ARTICLES

The Vignerons of the Douro and the Peninsular War *

Norman R. Bennett
Boston University

The French invasions of Portugal during the Napoleonic Wars naturally bear a prime responsibility for damaging Portuguese agricultural and industrial economic development, then in a relatively flourishing state.[1] Of fundamental importance to the Portuguese economy of the beginning of the XIXth century was the commerce carried on with Britain for the wines of the demarcated port wine region of the Douro valley.[2] It is the purpose of this study to consider the impact of the war upon the Douro producers and upon the port wine trade in general.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Douro wine country had, through its response to the demands of British drinkers, turned "into one vast vineyard".[3] The outbreak of a

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[1] José Accursio das Neves, *Variedades, sobre objectos relativos as artes, commercio, e manufacturas, consideradas segundo os principios da economia politica* (Lisboa, 1814), I, 7f; Jorge Borges de Macedo, *O bloqueio continental: economia e guerra peninsular* (Lisboa, 1962), 20, and *Problemas de história da industria portuguesa no século XVIII*, 2a. ed. (Lisboa, 1982), 235f.

[2] See Norman R. Bennett, "The Golden Age of the Port Wine System, 1781-1807," *The International History Review*, 12 (1990), 221-48.

[3] A. Moreira da Fonseca, et. al., *Port Wine: Notes on its History, Production & Technology* (Porto, 1981), 19. See also Fonseca's "Apontamentos Históricos sobre o Douro e sobre a preparação do Vinho do Porto," *Anais do Instituto do Vinho do Porto* (1941), 112f; Susan Schneider, *O Marques de Pombal e o Vinho do Porto: dependência e subdesenvolvimento em Portugal no século XVIII* (Lisboa, 1980), 69f.

major war naturally threatened both the integrated agricultural and commercial system, formed during the eighteenth century through the complementary labours of Portuguese winegrowers and British merchants, and the livelihood of the many individuals dependent upon the wine region's one-crop economy.[4]

The broken terrain of the wine region, plus its miserable roads, saved the area from much direct military activity.[5] Thus it has been suggested that the war had minimal impact on the port wine trade, with any decline explained more by poor climatic conditions than war-related activities.[6] But, for the wine-producing region and its inhabitants, other factors beyond actual combat between French and Portuguese-British forces had significant influences upon individual lives. The production of, and commerce in, port wines was conditioned by circumstances occurring both within and beyond the valley of the Douro. Any disruptions, for example, interfering with the regular shipment of wines to Britain,[7] with the activities of merchants in Porto, or with the arrival of needed labourers from Galiza for vineyard tasks, might greatly disrupt local life. The recruiting of men for military and support services, both in and beyond their home neighbourhoods, also was a factor. In addition, various localities along the Douro served as important bases for garrisoning men during intervals between campaigns and as supply depots for military activities occurring elsewhere. Both circumstances introduced intrusive demands and influences into this heretofore relatively isolated rural environment.

The futile diplomatic balancing act of Portugal, an endeavour to avoid being drawn into the hostilities between Britain and

[4] Francisco Soares Franco, *Memoria em que se examina qual seria o estado de Portugal, se por desgraça os francezes, o chegassem a dominar* (Lisboa, 1809), 25f.

[5] Antonio Pedro Vicente, "Memórias Políticas, Geográficas e Militares de Portugal, 1762-1796," *Boletim do arquivo histórico militar*, 4 (1971), 134, 171f.

[6] A.D. Francis, *The Wine Trade* (New York, 1972), 268.

[7] Always a predominant factor: see H.E.S. Fisher, *The Portugal Trade: A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce, 1700-1770* (London, 1971), 119.

France, ended with the unopposed French invasion of General Junot in 1807. For northern Portugal the disintegration of their national government meant initially a limited occupation by France's Spanish ally. The Spanish military established regional headquarters in Porto, requesting the Portuguese to remain quiet, while promising both non-interference into matters of local law and custom and swift punishment to all — whether Portuguese or Spanish — disturbing the peace. In general, the new regime, and especially the Spanish occupiers, had minimal impact upon the port-wine region. Very few Spaniards traveled very far from Porto. Orders from the French command in Lisbon for separating the Portuguese from their weapons went largely unobserved.[8]

The obviously temporary relationship between occupiers and occupied ended as the influences flowing from the Spanish rising against the French, beginning in May 1808, reached northern Portugal. Spanish forces were recalled, and, during June, many northern localities formally declared allegiance to the absent Portuguese ruler and to the Junta of Porto. A call to arms, issued by local authorities in Vila Real and elsewhere, led to the summoning of local men and collecting of Douro boats. The French reacted by despatching Louis Loison, leading around 2500 men, for the first significant military incursion into the wine-producing region. Advancing from Almeida to Lamego, Loison crossed the Douro and moved along the winding hillside roads bordering the river to Mesão Frio. The invaders encountered determined resistance, the Portuguese utilizing the

[8] ALBERT SILBERT, *Do Portugal de antigo regime ao Portugal oitocentista.* 2a. ed. (Lisboa, 1977), 64-9; ANTONIO FERRÃO, *A 1a. Invasão françesa (A invasão de Junot visita atraves dos documentos da intendencia geral do Policia, 1807-1808) (Coimbra, 1923), cclxxviii;* BARON THIÉBAULT, *Relation de l'expédition du Portugal en 1807 et 1808, Par le* Ier *corps d'observation de la Gironde, devenue armée de Portugal* (Paris, 1817), 106; SIMÃO JOSE DA LUZ SORIANO, *Historia da guerra civil e do estabelicimento do governo parlamentar em Portugal: comprehendo a historia diplomatica, militar e politica d'este reine desde 1777 até 1824: segunda epocha - guerra da peninsula* (Lisboa, 1870), I, 178-92.

contours of their walled hillside vineyards to pour effective fire into the confined Frenchmen. Loison retreated, his men sacking Régua before re-crossing the Douro and eventually returning to Almeida.[9]

The landing of a British expedition north of Lisbon then caused the recall of most French units to the region of the capital, thus leaving the Portuguese of the north free to organize their own administration. Wine region localities continued their allegiance to the Porto Junta, but that government did not exercise any effective authority beyond its own neighbourhood. The societal stress brought upon by the French invasion and occupation, and the varying reactions to it among local individuals, caused much disorder in many regional towns.[10]

The next direct threat to the Douro region came in 1809 with the French invasion led by Nicolas Soult. The French advance, from Chaves to Porto, mostly bypassed the wine country, but Portuguese from the north, numbering about 6000 — around one half of them regular troops, led by Manuel de Silveira Pinto da Fonseca[11] — came forward to resist the invaders. Soult, after seizing Porto, found his army isolated in the midst of a very hostile population — "what hatred of foreign rule", exclaimed one Frenchman.[12] Lacking the resources necessary for continuing the planned advance toward Lisbon, Soult decided to hold fast, and to complete the regional conquest. One part of this effort required a move along the Douro to clear territory up

[9] General Foy, *History of the War of the Peninsula under Napoleon.* 2nd ed. (London, 1829), II, 92-3, 432-43; Charles Oman, *A History of the Peninsula War* (Oxford, 1902), I, 213; Soriano, *História, I, 253-62;* Carlos de Azeredo, *As populações a norte do Douro e os Franceses em 1808 e 1809* (Porto, 1984), 38-49.

[10] Soriano, *Historia, I,* 303f; Vasco Pulido Valente, "O Povo em Armas: A Revolta Nacional de 1808-1809," *Análise Social,* 15 (1979), 31-2; *O Leal Portuguez,* 4 (27 July 1808), 4; Teresa Bernardino, *Sociedade e atitudes mentais em Portugal (1777-1810)* (Lisboa, 1986), 157, 182.

[11] Marquess of Londonderry, *Story of the Peninsular War* (London, 1856), 143.

[12] P.M. Le Noble, *Mémoires sur les opérations militaires des français en Galice, en Portugal, et dans la vallée du Tage en 1809* (Paris, 1821), 146.

to the Tamega River. The hard fighting occurring, with the French giving no quarter to non-military combatants, culminated, for Silveira's contingent, with sharp combats over control of the passage of the Tamega at Amarante. The French, in early May, momentarily were successful, pushing across the river and chasing fleeing defenders to Vila Real. The arrival of Portuguese and British troops at Lamego, and the British entry into Porto, caused a French withdrawal, the local inhabitants rising to harass the retreating enemy. During the disorders Mesão Frio was burned, while many area residences suffered damage.[13]

Soult's retreat into Spain ended significant French incursions into the wine region. Occasional minor skirmishing occurred, but the only notable French military entry was a brief episode occurring in December 1810 and January 1811. Portuguese raiding activity against the French army then campaigning in central Portugal prompted General Claparède to lead a small unit as far as Lamego. After a brief occupation of the city, he returned to the principal scene of French activity.[14] Subsequent troop movements were mostly related to events occurring beyond the Douro region.[15]

The French and Spanish intrusions, involving both Porto and the wine-producing country, naturally sharply threatened the structure of the region's production and commercial system. We can examine the impact of the war years by examining the efforts of both winegrowers and shippers. The specific activities

[13] *Journal du général Fantin des Odoards: étapes d'un officier de la grande armée, 1800-1830* (Paris, 1895), 219; A. D'ILLENS, *Souvenirs d'un militaire des armées françaises dites de Portugal* (Paris, 1827), 211, 264-75; AZEREDO, *As Populaçãoes*, 51f; OMAN, *History*, II, 16f, 266; SORIANO, *História*, II, 104f; *Mémoires du Maréchal Soult: Espagne et Portugal* [ed. by Louis & Antoinette de Saint-Pierre] (Paris, 1955), 81f.

[14] M. GUINGRET, *Relation historique et militaire de la campagne de Portugal sous le Maréchal Masséna* (Limoge, 1817), 109-11; GÉNÉRAL KOCH, *Mémoires de Masséna* (Paris, 1850), VII, 312-13.

[15] SORIANO, *História, III*, 47, 54, 60, 480; W.F.P. NAPIER, *History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from A.D. 1807 to A.D. 1814.* (New York, 1890), II, 272f.

of the Douro farmers — in the absence of winegrower archives — are much more difficult to determine than those of the Porto merchants. In trying to breach what social historian Brian Harrison has called "the silence of the inarticulate", we can accept what he asserts elsewhere: "historians do not usually allow themselves to be discouraged by lack of firm evidence".[16]

Douro winegrowers attempted to follow normal economic patterns during the war years. Some producers sold to the regionally dominant Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro [henceforth called the Wine Company], at legally set prices. Others dealt with private merchants for higher prices. The remainder survived as best they could.[17] Wine scarcity, however, probably forced more growers than usual into the first group. We will return to a discussion of the growers shortly. Winegrowers continued in active business dealings because the export of port wine from Porto persisted despite the departure in October 1807 of most of the important resident British merchant community. Since the sea remained dominated by Britain, giving Napoleon's continental blockade a minimal impact, commerce went on, even during the periods of French occupation. Junot's administration, for example, sold passes permitting a barely concealed commerce with the enemy. After the French departure Royal Navy vessels periodically arrived to convoy British bound cargoes of wine and other commodities.[18]

A few Britons did return to Porto in the intervals between enemy occupations — Soult's arrival trapped about thirty Brit-

[16] BRIAN HARRISON, "Drink and Sobriety in England, 1815-1872: A Critical Bibliography," *International Review of Social History*, 12 (1967), 229, and *Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England, 1815-1872* (Pittsburgh, 1971), 22.

[17] A. GUERRA TENREIRO, "Douro: Esboços para a sua História Económica," *Anais do Instituto do Vinho do Porto*, 2 (1942), 58-9. He specifically refers to the years from 1811, but the conclusion probably covers the period from 1807.

[18] MACEDO, *O Bloqueio Continental*, 57f; FERRÃO, *A 1a. Invasão Françesa*, ccxx, 326, ccxxxiv; THIÉBAULT, *Expedition du Portugal*, 85. For a full account of these years, JORGE MANUEL MARTINS RIBEIRO, "A Comunidade Britânica do Porto durante as Invasões Francesas (1810-1811)," Dissertacão de mestrado em História Moderna apresentada à Faculdade de letras da Universidade do Porto, 1987.

ish vessels in the Douro — but most merchants remained absent until the war's end. A visitor of 1812 found only four British families there.[19] The departing merchants, however, often concluded arrangements with Portuguese associates for safeguarding their remaining property and for maintaining the wine trade to Britain.[20] The loss of British shippers was compensated for by an increase of Portuguese export activity. Independent merchants, plus the powerful Wine Company, profited from the foreign disappearance to augment their share of the wine trade. In 1809 and 1810, for example, the eleven British firms included in one or both official export listings shipped only 4900 and 2700 pipes. None of the firms were among the leading exporters.[21]

One avenue for evaluating the course of winegrower business is through an examination of the relationships of two British wine firms with growers during the war era. One firm, Offley, Hesketh, Webber & Co., before the French invasions normally had been among the leading buyers and exporters of port wine.[22] Its British agents carefully attempted to settle all outstanding accounts with growers, and to plan for possible future business operations, before leaving Porto in October 1807. Any continuing transactions were left in the capable hands of

[19] JOHN MILFORD, *Peninsula Sketches, During a Recent Tour* (London, 1816), 194; ILLENS, *Souvenirs*, 178; *O Leal Portuguez* 16 (19 Oct. 1808), 150 and 6 (11 Feb. 1809), 64-5; Crispin to Hamilton, 30 Dec. 1811, in Hamilton to Board of Trade, 3 Jan. 1812, BT 1/62, Public Record Office, London [hereafter PRO].

[20] See, for example, the activities of the agent of the firm of Warre reported in WILLIAM WARRE [ed. by EDMOND WARRE], *Letters from the Peninsula, 1808-1812* (London, 1909), 54 and passim.

[21] Jeffrey to Wellesley, 2 March 1811, FO 63/117, Jeffrey to Hamilton, 30 Dec. 1811, with enclosures, FO 63/121, and the data on British merchants collected in FO 63/140: PRO; *Review of the Discussions relating to the Oporto Wine-Company* (London, 1814), 23. See also DOMINGOS OLIVEIRA SILVA, "The Apogee and Decline of British Hegemony in Portugal, 1807-1820," unpublished Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, University of Southampton, 1985, 65f. For the growth in Wine Company buying, CRISTOVÃO GUERNIER, *Discurso histórico e analytico sobre o estabelicimento da Companhia Geral da Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro* (Lisboa, 1814), 33.

[22] BENNETT, "Port Wine System," 222-24.

their Portuguese agents.[23] Thus an unfortunate gap is present in the archives of the firm due to the absence of the men usually dealing with Douro region agents and growers. Still, a general account of the course of business can be attempted, especially for the years from 1811, when British agents increasingly returned to Portugal.

By December 1808 Offley was ready to attempt a cautious return to previous patterns. Agents were instructed not to make financial advances to growers — often vital for meeting the winegrowers' many continuing expenses — and to despatch empty casks up river for wine purchases. One Offley partner joined other Britons in going back to Porto, but Soult's arrival ended this effort.[24] Wine dealings went on in very restricted fashion until June 1809 when the firm's principal Douro resident Portuguese agent, José Henriques da Silva Pereira, received orders to resume normal activities, with a special effort requested for renewing old and enduring links with specific producers. Pereira immediately set to work, purchasing almost 800 pipes of wine, and taking full advantage of the surplus amounts held by farmers to refuse offering prices beyond the legally — established limits. Business activity for the remainder of 1809 was limited, as agents worked to overcome wine quality and transportation problems caused by the war.[25]

When the time neared for the 1810 annual wine port wine fair at Régua, normally one of the most important events in Portuguese economic life,[26] the British firm ordered Pereira to warn expectant growers that buying probably would be limited. The

[23] O. to Pereira, 10 Oct. 1807 and subsequent letters, Offley Forrester Archives, Vila Nova de Gaia, OA 20. For information on the archives, see BENNETT "Port Wine System," 222, fn. 6.

[24] *The Farrington Diary, by* JOSEPH FARRINGTON [ed. by JAMES GREIG] (London, 1926), VI, 221; Jeffrey to Canning, 1 April 1809, FO 63/79, PRO.

[25] O. to Pereira, 3 June 1809, c. 2-5 July 1809, O. to Leite [a winegrower], 5 July 1809, OA 20.

[26] ADRIEN BALBI, *Essai Statistique sur le Royaume de Portugal* (Paris, 1822), I, 156.

agent was specifically informed to purchase carefully, and at the legally-set price. Then, unfortunately for us, the death of a major British partner forced a reorganization of the firm, resulting in correspondence gaps lasting into 1812. Then the new partners, seemingly not as powerful a combination as their predecessors, entered the competition again, despatching to Porto the able and active James Forrester. Business conditions were difficult, with shortages of casks, and delays in river and land transport. The cost of both cart and boat travel were very high.[27]

A poor growing season made the vintage of 1811 of indifferent quality, but war time stimulated demand for the limited quantity vintage, plus a steady growth in the costs of production, and kept prices high. The Wine Company advanced the legal purchase price from $40000 and $36000 to $60000 and $50000 per pipe for wines of the first and second class. Actual prices, as always in seasons of high demand, soared far over the established figures. Some growers, it was reported, received prices near $100000 per pipe, with an estimated average payment to all vignerons of about $80000.[28] The intense competition for wines, including those remaining from previous vintages, quickly exhausted supplies, causing the Wine Company to seek out foreign sources to meet consumption demands from the inhabitants of Porto and nearby locations where it held the wine-selling monopoly. During 1810 local shortages also forced the importation of large amounts of distilled alcohol, for port wine blending, from Spain, Britain, and the Açores, plus wine for loc-

[27] O. to Pereira, 16 July 1809, 11 March 1810, OA 20.

[28] M.J.M.C.E.P. et al., *Primeiros ensáios para o exame imparcial da questão, por todos suscitada, e por quasi ninguem examinada - se a Companhia Geral de Agricultura das Vinhas do Alto Douro he ou não util que exista?...* (Paris, c. 1817), 46, 62; *O Campeão Portuguez*, 2 (1820), 135.

For price information, JOSEPH JAMES FORRESTER, *Portugal and its Capabilities*, 3rd ed. (London, 1856), 53-4; FLEETWOOD WILLIAMS, *Observations on the State of the Wine Trade, occasioned by the Perusal of a Pamphlet on the Same Subject by Mr. Warre* (London, 1824), 5; THOMAS GEORGE SHAW, *Wine, the Vine, and the Cellar* (London, 1863), 120.

al use from the latter.[29] By fair time in 1815 the persisting demand had forced, complained Offley's agent, the paying of "extravagent prices", with merchants offering excess amounts of up to $50000 per pipe for current wines. Scarce earlier vintages sold for up to $130000.[30]

From 1812 through 1815 — figures are lacking for 1808 through 1811 — Offley purchased a yearly average of 772.75 pipes. From 1781 through 1806 their average purchase had been 2894 pipes, with amounts below 1000 pipes in only two years. Offley dealt with far fewer winegrowers than it had in the prewar years. From 1781 to 1807 purchases were made from a low of eighteen growers in 1813 to a high of fifty-one in 1812. The average number of winegrowers was 104. From 1812 through 1815 the average number was about thirty-seven. Offley did, however, continue purchasing from winegrowers producing widely differing amounts. Since Offley met its requirements only through stiff market competition for high-priced wines, it can be assumed that many former sellers to the firm had the opportunity, despite the wartime disruptions, to profit from their labours by dealing with other merchants.[31]

Table 1 *
PURCHASES FROM GROWERS

Pipes	1-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	Over 40	Total (Growers)	Total (Pipes)
1812	26	14	3	4	3	51	851
1813	6	4	3	2	3	18	507
1814	12	5	8	—	7	32	862
1815	24	7	7	4	4	46	871

(*) From Offley Waste Books and Journals, OA.

[29] Stuart to Wellesley, 16 Sept. 1811, FO 63/113, PRO; JOSE BAPTISTA BARREIROS, *Ensāio de Biografia do Conde da Barca* (Braga, 1959), 94.

[30] O. to Offley Brothers, Forrester, 15 Feb. 1815, 27 June 1815, and other correspondence in this file, OA 21.

[31] See BENNETT, "Port Wine System", 231, and Table I.

Another British firm, George Sandeman, provides roughly similar information for 1814 and 1815. Their resident agent stepped into the competition for wines in 1814, discovering at the annual fair that the purchase of the best wines required higher prices than anticipated. Many rival agents, he noted, had to accept inferior wines to meet their requirements. Some winegrowers resolutely set the prices they wanted, holding to them well beyond the time of the fair until still-searching agents finally concluded purchases. The competition in 1815 generally repeated the pattern of 1814.[32]

The amount of port wine reaching Britain during the war years is another indication of the struggles of winegrowers and merchants to surmount the economic dislocations of their era. British demand for port wine remained strong through 1811, then declined because of accumulation of supplies — some of them of doubtful character — and rising prices. The officially approved annual vintage totals for port wine suitable for shipment to England for the years from 1781 through 1806 averaged slightly over 52,590 pipes. The annual average total for 1807 through 1815 was over 52,917 pipes. Exports to Britain from 1781 through 1806 had averaged over 36,950 pipes. Exports from 1807 through 1815 dropped to an average of about 31,940 pipes. The high for the years under review, 50,310 pipes, came in 1807, with exports for the remaining war period, except for 1809 and 1810, falling below the pre-war average. Since the winegrowers had new war-time sources for sales — discussed shortly — the export figures, despite the lesser totals, probably were not a major negative factor to growers.[33]

A clear indication of the intense market competition for wines was the resurfacing of the normal friction existing be-

[32] Sandeman information drawn from Porto agent letters to Sandeman, Gooden, & Foster in Letterbook, 1814-1817, Sandeman Archives, Vila Nova de Gaia.

[33] Table II; WARRE, *Letters, 25; Considerações Fundadas em Factos sobre a extinção da Companhia do Porto* (Rio de Janeiro, 1812), 22; *Continuação da relação dos factos pela commissão dos commerciantes de vinhos, em Londres...* (Lisboa, 1813), 26.

Table 2 *
WINE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT, 1807-1815

Production		Exports	
1807	54,707	50,310	54,718
1808	56,524	35,916	40,207
1809	38,633	42,436	44,549
1810	36,250	40,498	42,149
1811	42,663	18,378	24,189
1812	55,913	22,647	23,822
1813	64,731	21,154	25,161
1814	70,143	24,452	28,668
1815	56,691	31,670	37,740

(*) From Conceição Martins [direcção e prefácio de Antonio Barreto], *Memória do Vinho do Porto* (Lisboa, 1990), 201, 220; Bennett, "Port Wine System", 244-45.

tween British merchants and the officials of the Wine Company. The Porto British community, for example, petitioned its home government in November 1811 about the alleged failure of the company to meet existing treaty stipulations.[34] The Duke of Wellington added his weighty opinion to the arguments by asserting that the Wine Company was collecting excess profits from war-provided opportunities. The company, nonetheless, continued in operation and, despite strong official British protests, had its charter renewed for an additional twenty years in 1815.[35]

How did individual winegrowers fit into this general commercial pattern? It appears that war-year vineyard operations, apart from the brief periods when French troops were present, basically were similar to those of more normal times. The Wine Company, with its important financial contributions to the harassed Portuguese state made even more vital by war-time

[34] Chetwynd to Hamilton, 23 Sept. 1811, 9 Nov. 1811, both with enclosures, FO 63/121, PRO.

[35] Wellington to Stuart, 31 March 1811, 13 April 1813, in Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, ed., *The Dispatches of Field Marshall the Duke of Wellington, during his Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818* (London, 1838), VII, 421, 463.

conditions, continued its dominating wine country role. Wine-growers with company ties maintained their favourable position, at the expense of other growers, by sales to merchants paying prices over the established limit. Past abuses stemming from the company's misuse of its extensive powers persisted, and new ones appeared because of the changed circumstances brought by the French and British presence. Busy Wine Company activity naturally meant that some Douro growers lost opportunities for profit. The war gave the company several new lucrative business lines, particularly from the stimulating of internal demand to supply the alcoholic beverage requirements of British and other troops.[36] The Wine Company, as mentioned previously, also had difficulty at times in filling the demands of customers in its monopoly selling-zone in and around Porto and in the Douro region. Some irritated growers claimed that the organization abused its privileged status to force growers to sell their produce to the company at lower prices than those offered by the competing merchants. The Wine Company, additionally, could force vignerons to live by the letter of the law and accept half of any payment for wines in government paper. Such notes then passed at up to a 30% discount. Private merchants, avidly seeking wines, were forced by growers to offer only specie. All such complaints predated the war era.[37]

The inhabitants of the wine country, while participating in the busy activities just described, additionally, as the agricultural year passed through its usual intervals, encountered a host of other events potentially upsetting to their normal routine. Again, to determine their influences, we must adopt the earlier-cited Harrison approach. Episodes of daily life are especially

[36] *Review of the Discussions Relating to the Wine-Company*, 10; Wellington to Casamayor, 19 April 1814, FO 179/15, PRO.

[37] M.J.M.C.E.P. et al., *Primeiros Ensaios, 80-1*. A good source for complaints against the Wine Company is Antonio Lobo de Barbosa Ferreira Teixeira Gyrão, *Memoria histórica e analytica sobre a companhia dos vinhos denominada da agricultura das vinhas do alto Douro* (Lisboa, 1833).

difficult to portray because they mostly reflect the interactions between ordinary citizens and the men of the lower ranks — the so-called "lesser men"[38] of the British and French armies. Thus we will utilize pertinent information largely drawn from the memoirs and correspondence of military men active along the Douro, buttressing this data, when possible, with occurances occurring in other parts of Portugal which hopefully mirror wine country reality.

The obligation for military service by Portuguese males must have caused at least occasional problems for growers. In addition to the regular army — often recruited through use of force — Portugal depended for defence on local militia, with all males between eighteen and forty liable for service. When required, a levy en masse, the *ordenança*, was summoned. It comprised all able males between the ages of sixteen and sixty, under the command of their local aristocracy, and carrying whatever weapons they possessed.[39] Both militia and *ordenança* from the Douro region experienced only limited participation in hostilities, returning to their normal activities once intruding Frenchmen left their region. Involvement during periods of the year when vineyard tasks needed completion certainly was a threat to winegrowers. Fortunately, for the port-wine producers, direct military incursions into their region did not happen during grape-harvesting seasons. The many tasks of vineyard upkeep occurring during other seasons naturally did suffer, but more specific records are needed to adequately measure this impact.[40]

[38] A.F. Mockler-Ferryman, *The Life of a Regimental Officer during the Great War, 1793-1815* (Edinburgh, 1913), vi.

[39] José Maria Amado Mendes, *Trás-os-montes nos fins do século XVII segundo um manuscrito de 1796* (Coimbra, 1981), 49-52; Andrew Halliday, *The Present State of Portugal, and of the Portuguese Army* (Edinburgh, 1812), 204-08. For an example of forced recruiting, *An Ensign in the Peninsular War: the Letters of John Aitchison* [ed. by W.F.K. Thompson] (London, 1981), 59.

[40] For invasion times, see above; for vineyard tasks: Visconde de Villa Maior, "Ampelographia e Oenologia do Douro," *O Archivio Rural, 8 (1865-66), 87-9, 534-35.*

Men in the ranks often solved such needs in their own way. When military actions in bordering regions, as during the 1810 invasion of central Portugal, required militia duty, individuals apparently deserted their positions when necessary.[41] An additional labour — related factor potentially influenced by wartime pressures was the extensive utilization of workers from Galizia for harvesting and other tasks. Their normal number in northern Portugal during this era was estimated at 12,000 individuals. When hostilities occurred between Spain, France, and Portugal in 1801, the Portuguese government issued a proclamation requiring all Spaniards to return home. The quickly — realized result of any actual enforcement of the decree led to its repeal three weeks later. It appears that the workers, during the later French invasions, were left free, if personal circumstances permitted, to perform their Douro tasks.[42]

An almost permanent disruptive factor for the wine country's peoples was the presence of varying numbers of soldiers. The Douro valley's proximity to major theatres of combat made it an important location for basing supplies and quartering of troops. The towns of Lamego and São João de Pesqueira, especially, were in constant use. Lamego, in addition, housed a hospital station.[43] Other groups of soldiers, both Portuguese and foreign, frequently were advancing or retreating to various

[41] Stuart to Wellesley, 7 July 1810, FO 63/91, PRO; OMAN, *Peninsular War*, IV, 6.

[42] SORIANO, *História, II*, 281-82; ROBERT SOUTHEY [ed. by ADOLFO CABRAL], *Journals of a Residence in Portugal, 1800-1801, and a visit to France, 1838, Supplemented by Extracts from his Correspondence* (Oxford, 1960), 174.

[43] See, for example, SORIANO, *História*, II, 64; RICHARD CANNON, *Historical Record of the Ninth, or the East Norfolk, Regiment of Foot* (London, 1848), 60, 63, and *Historical Record of the Seventh Regiment, or the Royal Fusiliers* (London, 1842), 73. For the hospital, [P.W. BUCKHAM], *Personal Narrative of Adventures in the Peninsula during the War in 1812-1813: by an Officer Late in the Staff Corps Regiment of Cavalry* (London, 1827), 51; FRANCISCO SARAIVA COURAÇA e JERONIMO DE MACEDO TAVARES, "Relação das Molestias que grassarão n'este Hospital Militar de Lamego durante o mez de Setembro de 1813," *Jornal de Coimbra, 6* (1814), 262, and following issues.

locations.[44] The presence of the soldiers, whatever its duration, naturally entailed intimate, daily contact with local inhabitants, the male intruders inserting a major source of potential instability into any neighbourhood. "No country", Wellington laconically commented, "can enjoy the advantage of a large army to defend it, without suffering some inconvenience".[45]

Specific causes of friction between the wine-country inhabitants and their visitors often encompassed disputes concerning women, foodstuffs, wine, transport, and lodging. And, behind much of the friction, were the very different cultural attitudes separating Portuguese and Britons. Many Britons were not used to living in very poor rural regions, nor to what they perceived as a Portuguese over-tolerance for accumulations of refuse.[46] Resolution of such problems normally was not easy, most of the Britons lacking, at least initially, any knowledge of the Portuguese language. Many individuals never did make much effort to understand a differing society. As one solider over — optimistically observed: "twenty words of Portuguese were sufficient to enable one to pass comfortably through the country".[47] Others simply shrugged such matters off as the inevitable accompaniment of a Roman Catholic — dominated country, Portugal turning out, one soldier observed, "like most countries where bigotry and superstition prevail".[48] The attitude permeated all

[44] N. Ludlow Beamish, *History of the King's German Legion* (London, 1832), I, 173, 364; C.R.B. Knight, *Historical Records of the Buffs... 1704-1914: Part I* (1704-1814) (London, 1935), 296-97. For activities by Portuguese soldiers, Volgmann [sic], "Wanderungen durch Spanien und Portugal in Gefolge der Francosischen Armeen," *Minerva,* 3 (1815), 232-33.

[45] Wellington to Stuart, 21 March 1812, Gurwood, *Despatches of Wellington,* VIII, 4.

[46] See, for one example, Joseph Donaldson, *Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier* (Philadelphia, 1845), 185.

[47] Harry Ross-Lewin, *With "The Thirty-Second" in the Peninsula and other Campaigns* (Dublin, 1904), 113.

[48] John Blakiston, *Twelve Years' of Military Adventure in Three Quarters of the Globe* (London, 1829), II, 146. See also the aptly titled volume by Walter Bromley, *The Distressed and Destitute State of the Inhabitants of Spain and Portugal, Respecting Moral and Religious Instruction,* 2nd ed. (London, 1813), especially 231. The

ranks. Wellington lamented that our "Officers are too much disposed to treat with contempt all foreigners", with General Thomas Picton proving the charge with his 1810 castigation that "this country in every political and civil consideration is, without contestation, one of the most miserable in the world".[49] Not surprisingly, the Portuguese met such attitudes with a similar disdain. One individual at Coimbra in 1810 compared the two powers contesting in his country: "you English are likewise rascals, and not better Christians than the French; you may all of you go to the devil together".[50]

Relations between Britons and Portuguese, however, often were not always as charged as these attitudes might suggest. There was normally a great difference between the treatment of the Portuguese by the two contending foreign armies. The French attempted to follow their usual technique of living off of the resources of the invaded country.[51] Only the minimal presence of the French in the wine country spared its inhabitants the massive hardships suffered in other, less fortunate, Portuguese regions. The British, organized in a very different fashion, worked to create an efficient system for providing their forces with food, drink, medical care, and other necessities of campaign life. But the system frequently did not work, or, if it did, the necessities delivered were normally inadequate to satisfy soldiers facing the hardships imposed upon men serving during all seasons in environments habitually possessing very limited re-

British attitude corresponds to the thoughts of PETER BURKE: see *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1978), 8-9.

[49] Wellington to Peacocke, 8 Oct. 1811, GURWOOD *Dispatches of Wellington*, VIII, 327; FREDERICK MYATT, *Peninsular General: sir Thomas Picton* 1758-1815 (N. Pomfret, 1980), 81. The attitude also corrisponds to the "lenda negra" described by CASTELO BANCO CHAVES, ed., *O Portugal de João V. Visto por tres Furasteiros* (Lisboa, 1983), p. 9.

[50] *The Adventures of a Young Rifleman, in the French and English Armies, during the war in Spain and Portugal, from 1806 to 1816 (Written by Himself).* (Philadelphia, 1826), 177.

[51] FOY, *History of the War*, I, 42-5; *Mémoires de colonel Delagrave: Campagne de Portugal (1810-1811)* [ed. by EDOUARD GACHOT] (Paris, 1902), 60-1.

sources. When arriving in a new neighbourhood soldiers pursued regular plundering patterns for securing the chickens, pigs, etc. necessary for filling cooking pots. Pots also required firewood, while the construction of shelters for passing men placed further demands upon that scarce item. Valued olive and other trees were cut down, while wooden parts of churches and houses inevitably disappeared. One officer, for example, wintering in São João de Pesqueira, and describing it as "by far the coldest country I ever saw", was much tempted to "spoil" his assigned residence to keep warm.[52] "A soldier must not be too nice", a British member of the constitutionalist ranks of the 1830s later concluded about plundering, admitting that "the temptations were too much for us poor men".[53] The normal lack of discipline among sorely pressed soldiers was heightened greatly by the temptations coming from campaigning in a wine-producing country. Robbery, and murder, ensued. Intoxicated men, complained Wellington, "commit[ted] every description of outrage [because] no soldier can withstand the temptation of wine".[54]

Initial contacts between Portuguese and Britons often were most satisfactory. The first arrivals in Moncorvo on the Douro, for example, returning from General Moore's Spanish campaign, received in 1808 an "exceedingly hospitable" reception.[55] But,

[52] JOHN SPENCER COOPER, *Rough Notes of Seven Campaigns in Portugal, Spain, France and America* (London, 1869), 8-9 (for a Braga episode; this volume offers an excellent account of the brutal conditions of army life); WILLIAM GRANVILLE ELIOT, *A Treatise on the Defence of Portugal,* 2nd ed. (London, 1811), 160-64; *Memoirs of Sir Lowry Cole* [ed. by MAUD LOWRY COLE & STEPHEN GWYNN] (London, 1934), 90. For the wood scarcity of the region, W.C. v. ESCHWEGE, *Nachrichten aus Portugal und Dessen Colonien: Mineralogischen und Bergmannischen Inhaltes* (Braunschweig, 1820), 26.

[53] THOMAS KNIGHT, *The British Battalion at Oporto: with Adventures, Anecdotes, and Exploits in Holland; at Waterloo; and in the Expedition to Portugal* (London, 1834), 64-7, 77.

[54] Wellington to Liverpool, 24 Jan. 1810, GURWOOD, *Dispatches of Wellington, V,* 448. The French had similar problems: ILLENS, *Souvenirs,* 16.

[55] THOMAS BUNBURY, *Reminiscences of a Veteran* (London, 1861), I, 18-9; C.T. ATKINSON, "A Light Dragoon in the Peninsula: Extracts from the Letters of Captain

when soldiers stayed on for longer periods, local attitudes altered. "Hospitality is a virtue which I am sure never survived above one campaign," concluded one soldier.[56] "The Portuguese," a Douro — stationed Briton unsurprisingly noted, after mistakenly being set upon by a Lamego mob and delivered unharmed to his commanding officer, "are particularly jealous of their females".[57] A São João de Pesqueira visitor, who later fondly reminisced about "the first exilarating touch of Old Lamego [wine]" became involved in disorder following celebrations mixing music, alcohol and women. The quarrels could be fatal, one 1813 Lamego episode ending with the killing of a soldier. When the municipal authorities did not punish the claimed offender, tensions further increased.[58] The British authorities did attempt to mitigate the troubles through applying to soldiers the customary harsh punishments. Flogging was the usual sentence, although a few guilty individuals were hanged. The friction never ceased, however, the soldiers, out of necessity or choice, continuing their plundering and disorderly behaviour. Even when caught, they did not consider themselves guilty of poor conduct, one soldier in 1813 asserting about a flogging that "most of us thought this punishment rather severe".[59]

Even when wine and women – related strife was absent, there were many other issues needing resolution. The British army required additional food supplies for men and horses, plus carts and oxen for hauling war materials. When local citizens resisted compliance, the British attempted to utilize the civil administrative structure of their ally, but even then farmers demonstrated "the greatest repugnance" to such requisitions, forcing

Lovell Badcock, 14th Light Dragoons, 1809-1814," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 34 (1956), 160.

[56] Blakiston, *Military Adventure*, 148.

[57] Bunbury, *Reminiscences*, 20-1.

[58] Richard D. Henegan, *Seven Years' Campaigning in the Peninsula and in the Netherlands; from 1808 to 1815* (London, 1846), I, 57; John Harley, *The Veteran, or Forty Years in the British Service: Comprising Adventures in Egypt, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, and Prussia* (London, 1838), II, 72, 76.

magistrates to proceed with "the greatest violence".[60] When problems arose at Alijo in 1813 Wellington instructed an officer "to employ armed parties to protect his foragers" and to call on local officials to assist by joining "in repressing the disposition of the people in that part of the country to oppose the military".[61] The magistrates, at times, cooperated, but, usually lacking the requisite power for enforcing orders, they often attempted to make the British act on their own. One official, for example, when asked to provide carts for transporting wounded British soldiers to Lisbon, simply countered that his compatriots would not obey him, suggesting that the British themselves sieze both carts and drivers. The soldiers often made relations even more tense in such situations by manipulating their controls over hapless Portuguese to bring personal profit.[62] And, when magistrates did bow to British urgings, new complaints followed. In 1811 in Lamego, for instance, inhabitants protested that their officials complied "by forcing the poor to supply their carts, and by totally exempting the rich from supplying theirs".[63]

Serious issues for the local residents were involved in such matters. Residents could profit from selling property to the British. Traditional fairs, for instance, were visited by purchasing officers seeking cattle or carts.[64] But many owners had no wish to transact business with the soldiers: oxen and carts, and

[59] WILLIAM GRAHAM, *Travels through Portugal and Spain, during the Peninsular War* (London, 1820), 29; COOPER, *Seven Campaigns*, 37f.

[60] Araujo to Wellington, 28 April 1810, Wellington to Stuart, 1 May 1810, both in Stuart to Wellesley, 12 May 1810, FO 63/90, PRO.

[61] Wellington to Beresford, 2 Feb. 1813, GURWOOD, *Dispatches of Wellington, X*, 73.

[62] *A British Rifleman: the Journals and Correspondence of Major George Simmons, Rifle Brigade, during the Peninsular War and the Campaign of Waterloo* [ed. by WILLOUGHBY VERNER] (London, 1899), 84-5; C.W.C. OMAN, *Wellington's Army, 1809-1814* (New York, c. 1912), 247.

[63] Wellington to Stuart, 12 Sept. 1811, GURWOOD, *Dispatches of Wellington*, VIII, 278.

[64] BUCKHAM, *Narrative of Adventures*, 135, 148.

especially the former, were vital to the daily tasks of the community. The British did offer payment for items taken, but this was of little use when replacement oxen were not available.[65] River transport caused similar problems. Douro craft, the only means of transporting wines to Porto, were in short supply, the demands for their use made more acute by war-related losses.[66] The British admitted that seizing boats was "a cruel necessity", but they still took them. Some hostile episodes occurred on the Douro, probably because of such tensions.[67] And, as the war dragged on, an additional complication increased regional resistance. The British did offer payment for goods and animals taken, but a persisting shortage of hard currency forced them to offer promisory notes. The paper was of little practical use for isolated rural Portuguese. In addition, a high depreciation rate for government – issued paper was a Portuguese fact of life. Thus, regularly, when local citizens learned that an oxen search was planned, all animals often quickly disappeared.[68]

One major British Douro River project much augmented the demands upon the region's inhabitants. In 1811 Wellington decided to transport his army's badly-wanted seige train from Porto up river to the vicinity of Lamego, and then overland to the campaign scene. From July through September hundreds of boats, carts, and pairs of oxen successfully carried the materials to a base near Lamego. Wellington, stimulated by the possibility of an increased utilization of the river to meet army requirements, planned opening the Douro for effective transport as far as the Spanish border. After reading Portuguese and British surveys, he concluded the task could be accomplished "with very

[65] GRAHAM, *Travels through Portugal*, 41 (for a Braga episode).

[66] FOY, *History of the War, II*, 442 (for an episode near Moncorvo).

[67] HENEGAN, *Seven years' Campaigning*, I, 20, 83, 86.

[68] BUCKHAM, *Narrative of Adventures*, 134-36; J.W. FORTESCUE, *A History of the British Army* (London, 1912), VII, 196. For losses on Portuguese paper: *Recordaçoens de Jacome Ratton sobre occurencias do seu tempo em Portugal, durante o lapso de sesenta e tres annos e meio, alias de Maio de 1747 a setembro de 1810* (Lisboa, 1813), 135.

little trouble, and... ordered the necessary work to be performed." With Portuguese participation, gained with the usual friction, natural and human obstacles were cleared from the river. It was usable, when water levels permitted, for military transport, but Douro boatmen, well aware of the dangers of passing through unfamiliar waters, resisted British requisitions.[69]

Still other difficulties emerged between Portuguese and Britons. Local residents, their normal paucity of resources made more acute by war-caused shortages, at times longingly observed the more abundant property of their military neighbors. Troops were quartered in Douro valley localities because the possibility of more or less secure river transport made supplying them easier.[70] The residents, often hard-pressed for food because of the soldiers' presence, as at São João de Pesqueira during the poor agricultural year of 1812,[71], probably reacted similarly to the people of another northern location at the lifestyle of their allies. "They certainly stared," commented a bemused Briton, "to see us eat beef, pork, etc., in such quantities, and drink wine so freely".[72] There were food-related quarrels at nearby Celerico in 1814, for example.[73] At São João de Pesqueira and elsewhere, where the British stored ammunition, there were similar "bad feelings," with minor quarrels following a refusal for sharing the stores with local farmers.[74]

[69] Wellington to Stuart, 28 Nov. 1811, GURWOOD, *Dispatches of Wellington*, VIII, 429 & ff. ARTUR TEODORO DE MATOS, *Transportes e comunicações em Portugal, Açores e Madeira* (1750-1850) (Ponta Delgada, 1980), 263-72, 519-28, has relevant information on the project. For problems with boatmen, NAPIER, *History of the War*, IV, 19.

[70] See, for example, L.I. COWPER, ed., *The King's Own: the Story of a Regiment* (Oxford, 1939), 393; FORTESCUE, *British Army*, VIII, 423.

[71] *Memoirs of Cole*, 90-1; *Correio Braziliense. ou armazem literario*, 8 (1812), 564.

[72] *Journals of Simmons*, 50-1. For normal early nineteenth century rural diets, JOÃO DE ANDRADE CORVO, *Relatorio e projecto de Lei sobre o commercio dos cereas...* (Lisboa, 1864), 19f.

[73] Casamayor to Forjaz, 9 Nov. 1814, with enclosure, FO 179/15, PRO.

[74] HENEGAN, *Seven Years' Campaigning*, 57.

Finally, when judging the war's impact upon Douro vignerons and their neighbors, it seems probable that both economic and physical suffering was minimal. Contemporary authors, and later commentators, mention damage to vineyards, but specific detail is lacking.[75] Visitors to the wine country certainly did not notice any fundamental war-related problems.[76] The sales of wines to British merchants did decline, yet other compensating outlets for production were found among Portuguese buyers. Additional amounts were bought for soldier consumption. The correspondence of the Sandeman and Offley agents for 1814 and subsequent years clearly portray a wine region following normal patterns of growth and sales.[77] Individual winegrowers certainly had widely varying reactions to the many factors influencing their lives between 1807 and 1815, but the answers to those questions await resolution. For winegrowers as a group the war years appear as but one more variation in their endless struggle to win a living from the production and sale of their wines.

[75] GEORGE LANDMANN, *Historical, Military, and Picturesque Observations on Portugal* (London, 1818), II, 253; SARAH BRADFORD, *The Englishman's Wine: the Story of Port* (London, 1969), 71.

[76] *Journal de lieutenant Woodberry: campaign de Portugal et d'Espagne, de France, de Belgique et de France (1813-1815)* [trans. by Georges Helie] (Paris, 1896), 67; BUCKHAM, *Narrative of Adventures*, 187-95.

[77] The standard surveys of Douro quintas probably reflect the lack of war damage by their silence regarding the topic: MANUEL MONTEIRO, *O Douro: Principaes quintas, Navegação, Culturas, paisagens e Costumes* (Porto, 1911); VISCONDE DE VILLA MAIOR, *O Douro illustrado: album do Rio Douro e Paiz Vinhateiro* (Porto, 1876).