

Origins and Perspectives of the Humanitarian Corridors' Programme - Just a Matter of Economic Sustainability?

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ABSTRACT

As the Humanitarian Corridors' programme is gaining more attention in the international debate, this article goes back to its onset through original documentation. An in-depth analysis of its first memoranda of understanding will help to shed light on how everything started and how a pilot project became one of the most viable solutions prompted by the EU to the so-called migration crises. After retracing the origins of this initiative through a historical approach, the present contribution offers finally a reflection about possible developments of Humanitarian Corridors in international politics, both at a European level and in a wider sense.

The 2010s context

In the years 2010s, after the European Commission announced the launching of a joint programme (European Commission [EC], 2009), resettlement was proposed as the main policy instrument to tackle the issue of refugees in the EU, even though as of today, it doesn't seem a successful solution. Its partial failure is shown both by the exiguous numbers of people resettled, as well as by the cold welcoming by Member States and it is evident especially after the political developments of recent years.

The so-called 2015 European migrant crisis, although representing a crucial moment for European institutions, did not produce a substantial shift in terms of migration policies, which are

increasingly devoted to filtering and containing flows, to repatriation and to the annihilation of migratory autonomy, through tools that have little to do with a democratic system. As economic and security considerations prevail, so is the attention on migration categories and their restrictive interpretation, which often makes it difficult to speak out about mobility as one of the possible policy tools to be used: i.e. mobility becomes a problem, while the lack of legal spaces where to move seems to get no attention at all.

Probably, the most significant political result of the aforementioned crisis is the European Agenda on Migration, which was drawn up by the EC in 2015. The Agenda formally encourages States to increase the possibilities of legal entry activating new channels and it aims at the creation of a new policy on legal migration, but the fight against illegal migration still remains its most implemented aspect. In fact, the Agenda proposes to triple “the capacities and assets for the Frontex joint operations Triton and Poseidon” and the most relevant new policy has been the creation of hotspots in Greece and Italy (EC, 2015).

A hostile political climate, as well as xenophobia and electoral needs, have focused attention and resources on security and paralyzed any attempt in other directions, leaving asylum application as almost the only possible channel of legal entry in Europe. Besides, restricting the category of refugees gives States the opportunity to easily reject all other persons, thus qualifying them as economic migrants.

But the 2015 crisis and the European Agenda for Migration seem also to have opened a gap for the exploration of several programmes for refugees, in which a central role is played by civil society (see: European Migration Network [EMN], 2016).

Initiatives based on mobility have thus started to appear on the political scenario, after years when international migrations were presented as a negative phenomenon that needed to be discouraged (see: Collett, Clewett, & Fratzke, 2016).

Despite their impact on European policies remains limited, all these new programmes for refugees are part of a broader process of expansion that the neoliberal system of governance of migration is

experiencing at a global level (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009). In this context, the idea of sponsorship begun gaining relevance (see: European Resettlement Network [ERN], 2017).

In September 2016, one year after the European Agenda, the General Assembly of the United Nations [UNGA] adopted a Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, which aimed at “expanding the number and range of legal pathways available for refugees to be admitted to or resettled in third countries” (UNGA, 2016).

To this end, UNGA proposed to take into consideration several instruments, which could lead to the expansion of existing humanitarian admission programmes, possible temporary evacuation programmes – including evacuation for medical reasons – flexible arrangements to assist family reunification, private sponsorship for individual refugees and opportunities for labour mobility for refugees, including private sector partnerships, and scholarships and student visas for education (UNGA, 2016).

Concerning humanitarian admission programmes in the EU, “Germany has taken the lead in developing such alternative admission programmes, providing in 2013 and 2014, 35.000 places within the framework of Humanitarian Admission, a process through which countries admit groups of refugees from third countries who are eligible to temporary protection on humanitarian grounds” (ERN, 2017).

Anyway, a wider strategy would be required to make also the other UN-mentioned channels grow, as “Partnerships between governments, international organizations and civil society are indispensable to expand and develop such pathways” (ERN, 2017).

All these initiatives are therefore leading to the enlargement of the world migration global governance, but, at the same time, they are saving human lives while opening new routes for legal migration towards Europe. No coincidence then if the most important programme of humanitarian admission started in the same 2015, when the need for a change in the European migration regime emerged probably stronger than ever, and the first memorandum of understanding was signed for the opening of Humanitarian Corridors to-

wards Italy and, in perspective, Europe. Despite their quite recent creation, there is already a considerable literature on Humanitarian Corridors which allows us to make a selection among the most significant works (Barone, 2018; Bianchini, 2021; Colmayer & Signorini, 2017; Confronti & Idos, 2020; Gatta, 2020; Gerli, 2022; Impagliazzo, 2018; Marazziti, 2019; Marazziti, 2023; Marino, 2019; Morozzo della Rocca P., 2017; Morozzo della Rocca R., 2023; Naso, 2019; Ricci, 2020; Rolando, 2018; Sangiorgi, 2017; Sossai, 2017; Trotta, 2017). Humanitarian Corridors received all this attention probably because they opened an unexplored path in Europe: new programmes are consequently gaining more space, such as for example University Corridors for Refugees, which follow in the footsteps of Humanitarian Corridors.

The memoranda of understanding of the Humanitarian Corridors' programme

At the end of 2015, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Italian authorities and some private organizations. The declared aim of the project was to avoid further deaths at sea by facilitating the legal and safe arrival in Italy of potential beneficiaries of international protection, especially the most vulnerable subjects (Memorandum, 2015).

Since the very beginning of the document, the initiative doesn't appear as something separated, but rather consistent with the EU frame: the memorandum begins with a quote of the special meeting of the European Council held on April, 23rd of the same year, where the following declaration was adopted:

The situation in the Mediterranean is a tragedy. The European Union will mobilize all efforts at its disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human emergency that we face, in cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. Our immediate priority is to prevent more people from dying at sea (European Council, 2015)

The document then makes a further reference to the EU, citing the Resolution approved by the European Parliament a few days after the Council meeting, which invited the member States to make full use of the existing possibilities for issuing humanitarian visas at their embassies and consular offices; it also points out, in this connection, that the Council should seriously consider the possibility of triggering the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive or Article 78(3) of the TFEU, both of which foresee a solidarity mechanism in the event of mass and sudden inflows of displaced persons (European Parliament, 2015)

Despite the abovementioned references, the legal basis of the project is rather identified in article 25 of Regulation (EC) no. 810/2009 of July, 13th 2009 by the same memorandum (Memorandum, 2015). The abovementioned article 25 refers to article 5 of the 2006 EC Regulation number 562 – the Schengen Border Code – now replaced by article 6 of the EU-Regulation number 399 of March, 9th 2016.

This provision, related to the crossing of borders, regards the possibility of issuing entry visas with limited territorial validity “on humanitarian grounds, for reasons of national interest or because of international obligations”, notwithstanding the entry conditions of the Schengen Borders Code.

The protocol is thus giving a wider interpretation of this discipline, but at the same time it maintains consistency against Parliament’s suggestion. In this way, the initiative can be ascribed to the European legislative framework while pushing for its reform.

The Humanitarian Corridors programme can thus have strong consequences on the European migration regime, because the implementation of an autonomous response by private entities implicitly highlights the dysfunctionalities that lie behind the Schengen system.

The protocol seems confident about the creation of new legal pathways of entry into the EU. In fact, the agreement reminds that in May 2015 the EC accepted the requests coming from the Parliament and the Council, as it elaborated a European Agenda on Mi-

gration that “responds to the need for a swift and determined action in response to the human tragedy in the whole of the Mediterranean”. Concerning resettlement, the memorandum remembers that the aforementioned Agenda invited Member States to “use to the full the other legal avenues available to persons in need of protection, including private/non-governmental sponsorships and humanitarian permits, and family reunification clauses” (EC, 2015). An additional memorandum of understanding was then signed in January 2017, which provided for granting one thousand visas for as many Syrian refugees from the camps in Lebanon.

In both protocols, the promoting organizations commit to take full charge of the project in all its phases and, precisely in consideration of this, the two programmes would be totally self-financed, not entailing any burden on the Italian State. They both went through renovation: the first one was renewed on November, 7th 2017 for one thousand additional visas for refugees from Lebanon and Morocco; while the second one was signed again on May, 3rd 2019 for six hundred additional visas for refugees from Ethiopia, Niger and Jordan (Memorandum, 2015; Memorandum, 2017).

The first of the two documents – which it’s more extended than the other – specifies that States (i.e. Morocco and Lebanon) are chosen both for their characteristic of transit countries and for the presence on the territory of realities already engaged in supporting refugees. In any case, the people admitted to the project are not citizens of the chosen countries, but they arrived there with the intention of continuing their journey towards Europe (Memorandum, 2015).

The same first document that was renewed in November 2017 also refers to the EC Recommendation of September, 27th 2017, regarding the enhancement of the legal pathways for persons in need of international protection (EC, 2017b). It recalls this Recommendation, reminding that the EC called on Member States to join the new EU resettlement scheme which would bring at least 50,000 of the most vulnerable people in need of international protection to Europe over the next two years.

In this context, the EC encouraged Member States to set up private sponsorship mechanisms, in order to allow groups and organizations to plan and finance resettlements, in accordance with national legislation. To that end, the EC invited Easo, the European Asylum Support Office, to coordinate a pilot project on private advocacy mechanisms (EC, 2017a).

Two years after the stipulation of the first memorandum on Humanitarian Corridors, the EU Agency's Board of Directors – composed of representatives of EU member states, the EC, and UNHCR – was thus beginning to actually test a new European policy.

As the first memorandum states, the inception of a new European approach on migration is possible because the magnitude of the flows of displaced people towards Europe requires new forms of reception and international protection for particularly vulnerable people. Regarding international protection, the protocol affirms that European and national regulatory frameworks already provide some tools that offer adequate a legal base to support the project, but that this does not exempt the entire legal system from the need to evolve responding to the size and importance of the ongoing historical process.

An entry visa with Limited Territorial Validity is issued for the only purpose of allowing entry into Italy in a legal way and under conditions of personal security. The proposing associations must deal with the subsequent phase of hospitality and reception, including assistance in carrying out necessary administrative activities, as well as the request for international protection that needs to be forwarded to competent national bodies. Furthermore, the provisions of the protocol provide for those association to deal with the strengthening of social and cultural integration paths – as well as the acquisition of linguistic, working and social skills – with the aim of promoting stabilization in Italy of the people included in the project and excluding voluntary secondary movements (Memorandum, 2015; Memorandum, 2017a).

An essential condition for the success of the initiative is to ensure that the beneficiaries will remain in Italy, i.e. without accessing the

rest of the free movement area and thus compromising the use of the tool of Limited Territorial Validity visas.

Regarding the cases of individuals in need of protection, the issuance of a visa is an instrumental measure with respect to three different solutions: resettlement, sponsorship, or humanitarian admission. Where legislation provides for the need for a visa, the State of destination could – and sometimes did – still allow entry, as an exception to this obligation (Morozzo della Rocca P., 2017, pp. 20-21).

Due to their intrinsic characteristics, the protocols are placed in a complementary and distinct way with respect to the ‘Resettlement’ project indicated among the Immediate Actions of the European Agenda on Migration (Memorandum, 2015).

Indeed, Humanitarian Corridors – like resettlement- intend to allow legal access to Europe for subjects in clear need for international protection. This means a broad category of people, which also includes people who can be recognized as refugees by UNHCR.

However, unlike Resettlement, Humanitarian Corridors propose to take also into consideration specific individual situations. This is the case of persons that, due to their particularly vulnerable conditions, would be easily victims of trafficking or would have no possibility of reaching Europe, even if they do not fall within the categories envisaged by the Geneva Convention (Memorandum, 2015).

One of the main criticisms is that Humanitarian Corridors would restrict the ways of entry to the EU by fostering the migration selection process, rather than widening it. This is a risk concerning any legal mechanism that regards rights protection, but it depends on how the legal tool is used. Furthermore, Humanitarian Corridors are intended for people whose particularly vulnerable conditions prevent them from following the route usually taken by asylum seekers, so they are addressed to people other than those who normally apply for asylum.

The second memorandum clearly stated that Humanitarian Corridors would have gained more importance within the European

framework. Even though this protocol has no substantial innovation with respect to the others, it contains some relevant differences.

The document begins by stating that migration entails the need to identify alternative legal pathways for people in need of protection, experiencing innovative forms of reception. This is clearly a programmatic statement, which emphasizes the need for solutions based on mobility (Memorandum, 2017a). Such part could not be found in the previous protocol, which exclusively aims at identifying innovative forms of international reception and protection (Memorandum, 2015).

The second agreement also says that, due to the accumulated experience, the project is thought as a new and additional tool, capable of expanding the already available and tested pathways to legal immigration in international law. It affirms that Humanitarian Corridors represent a best practice within the EU, due to the synergy between the Italian Government and the promoting civil society organizations. As a matter of fact, the memorandum assesses the growing attention and appreciation expressed in several reports and proposals drawn up by EU bodies. Such documents focus on initiatives which aim at creating complementary legal pathways for asylum seekers and refugees with the involvement of the private sector and the civil society (Memorandum, 2017a).

Among the EU sources expressly mentioned in the document, there is above all the Communication of the EC on the implementation of the European Agenda for migration, which invites EASO to coordinate a pilot project on private sponsorship mechanisms (EC, 2017a).

The renewed version of the second Memorandum also recalls the 2018 study, carried out on behalf of the EC, on the feasibility and added value of sponsorship schemes as a possible pathway to safe channels for admission to the EU, including resettlement.

Notwithstanding the low numbers of beneficiaries compared to the overall migrant population, Humanitarian Corridors seem to open a new path for European migration policies (Impagliazzo, 2017, pp. 70-71), as this programme has spread to other Member

States in different forms. Among the earliest experiences, the most relevant is probably the French one signed on March 2017, because of the importance this country has within the European context.

The French protocol allows the arrival of 500 people from Lebanon and contains stronger references to the situation of the war in Syria than the Italian ones (Memorandum, 2017b).

As the agreement says, that conflict actually represents the trigger that has led to the implementation of the entire French project. If the strong reference to the wider political European framework is immediately clear in the Italian memoranda, the focus on European politics is not so evident in the French one.

Indeed, the French protocol clearly states from the very beginning that this action is called “Opening of humanitarian corridors”, at European level and that the aims of the project are the implementation of an innovative project of identification in the country of first asylum and solidarity reception of refugees in France. Nevertheless, the text of this protocol seems less innovative than the Italian ones. It underlines that the Humanitarian Corridors initiative is strictly related to the ongoing international situation, whereas the Italian documents aim at influencing the European political scenario with a broader perspective.

The French initiative has rather to be intended as a sort of answer to a call to action made by the international community, since its memorandum states that French authorities support the appeal of the High Commissioner for Refugees and the EU to open legal channels of access for refugees, in addition to the places offered under the resettlement programme carried out with the UNHCR (Memorandum, 2017b).

Humanitarian Corridors and the European migration regime

To a first approximation, the launching of the humanitarian corridors project constitutes a sponsorship model aimed at the resettlement of potential beneficiaries of international protection.

Precisely this potential represents one of the aspects that need to be investigated with more attention, since it undermines the idea that resettlement programmes are exclusively reserved to refugees.

The visa with Limited Territorial Validity together with the fact that Humanitarian Corridors are open both to potential holders of international protection and refugees, thus contribute to mix up mobility categories, as they underline the need for a reform of the right of asylum in Europe.

Actually, a push towards transformation – wished also by the same European Parliament with the 2016 report on the implementation of the Common European Asylum System – aims at regulating protection application already in third countries, thus providing for a protected entry into those of destination through diplomatic asylum (EP, 2016).

Nevertheless, today no change of the right of asylum – even a radical one – would realistically avoid the need to resort to ‘humanitarian enlargement’ of pathways intended for protection, or simply of channels meant for reception. Such an enlargement, however, should have a numerical consistency, since the EU proposal for a common resettlement framework doesn’t seem to work at full speed, despite its aim to get a greater adhesion by Member States compared to the current situation (Morozzo della Rocca P., 2017, p.6).

Another central aspect of the Humanitarian Corridors initiative concerns the reintroduction of the concept of sponsorship, albeit on a different basis compared to the past.

The mobilization of the promoting organizations led the EC itself to intercept this engagement in favour of solidarity. In a Communication of April, 6th 2016 about the reform of the Common European asylum system and the enhancement of legal avenues to Europe, the EC affirms that “private sponsorship, where the costs of sponsorship and settlement support for persons in need of protection can be supported by private groups or organisations, can also play an important role in multiplying the legal entry possibilities“(EC, 2016).

The sponsorship system, as provided by the Humanitarian Cor-

ridors, potentially prefigures the development of a new scheme of access through legal channels. It can also be regarded as an effective method of social integration even for categories of migrants not strictly related to the ones entitled to international protection. Although private sponsorship is among the tools that can be used for resettlement programmes, the sponsorship system can be a method of managing entry and reception also for other categories of migrants (EC, 2016).

In Italy, for example, private sponsorship had been provided for until 2002 by the *Testo unico sull'Immigrazione* [Consolidated Immigration Act], in the form of the *prestazione di garanzia* [guarantee] under article 21 (Consolidated Immigration Act, 1998).

Through this legal institute, a *garante* [guarantor] had the right to request the entry into the national territory of a foreigner residing abroad, in order to allow him to look for a job. The sponsor could be a private individual or an institution, which had to demonstrate his/her/its capability to ensure the foreigner's accommodation for the entire duration of the first annual residence permit; as well as the coverage of subsistence and health care costs.

The strong point of the idea of sponsor is clearly the central role played by social, work, and family networks, which ease the process that leads to full participation in the social and economic life of the country of immigration. For the Humanitarian Corridors case, those integration goals are easier to reach, since there is no rigid deadline, unlike most reception systems. The duration of the reception, which is expected to be at least of one year, can therefore be extended whenever it is deemed necessary to continue the empowerment process. This entails, first, lower reception costs compared to public initiatives, since the main assistance services are offered by volunteers. Secondly, a further cost containment is assured by the provision of homes on loan for solidarity purposes, both from institutions and private individuals.

All this is clearly symptomatic of a further retreat of the State from its fundamental functions in the field of social policies. On the other way round, this allows the development of a widespread re-

ception. By promoting socio-working interactions of the beneficiaries within the immigration country's context, such a kind of reception can hope to make inroads into local communities, which more than sometimes are strongly reluctant to open policies towards immigration.

The EC itself asked Member States to encourage the legal entry of migrants through private sponsorship, since it "helps to raise public awareness and support for refugees and allows for a more welcoming environment as local communities are usually involved" (EC, 2016).

While a policy for European entry quotas was proposed in the past, following the flow programming system introduced in Italy by the Martelli Law (see: Paoli, 2018, p. 159), the idea of sponsorship hasn't received until now any political elaboration at the European level, although both policies belonged to the same national legislation.

Indeed, the Canadian sponsorship system represents a benchmark in this field. This system underwent a reform in 2013, when a new model for sponsorship programmes was launched, which provides for the division of hospitality costs for twelve months, between the Canadian government and the sponsor (ERN, 2017).

In Canada there is also a loan programme for refugees which can cover the cost of medical tests, travel, and other related costs, not to mention the possibilities for universities to act as sponsors and welcome people in need, no matter if they are legally recognized as refugees or not. All this encouraged a widespread support for refugees, easing hospitality in local communities and helping to set the framework of public debate around these issues (ERN, 2017).

Looking at the Annual Reports on Immigration by the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship presented to Parliament, it seems evident that all these initiatives go against the political trend in most Western countries, and this probably helped to fuel interest in the situation of Canada by European institutions.

The launch of the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative in 2016, which aims at spreading the Canadian sponsorship model in other

countries, has maybe further assisted sponsorship initiatives in receiving so much attention from the EU ever since. This allowed Humanitarian Corridors to take a leading role among such measures: the first Humanitarian Corridors' agreement was signed in 2015, two years after the launch of the new Canadian policy and right after the announcement of the European Agenda on migration, then followed by the UNGA Declaration on Refugees and Migrants.

An international codification for humanitarian corridors?

For the promoting associations, the "Humanitarian Corridors" refers to itineraries that the beneficiaries have to follow, until they reach the place of reception and social inclusion. Among those organizations, the Community of Sant'Egidio put in place similar experiences in 1983 with Lebanon and in 1986 with Iraq, although on a smaller scale (Morozzo della Rocca R., 2023, pp. 59-64).

Although it has not been codified in international humanitarian law, the definition "Humanitarian Corridors" echoes similar strategies adopted in the international context.

In facts, the idea of creating a special protection regime for particular areas and corridors was born as early as 1870, although it is probably only around the downfall of the bipolar system that it began to take its current shape. Rarely the UN Security Council expressly referred to the concept of corridor, passage, or transit between two well-defined geographical locations. Most of the times this body indicated in general term the purpose for which the corridors were to be used. Only on some rare occasions the use of corridors was limited to the evacuation of certain groups of people (Giuffrida, 2008, pp. 152-168).

Regardless of humanitarian corridors' uncertain international legal identity, however, any humanitarian intervention can be defined as such only if it remains temporary. A protracted intervention could have negative consequences (Giuffrida, 2008, pp. 138-139).

From an historical point of view, the Humanitarian Corridors

are part of the broader process of securitization of asylum, which implies "a shift from a paradigm of refugee protection to prioritizing the protection of national security interests" (Hyndman & Mountz, 2008, p. 253).

This has happened because, over the last few decades, Western countries have introduced "an array of measures designed to prevent asylum applications from being lodged in their countries, ... governments have initiated a series of legal and political manoeuvres that de facto extend their frontiers into refugee-producing countries" (Loescher, 2001, p. 351).

For the EU, all of this has coincided with the 'outsourcing of protection', which is a double-fold process. First, it means the externalization – from a spatial point of view- towards third countries of the responsibility to protect. Secondly, from a stricter political point of view, it implies extending EU's neoliberal system of governance to a growing number of actors, outsourcing migration policies to private individuals whenever it could do so (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 791).

The idea of *burden sharing* is the underlying rhetoric of this outsourcing process, but it worked rather as *burden shifting* (Trotta, 2017, p. 6), dumping political and economic costs of reception on other actors.

Humanitarian Corridors can be framed as a pressure action aimed at changing the direction of current European policies and raising awareness among citizens at the same time, making them more favourable to the adoption of less restrictive migration policies. This push towards openness would bring to the creation of new legal entry routes, thus relieving the asylum application channel and turning it into a residual way of entry. Only the creation of legal spaces for international mobility would consent to reduce the pressure on the entry channel of the Humanitarian Corridors, should this manage to acquire a European dimension and a significant numerical consistency.

The initiative could actually strive to create new spaces for transnational mobility by favouring a less hostile political climate to

migration. This also implies savings both in terms of time and resources that could be used to support the creation of new migratory opportunities, easing pressure at the same time on the asylum way of entry into the EU, and allowing the same refugee profile to finally acquire the residual character it should have in a non-emergency context.

Lastly, while the present analysis has so far concerned Humanitarian Corridors per se, there is a potential effect that must be considered for the international community and the humanitarian sector more specifically. From an historical point of view, it seems that the idea of protected channels for transit has been acquiring a more definite shape within the international context for the last few decades. As the Humanitarian Corridors' programme is gaining more attention, the same concept of humanitarian corridors could reach an international codification in the future. They might become an effective tool in facing humanitarian crises, which the UN could activate in specific situations to relieve populations from wars or natural disasters. This trend seems to be confirmed by the recent UN Security Council Resolution on Gaza (United Nations Security Council, 2023).

Conclusions

What lies ahead, hence, seems to be a new reception strategy with a continental dimension, which grants civil society organizations an important role to play, in accordance with a neoliberal policy planning. Rather than adopting incisive measures, the European institutions are thus indirectly acknowledging the inadequacy of their own policies, further opening up their governance structure to the mobilization of the private sector.

Despite all of that, "if the fact that the humanitarian corridors might per se be seen as an "alternative" in the sense of creating privileged channels, and thus further discriminations between asylum seekers, they could at the same time, at least potentially, function as

a trigger for the improvement of the wider Italian asylum system” (Trotta, 2017, p. 24).

Compared to the resettlement model, temporary programmes of humanitarian admission (with or without the use of private sponsors) differ for the greater simplicity of procedures concerning groups of refugees to whom only a temporary authorization to stay is issued. This authorization can be renewed if the dangerous situation still exists at the expiry of the indicated term, and it can be converted into a different residence permit, for example for work or family reasons (Morozzo della Rocca P., 2017, p. 16).

Unlike the Humanitarian Corridors, resettlement policies are conceived as an instrumental measure for cooperation with countries of origin and transit, which is mostly focused on flows containment.

Resettlement policies promoted by the EU, however, have encountered a substantial failure to date. Among the causes of this unsuccessful attempt lies the incessant increase in efforts to contain migration and the attention dedicated to security issues. Within this context, private initiatives can clearly represent an alternative to be pursued, from the point of view of European institutions.

Undoubtedly, the Humanitarian Corridors constitute a model that can be more easily welcomed by Governments than strong public measures. This is both because of an economic sustainability (without any cost for the States) and a political sustainability, since the responsibility for entry and reception (at least for the first year) is fully charged to the promoting associations.

Although this initiative was regarded as a model of public mobilization in accordance with the State (Morozzo della Rocca P., 2017, p.10), it highlights the considerable failures of EU migration politics, which anyway could conversely be pushed by public opinion to adopt different policies.

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