Long experience in dealing with these inquiries and other questionnaires informs the suggestions she makes, which throw much original light on a type of source material which still puts off many historians.

Stuart Woolf's impressive contribution on 'the history of the origins of statistical inquiry in France between 1789 and 1815' takes up half the book and one can easily see why it formed the centre-piece of the day-seminar in Paris. Woolf shows clearly how statistical investigation was related to the objects pursued by the government, and the statistics of the revolutionary period well

reveal the desire to achieve economic control. He argues that the golden age of statistical inquiry coincided with the brief dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety and revealed the 'imperious desire to know and control' shown by the new masters. The desire and the need to know explain the frenzied search for figures, and Woolf suggests that there was a 'falling away from the cult of encyclopaedic knowledge towards that of the utilitarian number, a falling away from a taste for general inquiries in favour of more detailed studies of limited subjects'. The desire to free information gave way to the desire simply to collect and monopolise it. His comments on the ways in which these new formulae evolved, on the difficulties involved in obtaining information from local authorities, on the organisation of the Ministry of the Interior which was in charge of the whole process from the initial inquiry through to the ordering of the data and their interpretation, serve to reveal the complex mechanisms of this 'administrative and ideological machinery' that sought to square the hexagon.

The second session of the seminar was more technical. Serge Chassagne discussed the 'central administration, its personnel and administrative mechanisms' and emphasised the insecurity of organisation, the rapid fluctuations in the numbers employed by the Interior Ministry, the length of service of employees and the ways in which they were influenced by their Ancien Regime training. This short but very imaginative essay shows us 'who did what in the service of whom' within the central offices of the Ministry.

Denis Woronoff discussed the structure of the statistical questionnaires, taking the iron and steel industry (of which he has incomparable knowledge, as is shown in his recent and massive *thèse d'état*) as a case study. He asked what was the logic of the questionnaire and how was it received, and in reply to those questions he described the different types of questionnaire, their length and the arrangement of the questions and categories, without forgetting to mention what was not included. His analysis of the recipients of these questionnaires (mayors, engineers, entrepreneurs and landowners) also served to illustrate the often very precise types of information desired by authorities that were eager for details.

René Bargeton, who is an administrator attached to the Prefecture, presented a sociological study of regional administration and discussed 'the personnel and local methods of statistical inquiry'. He showed how messages were received at a local level and his comments revealed his immense experience and understanding of the workings of administrative power. A mixture of permanence and retrospective continuity...

The general level and exceptional quality of all these papers is evident merely from glancing through the names of the participants — Louis Bergeron, Jacques Dupaquier, Jean-Claude Perrot who acted as chairmen of the discussions. And the range, richness and diversity of the information and comments provided by Lilian Viré and Stuart Woolf constitute a comprehensive overview

of the state of current research on the history of statistical investigation in the early XIXth century.

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G. B. SUTTON, *A History of Shoemaking in Street, Somerset: C. and J. Clark 1833-1903*. York, England: William Sessions Limited, 1979, pp. 208.

This book was presented as a master's thesis in economic history at Nottingham University in 1959 and is published now through the C. and J. Clark Museum and Archives. The Clark firm is to be strongly commended for the concern for its history that has produced not only this but Brendan Lehane, *C. & J. Clark 1825-1975* (Street, Somerset, 1975), a richly illustrated brief history as well. If more firms preserved their records and made them available for scholarly research, as Clarks have done, our understanding of the development of business would be far richer.

Sutton's account concerns the early history of the firm, before it became a limited company in 1903. This story has two parts: the establishment of the firm by Cyrus and James Clark and their largely unsuccessful attempts to make it a profitable venture and the career of Stephen Clark, who took over the firm in 1863 and succeeded in putting it on a sound financial footing. The company continues to this day to be owned and operated by members of the founding family, an increasingly rare situation among such large-scale firms.

The book is a very detailed reconstruction of the firm's operations based on surviving records, with the most attention devoted to production, marketing, and finance. As a case study of the problems of a small, underfinanced firm attempting to operate in a constantly changing environment the book has considerable value. Despite several unfortunate gaps in the records, a compelling account of the problems facing early nineteenth-century entrepreneurs and the limitations of the business system of the era emerges. Unfortunately, what is expected of such studies has changed during the twenty years between completion of the study and its publication. The shortcomings of the book result from the general lack of a context for the history of the Clark firm. Nowhere in the book does one get a clear sense of how typical Clark was either of shoe firms or any small firm that sought to grow. All of the information is less valuable than it might be because we never know how it fits into the general patterns of British industry. Particularly distressing is the lack of comparison with the United States shoe industry, which was a major competitor for the Australian market in the late nineteenth century. What the text does offer is tantalizing, but the reader must supply the context him or herself.

While it may be unfair to have expected Sutton to deal with all of this in a M.A. thesis done twenty years ago, the reader today needs to be aware of these

limitations. The book does have considerable value because, despite its many early problems, Clarks not only survived but prospered. The strategy of emphasizing a quality product and building a strong identification of the firm's name with that quality proved successful in the second generation and beyond. Students of business history will find this an important case study of a firm that overcame many serious problems and much early failure by carving out a special niche for itself in a broad market.

The foreword offers the possibility of future monographs on related subjects sponsored by the Clark Museum and Archives. Perhaps some of these will address the problem of context and build on this excellent case study. The shoe industry has not yet received the attention that its volume of production and importance in the economy merits. The appearance of this book and a number of recent studies of the United States shoe industry offer the promise of redressing this neglect and adding a valuable new dimension to our understanding of the development of industrial economies.

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U. TUCCI, *Mercanti, navi, monete nel Cinquecento veneziano*. Bologna, Il Mulino, 1981, pp. 316.

As Braudel points out in the introduction to Tucci's study, the history of Venice is in fact the history of Western Europe and the Mediterranean as a whole, and for many years now it has held a central place in the research of numerous Italian and foreign historians who continue to raise and draw attention to new problems, to reveal new significances and new peculiarities. The most important of these, referring only to those dealing specifically with economic and social history, must include the classical studies by Luzzatto and Lane which provide a fundamental base for all subsequent work, and the more recent studies by Brian Pullan, J.R. Hale, J. Georgelin, J.-C. Hocquet and others. To these must now be added Ugo Tucci's volume, which brings together a series of essays on Venetian history previously published in a variety of journals that are not always easily obtainable.

Drawing on massive first-hand archival research and an immense secondary bibliography, Tucci tackles some of the major issues in the social and economic history of XVIth century Venice. The topics covered include the Venetian nobility's withdrawal from trade; the types of trade carried on with the East; investment in insurance; the profits of Venetian galleys in the early XVIth century; the history of the Rialto Bank; the history of currency and the international movements of Venetian gold. The range of topics is extremely comprehensive, and in addition to its originality has the virtue of enabling the reader to deepen his understanding of a number of specialist issues. The chronological

limits of many of the essays are always compensated by the author's ability to set a particular topic against a much broader historical perspective.

In the first two of the eight essays that make up the book the author examines the gradual withdrawal of the nobility from Venetian trade. Tucci, like Priuli, sees the cause of this major transformation that completely changed the life-styles, aspirations and interests of the Venetian patriciate, in the growing awareness of the revolution that was taking place in the international structure of trade and in the long period of recession in commerce. Given the enormous scale of the process that affected every aspect of Venetian life and changed many of the fundamental features of the mercantile republic, there were inevitably a multiplicity of factors at work. One must, therefore, take into account the gradual decline in State intervention in commercial affairs, the social prestige conferred by landownership, and the powerful attraction exercised by public office which tended to encourage an aristocratic-noble ethos to the detriment of civic life. Although in Venice humanism did not bring into being an intellectual class that was isolated from practical life and devoted to literary pursuits, it did encourage this same change of moral and social attitudes on the part of the patriciate, in common with that more general tendency that can be detected in one form or another in many other Italian city states.

By the second half of the XVIth century, commerce had become almost exclusively the preserve of the 'citizens', the social group that lay between the nobility and the populace and who had in the past participated with the nobility in Venice's great trading activities. The ranks of the mercantile class were also filled out by enterprising recruits from the lowest of Venice's three social orders, and in fact many of those who had started out from very humble beginnings were able to reach important economic and social positions and on many occasions enabled the city to weather major crises.

For most of the century the economic situation was unfavourable. The disruptive presence of the Turks in the Mediterranean and the no less problematical presence of foreign merchants threatened the trading privileges and monopolies of the Venetians and seriously reduced their opportunities. But right to the end of the century trade could still offer very considerable rewards, as is evident from the accounts of two Venetian merchants who were engaged in buying and selling in Aleppo between 1579 and 1581. But as Tucci points out, Venetian trade was seriously undermined by the structural changes that were taking place. The Venetian commercial sphere was polycentric, and to make his profits the merchant had to calculate costs and prices carefully. But in the changed commercial situation it was no longer sufficient to make good buys in Constantinople or in Aleppo or Alexandria, since the European prices for Oriental goods were now also being determined at Lisbon and Antwerp. And as the number of competitors grew, so prices also tended to fluctuate uncontrollably, making it more and more difficult for the merchant to keep his bearings. After the abandonment of the convoy system in the 1530s or 1540s,

life became even more difficult, since anyone could, with a single shipment, upset prices and traditional commercial seasons. In short, for most of those involved the mechanisms of exchange became difficult and perplexing, and the increased competitiveness of the markets further narrowed the individual merchant's room for manoeuvre and reduced the numbers of merchants involved.

While the growing difficulties of the market were becoming evident by the end of the XVIth century, the crisis of the Venetian trade monopoly had been present from its earliest years and had direct repercussions on trade with Flanders and England. Flanders in particular, and quite independently from the question of supplies from the Levant, had already by the start of the XVIth century ceased to offer the Venetians an important market, and even before Vasco da Gama's expedition brought fresh supplies of spices and African colonial products Portuguese competition had proved disastrous for the Venetians. Nonetheless, the commercial links between the Mediterranean and the northern countries remained strong, and the spices brought by the Venetians were of higher quality than those of the Portuguese and continued to find faithful clients — it only needed news to reach Antwerp that a shipment of spices from Beirut had reached Venice for the prices of Portuguese goods there to collapse.

However, the accounts of the trade carried on in Flanders by a Venetian convoy galley in 1504 reveal clear evidence of the crisis affecting the trade between Venice and the North Sea in the early XVIth century. The accounts list all expenses as debits, with the sales on the income ledger and enable the author to calculate the production costs of those convoy shipments, revealing the exceptional value of this rare and original document. Analysis of the items of expenditure reveals interesting feature of the Venetian commercial fleet, which include: the high cost of the 'human motor' which, as Tucci points out, was typical of an age in which technology was poor; the absence of insurance payments, indicating the safety guaranteed by this form of transport; expenditure on gifts, which had to be made to facilitate the exchange of goods. The register also lists the costs of equipping the vessel, payments for pilots, for various services, for port taxes etc. But Tucci argues that all these expenses were much less than the basic cost of paying the crew. A prime characteristic of the Venetian fleet was a rigid technological conservatism, the explanation for which can probably be found in the fact that the heavy galleys with their guns and marines also provided military defence and offered the Republic a ready armed force on which it could call in times of need.

The total expenditure amounted to 9,245.4 ducats, while sales reached little over 7-8,000 ducats, so that it was only by virtue of the State contribution of 5,500 ducats that the contractors were able to bridge the deficit and draw an artificial profit. In the changed commercial situation, the State contribution was indispensable and represented an effective anti-crisis measure to defend the network of Venetian commercial contacts and settlements.

At the same time, the contraction in the volume of Venetian trade in the West and in the East did not slacken the flow of Venetian currency toward the Orient — in fact, Venetian *zecchini* were increasingly used to compensate for the falling off in demand for Venetian commercial commodities. The Venetian gold *zecchino*, which was produced by very primitive technological methods (the coin-press was not introduced in Venice until as late as 1755) retained its standing as commercial currency and was widely used in international trade and circulated over an area much wider than the Venetian sphere of commercial operations. Bringing together very dispersed and fragmentary data the author reconstructs the issues of gold coin struck by the Venetian mint, and this enables us to draw interesting conclusions about the relationship between these issues and the economic situation, revealing the importance of non-local factors in their timing.

As we said at the outset and have tried to illustrate, these essays cover a wide range of problems of Venetian economic and social history in the XVIth century. The author frequently sets up new topics for investigations, as in the chapter entitled 'Costs and profits of a Venetian galley', which will encourage further research into interesting and hitherto unexplored areas of Venetian history.

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